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In February 2008, I attended a guest seminar by Asbjørn Eide at Tilburg 
University. I had just returned from a long stay at Uppsala University, Sweden, 
where I took a number of Master courses in International Law, including some 
lectures on the Saami and their rights. I also had the chance to visit a part of 
Sápmi in the North of Sweden near the mining town of Kiruna, where I 
enjoyed both the Aurora Borealis and some of the strongest coffee I ever tasted. 
 The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples had just been 
adopted and Professor Eide explained some of its core principles in an inspiring 
lecture. I asked him about the interpretation of “free, prior and informed 
consent,” of course unaware that this question would keep me occupied for six 
years to come. 
 That question resulted in a Master thesis, admittance to the Tilburg 
University Research Master program, a research proposal, and eventually a PhD 
position at the department of European and International Public Law and the 
Center for Transboundary Legal Development at Tilburg University. 
 It has been a great privilege to receive the chance to write, teach, and learn 
so much about the fascinating topics of indigenous peoples, multiculturalism and 
human rights. In contemporary conflicts over cultural recognition, land rights, 
and the earth’s remaining resources - caused by the ongoing process of 
economic globalization - the interests of all those involved need to be balanced 
carefully. The cover image of the Brokopondo Reservoir in Suriname is 
symbolic for the diversity of interests that may be at stake. In this context, 
international human rights law is challenged to contribute to more equal and 
inclusive societies. 
 Fortunately, writing a PhD is not always a solitary task, and many people 
helped me to conclude this project successfully. I would like to seize this 
opportunity to thank some of them.  
 First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Willem van 
Genugten and Anna Meijknecht. Willem, thank you for all the guidance and 
opportunities you have provided me with over the years. You assisted me with 
all the difficult choices I had to make in my academic career, and I strongly feel 
they were all the right ones. Your advice has been priceless.  Anna, our countless 
meetings have been invaluable and I enjoyed every one of them. I will never 
forget our research and teaching visits to Suriname and Ireland. Thank you for 
having so much confidence in me and always helping me out. 
 In addition, I would like to thank the other members of the reading 
committee, Asbjørn Eide, Kees Bastmeijer, Felix Ndahinda, Nico Schrijver and 
Theo van Boven, for taking the time to read and comment upon this book and 
for earlier discussions, presentations, and feedback on this topic. 
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One morning in 1997, somewhere in the vicinity of Kajapaati village Suriname, 
a group of Saramaka Maroon children were playing in the forest when they 
discovered Chinese loggers - escorted by Surinamese soldiers - felling trees and 
constructing roads, buildings, and further infrastructure needed for large-scale 
logging operations.1 The effects on the community’s traditional hunting grounds 
were devastating. One of the Saramaka eyewitnesses declared: 
 
The soldiers told me: “Leave the Chinese, go hunting here (in an 
area where the Chinese have finished cutting already). But don’t let 
the Chinese see you.” Well, I went there: there was destruction 
everywhere; the forest was destroyed. In Paramaribo people do not 
know what the Chinese are doing. Should not someone control the 
logging-activities of foreign investors? The Chinese cut hundreds of 
trees, dragged them to a place and piled them up there. They 
abandoned them in the forest because they did not need them 
anymore. For us, people from the interior, it is terrible to see cedar 
trees cut down that are so important for us. And all this destruction 
made the animals flee away also.2  
 
Dr. Richard Price, a well-known anthropologist and leading academic expert on 
the Saramaka people, declared that without immediate protective measures, 
ethnocide, which in his opinion would mean the destruction of one of the most 
creative and vibrant cultures in the entire African Diaspora, would be the most 
likely outcome. Dr. Price concluded that: “By unilateral fiat, and through the 
granting of logging and mining concessions to Chinese companies, the 
postcolonial government of Suriname is currently attempting to expunge some 
of the most sacred and venerable rights of Saramakas. In this respect, the 
destruction of the Saramakas' forest would mean the end of Saramaka culture.”3 
Head Captain and Fiscali of the Saramaka People, Wazen Eduards testified: 
 
The forest is like our market place; it is where we get our 
medicines, our medicinal plants. It is where we hunt to have meat 
                                                        
1 Cf. Price R, Rainforest Warriors, Human Rights on Trial (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2011), p. 104 and 254: Different accounts circulate of the Chinese arrival. 
2 Forest Peoples Programme, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights requests that Suriname 
suspend logging and mining concessions in Saramaka Maroon territory, Press Release, 20th August 
2002, www.forestpeoples.org. 
3 Ibid. Also see: Price R, Rainforest Warriors, Human Rights on Trial (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2011), p. 104. “If they interfered with Chinese logging operations, they were told, they 
would be arrested and imprisoned.” 
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to eat. The forest is truly our entire life. When our ancestors fled 
into the forest they did not carry anything with them. They learned 
how to live, what plants to eat, how to deal with subsistence needs 
once they got to the forest. It is our whole life.4 
 
In November 2007, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled against 
the State of Suriname in asserting that it had violated the property rights of the 
Saramaka forest people by granting logging concessions to third parties without 
the consent of the Saramakas.5 Large-scale extractive industry projects on 
indigenous peoples’ territories, often with state approval but without the consent 
or participation of the indigenous population residing there, are unfortunately 
common and are amongst the main concerns for these people.6  
I.1 Indigenous Peoples and Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
Immense energy has been invested in promulgation of the principle 
that activities affecting the lands, resources, and environments of 
indigenous peoples must be subject to full prior informed consent or 
consultation. Indigenous groups have insisted that consent is 
required; many States have insisted that consultations are all that is 
needed. The differences on the ground may often be less marked, 
given asymmetries of power and violations of the rule of law that 
often in fact occur. Nonetheless, this has been an important 
dimension of juridification of indigenous issues, and has provided 
significant leverage for them in national court proceedings, 
particularly in Latin America.7 
 
While official statistics diverge, indigenous peoples make up approximately 6% 
of the world’s population (some 370 million individuals) and encompass around 
5000 distinct peoples in over 70 countries. They represent about 80% of the 
world’s cultural diversity and their environments comprise approximately 80% of 
                                                        
4 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 82. Testimony of Head Captain and Fiscali Wazen 
Eduards during the public hearing at the Court held on May 9 and 10, 2007 (transcription of 
public hearing, pp. 3-4). 
5 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007). 
6 Numerous examples are provided throughout this study. See especially the case law discussed 
in Part V and the reports, decisions, and documents of the Human Rights Committee, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights referred to in Part IV. 
7 Kingsbury B, ‘Indigenous Peoples’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
www.mpepil.org, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 
Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 2012, paragraph 38. 
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the globe’s biological diversity.8 Indigenous peoples suffer disproportionately 
from poverty. 
 Pressing problems exist worldwide in relation to conflicts over lands and 
resources and the implications hereof on indigenous communities are profound. 
Due to the ongoing process of (economic) globalization, transnational 
corporations (TNCs) can more easily gain access to natural resources in 
developing regions with indigenous populations. Furthermore, the present 
economic situation leads to further escalation of the worldwide battle for natural 
resources, in which indigenous peoples often suffer first and worst.  
 More fundamentally, in some cases the very survival, both cultural and 
physical, of indigenous communities as distinct cultural collectives is at stake. 
Especially small, sometimes (partially) isolated communities are vulnerable and 
are amongst the first to experience the negative effects of these activities. Large-
scale projects, like mining, logging, or the building of hydroelectric dams can 
severely affect indigenous peoples’ livelihoods, ancestral territories, and their 
culture. 9 Considering the major impact these projects have on indigenous 
communities, often transforming their entire way of life, it seems reasonable that 
decisions about these projects should not be taken without the people concerned 
having a say in them.  
 For this reason, free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is devised as a tool in 
international law to give indigenous peoples the power to participate in, and 
influence the outcome of, such decisions. At first glance, the idea seems 
sufficiently clear but deeper investigation reveals that this notion is not as 
straightforward and easily applicable as it looks. Conflicting interpretations and 
lack of clarity as to its scope and content hamper effective implementation of this 
relatively new standard. The goal of this study is to reveal and analyze the 
context and content of FPIC in order to suggest directions to improve its 
effectiveness and promote its implementation. Therefore the question that is 
central to this study reads: 
 
How is the concept of “free, prior and informed consent” presently understood in the 
context of indigenous peoples' rights - under international law - to self-determination, land, 
resources, and participation and under which conditions could its implementation succeed in 
practice? 
                                                        
8 See, Official Website of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(UNPFII), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/, visited 26 December 2013. 
9 The effects can be devastating. Rainforest, for example, does not regenerate back to its 
original level of biodiversity after logging activities have taken place; it is substituted by so-
called secondary forestation. Furthermore, open-pit mining projects often include the use of 
dangerous chemicals that pollute the soil and waterways, leading to severe health issues in 
certain indigenous communities. The building of hydroelectric dams has displaced tens of 
thousands of indigenous people from their traditional lands. 
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I.2 Indigenous Peoples, International Law, and Human Rights 
Public international law in its pure post-Westphalian form is created by 
sovereign nation states. In its predominant perception since the end of the 
Second World War, human rights law has been concerned with protecting the 
individual. The primary concern with the state and the individual in 
international law is challenged by the emerging legal framework on the 
protection of intermediate and often vulnerable groups. This development has 
been a rather slow one opposed by many states on the basis of arguments related 
to inter-group conflict, secession, and controversy over the collective nature of 
the claimed standards.10 Nevertheless, a substantial body of generic and targeted 
legal norms pertaining to the protection of certain ethno-cultural groups has 
developed.11  
Generic protection of these groups in international law centers around 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
protects the right to culture.12 Targeted norms focus on specific types of groups 
within the broader framework of minority protection, e.g. national minorities, 
immigrants, and indigenous peoples. 13  
The last four decades have witnessed the emergence of a considerable body 
of legal and quasi-legal norms pertaining specifically to this latter group. 
Indigenous peoples have sought international legal protection since states are 
often the violators of their asserted rights. Although there is no single official 
                                                        
10 On the debate over collective or cultural rights, in general See Kymlicka W, Multicultural 
Citizenship (OUP, Oxford 1995). Also See Kukathas C, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’, 
Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, February 1992. Also See Roth H I, ‘Collective Rights, 
Justifications and Problems,’ Centre for Multiethnic Research, Uppsala University, 1999. For 
a more communitarian perspective See Taylor C, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Amy 
Gutmann, Multiculturalism, Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1995) 25 - 73. Also see Dyke V V, ‘The Individual, the State, and Ethnic 
Communities in Political Theory’, World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1977. For a comprehensive 
theoretical exposition see: Galenkamp M, Individualism versus Collectivism: the Concept of 
Collective Rights (Dissertation, Erasmus Universiteit, Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte, 
Rotterdam,1993) 
11 See e.g. W.J.M. van Genugten et. al, The United Nations of the Future, Globalisation with a 
Human Face (KIT publishers, 2006). 
12 Noteworthy, Article 27 does not confer genuine collective rights to groups, but refers to 
their individual members. Nevertheless, Article 27 has provided the basis for a series of cases 
on the legal protection of (members belonging to) minorities and the Human Rights 
Committee has expressed its willingness to accept collectively submitted communications. See 
primarily: Lubicon Lake Band vs Canada, Case 16/1984, view of 26 March 1990. UN Doc. 
Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40). Sandra Lovelace vs Canada, Case 24/1977, UN Doc. A/36/40, 29 
December 1977. Apirana et. al. vs New Zealand, Case 547/1993, view of 20 October 2000. 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (2000). Also see: Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland, HRC, 
Communication No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994).  
 Jouni Länsman et al. v. Finland, HRC, Communication No. 671/1995, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1996). 
13 Kymlicka W, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 2007). 
CHAPTER I 
13 
definition in international law, relevant characteristics of indigenous peoples are 
that they are culturally distinct from the majority population, they have retained 
some or all of their own governmental and cultural structures (and are willing to 
preserve those), and often have a special, spiritual relation with their lands. Well-
known working definitions focus on objective criteria and on subjective 
elements, whereas self-identification as indigenous is considered a fundamental 
criterion.14 
The first international legal document dealing specifically with indigenous 
peoples is the International Labour Organisation’s Convention No. 107 of 1957 
(ILO 107),15 which was replaced in 1989 by ILO Convention No. 169 (ILO 
169).16 Even though ILO 107 is officially still in force, it was replaced because it 
focused not so much on the rights of indigenous peoples in the light of 
preserving their culture, but had a more assimilative approach, aiming at 
progressive integration into the majority culture as the appropriate solution to 
combat discrimination and poverty.17 Replacing ILO 107 with ILO 169 
reflected a broader shift in legal and political thinking concerning indigenous 
peoples.18 The emphasis on integration and non-discrimination slowly shifted 
towards less patronizing ideas of self-determination, equal participation, and 
                                                        
14 See, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, José R. Martínez Cobo, Final Report on the Study of 
the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and 
Recommendations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 page 50 at 379 and page 5 at 21 and 22. 
Also see, ILO Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, (Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the 
International Labour Organisation at its seventy-sixth session, entry into force 5 September 1991) 
article 1. 
15ILO Convention No. 107, (1957, Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, entry 
into force: 02-06-1959). 
16 ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, (Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the International Labour 
Organisation at its seventy-sixth session, entry into force 5 September 1991). 
17 Paragraph 46 of the 1986 report of the Meeting of Experts described the need for 
replacement quite explicitly: “The integrationist language of Convention No. 107 is outdated, 
and that the application of this principle is destructive in the modern world. In 1956 and 1957 
it was felt that integration into the dominant national society offered the best chance for these 
groups to be part of the development process of the countries in which they live. This had, 
however, resulted in a number of undesirable consequences. It had become a destructive 
concept, in part at least because of the way it was understood by governments. In practice it 
had become a concept which meant the extinction of ways of life which are different from 
that of the dominant society. (...) policies of pluralism, self-sufficiency, self-management and 
ethno-development appeared to be those which would give indigenous populations the best 
possibilities and means of participating directly in the formulation and implementation of 
official policies.” ILO Conventions are legally binding. Up untill now however, ILO 
Convention 169 has only been ratified by 21 States. 
18The provisions and principles of ILO Convention 169 were substantially influenced by the 
Martínez Cobo Study, for the final report, see Final Report on the Study of the Problem of 




cultural integrity.19 The political climate changed in the 1970, partly under the 
influence of the 1966 Human Rights Covenants,20 and partly because 
indigenous peoples themselves found better ways for making their voices heard 
in the international arena.21  
Thus, instead of emphasizing non-discrimination and integration, the focus 
shifted towards self-determination and cultural integrity and towards accepting 
that indigenous peoples have their own cultures distinct from the larger political 
order and are often willing to preserve those. The claim to self-determination 
entails the belief that the right of indigenous peoples to practice their culture and 
traditions freely in accordance with their own institutional structures and 
customs is invaluable in protecting them, and that in order to achieve this, 
indigenous peoples should be able to fully participate in the relevant decision-
making processes.22   
Indigenous peoples, as distinct peoples, are to be self-determining actors or 
subjects instead of merely object of protection.23 This change in perception can 
be described as the move towards “accommodation” and away from 
“integration.”24 
                                                        
19Anaya S J, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 
2004). 
20International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into 
force Mar. 23, 1976) & International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). See A. Eide, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
Achievements in International Law during the Last Quarter of a Century’ (2006) Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law, 163. 
21James Anaya, the second UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, distinguished two significant developments after 
the end of the Cold War and the decolonisation period. Related to the decline of the Soviet 
authoritarian system, there arose a renewed world-wide faith in non-authoritarian democratic 
institutions. Moreover, the idea of subsidiarity gained ground; the conviction that decisions 
can often best be made at the most local level (bottom-up instead of top-down approaches). 
The second development Anaya mentions can be characterised as the embrace of cultural 
pluralism, brought about by the fading classic notion of the culturally or ethnically 
homogenous nation-state. See Anaya S J, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Second 
Edition, Oxford University Press, 2004). 
22In other words; where ILO Convention No. 107 was still ‘about them, without them’ the 
newer instruments are more a result of a cooperative effort, in which indigenous 
representatives had a say about what kind of measures, rights or policies they need. 
23 As will be examined in-depth later on, this concept of indigenous self-determination does 
not, in contemporary international law, focus on secession and independent statehood 
(external self-determination), but on forms of autonomy or self-government and effective 
participation in the larger political order (a distinct form of internal self-determination) See 
Cassese A, Self-Determination of Peoples, a Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 1995, 
reprinted in 1996). Also see: Summers, James, Peoples and International Law, How Nationalism 
and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden/Boston, 2007). 
24 Kymlicka W, ‘The Internationalization of Minority Rights’, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 6(3/4), 2008. Kymlicka argues that potential self-governing groups, like 
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Eventually, this shift in thinking would pave the way for the adoption of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in September 
2007.25 While ILO 169 remains the only legally binding instrument (together 
with ILO 107, which is still in force for some countries), the UNDRIP is the 
most widely supported document dealing specifically with indigenous peoples 
and some of its provisions can be perceived as reflective of customary 
international law.26 
The Declaration’s articles and preamble paragraphs reflect the main areas of 
concern for indigenous peoples and seek to protect a substantial number of 
collective rights in addition to individual rights.27 Recognition of such collective 
rights is perceived as essential to guarantee the continuing cultural survival of 
indigenous peoples as distinct collectives.28 It is increasingly acknowledged that a 
number of issues are difficult to approach under a solely individual human rights 
regime since they specifically pertain to indigenous peoples as collectives. 
 
UNDRIP: Key and Controversial Issues 
 
Although the Declaration was adopted with an overwhelming majority, some 
controversial issues remained. The most controversial ones all have to do with 
the topic of this study: the right to self-determination, rights to lands and 
resources, and rights to consent to political or other decisions that may affect 
indigenous peoples. 29 
                                                                                                                              
indigenous peoples, should get similar tools of nation-building to those of states. See Kymlicka 
W, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2007). Integration in the sense used here refers to full integration into 
majority culture, which is quite different from “fair inclusion” into a society. 
25United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/61/295, adopted by the 
General Assembly on Thursday September 13, by a vote of 144 in favour, 4 against and 11 
abstentions. The final text was the result of a process of nearly 25 years of drafting and 
discussion. 
26 Eide A, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Achievements in International Law during the Last 
Quarter of a Century’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 163, 2006, 207. 
27 These rights are to be read in conjunction with the broader framework of human rights 
protection, see Preamble and inter alia article 46(2) of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/61/295,). 
28 The collective provisions in the Declaration flow from some of the most pressing issues for 
indigenous peoples: threats to their lands, conflicts over resources, exclusion from decision-
making, and the lack of self-determined development. See e.g. Genugten W J M van, 
‘Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and 
the Interaction of Legal Systems’, 104 Am. J. Int’l L, 2010 & Wiessner S, ‘Indigenous 
Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’, 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2008. 
29 See UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Indigenous 
peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources: Working paper by Erica-Irene A. 
Daes, former Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 30 
July, 2002. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/23. Also see: Wiessner S, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty: A 
Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, 41 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2008. 
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After a quarter of a century of careful drafting, the adoption of the Declaration 
marked a “milestone of re-empowerment” for indigenous peoples.30 A unique 
feature of the UNDRIP is that it was drafted in consultation with indigenous 
peoples worldwide, a feature that reflects contemporary perspectives on how to 
respect indigenous rights and one that will be a central theme throughout this 
study. The UNDRIP is therefore a result of compromises between state and 
indigenous views, rather than the usual state developed international document. 
UNDRIP contains different rights and principles that are particularly important 
for indigenous peoples and sets out minimum standards for their protection. It 
contains rights to freedom, equality, life, and integrity, but also rights to preserve 
and vitalize their cultures. Furthermore, the UNDRIP has provisions on 
education, language, media, labour rights, traditional knowledge, and cultural 
heritage. Most importantly, UNDRIP contains numerous provisions that deal 
with indigenous peoples' rights to their lands and resources. These provisions 
have to be seen in light of the right to self-determination and the different 
principles and rights on effective participation. These rights and principles are 
devised to operationalize self-determination and to make sure that indigenous 
peoples are adequately involved in matters concerning their lands, resources, and 
further interests. These rights - self-determination, lands, resources, and 
participation - form the most controversial part of the UNDRIP.  
 While it was adopted with an overwhelming majority of votes, four large 
common law states, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia - all 
states with large indigenous populations - voted against it. Their concerns had to 
do with the nature of the right to self-determination, with the possible 
implications of granting indigenous peoples far-reaching land and resource rights 
(including rights to restitution and compensation), and the right to free prior and 
informed consent prior to the approval of any project that may affect their lands 
or territories (Article 32). Seen together with the general framework of 
participation rights, enshrined in Article 18 and 19 of the UNDRIP, their 
implementation may have profound redistributive economic consequences. 
Nevertheless, these rights could also constitute an extremely important last line 
of defense for indigenous communities.31 Fortunately, all four opponents revised 
their position and later on endorsed the UNDRIP. Nevertheless, the issues 
mentioned were never really resolved.32 
 The UNDRIP is the most important part of international law for the 
purposes of this study and constitutes the key framework of reference. In order 
to come up with a proper answer to the research question it is vital to examine 
                                                        
30 Wiessner S, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2008, pp. 
1141-1142. 
31 Eide A, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Achievements in International Law during the Last 
Quarter of a Century’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 163, 2006. 
32 For instance, the questions was posed whether Article 19 conferred upon indigenous 
peoples a veto right over national legislation. Furthermore, it was claimed more generally that 
the provisions on lands and resources were unworkable and unacceptable. 
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FPIC processes in light of the right to self-determination and rights to lands and 
resources, since these concepts are very much intertwined. 
 
The Human Rights Framework 
 
Indigenous claims are often framed in the language of human rights but the 
human rights revolution can be seen as a double-edged sword because it opens 
up political space for ethno-cultural groups to contest inherited hierarchies, 
while it also demands groups to advance their claims in the specific language of 
human rights, civil rights liberalism, and democratic constitutionalism.33 
Consequently - and as will be illustrated in this study on multiple occasions - 
this means that some international legal concepts require fundamental rethinking 
and progressive interpretation. 
According to James Anaya, claims framed in the language of human rights 
are likely to be more successful than claims that originate from a state-centered 
strain of argument.34 The human rights movement may also be a more effective 
vehicle for creating awareness and sympathy about the situation of indigenous 
peoples worldwide.35 Human rights could be seen as the articulation of rightful 
claims made on behalf of those who require the status quo to be contested in 
order to redress injustices.36 They have the ability to generate powerful political 
and moral conviction, but as the indigenous rights movement clearly shows 
claiming real recognition of rights is a long, and maybe even endless, struggle.37  
 International human rights law provides a set of standards against which state 
behavior is to be assessed. It poses limitations upon state sovereignty insofar as it 
tells us that the state’s treatment of its citizens (including indigenous peoples and 
other minorities) is not only an internal matter but also a legitimate matter of 
international concern.38 Rights matter because they speed up and channel the 
process of worldwide diffusion or distribution of norms related to indigenous 
                                                        
33 Kymlicka W, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 2007), pp. 92-93: Cf. Tully J, Strange Multiplicity, 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversit (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 108: 
“Understanding a general concept consists in being able to give reasons why it should or 
should not be used in any particular case by describing examples with similar or related aspects, 
drawing analogies or disanalogies of various kinds, finding precedents and drawing attention to 
intermediate cases so that one can pass easily from familiar cases to the unfamiliar and see the 
relation between them.”  
34 Anaya S J, ‘Superpower Attitudes Toward Indigenous Peoples and Group Rights’, Am. 
Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 93, 1999, p. 252. 
35 Cf. Rorty R, ‘Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality’, 1993. 
36 Dembour M B, ‘What Are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought’, Hum. Rts. Q. 32, 
2010. 
37 Cf. Douzinas, C. (2000). The end of human rights: Critical legal thought at the turn of the century, 
Hart Publishing, p. 342. 
38 Bankes N, 'International Human Rights Law and Natural Resources Projects within the 
Traditional Territories of Indigenous Peoples', 47, Alberta Law Review, 2010, pp. 494 – 495. 
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peoples. Consequently, the rapid diffusion of FPIC norms in particular is 
promoted by its legal character.  
Human rights reflect societal struggles for recognition. This is very apparent 
in the indigenous discourse, and the rights asserted in UNDRIP refer to a 
number of pressing societal problems. This implies that these struggles are far 
from over once a right has been asserted or recognized: after the standard setting 
has been conducted the difficult process of implementation just begins. 
 
The Central Place of Participation Rights 
 
Participation rights and standards form an important part of the contemporary 
system of indigenous peoples protection. As will be examined in detail in this 
study, self-determination and derivative rights to control lands and resources 
require well-developed participatory approaches. The aim of these participation 
rights is to create a more equal situation in decision-making processes that affect 
indigenous groups. Equality for vulnerable groups like indigenous peoples or 
minorities vis-à-vis the majority culture should be attained not only in law but 
also in fact.  
 As the Permanent Court of International Justice concluded in the Minority 
Schools of Albania case: “Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind, 
whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in order 
to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between different situations. 
There would thus be no true equality unless minority groups were enabled to 
sustain those characteristics that defined them as minorities.”39 In order for 
participation to be effective and based on a situation of true equality, one should 
always take into account the specific and often vulnerable situation in which 
many indigenous peoples find themselves. 
 In line with these remarks on true equality as a necessary requirement for 
effective participation, the UN Human Rights Committee has similarly 
observed in the Apirana Case, recalling its general comment on Article 27 of the 
ICCPR, that: “Especially in the case of indigenous peoples, the enjoyment of 
the right to one’s own culture may require positive legal measures of protection 
by a State party and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of 
minority communities in decisions which affect them.”40 Where Article 27 
(explained as the right to enjoy one’s culture) was traditionally understood as 
including only negative rights of non-interference,41 the Committee emphasizes 
                                                        
39 Permanent Court of International Justice, Minority Schools in Albania Case, Ser. A/B No. 64, 
1935. In: Meijkecht A, Towards International Personality: The Position of Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law (Intersentia – Hart, Antwerpen – Groningen – Oxford, 2001), p. 
101. 
40 HRC, Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (2000). In: Moucheboeuf A, Minority Rights Jurisprudence 
(Council of Europe Publishing, 2006), pp. 262-263. 
41 Will Kymlicka W, ‘Theorizing Indigenous Rights’, University of Toronto Law Journal 49, 
1999, p. 284. 
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the importance of positive legal measures.42 An active duty for the state to 
consult indigenous peoples is similarly observed in two cases before the 
Committee concerning violations of Saami cultural rights under Article 27.43 In 
these cases, the duty to consult arose by virtue of indigenous peoples’ interest in 
cultural integrity and rights of use for certain purposes.44 Parallel to the Apirana 
Case, the Committee notesthat measures must be taken to ensure the effective 
participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect 
them.45  
The Committee expands the protection under Article 27 towards a more 
positive obligation for the state to ensure effective participation. As will be 
argued in subsequent paragraphs, this is in line with an interpretation of internal 
self-determination for indigenous peoples as a participatory, ongoing, and 
relational concept.46 As Will Kymlicka has observed, there is a need for a 
conception of indigenous rights that accords them substantive rights to 
autonomy and self-determination, but which works within the framework of 
larger states.47 What is needed, according to Kymlicka, is a middle ground 
entailing a positive interpretation of Article 27 and an interpretation of self-
determination that does not imply a right to secede and form a new independent 
state; a form of internal self-determination and positive cultural protection 
through equal participatory processes.48   
 In light of the framework that the UNDRIP provides, FPIC processes may 
be seen as an important tool to accomplish more equal and inclusive decision-
making.  
                                                        
42 Also see: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 23, 
the Rights of Minorities, Article 27, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5(1994). In paragraph 6.1 the 
Committee stresses that although Article 27 is expressed in negative terms, it nevertheless 
entails positive obligations.  
43 HRC, Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994). & HRC, Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 
Communication No. 671/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1996). 
44 Anaya S J, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions about Natural 
Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of what Rights Indigenous Peoples have 
in Lands and Resources’, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 22, 2005, p. 
12. 
45 Moucheboeuf A, Minority Rights Jurisprudence (Council of Europe Publishing, 2006), p. 262. 
46 Although Self-Determination is not a right cognizable under the Optional Protocol. See: 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 23, the Rights 
of Minorities, Article 27, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5(1994), paragraph 3.1. 
47 Will Kymlicka W, ‘Theorizing Indigenous Rights’, University of Toronto Law Journal 49, 
1999, p. 285. 
48 Cf. Kymlicka W, ‘Theorizing Indigenous Rights’, University of Toronto Law Journal 49, 
1999. In principles, indigenous peoples do not possess rights to secession although it can be 
argued that when certain human rights violations by the state are so pervasive, structural, and 
serious, indigenous peoples may have such a right as an ultimum remedium. This study discusses 
situations in which indigenous peoples do remain within the framework of the state. 
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I.3 A Short Introduction to the Legal Status of FPIC 
As a crucial dimension of the right of self-determination, the right of 
indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent is also 
relevant to a wide range of circumstances in addition to those 
referred to in the Declaration. Such consent  is vital for the full 
realization of the rights of indigenous peoples and must be 
interpreted and understood in accordance with contemporary 
international human rights law, and recognized as a legally binding 
treaty obligation where States have concluded treaties, agreements 
and other constructive arrangements with indigenous peoples.49 
 
Free, prior and informed consent is rapidly developing into one of the most 
important legal safeguards indigenous peoples have at their disposal. Since it is 
still in a phase of dynamic development, full consensus on its application and 
interpretation is absent, and both its elements and its place in the broader legal 
framework concerning indigenous rights are underexposed. 
 While this study will examine the principles, procedures, platforms, and 
practices connected with FPIC in detail, it seems appropriate to already provide 
the reader with a compressed legal commentary on the current status of FPIC. 
This concise overview might be useful for a better understanding of the different 
parts and paragraphs that follow. After this short introduction, a paragraph on 
the research approach and the different sub-questions that inform the main 
research goal will conclude this introductory part. 
 
FPIC: Current Legal Status 
 
FPIC is becoming a key principle for the protection of indigenous peoples. 
Nevertheless, it is still in a phase of dynamic development and the scope of the 
standard is not yet fully clarified. What is clear, is that FPIC is relevant in a 
number of different contexts and is seen as invaluable in relation to development 
projects that affect indigenous peoples. FPIC should always be seen as part of a 
larger framework, together with the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination and their right to effectively participate in decision-making 
processes on matters of their concern. These legal concepts form an inherent 
part of any discussion on the rights of indigenous peoples.  
 FPIC is predominantly present within the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and in regional jurisprudence the concept has 
been referred to by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Moreover, consent requirements 
are present in documentation and law of the International Labour Organisation, 
the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
                                                        
49 United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, E/2011/43, E/C.19/2011/14 
report on the 10th session UNPFII, paragraph 36. 
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Discrimination, The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, The 
2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, The OAS Draft American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in the framework of the 
World Bank Group and the Extractive Industries Review, and in a number of 
national cases. The most relevant instruments are mentioned below.  
 As mentioned, different international legal documents dealing specifically 
with indigenous peoples have been adopted, of which the UNDRIP is the most 
recently adopted and the most widely supported.50 Although the Declaration is 
strictly speaking not legally binding, a number of its articles can be perceived as 
reflective or contributing to the formation of customary international law.51 In 
this respect it is relevant to mention that James Anaya, the Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples highlighted that: “a commitment to these 
rights should not be obscured by a discussion about whether or not it is a legally 
binding document, as it had significant normative weight grounded in its high 
degree of legitimacy as a product of years of struggle and advocacy by 
indigenous peoples, which was augmented by its grounding in the human rights 
principles of the United Nations Charter. Implementation of the Declaration 
should be regarded as a political, moral, and legal imperative without 
qualification.”52 Moreover, different human rights bodies refer to the UNDRIP 
in their judgments, decisions, and other documents.53 
 The preamble affirms that the UNDRIP is a standard of achievement that is 
to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect and that recognition 
of indigenous peoples' rights will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations 
between the state and indigenous peoples, based on principles of justice, 
democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination, and good faith. 
 Within the UNDRIP, FPIC is enshrined in Article 10 on relocation, Article 
11(2) on cultural, spiritual, intellectual, and religious property, Article 19 on 
legislative and administrative measures affecting indigenous peoples, Article 28 
on redress for damage, confiscation, or occupation of their lands, Article 29(2) 
on the storage and disposal of hazardous materials and, most relevantly, Article 
32 on projects affecting their lands, territories, and other resources.  
                                                        
50 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/61/295, adopted 
by the General Assembly on Thursday September 13 2007, by a vote of 144 in favour, 4 against and 
11 abstentions.  
51 Cf. International Law Association, Sofia Conference (2012), Rights Of Indigenous Peoples, 
Final Report. 
52 Statement by James Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
General Assembly, GA/SHC/3982, Press Release, Department of Public Information - News 
and Media Division - New York, Sixty-fifth General Assembly, Third Committee, 18th & 
19th Meetings (AM & PM), 18 October 2010. 
53 These will be discussed throughout this study. 
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ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989 (ILO 169)54 is widely regarded as the most 
important legally binding instrument dealing with indigenous peoples' 
protection. ILO 169 refers to a requirement of consent with regard to relocation 
of indigenous peoples in Article 16.55 Articles 6, 7, and 15 of the Convention 
provide the general legal framework with regard to the consultation and 
participation of indigenous peoples. Article 6 requires that indigenous peoples 
are consulted in good faith through appropriate procedures and, in particular, 
through their representative institutions, with the objective of achieving 
agreement or consent, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them directly.56  
 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), adopted during the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, promotes biodiversity, sustainable use, and 
the sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The 
CBD includes requirements for national reporting of efforts to implement the 
provisions of the Convention. Noteworthy provisions are firstly Article 8(j) on 
respect for indigenous and local communities in relation to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity. Article 8(j) calls for consent, participation, 
and benefit-sharing models in relation to indigenous customs and traditional 
knowledge. Other relevant provisions are Article 10 on the sustainable use of 
components of biological diversity and Article 17 on the exchange of 
information. Relevant to mention is also Article 9 on traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, which 
was adopted on October 29, 2010.  
 Recent developments within the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
foremost in the judgments and decisions of the Court and Commission 
respectively, stress the need for effective mechanisms for the participation of 
indigenous peoples and indicate the necessity to consult and under certain 
conditions obtain consent from indigenous peoples in relation to decisions that 
affect them through culturally appropriate processes.   
 Most importantly, the Court held in Saramaka People v. Suriname that in 
ensuring the effective participation of members of the community, the state has a 
duty to actively consult with the community according to their customs and 
traditions. This duty requires the state to both accept and disseminate 
information and entails constant communication between the parties. These 
                                                        
54 ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the International Labour 
Organisation at its seventy-sixth session, entry into force 5 September 1991. 
55 Article 16(2) ILO 196 reads: “Where the relocation of these peoples is considered necessary 
as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed 
consent.” 
56 A/HRC/15/35, General Assembly Distr.: General, 23 August 2010, Human Rights 
Council, Fifteenth session. Item 5, Human rights bodies and mechanisms, Progress report on 
the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, Report of the 
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, paragraph 18. 
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consultations must be in good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures 
and with the objective of reaching an agreement.  
 Additionally, the Court considered that regarding large-scale development or 
investment projects that would have a major impact within the community’s 
territory the State has a duty to not only consult with the community but also to 
obtain their free, prior and informed consent, according to their customs and 
traditions.57 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has 
affirmed this view in a recent decision concerning the Endorois community in 
Kenya.58 Both cases will be studied in detail in Part V of this study. 
 In relation to the implementation of FPIC processes, there are a number of 
studies that aim to inform guidelines on how to shape such a process properly. 
These studies have taken place in amongst others: the Congo basin, the 
Philippines, Australia, and within the framework of the World Commission on 
Dams and the Forest Peoples Programme.59 The most comprehensive 
implementation models for FPIC can be found in a number of voluntary 
initiatives concerning sustainable commodity use. These models will be subject 
to review in Part V. Although practice reveals shortcomings in implementing 
FPIC processes, it also provides some good examples and indicates the potential 
of FPIC to generate mutually beneficial constructive agreements. Nevertheless, 
these voluntary initiatives may go further than what is strictly speaking legally 
required and are devised within specific areas. 
 In short, FPIC is present in a variety of different international legal 
documents and is a key principle that guides decision-making processes between 
indigenous peoples and other actors. FPIC processes include extensive 
consultation and participation by indigenous communities through culturally 
appropriate procedures in decision-making processes that affect them. Such 
processes may include the option of withholding consent depending on the 
impact and nature of the decision under discussion or the nature of the affected 
rights.60 It is imperative for any given FPIC process that it is conducted in good 
                                                        
57 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), Paragraph 133 and 134. Emphasis added. 
58 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010. 
59 See e.g.: Lewis J, Freeman L and Borreill S, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent and 
Sustainable Forest Management in the Congo Basin, A Feasibility Study conducted in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo and Gabon regarding the 
operationalisation of FSC Principles 2 and 3 in the Congo Basin’, July 2008. Cariño J, 
‘Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior, Informed Consent: reflections on concepts and 
practice’, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2005. Colchester M and 
Ferrari M F, ‘Making FPIC Work: Challenges and Prospects for Indigenous Peoples’, Forest 
Peoples Programme, June 2007.  
60 E/C.19/2005/3, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, 17 February 2005, presented at the 
Fourth session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, 16-
27 May 2005. 
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faith and with the objective of obtaining consent and reaching agreement in a 
spirit of cooperation. The following paragraph will explain how FPIC will be 
examined in this study. 
I.4 Structure and Approach 
This study is divided into four parts: principles, procedures, platforms, and 
practices. The method used is primarily classic international legal research; an 
examination of the status and underlying concepts of FPIC from a number of 
legally relevant perspectives. Apart from consulting the usual sources of 
international law - treaties, declarations, statements by government officials, 
documents and studies in the context of international organizations, and 
scholarly literature - special attention will be given to regional human rights 
bodies' cases, primarily in the framework of the Inter-American human rights 
system, since it is here that groundbreaking work on the implementation of 
indigenous rights has been done over the last decade. 
 Secondly, some informative perspectives from related fields are explored. 
Considering that FPIC is a concept that is in a stage of dynamic development 
and that it functions in an area that is on the crossroads of international politics 
and law, a number of insights from political theory will be inspected. This will 
help to get a better view of the context in which FPIC is developing and will 
contribute to a better understanding of its justifications. Moreover some 
“internal comparative law” (related to the field of bioethics) will prove 
instructive in explaining the role of a legal concept of informed consent, because 
it is in this field that the notion was first employed. 
 Two cases - the case of the Saramaka Maroons in Suriname and of the 
Orang Asli People in Peninsular Malaysia - are particularly important for 
explaining how FPIC could be implemented and will be examined in detail. 
Field visits to Suriname and Malaysia were conducted in order to get proper 
perspectives on the context in which these cases take place. Moreover, the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues' sessions were visited, since it is within 
this unique international platform that indigenous voices and perspectives are 
most clearly presented.61 Discussions with numerous national and international 
experts in the field of international law, environmental law and sustainability 
                                                        
61 In Suriname, Maroon and Indigenous villages were visited, tribal leaders and their 
representative organizations consulted. Furthermore, government officials, members of 
different international organizations and employees and students at research institutes were 
visited and consulted. Many thanks go to Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade for his 
reflections on the Inter-American Court's cases he presided over. 
In Peninsular Malaysia, NGO experts, government officials, members from indigenous 
organizations and Ambassadors were interviewed. Moreover, on-site visits to logging 
concessions and timber factories in the North (Kedah) were held.  
At the UNPFII, numerous expert and indigenous representatives were consulted and views 
were exchanged with expert researchers from New York University Law School. Particular 
thanks go to Professor Benedict Kingsbury, for his sharp and insightful comments. 
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initiatives, land governance, legal philosophy, and human rights were invaluable 
in contextualizing this project. 
 In a study like the present one, further methodological choices are reflected 
by the structure and questions that are developed and posed. Therefore a concise 




Part II (Principles) will examine the substantive rights that form the justification 
for requiring participation rights like FPIC. This part answers why FPIC is such 
a central claim indigenous peoples make, a claim that cannot be examined 
accurately without taking into account its underlying principles.62 By examining 
the core rights on which FPIC is based, its normative premises are exposed.63 
 Three central concepts will be subject to investigation: the idea or right of 
self-determination of peoples, land and property rights, and (sovereignty over) 
natural resources. This part will examine the following questions: Why is FPIC 
such a prominent claim indigenous peoples make? What is the scope of the right 
to self-determination for indigenous peoples? Why are rights to lands and 
resources so central to indigenous peoples' demands? And what is the relation 





Part III (Procedures) will build on the findings and interpretations examined in 
Part II; that self-determination and control over lands and resources are central 
to indigenous peoples' claims and that respecting these claims can only be 
achieved with the effective participation of the indigenous peoples involved.  
 In the first paragraphs, the right to effective participation will be explored 
while in the second part, the strongly related concept of free, prior and informed 
consent will be more closely inspected. 
 
III.2 Effective Participation 
 
This paragraph will start with exploring why effective participation is such a 
central idea within the international legal protection of indigenous peoples. 
                                                        
62 Claims are often being presented in the form of rights, the language of UNDRIP is clearly 
one of rights, but its legal status is subject to different interpretations. See Allen S and Xanthaki 
A, Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, (Hart Publishing, 2011), 
p. 239. 
63 According to Kymlicka, the normative account is important, but a richer one is needed, in 
which these claims get negotiated, adopted or contested in western democratic politics. This 
richer account is also necessary if we want to understand how these policies might be adopted 
outside the sphere of western democratic states. See: Kymlicka W, Multicultural Odysseys: 
Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford University Press, USA, 2007). 
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Questions that will be treated are: What is the content of the right to effective 
participation in contemporary international law concerning indigenous peoples? 
Why is effective participation so central to indigenous peoples' claims? 
 The questions posed are not exclusively of a legal nature but also concern 
political issues. James Tully’s theory on intercultural constitutional dialogue will 
be explored and serves as a general framework for the interpretation of the legal 
model that this study examines. Throughout the paragraphs in part III, it is 
argued that such a fair intercultural dialogue is a necessary precondition for any 
FPIC process, and the following question is explored: Which political principles 
sustain a legal model for the implementation of indigenous peoples' rights to self-
determination, lands and resources? 
  
III.3 Free Prior and Informed Consent 
 
After having examined the broader idea of effective participation, the concept of 
free, prior and informed consent is inspected from different perspectives. The 
different elements; free, prior, informed, and consent are considered in turn, and 
the functions, justifications, and relevant principles connected to FPIC are 
exposed. Questions that are discussed are: How could the different elements of 





In order to come to an understanding of what it means that consent has to be 
given “freely” Philip Pettit’s theory of freedom is studied. Pettit’s theory is a 
very attractive one for exploring the meaning of freedom in the context of FPIC 
since it argues that freedom is best conceived as a situation in which an agent 
exercises discursive control in an interpersonal setting. Freedom is qualified as a 
capacity that exists in relation to others. This is the situation in which FPIC 
functions. Furthermore, Pettit’s arguments reveal which political ideal should be 
guiding in relations between indigenous peoples and states: the principle of non-
domination. This paragraph will investigate these questions: What could be meant 




It seems obvious that consent has to be obtained prior to the commencement of 
any project that is intrusive on indigenous rights, but it is not only before such 
projects start that FPIC is relevant. An act of “consenting” does not only 
function as a procedural justification for what otherwise would count as an 
infringement upon rights, it can also serve as the basis for a new relation 
between the actors involved, for instance when a transnational corporation 
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carries out a long-term mining or logging project on indigenous lands.64 
Therefore, the question is posed whether FPIC should only function until the 
moment of the decision, ex ante, or that it should continue to guide the process 
ex post? In that light, the central question is: What could be a proper description 




The requirement that consent has to be informed will be dealt with in the 
paragraphs on “information and communication.” It is suggested that the focus 
should not only be on what kind of and how much information is made 
available but also, and maybe even more, on the way the communication 
between the parties is modeled. Highly instructive in this respect is the 
theoretical debate on informed consent procedures in bioethics. As a legal 
requirement, informed consent is rooted in this field and it became a core 
principle of medical research and practice after the Second World War. In 
examining informed consent from this perspective, a number of valuable insights 
on information, communication, and informed consent processes in general will 
be gained. The debate on informed consent in the medical context has been 
held for over fifty years now, and a number of informative views and 
misconceptions about informed consent that will be useful for FPIC’s 
application in relation to indigenous peoples can be exposed in this way. The 
questions this paragraph attempts to tackle are: What should be taken into 
account when explaining the informed requirement?; what is the role and 
function of a legal “informed consent” requirement?; which (additional) 
standards should be taken into account in relation to the “informed” 
requirement? 
 
III.3.4 Representation Issues  
 
This paragraph will be concerned with the problems that might arise in relation 
to representation when conducting FPIC processes. Consenting necessarily 
entails an act of representation, and a number of different obstacles might arise in 
this respect, e.g. in relation to all sorts of situations of overlap, the (relative) 
isolation of some indigenous groups, and so called “illiberal” practices within 
communities. This paragraph will therefore consider: Which issues may require 
special attention when operationalizing FPIC processes in relation to 
representation? 
 
III.4 Conclusions on Procedure 
 
The conclusions of part III will combine the insights from the preceding 
paragraphs and will illustrate the theoretical framework underlying FPIC and 
                                                        
64 Cf. Brownsword R and Beyleveld D, Consent in the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2007). 
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possible explanations of its different elements. These are taken into account in 
later parts, where legal and quasi-legal systems for the implementation of FPIC 




IV.1.1 International Diffusion FPIC standards 
 
Part IV (Platforms) will explore legal standard setting and diffusion of FPIC 
norms in an international context. It will be illustrated that FPIC norms are 
widespread and taken up as a requirement in different international and regional 
standards and documents. This paragraph provides an overview of the existing 
platforms that enshrine FPIC standards. Therefore, the main questions are: 
Where can we find FPIC norms in international legal and policy documents and 
statements?; how is FPIC interpreted in these different settings? 
 
IV.1.2 The UN Mechanisms 
 
This paragraph will explain the structure of the special mechanisms that are in 
existence in the context of the United Nations. The Special Rapporteur, the 
Expert Mechanism, and - perhaps most importantly - the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues are the three entities that aim to 
promote and protect indigenous rights. Their views and work on FPIC and 
participation in decision-making are therefore particularly important. 
Consequently, the question that is explored in this paragraph is: Which UN 
mechanisms deal specifically with indigenous peoples' rights and how do they 




In the final part of this work – (Practices) the most developed and progressive 
systems for the implementation of FPIC and related rights to self-determination, 
land, and resources are explored. Two specific perspectives are taken. Firstly, a 
number of important cases and decisions in the context of the Inter-American 
Human Rights System are explored and explained to get to a proper 
understanding of the contemporary legal status of FPIC. Secondly, a number of 
the most developed and progressive implementation models for FPIC on the 
project level are examined in the context of voluntary initiatives concerning 
sustainable commodity use.  
 
V.1 Case Law 
 
This paragraph will be concerned with the developments regarding FPIC and 
indigenous rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System. The Inter-
American Court and Commission have developed extensive documentation and 
case law on indigenous land rights and effective participation.  
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A number of key-cases before the Court and Commission will be described and 
commented upon, after which the current “OAS model” about property, 
participation, and consent is exposed. Although the focus lies on the Inter-
American system, cases from other regions will also be considered. The main 
questions of these paragraphs are: How do the regional human rights bodies 
explain indigenous rights to self-determination, lands, and participation? What is 
the most comprehensive legal interpretation that supports this system? The case 
of the Saramaka People v. Suriname will be explored in-depth, since this is the 
most important decision for explaining FPIC. Moreover, the Saramaka case 
comprises earlier jurisprudence on land and resource rights and provides a 
stepping-stone for later developments in and outside the OAS area. 
 
V.2 Implementation Models in Voluntary Initiatives 
 
In the final paragraphs of Part V a number of voluntary initiatives concerning 
sustainable resource use will be examined. It is within these initiatives that the 
most comprehensive and progressive implementation models for FPIC on the 
ground can be found. Furthermore, it is also in the context of these initiatives 
that most action is taken in order to promote effective implementation of FPIC. 
In this dynamic setting, the following questions will be leading: What practical 
models for implementing FPIC processes on the project level can be found?; 
Which are the most comprehensive or adequate ones and which guidelines do 
they generally propose? Are these models in line with contemporary 
international law concerning indigenous peoples? 
The second case - besides Saramaka People v. Suriname - that will be 
explored in detail is the situation of the Orang Asli of the Malaysian Peninsula 
and their experiences with sustainable timber certification schemes. This case 
will illustrate a number of complexities that may arise when FPIC processes are 
being implemented. 
 
Scope and Final Introductory Remarks 
 
In the final conclusions the answers to the main questions of this study will be 
provided. The frameworks and guidelines developed and examined in this study 
will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of a very dynamic but 
immensely important principle for the protection of indigenous peoples 
worldwide. 
In suggesting - firstly - a framework that sustains and accommodates 
indigenous rights to self-determination and FPIC and - secondly - possible 
directions for its effective implementation, the focus will be on decision-making 
processes that affect indigenous peoples' lands, territories and resources, since it is 









II. PRINCIPLES  
For a proper understanding of FPIC, it is essential to examine its international 
legal roots. This is particularly important because the legal status of FPIC is 
unclear and because consent requirements derive from their underlying values or 
rights. This part is called Principles because the underlying concepts that 
legitimize and justify an FPIC requirement will be inspected. For indigenous 
peoples, self-determination is a fundamental claim they make using the language of 
international law. As will be argued, self-determination for indigenous peoples 
has cultural, political, and economic elements and rights to lands and resources are 
essential to realizing indigenous self-determination. To understand FPIC, it is 
essential to study these rights or principles, given that preventing infringement 
upon them is the reason for requiring FPIC. 
 This part will focus mainly on self-determination of peoples in order to 
expose its contemporary meaning for indigenous peoples. Related rights to lands 
and resources will also be explored to some extent, however, as the remainder of 
this work will examine these rights in detail, an introduction will suffice here. It 
will be shown what kind of interpretations of self-determination could work for 
indigenous peoples, since their situation is quite different from other subjects in 
international law. 
 In short, Part II - Principles - describes the foundations, the underlying 
principles, that justify or call for FPIC. First, it will be examined whether and in 
what way FPIC has a legal basis in contemporary international law. Secondly, it 
will be demonstrated that effective participation and FPIC are essential for 
operationalizing rights to self-determination, lands and resources. Thirdly, it will 
be argued that FPIC is such a controversial concept, precisely because it is 
contingent upon rights to self-determination, land, and resources, and these 
concepts are themselves contested and not absolute.65 Effective implementation 
of FPIC depends on adherence to these principles and they cannot be 
considered apart from each other.66 
II.1 Self-Determination 
II.1.1 Introduction 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
                                                        
65 These second and third arguments will be further developed throughout this study. 
66 Moreover, explaining the connection between FPIC and other, more fundamental 




pursue their economic, social and cultural development.67 
 
The idea of self-determination is the heart and soul of the international 
indigenous peoples movement. It is their core claim and, as James Anaya - the 
second Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples - has 
consistently argued, no discussion on indigenous rights and international law can 
do without covering the principle of self-determination.68 Moreover, and most 
importantly for our purposes, FPIC is time and again mentioned as one of the 
essential instruments for exercising this right.69 A detailed treatment of the 
substantive claim to self-determination is essential for this study since it 
underpins the more procedural FPIC principle.   
The cornerstone of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples is the right to self-determination as enshrined in Article 3. It is framed 
almost identical to the wording of the common Article 1 to the two 1966 
Human Rights Covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).70 The UNDRIP grants indigenous peoples the right 
to self-determination, which is regarded as the paramount source of legitimacy 
for most of the other provisions in the Declaration and the core principle of 
indigenous peoples protection.  
Self-determination is essentially the right to choose one’s own pace and path 
of development. In the context of indigenous peoples, it will be argued that it is 
primarily a participatory principle, because indigenous peoples are forced to 
enter into relationships with institutions of the states in which they reside.71 
Therefore, FPIC is an essential procedural element for the exercise of self-
determination. As will be discussed at length later on in this study, FPIC is also 
essential for respecting indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and resources. These 
rights are probably the most important legal guarantees indigenous peoples need 
in order to be “self-determining.” 
Although its contemporary understanding does not focus on an external 
right to secession, recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination 
lies at the heart of their claims. Self-determination can be exercised in different 
                                                        
67 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN A/RES/61/295, 
Article 3. 
68 Anaya S J, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 
2004), p. 97. 
69 E/2011/43-E/C.19/2011/14, Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 2011  
Supplement No. 23, UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report on the tenth 
session  
(16-27 May 2011, New York), p. 7 ff. “As a crucial dimension of the right of self-
determination, the right of indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent is also 
relevant to a wide range of circumstances in addition to those referred to in the Declaration.” 
70 Common article 1 to the ICCPR and ICESCR grants the right to “all peoples.” 
71 In general, indigenous peoples do not have “exit rights.” 
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ways,72 and the debate over whether self-determination for indigenous peoples 
could lead to independent statehood has arguably frustrated the more significant 
discourse about its intra-state scope and content.  
This emphasis in academic inquiry on whether self-determination for 
indigenous peoples involves rights to secession (to form a state) seems 
counterproductive, since it prevents substantive debate about its intra-state 
meaning. For indigenous peoples, this is the more fundamental issue: What 
could be understood by self-determination for indigenous peoples, as an intra-
state right?  
The distinction between internal and external self-determination is arguably 
flawed but nevertheless proves instructive in explaining the concept of FPIC. 
Moreover, the external-internal debate seems to obscure another implicit 
concern of states. Where in most cases it is evident that indigenous populations 
do not aspire independent statehood, a substantive right to self-determination 
that works within the framework of the existing state, seen in light of the 
broader developments in relation to land rights and requirements of consent, 
might have profound implications of a redistributive nature. Particularly in 
relation to rights to land and natural resources, these developments are only 
reluctantly accepted by states, if they are accepted at all. 
Different attempts have been made at clarifying and conceptualizing the 
meaning of the idea. James Anaya for instance, distinguishes between 
constitutive and ongoing (substantive) self-determination. Ben Kingsbury 
emphasizes the importance of the relational element of indigenous self-
determination.73 Further research on forms of indigenous self-determination is 
needed to find out in which way indigenous peoples can exercise self-
determination and related rights. This work argues that the UNDRIP is 
instrumental in this respect, because its provisions indicate those areas that are 
most important for indigenous peoples’ exercise of their right to self-
determination.   
According to some authors, indigenous self-determination should be seen as 
an umbrella provision and it can be broken up into a bundle of rights.74 Among 
the most important for indigenous peoples are the right to preserve cultural 
identity, to have collective authority regarding decisions related to the land and 
                                                        
72 Cf. African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. 
Zaire, , Comm. No. 75/92, 1995. 
73 See, Anaya S J, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Second Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2004). Contrary to a division between internal and external self-determination, Anaya 
distinguishes between constitutive and ongoing self-determination. Also see, Kingsbury B, 
‘Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in 
International and Comparative Law’, New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 34, 2001-2002. Kingsbury emphasises the relational aspect of indigenous self-
determination. 
74 Cf. Anaya S J, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Second Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2004). Also see, S.J. Rombouts, Tracing Free, Prior and Informed Consent, On Developments 
in International Law and Legal Doctrine that Shape a Contemporary Principle Favouring Indigenous 
Rights, Master Thesis, Tilburg University, 2008. (available upon request). 
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territory in which they live, and to determine the nature and scope of 
development activities within that territory.75 Others aim for a more holistic 
view of self-determination, in which the legal perspective is only marginally 
important.76 A number of these different views and interpretations need to be 
examined. 
The paragraph is structured as follows. Firstly, it is necessary to explore the 
historical context in which the idea of self-determination was shaped. This part 
will explain how self-determination transformed from a national to an 
international political ideal and eventually into a legal right. Importantly, this 
historical perspective also illustrates the impact of self-determination on the 
formation of international law and the modern conception of societies in general 
and will show that it has been predominantly concerned with statehood. 
Moreover, it will become clear that elements of “free consent” are at the heart 
of self-determination. 
Secondly, the law on self-determination in the post World War II era will 
be explored, and it will be shown that a narrow interpretation of the law of self-
determination does not have all that much to offer to indigenous peoples, 
considering their particular situation. Thirdly, it will be examined what self-
determination could mean for indigenous peoples and a number of different, 
overlapping, and progressive interpretations of the principle will be considered. 
Self-determination for indigenous peoples consists of political, cultural, and 
economic elements. It will be illustrated that for indigenous peoples, rights to 
their lands and resources are an important way to realize their right to self-
determination, and that participatory processes, including FPIC processes, need 
to be present. 
Finally, in the conclusions, a view on indigenous self-determination will be 
presented and it will be argued that self-determination, rights to lands and 
resources, and the concept of free, prior and informed consent are closely 
connected. Throughout this study, it will be demonstrated that FPIC is one of 
the most important practical expressions of self-determination for indigenous 
peoples.  
II.1.2 Development of the Idea of Self-Determination of Peoples  
In order to find out why self-determination is such a key-claim indigenous 
peoples make, to track its connections to statehood and human rights, and to 
find out why and how it is so tied up with FPIC – or more generally, a principle 
of consent – it is necessary to start at the roots of its formation.  
Roughly speaking, the evolution of self-determination of peoples can be 
categorized in four periods or stages relevant for the purpose of this study. First, 
                                                        
75 Eide A, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Achievements in International Law during the Last 
Quarter of a Century’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 163, 2006. 
76 See, Corntassel J, 'Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary 
Indigenous-Rights Discourse', 33 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 105, 2008. 
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the developments in the early frame will be illustrated. These include the 
formation of the doctrine on the territorial state and the conception of the right 
to self-determination of peoples in the period of the French Revolution. The 
second stage in which self-determination was shaped was the period of the 
League of Nations in the aftermath of the First World War. In this period, Lenin 
and Wilson shaped the doctrine and proclaimed self-determination on the 
international level, albeit for very different reasons. Thirdly, in the years after the 
Second World War, with the birth of the United Nations and its policy on 
decolonization, self-determination was apprehended again and molded into a 
legal standard. Finally, it will be argued that we have arrived in a new phase in 
the evolution of self-determination: the contemporary, postcolonial era 
conception of the right for peoples, which also explicitly includes indigenous 
peoples. These four phases will be briefly examined in order to gain a genuine 
understanding of the scope of self-determination for indigenous peoples. 
Before describing these phases in which the concept of self-determination 
took shape, it is useful to briefly touch upon some of the basic concepts and 
idiom that surround the debate on self-determination. 
 
II.1.2.1 Self-Determination and its Vocabulary 
 
A people is one of the concepts in international law that has proven hard or 
sometimes even unfeasible to define. What is defined, however, is that peoples 
are the units that posses the right to self-determination (its subjects). 
Furthermore, they exercise this right as a collective entity. Peoples are 
commonly seen as possessing certain national characteristics, while what these 
are remains largely undetermined. As a legal concept, the implications of the 
term people can be interpreted differently than in its common meaning.77  
Similarly, as explained earlier, there is no single agreed definition in 
international law of indigenous peoples. Two commonly used working-
definitions are those mentioned in the Martínez Cobo study and in International 
Labour Convention No. 169 of 1989. These definitions focus on objective and 
subjective elements, and both regard self-identification as indigenous people as 
an important requirement.78 Collective self-identification seems essential for 
                                                        
77 Summers J, Peoples and International Law, How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a 
Contemporary Law of Nations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2007), page 2. 
(Summers, 2007) 
78 In 1983 J.R. Martínez Cobo concluded his, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against 
IndigenousPopulations, and stated that: “Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those 
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies 
now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations 
their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as 
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.” 
Cobo distinguished between objective and subjective elements, emphasising self-identification 
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indigenous or other peoples, but it leaves no room for misrecognition by other 
actors, like state institutions or majority groups. At the same time, a number of 
objective criteria can be mentioned, as long as a flexible approach to definitions 
is taken. A framework definition that is too rigid may lead to exclusion of 
individuals or groups that may require similar protection. 
The concept of a nation is often used synonymously with a people.79 In 
colloquial and legal use there is little to separate both concepts. One distinction 
between them could be found in the idea that a nation sometimes denotes 
something broader than a people denotes and could additionally entail political 
institutions. Thus, a nation is sometimes used synonymously with a state, 
whereas for a people, this proves to be more difficult.80 David Miller defines a 
nation as a “community of people with an aspiration to be politically self-
determining.”81  
A state, at least for present purposes, can be seen as the self-governing 
political entity, constituting the basic unit of international law in the classic, 
post-Westphalian conception of sovereign states. It comprises the set of 
institutions that a nation or people may aspire to possess for themselves.82 For 
                                                                                                                              
as indigenous as invaluable. See: Cobo Conclusions, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 page 50 
at 379 and page 5 at 21 and 22.  
In 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples was adopted. The posed 
definition in Article 1 of the Convention also distinguishes between objective and subjective 
elements. Noteworthy, ILO 169 explicitly excludes the use of the term “peoples” from its 
meaning in relation to Self-Determination of peoples:  
Article 1  
1. This Convention applies to:  
(a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions 
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated 
wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;  
(b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their 
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which 
the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present 
State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own 
social, economic, cultural and political institutions.  
2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for 
determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.  
3. The use of the term “peoples” in this Convention shall not be construed as having any 
implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.  
Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the International Labour 
Organisation at its seventy-sixth session, entry into force 5 September 1991. Emphasis added. 
79 Benedict Anderson described a nation as an “imagined political community,” one that lives 
only in the minds of those who see themselves as citizens of the same nation. In: Singer P, 
One World, the ethics of globalisation (Second edition, Yale University Press, New Haven & 
London, 2004), p. 170. 
80 Summers, 2007, p. 3. 
81 Miller D, On Nationality (Oxford University Press, 1995) In: Keitner C, National Self-
Determination, The Legacy of the French Revolution (Oxford University, March 2000), p. 2. 
82 Keitner C, National Self-Determination, The Legacy of the French Revolution (Oxford 
University, March 2000), p.2. 
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indigenous peoples, however, this is most often not the case. States are the 
subjects of the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, two notions 
that are balanced against the principle of self-determination. Although there are 
many other criteria for defining states, this minimalist definition will suffice for 
this study. 
As James Summers explains, the concept of self-determination of peoples has 
been shaped by the doctrines of nationalism, liberalism, and international law. 
Once again, a minimal definition of these concepts will aid in understanding 
self-determination in its historical context. 
Nationalism can be seen as a political doctrine, established in the 
revolutionary currents of the late 18th century, which thrives on two basic 
assumptions. First, nationalists believe that the world is divided into nations or 
peoples. Secondly, their conviction is that “the Nation” or “the People” is the 
foundation of the state. Consequently, the nation obtains its freedom by the 
establishment of its own state of which the legitimate form ought to be the 
nation-state.83 Nationalists share the belief that individuals can only achieve self-
realization and freedom through their nation.84 Particularly important for 
international law is the nationalist conviction that peaceful and friendly relations 
between states can only be obtained through free nations. Therefore, the 
doctrine of nationalism is a doctrine on state-hood.85  
The nationality principle entails the belief that non-nation-states should be 
broken up or merged towards nation-states that correspond with peoples.86 In a 
nationalist approach, peoples are presented as a homogenous group,87 a 
perception that tends to ignore the complex diversity in the sometimes large 
bodies of nations.88  
Therefore, where nationalism considers states only legitimate insofar as they 
represent nations or peoples, international law regards states as its basic unit. The 
two principal sources of international law,89 conventions and custom, are 
derived from the intentions and practice of sovereign states.90 Nationalism is 
                                                        
83 Summers, 2007, p. 9.  
84 Summers, 2007, p. 9. 
85 Charles Taylor explained that nationalism in modern politics is a fruit of Romanticism. 
Nationalism has its roots in Rousseau’s notion that the locus of sovereignty must be a “people” 
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87 Peter Singer described that on some views of nationality, to be a member of the same 
nation is like an extended version of being kin. Singer P, One World, the ethics of globalisation 
(Second edition, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2004), p. 167. 
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based on nations and peoples, whereas international law is fundamentally state-
oriented. Both doctrines, however, are related to the notion of the state. 
Nationalism requires authentic peoples to exercise self-determination, while 
positive international law calls for clear and well-defined categories of peoples, 
through the formation of states, for a consistent application of the right.  
Nationalism and liberalism are perhaps the two most influential doctrines in 
relation to the development of self-determination. For our purpose, liberalism 
can be understood as a doctrine developed during the age of the Enlightenment, 
during the 17th and 18th century. Its basis proposition states that legitimate 
political authority derives from individuals, who are free and equal. Liberal states 
are characterized by constitutionalism, the rule of law, and representative 
democracy as the best way to guarantee individual freedom.91 The authority of 
the government is derived from the people; i.e. the group of individuals 
composing the population of the state.  
Nationalism, liberalism and international law shaped the notion of self-
determination throughout history. The following paragraphs will try to explain 
how they did, and illustrate the different shapes and content self-determination 
of peoples has taken on, in order to get to contemporary perceptions of the right 
for indigenous peoples.  
 
II.1.2.2 Westphalia and the French Revolution 
 
Westphalia and State Sovereignty  
 
Men are naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that 
the governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their 
beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of 
the people.92 
 
The major changes that took place over the centuries preceding the peace of 
Westphalia in 1648 formed the basis for the doctrines of liberalism, nationalism 
and international law. These doctrines would shape the concept of self-
determination. The erosion of the feudal system together with the growth of 
towns and increasing industrial activities created a more powerful middle class.93 
This led to the need for monarchs to consolidate their power and move towards 
a more centralized form of nation-building. The centralized approach entailed a 
conception of sovereignty that worked internally, as an expression of the 
absolute power of the monarch over his citizens and – externally - against other 
powers. This formed the foundation for the concept of the territorial sovereign 
state, conceived after the Westphalian peace treaty.94 The Westphalian model 
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provided a structural framework for relations between distinct political and 
territorial entities.95  
The English Civil War of 1642 together with the later Glorious Revolution 
of 1688 revealed nationalist feelings of community and common identity and 
showed a major reassessment of the nature of political authority.96 The new 
conception, led by John Locke (1632 – 1704), founded the basis of government 
in the consent of the people. His theory, as described in his Two Treatises of 
Government, formed an original liberal theory of government based on the rule 
of law, individual freedoms, and the wishes of the people.97 If a government 
exercised powers beyond its right and infringed the rights of the governed, as a 
form of tyranny, the power returned to the hands of the governed, who were 
consequently entitled to create a new form of government.98 The basis for 
government was vested in what he called “the body of the nation,” although it 
was ultimately derived from the individual.99 In Locke’s view however, the 
people were not seen as the sovereign with the right to change and abolish 
political institutions “at will” (as later conceptions would). Locke’s theory was 
more conservative, leaving change of government as an “ultimum remedium” 
against tyranny.100 Locke’s theory provided an early liberal view that would pave 
the way for a more expanded view on popular government and the birth of self-
determination as a principle that would be developed about a century later, in 
the period of the French Revolution.  
 
The French Revolution and the Nationality Principle 
 
La puissance législative appartient au peuple, et ne peut appartenir 
qu'à lui.101  
                                                                                                                              
century political thinkers like Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes, posed the theory of sovereignty 
as an attempt to analyse the internal structure of a state, reasoning that there must be an entity 
with supreme legislative power in each state. John Austin (1790 – 1859), a utilitarian thinker 
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99 Summers, 2007, p. 95. 
100 John Locke, 1689, Second Treatise, Chapter XVIII, Of Tyranny. 
101 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, 1762, Book III, Chapter I. 
PRINCIPLES 
40 
While the Westphalian peace treaty marked the birth of the territorial, sovereign 
State, the years of the French Revolution witnessed the birth of the nation-
state.102 In the ideal conception of the nation-state principle pre-political nations 
should determine the legitimacy of states.103 This is indicative of the roots of 
social contract theory, of which Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau are among the 
best-known exponents.104 The origins of the principle of self-determination can 
be traced back to the philosophical debate surrounding the French Revolution 
of 1789 and the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. These events 
are indicative of the objection to the idea that individuals and peoples were mere 
objects placed at the discretion of the monarch. The reasoning behind the 
principle was that government should be responsible to the people it 
governed.105 Government with consent of the governed, that is. 
In France, however, the principle of self-determination was first explained as 
a standard governing the transfer of territory. 106 Unfortunately, in revolutionary 
France, it was often misused in actual practice. It was apprehended to justify 
annexation of lands belonging to other sovereigns, like Avignon in 1791 and 
Belgium in 1793.107 This external form of self-determination thus was not applied 
very uniformly, and popular plebiscites were only regarded valid when the vote 
was pro-French.108 Internally, during the period after the revolution, self-
determination preserved a limited scope of application as well.109 Colonial 
peoples as well as minorities, ethnic, and cultural groups were not entitled to 
self-determination. The principle, as enshrined in Title XIII of the 1793 Draft 
Constitution, did not explicitly refer to the right of peoples to freely choose 
their rulers,110 as in the common contemporary understanding of “internal” self-
determination, which will be examined later on in these paragraphs. 
Despite the limited scope and flawed application of the principle in practice, 
the importance of the French proclamation of the principle should not be 
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underestimated. It expressed the shift from despotic rule towards the 
enlightenment ideals of democratic government. Contrary to the Lockean 
conception of popular consent, the French liberals, like Rousseau, believed that 
governmental institutions could also be erected and abolished “at will” by the 
people.111 Nevertheless, the French conception of the principle was primarily 
concerned with permitting states to justify distribution of territories, and so was 
applied mostly in its external form.112  
 
II.2.2.3 The Vienna Congress and Liberal Nationalism 
 
Another event in the aftermath of the French revolution that shaped self-
determination, was the reaction to the Vienna Congress of 1815. The Congress 
aimed to restore a large number of territories to their former dynastic rulers and 
create buffer states between the Great Powers.113 This was condemned by 
liberals and nationalists as reactionary. The liberal conception of popular 
government, together with the nationality principle (the idea that the nation and 
the state should be congruent) challenged this reaffirmation of the division of 
power in the Vienna system.114  
The combination of the nationality principle and liberal values led to the 
concept of liberal nationalism. The merger of liberal and nationalist values entailed 
that in order to create a liberal society with representative institutions, a well 
functioning system of government, and a strong belief in the rule of law, it 
would be very feasible to have a sense of solidarity and common identity among 
the governed. Thus, in order to create a representative government, with 
popular self-rule, it was viewed as essential to consider these nationalist 
conceptions.115  
Liberal nationalism paved the way for the inclusion of the internal 
component of self-determination. Nationalism alone appealed more to the 
external form of self-determination since it was more concerned with the 
merger and break-up of states: it required that the nation and the state should be 
congruent. Liberal theory put the emphasis more on internal principles such as 
democracy, individual rights, and the rule of law within states. Liberals believed 
that government is derived from “the people,” that is, states should have a 
representative democratic basis, emphasizing the internal aspects of self-
determination. Nationalist ideology states that government is derived from “a 
people,” thereby meaning that the state should correspond with the nation, in 
that way putting more emphasis on the external aspects. Taken together, liberal 
nationalism assumed the necessity of a common identity to form a truly free 
state. John Stuart Mill’s words are clarifying: 
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Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of 
different nationalities. Among a people without fellow feelings, 
especially if they read and speak different languages, the united 
public opinion, necessary for the working of representative 
government, cannot exist.116  
 
Comprised in a simple model, self-determination of peoples in a liberal, 
nationalist, and liberal nationalist view could be presented as follows. The liberal 
perception on self-determination is concerned with the people comprising the 
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Figure 1: Liberalism.  
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Nationalist ideology assumes that states should be merged or broken up to 























In a liberal nationalist model, the ideal concept would be a state which 
corresponds with a nation or people, and that is internally organized by and with 
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Although the conception illustrated in the last model entailed an enhancement 
of the concept of self-determination, for culturally distinct minorities and 
indigenous peoples this liberal nationalist doctrine resulted in practice in forced 
assimilation and integration into the - often culturally quite different - larger 
political order.117 In this light, Francis Fukuyama has a point in observing that: 
“Most ‘liberal’ European societies were illiberal insofar as they believed in the 
legitimacy of imperialism, that is, the right of one nation to rule over other 
nations without regard for the wishes of the ruled.”118 Nevertheless, liberal 
nationalism shaped the content of self-determination as operating both internally 
and externally.  
Thus, the roots of self-determination, as a political principle, can be traced 
down far in history, originating from the liberal social contract theory conviction 
that government is legitimized through the “consent of the governed,” and 
nationalism, which holds that the nation and the state should be congruent. 
Taken together, the doctrine of liberal nationalism assumed that popular 
government and free institutions should be achieved ideally in a state, in which 
the “nation” or “people” held a common identity and shared values.  
 
II.2.2.3 Lenin, Wilson, and the League of Nations 
 
The second phase, in which self-determination was proclaimed in the 
international arena, concerns the period in the aftermath of the First World War. 
The abhorrent outcomes of a intercontinental war fought with modern 
weapons, resulting in millions of casualties, millions mutilated, and millions in 
poverty and shock, led to the belief in the interbellum that world peace could 
only be achieved through the creation of a global organization.119 This resulted 
in the birth of the League of Nations, of which US President Woodrow Wilson 
was the founding father. Together with the events in the currents of the 
Bolshevik October Revolution of 1917 - in which Lenin was the key figure - 





In the wake of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the 
concept of self-determination appeared on the international scene.120 Lenin was 
the first to propose the right of self-determination to the international 
community as a general criterion for the liberation of peoples. To Lenin, self-
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determination was to be the leading principle to liberate oppressed people and 
consequently spread the socialist revolution throughout the world.121  
The first elaboration on the principle of self-determination appeared in 
Lenin’s “Theses on the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-
Determination” (1916), and this was followed by many other Soviet declarations 
on the subject.122 For Lenin, Self-Determination had three main components. 
First, it served ethnic or national groups to freely decide their destiny. This 
could be achieved by secession or by gaining degrees of autonomy while 
remaining part of the larger political order. Secondly, it functioned as a guiding 
principle for territorial ordering in the aftermath of violent conflict. Third, self-
determination was an anti-colonial right, aimed at the liberation and 
independence of all colonial countries.123 Where the second component 
resembled the principle as it was used in the period after the French Revolution, 
the other two components were largely new.  
Evidently, in this case, the underlying political philosophy of self-
determination was socialism, expressed on the international level with “full 
equality of nations” and “the right of the oppressed nations to self-
determination.” Lenin mentioned in his “Theses” that victorious socialism had 
to go hand in hand with full democracy. Lenin’s way of applying self-
determination was mainly through promoting secession, expressed not per se 
through forcible means, but by a free expression of popular vote.124 Obviously, 
for Lenin, the ultimate goal of self-determination was not realizing 
independence for the colonial territories, but the creation of state structures 
susceptible to socialist world-government. The idea of self-determination was 
thus apprehended by Lenin as an instrument to spread socialism throughout the 
world. 
Where in time the first and second components became less important, the 
third (self-determination for colonial peoples) became very influential in 
international law and in shaping the world of states as we know it today. It is 
largely due to the Soviet Union efforts that self-determination became enshrined 




President Woodrow Wilson developed an alternative concept of self-
determination at the same time Lenin did. His view, as an expression of western 
democratic theory, was founded in the classic liberal principle that government 
must be based on the consent of the governed. He thereby emphasized a fourth 
component of the concept of self-determination, namely that a people should be 
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granted the right to freely choose its political leaders.126 Self-determination, in 
the Wilsonian conception meant an internal right to self-government. In addition 
to this variation, Wilson also proposed that self-determination was primarily 
related to the restructuring of states in Central Europe. Secondly, self-
determination was a criterion governing territorial change, and thirdly, it could 
serve as an instrument for settling colonial claims. Wilson, however, was of the 
opinion that self-determination had to be reconciled in this last variation with 
the interests of the Colonial Powers.127  
There appeared to be three major differences between Lenin’s and Wilson’s 
conception of self-determination: first, their clearly distinct ideology, second, 
Wilson’s emphasis on the internal conception, and third, the divergent ways of 
applying the idea of self-determination in practice. For Lenin it meant 
immediate liberation for colonial peoples, while Wilson called for a more 
gradual process of liberal reform.128  
Wilson’s thoughts on self-determination were heavily criticized. The 
concept was said to be too vague and its consequences underestimated. 
Moreover, self-determination in Wilson’s view was not applicable to national, 
internal matters, like the protection of United States minorities or indigenous 
peoples.  
 
The Interbellum Influence on Self-Determination  
 
In the end Wilson’s draft provision on self-determination, which provided a 
counterweight for territorial integrity, was not enshrined in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations.129 After the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, self-
determination was applied rather arbitrarily and was deemed irrelevant in cases 
where the people’s will would run counter to the victors’ political, economic 
and strategic interests.130 Furthermore, the Allies did not insist that the newly 
emerged states would adopt a democratic form of government, i.e. consent of 
the governed was no formal requirement. Nevertheless, in the spirit of Wilson, 
the new world organization was called League of Nations, instead of states, and 
had in its covenant preamble enshrined that the League was not only one of 
states, but also of peoples.131  
Moreover, the League appointed a commission of jurists in 1920 to inspect 
the Åland situation, which led to the eventual granting of far reaching 
autonomy-rights for the Finnish islands. Although the inhabitants had no right 
to secession, the commission did acknowledge the possibility of secession for 
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minorities.132 The reports affirmed that self-determination could be - at least 
partially - achieved without leading to independent statehood. 
Whereas the “Wilsonean” League of Nations eventually failed, the efforts of 
Lenin and Wilson did pave the way for self-determination to become embedded 
in international law. This, however, only happened after the Second World 
War.  
II.1.3 The Law of Self-Determination 
II.1.3.1 The Period after the Second World War  
 
In the wake of the Second World War, self-determination developed from 
primarily a political postulate towards a genuine legal standard. As such, it was 
apprehended and applied extensively, mainly externally, within the colonial 
context. Self-determination became an international legal norm shaped by treaty 
law and custom. This paragraph provides a short account on the positive law of 
self-determination as it was conceived within the different legal instruments 
created after the Second World War. 
The Atlantic Charter of 1941, which proved to be the first step towards the 
UN Charter, proclaimed self-determination as both a general standard governing 
territorial changes and as a principle requiring the free choice of rulers by the 
governed within the sovereign state.133 The Charter, drafted by Winston 
Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, thus comprised both external and internal 
self-determination.134 While the text seems aimed at a universal right to self-
determination, Churchill explicitly noted that self-determination had no bearing 
on colonial territories and served only to restore “the sovereignty, self-
government and national life of the states and nations of Europe under the Nazi 
yoke” next to providing for “any alterations in the territorial boundaries which 
may have to be made.”135  
 
The UN Charter 
 
In 1944, the UK, China, the US, and the Soviet Union drafted several proposals 
for a foundational document for a new world organization at the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference. Self-determination was not explicitly mentioned in these 
proposals, but in 1945, when the United Nations Conference of International 
Organization convened in San Francisco, a provision on self-determination was 
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enshrined in the UN Charter as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union.136 
Although the provision identified self-determination as a core objective for the 
new world organization,137 it remained largely unclear how the principle should 
function in practice and the concept was subject to different forms of 
criticism.138  
Therefore, the Drafting Committee agreed on four points guiding the use of 
self-determination. First, the principle had to correspond closely to the will and 
desires of peoples everywhere and should be clearly stated in the UN Charter.139 
Second, the principle conformed to the Charter purposes only insofar as it 
meant a right to self-government, not secession.140 Third, the principle extended 
to a possible amalgamation of nationalities if they freely chose this course.141 
Finally, but very important, it was agreed that an essential component of the 
principle of self-determination was “the free and genuine expression of the will 
of the people.”142  
At first sight, these four points seem to go quite far, but in fact states were 
unable to positively define self-determination and did not uniformly distinguish 
between internal and external self-determination. It did not entail a right to 
independence and only suggested that states should grant some form of self-
government and sovereignty to communities under their jurisdiction.143 Self-
determination had to go hand in hand with the promotion of friendly relations 
among states. This severely limited its scope, since it could easily be set aside by 
arguing that its exercise could possibly lead to conflict between states. More 
importantly, the Charter did not impose direct and immediate legal obligations 
on states since self-determination was framed in terms of a goal or program of 
the UN.144 
In spite of all these ambiguities and limitations on self-determination, the 
principle or right145 was recognized for the first time in a multilateral treaty, the 
UN Charter, which turned out to be one of the most important pieces of 
legislation for the new world community.146 The adoption of the UN Charter 
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thus marks an important turning point in history for self-determination. From a 
political postulate it now became an international legal standard. Although at first 
intended to guide UN action only, it would gradually become binding on 
sovereign states as well.147  
In the years following the adoption of the UN Charter the emphasis shifted 
from self-determination as a principle guiding peaceful relations between 
sovereign states towards an instrument aimed at achieving independence for 
colonial territories. Socialist doctrine together with the anti-colonial movement 
transformed self-determination into an external right to independence.148 Article 
1(2) was eventually conceived as a legal entitlement to decolonization, with the 
UN serving as the international forum for guiding the process of gaining 
independence for the colonial territories overseas through its trusteeship 
doctrine, (the so called “blue water thesis”) guided by the principle of uti 
possidetis iuris.  
UN GA Resolution 1514, the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, together with UN GA 
Resolution 1541 on the principles that should guide UN members in the 
application of the right to self-determination were the two most important 
resolutions for determining whether a right to independence existed.149 These 
were in some sense supplemented by the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN.150 The 1970 Declaration 
included an important “saving clause” which provides for a duty for states to 
realize an internal right to self-determination for its people which entails 
representative government without discrimination. Failure to do so might result 
in the emergence of a remedial right to secession for certain groups.151 
The external application of the right to self-determination, however 
important for shaping our world as it is today, will not be elaborated upon much 
further since the focus of this study lies within the internal conception of self-
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Colonial Countries and Peoples) and General Assembly Resolution 1541(XV) of 1960. 
150 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Adopted on a Report from the Sixth Committee 
(A/8082), 2625 (XXV). Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations 
151 The clause reads: Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described 
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour. Italics added. For a detailed treatment see: Cassesse, 1996. 
Also see Driest S F Van den, Remedial Secession, A Right to External Self-Determination as a 
Remedy to Serious Injustices (School of Human Rights Research Series, Intersentia, 2013). 
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determination. 152 Internal self-determination is a contested term and it may 
obscure the meaning of self-determination for indigenous peoples.  
Whereas the external component was shaped by the socialist and third world 
country political climate, the Western conception of self-determination still 
embraced an internal principle aimed at the democratic freedom of every 
people. The principle was thus conceived as the fundamental criterion for 
democratic legitimization of governments, but this meant governments of 
nation-states.153  
 
The 1966 Human Rights Covenants 
  
Prior to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, it 
became clear that the UN members aspired to adopt legally binding treaty 
provisions regarding the general principle of respect for human rights. These 
were eventually enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)154 and the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)155 in 1966. In accordance with liberal views on 
individual freedom, the Western countries initially only wanted to include 
individual human rights, but under pressure from the Soviet Union, and with 
support from the developing countries, a collective provision on self-
determination was eventually enshrined in common Article 1 to the 
Covenants.156 It reads as follows: 
 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust 
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-
                                                        
152 Also see: Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 
217. For an extensive examination see: Cassese, 1996 and Summers, 2007. 
153 Cassese, 1996, p. 47. 
154International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976. 
155 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 
21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976. 
156 Cassese, 1996, p. 49. 
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determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
The codification of self-determination, while at first heavily contested, formed 
the core Article of the Covenants. The wording is - almost - identical to the 
right enshrined in Article 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. An elaboration on its content is useful.  
Peoples are entitled to exercise their right to self-determination “freely” to 
determine their political status and their social and cultural development. With 
regard to internal self-determination, the chosen formulation “freely” requires 
that peoples choose their legislator free from any manipulation or undue 
influence from the national authorities.157 Internal, democratic, self-
determination should be understood as providing the opportunity for genuine 
expression of the popular will. Therefore, it encompasses a general right 
justifying the exercise of the other, individual, rights in the Covenants, in 
particular the political rights. Article 1 established a permanent link between self-
determination and the exercise of the individual rights enshrined in the 
Covenants as it developed into a legal principle guiding internal decision-making 
processes.158 Self-determination in this way became inextricably linked to 
democratic decision-making, providing a continuous or ongoing right.159 
Externally, Article 1(1) imposes the requirement that the political institutions 
of a state should be free from outside interference.160 Territorial integrity and 
state sovereignty (the counterweight principles of self-determination) can be 
distinguished here as providing a prohibition of interference by other states. 
Paragraph 2 expands self-determination to control over natural resources, which 
appears to be the logical corollary of self-determination as the right for peoples 
to freely choose by whom they are governed.161 However, the principle of 
sovereignty over natural resources is highly controversial within the context of 
indigenous peoples, as the next paragraphs will illustrate.  
Paragraph 3, on non-self-governing and trust territories, deals with 
achieving independence for colonial territories. In contemporary international 
law, the provision has lost most of its significance, since most of the colonial 
territories have already gained their independence. While in wording, self-
determination under Article 1 common to the 1966 Human Rights Covenants 
applies to all peoples, in practice it only applied to entire populations in 
independent sovereign states, entire populations of colonial territories that had 
                                                        
157 Cassese, 1996, p. 53. 
158 Cassese, 1996, p. 54. 
159 Whereas the original draft read “All peoples shall have the right to self-determination” the 
final text reads “All peoples have the right to self-determination” thereby emphasizing the fact 
that self-determination is exercised in a permanent, continuing manner. See: Cassese, 1996, p. 
54. Also see: Franck T ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ Am. J. Int’l L. 86, 
1992.  
160 Cassese, 1996, p. 55. 
161 Cassese, 1996, p. 55. 
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not yet gained full independence,162 and populations living under foreign 
military occupation.163 In positive international law, under the regime of the 
1966 Covenants, peoples living within sovereign states and minority groups are 
not entitled to self-determination. This is where the controversy regarding the 
legal implications of the right for indigenous peoples becomes visible. The 
emphasis was on external self-determination for colonial peoples, not on separate 
peoples that continue to be politically associated with a state.  
 
Conclusions on the Post World War II eriod 
 
In short, initially self-determination, as it entered the realm of international law 
with its codification in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter, only meant a right to 
self-government and proclaimed an objective for the UN and its Member States. 
However, under the pressure of the Soviet Union and the anti-colonial 
movement, it developed into a legal entitlement to decolonization, with the UN 
monitoring and guiding the process of independence for colonial territories.  
 This led to the adoption of Article 1 common to the 1966 Human Rights 
Covenants. With the adoption of the Covenants, self-determination gained a 
broader meaning than just an anti-colonial concept.164 It encompassed a right to 
internal self-determination, but this meant the right for the whole population of 
an independent state to freely choose its rulers, its government. Although the 
right only applied to whole populations, it was the first time that an international 
legal provision proclaimed the right of a people to democratic rule. 
Nevertheless, it did not apply to peoples or nations within states. Thus, although 
self-determination gained its internal component in international law, there was 
still no noticeable shift away from the state-centered approach. In the next 
paragraph, the evolution of self-determination for indigenous peoples in the 
post-colonial era will be examined. 
II.1.4 Beyond the State: Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples 
This paragraph describes how self-determination has become a right indigenous 
peoples claim. The concept of self-determination is largely disconnected from 
independent statehood, since indigenous peoples by and large do not aspire 
secession. The challenges to indigenous self-determination are myriad and 
widespread, and the debate about its content is far from over with the adoption 
of the UN Declaration and its provision on self-determination. This and the 
following paragraphs will illustrate that indigenous self-determination has 
important political, cultural and economic elements, all of which are contested 
and all of which are related to FPIC. 
 
                                                        
162 The boundaries were kept intact, guided by the principle of “Uti Possidetis Iuris.” 
163 For an elaboration on the assessment of these categories, see: Cassese, 1996. 
164 Cassese, 1996, p. 65. 
CHAPTER II 
53 
II.1.4.1 Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples during the Post-Decolonization 
and Post Cold-War period 
 
At the start of Part II, the right to self-determination was cited as it is enshrined 
in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. As described 
above, self-determination evolved towards a democratic right, intimately tied to 
human rights precepts after the Second World War, through the UN Charter 
and the UN Human Rights Covenants. However, this internal right to self-
determination only applied to whole populations of states.165 The fourth period, 
in which arguably a right to self-determination for indigenous peoples was 
recognized, is indicative of a trend in international law: an expansion of the right 
to nations or peoples within states, not constituting the whole of the 
population.166 This reconceptualization of self-determination, in which sub-state 
groups can be its subject, is essential for this study and for a proper understanding 
of free, prior and informed consent. 
The shift to self-determination for indigenous peoples was caused by a 
change in political and legal mode of thought. In relation to indigenous peoples’ 
and minority protection, the focus had always been on combating discrimination 
and integration into the larger political order. This required positive measures, 
which are inherently of a temporal character in contrast to the latter conception 
of indigenous self-determination as facilitating a continuous process.167 The 
climate changed in the 1970s, partly under the influence of the 1966 Human 
Rights Covenants168 and because indigenous peoples themselves found ways to 
make their voices heard. 
                                                        
165 The 1975 Helsinki Final Act emphasized that the internal dimension of self-determination 
is best seen as a democratic right. For an excellent discussion see: Cassese A, Self-Determination 
of Peoples, a Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 1995, reprinted in 1996), page 278-
296. 
166 Evidently, this is a very slow trend, Cf. Crawford J, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in 
International Law, Its Development and Future’, in: Alston, Peoples Rights (2001), p. 64. “[…] 
this does not mean that the only ‘peoples’ relevant for international purposes are the whole 
people of each state. International lawyers should resist the conclusion that a widely-used term 
is to be stipulatively and narrowly defined, in such a way that it reflects neither normal usage 
nor the self-perception and identity of diverse and long-established human groups. That 
would make the principle of self-determination into a cruel deception: it may be so, but the 
presumption is to the contrary, and our function should be to make sense of existing 
normative language, corresponding to widely-regarded claims of rights, and not to retreat into 
a self-denying legalism.” 
167 Allen S and Xanthaki A, Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
(Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 238 ff. Stephen Allen explains that human rights approaches to 
problems of group discrimination have focussed on positive action. The rationale for such 
measures is substantive equality, but when the discriminatory practices are corrected, the need 
for such measures ceases. It is therefore problematic to phrase such measures in the language of 
rights, which are not of a temporal character. 
168 Eide A, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Achievements in International Law during the Last 
Quarter of a Century’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 163, 2006, page 163. 
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James Anaya distinguishes two significant developments after the end of the 
Cold War and the decolonization period. Related to the decline of the Soviet 
authoritarian system, a renewed worldwide faith arose in non-authoritarian 
democratic institutions, linked to the notion of subsidiarity, the idea that 
decisions can often best be made at the most local level. Bottom-up approaches 
are preferred over top-down approaches. The second development can be 
characterized as the embrace of cultural pluralism brought about by the fading 
classic notion of the culturally or ethnically homogenous nation-state that was 
explored at the beginning of this part.  
Thus, instead of emphasizing non-discrimination and integration, the focus 
shifted towards self-determination and cultural integrity, towards accepting that 
indigenous peoples have their own cultures, distinct from the larger political 
order in which the “indigenous nation” is placed. This entails the belief that the 
right of indigenous peoples to freely practice their culture and traditions in 
accordance with their own institutional structures and customs is invaluable in 
protecting them.169 Acceptance of intrinsic worth of cultural diversity replaced 
the idea of progressive integration. The emergence of FPIC processes are in line 
with these developments. 
In positive international law however, as was indicated above, this does not 
amount to a right to secession. The dominant view on indigenous peoples’ right 
to self-determination is that it implies only internal self-determination, and that a 
right to independence is only allowed under exceptional circumstances, as an 
ultimum remedium. It is largely beyond the scope of this study to go into the 
question why indigenous peoples should or should not have secession rights.170 
Since informed consent procedures are applied between indigenous groups and 
other entities within states, the focus will be on self-determination within the 
framework of the state.  
Regarding external self-determination, it is important to bear in mind that 
in general the international community discourages secession, on precepts of 
stability and peace, and balances self-determination against territorial integrity 
and state sovereignty. In the post-colonial era, the preferred course of action is 
to encourage the state to share power democratically with all groups or nations 
within its boundaries, under a constitutional formula that guarantees effective 
and genuine participation and representation.171 The scope of this right to 
“internal” self-determination, which is arguably a confusing term, is assessed in 
light of the historical conception of self-determination mentioned in the former 
paragraphs. Taken together with contemporary interpretations, the ties between 
                                                        
169 The replacement of ILO Convention No. 107 by ILO Convention No. 169, which will 
be mentioned in the next paragraph, is highly illustrative of this changing perception on 
Indigenous Peoples protection. 
170 In this respect, See Driest S F Van den, Remedial Secession, A Right to External Self-
Determination as a Remedy to Serious Injustices (School of Human Rights Research Series, 
Intersentia, 2013). 
171 Daes E I A, ‘Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 1, 1993, page 8. 
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self-determination precepts and the principle of free, prior and informed 
consent, as enshrined in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, will become clearer.  
 
II.1.4.2 Interpretations of Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination  
 
This paragraph will examine different interpretations and conceptualizations of 
the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples. Eventually, a model on 
indigenous self-determination will be presented that will also serve to clarify the 
notion of FPIC later on in this study. 
One familiar line of argument, reasoning from a state-centered frame,172 is 
that indigenous peoples possess elements of sovereignty predating the existence 
of the larger political order in which they live. Indigenous peoples are “peoples” 
subject to the right to self-determination, as explicitly stated in the UN 
Declaration. “Peoples” can be equated with “nations” whereas the difference 
between the two would be that “nations” also possess - some basic or more 
developed - governing structures. Indigenous peoples often retained their own 
systems of government and decision-making, which are usually quite distinct 
from the governmental system of the larger political order. In this light, since 
indigenous peoples are distinct cultural groups within states, all these states are 
multi-nation states.  
In social contract theory, a nation’s legitimacy is derived from a constitutive 
(hypothetical) moment, in which the nation is conceived with the consent of 
the governed. Indigenous peoples were excluded from this process as a rule. In 
other words, it is doubtful if the indigenous people concerned would have 
consented to inclusion into the larger political structure. Political values and 
systems foreign to them were often simply imposed on them, without their 
consent, and often through a practice of systemic inhumane treatment and 
forced assimilation. In general, indigenous peoples did not participate in state-
building or shared in national decision-making.173  
This line of reasoning forms a justification for granting indigenous peoples 
the right to self-determination. It does not reject the possibility that other sub-
state groups could also have claims to the same right. However, the trend in 
international law and politics is that indigenous peoples are more likely 
candidates for being subjects of the right to self-determination.174 
                                                        
172 Anaya S J, ‘Superpower Attitudes Toward Indigenous Peoples and Group Rights’, Am. 
Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 93, 1999, p. 252. According to Anaya, the state-centered approach should 
be distinguished from the human rights approach. However, both lines of argumentation are 
instructive and since self-determination has, as this paragraph illustrates, always been a doctrine 
connected with statehood, these aspects need not to be ignored. 
173 Daes E I A, ‘Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 1, 1993, page 8. 
174 I see no basis on which to reject a concept of internal self-determination for other minority 
groups. An examination on this issue unfortunately falls outside the scope of this work. James 
Anaya argues that what distinguishes indigenous peoples is the remedial aspect of self-
determination. Indigenous peoples’ substantive rights to self-determination, in Anaya’s 
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Since the common opinion is that self-determination for indigenous peoples 
means “internal” self-determination,175 an extra dimension of sovereignty, or 
perhaps better, autonomy, is created within the framework of the State for the 
new self-determining entity. Sovereignty, in this view, is no longer conceived in 
the absolute post Westphalian conception, but is a more dynamic notion 
applicable not only to the state. Other entities within the state itself (in this case 
indigenous) peoples may, to a certain extent, possess a form of sovereignty 
parallel to state sovereignty.176 Later on in Part II we will examine a for 
indigenous peoples particularly important and controversial aspect of 
sovereignty, namely the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, which is an important economic component of self-determination.  
Internal self-determination for indigenous peoples is often equated with self-
government, which again expresses the belief that government is to function 
according to the will of the people governed.177 Self-determination in this sense 
is a democratic right. According to Thomas Franck, self-determination 
postulates the right of a people organized in an established territory178 to 
determine its collective political destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore 
at the core of the democratic entitlement.179 It has evolved into a more general 
notion of internationally validated political consultation.180 This also illustrates 
that, as mentioned before, self-determination operates as a continuing or 
ongoing right instead of only legitimizing a constitutive moment.181  
Arguments derived from state-centered and human rights based approaches 
dominate the debate on indigenous self-determination, and different authors 
have interpreted and elaborated on its content. One of the early key documents 
                                                                                                                              
opinion, have been more systemically violated in the past. At present, indigenous peoples 
continue to be more vulnerable than other national groups. See: Anaya, 2004. See also: 
Kymlicka W, ‘Theorizing Indigenous Rights’, University of Toronto Law Journal 49, 1999. 
Also see Kymlicka W, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 2007), where Kymlicka explains that arguments concerning 
national security presently prevent the recognition of rights to self-determination for other 
groups.  
175 Anaya argues that: “The resistance towards acknowledging self-determination as implying 
rights for literally all peoples is founded on the misconception that Self-Determination in its 
fullest sense means a right to independent statehood.” This misconception is often reinforced 
by reference to decolonization. Anaya, 2004, page 103. 
176 Lenzerini F, ‘Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of 
Indigenous Peoples’, Texas International Law Journal 42, 2006-2007, p. 189. 
177 Anaya, 2004, page 150. 
178 Although a requirement of territory is contested, see Morag Goodwin, The Romani Claim 
to Non-territorial Nationhood, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2006. 
179 Franck T ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ Am. J. Int’l L. 86, 1992., p. 
52. 
180 Ibid. p. 55. 
181 In this context one could point to the referendums or plebiscites held in the decolonisation 
period, indicative of a constitutive moment in which Self-Determination is exercised as 
leading to the formation of a new independent State. 
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is former Chairperson and Special Rapporteur of the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations, Erica-Irene A. Daes’ 1993 paper.182 
She asserts that it would be “inadmissible and discriminatory” to deny 
indigenous peoples the right to self-determination merely because they are 
indigenous. Besides the fact that this would imply that indigenous peoples would 
not have any rights to secession, this would mean that they are not in a position 
to demand full democratic partnership.183 According to Daes, self-determination 
has taken on a new meaning in the post-colonial era. She considers: 
 
Ordinarily it is the right of the citizens of an existing independent 
state to share power democratically. However, a state may 
sometimes abuse this right of its citizens so grievously and 
irreparably that the situation is tantamount to classic colonialism, and 
may have the same legal consequences.184 
 
Daes does not rule out the possibility of a right to secession, but this is only an 
option in the most extreme cases. She continued: 
 
The international community discourages secession as a remedy for 
the abuses of fundamental rights, but as recent events around the 
world demonstrate, does not rule out this remedy completely in all 
cases. The preferred course of action, in every case but the most 
extreme, is to encourage the state in question to share  power 
democratically with all groups, under a constitutional formula that 
guarantees that it is effectively representative.185 
 
This articulation of self-determination seems to be the way the right is to be 
understood in the context of the UNDRIP. Daes argues that with some 
exceptions, indigenous peoples were never part of state-building, and did not 
have any opportunity to participate in the constitutional design of the states in 
which they live.186 Indigenous peoples thus should be retroactively involved in 
the process of creating the institutions and governmental framework of the larger 
states in which they reside. In Daes’ much cited words: 
 
With regard to indigenous peoples, then, I believe that the right of 
self-determination should ordinarily be interpreted as the right of 
these peoples to negotiate freely their political status and 
representation in the states in which they live. This process might 
best be described as a kind of belated state-building, through which 
                                                        
182 Daes E I A, ‘Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 1, 1993. (Daes, 1993) 
183 Daes, 1993, p. 9. 
184 Daes, 1993, p. 8. 
185 Daes, 1993, p. 8. 
186 Daes, 1993, p. 8. 
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indigenous peoples are able to join with all the other peoples that 
make up the state on mutually-agreed upon terms, after many years 
of isolation and exclusion. This process does not require the 
assimilation of individuals, as citizens like all other, but the 
recognition and incorporation of distinct peoples in the fabric of the 
state, on agreed terms.187  
 
Daes combines lines of argumentation from both a statist and a human rights 
perspective to come to her understanding of indigenous self-determination. The 
“belated state-building” argument mentioned above denotes a form of 
retroactive consent to the governmental structures of the state in which 
indigenous peoples live. Daes’ contractarian argument requires a re-negotiation 
of the arrangements (constitutional or other) between indigenous peoples and 
states. Further on in this study it is argued that FPIC is about building a 
framework in which such negotiations – between indigenous peoples and other 
entities, not just states – can be held.  
James Anaya also refers to self-determination as foundational for the 
contemporary normative regime that concerns indigenous peoples.188 He 
conceives of self-determination as a “universe of human rights precepts 
concerned broadly with all peoples, including indigenous peoples, grounded in 
the idea that all are equally entitled to control their own destinies.”189  
According to Anaya, self-determination is a human right, and should be 
interpreted together with other human rights norms. As a configurative 
principle, it is to be complemented by more specific human rights norms in 
forming a holistic framework for the governing institutional order.190 The line 
taken in this study is that free, prior and informed consent is invaluable for the 
exercise of those other norms, especially those dealing with lands and resources.  
 The interpretation that self-determination is necessarily tied up with 
statehood should be abandoned to make place for a right to self-determination 
that is meaningful for indigenous peoples. Anaya described three types of 
dominant variants on the classic perspective on self-determination, all three of 
which are flawed.191 
 The misconception that is present in these variants is that they perceive the 
world as divided in mutually exclusive “sovereign” territorial communities. 
According to Anaya, this view is based on the Western theoretical perspective of 
an international legal space composed of individuals and states. This model 
                                                        
187 Daes, 1993, p. 9. 
188 Anaya 2004, p. 97. 
189 Anaya 2004, p. 98. 
190 Anaya 2004, p. 99. 
191 Anaya 2004, p. 100. The first variant holds that self-determination only applies to 
populations and territories under a situation of classical colonialism, the second states that 
peoples entitled to self-determination include the aggregate population of independent states 
and classical colonial territories, and the third variant perceives ‘peoples’ as those units that 
once were sovereign states or are entitled to be states.  
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ignores the “multiple overlapping spheres of community, authority and 
interdependency that actually exist in the human experience.”192 It is clear that 
Anaya emphasized that in the contemporary world, a conception of self-
determination based on a division between individuals and states does not 
suffice, if it is to have real meaning for the multiple and overlapping spheres of 
human association that characterize humanity.193  
Therefore, the ideal or principle of self-determination, which is based on 
precepts of equality and freedom, ought to concern the constitution and 
functioning of all levels and forms of government.194 In Anaya’s view, peoples 
should thus be understood to denote “all those spheres of community, marked 
by elements of identity and collective consciousness, within which people’s lives 
unfold – independently of considerations of historical or postulated 
sovereignty.”195 Although Anaya rejected these attributes of sovereignty, their 
argumentative value is seen in this study as complementary to human rights 
based arguments, and considered instructive in clarifying the application of free, 
prior and informed consent. 
Anaya’s conceptualization of self-determination makes the concept 
applicable not only to whole populations of states and colonial peoples, but also 
to “other spheres of community that define human existence and place in the 
world.”196 This is in line with the view taken here that self-determination at its 
core is not concerned with independent statehood. For indigenous peoples, 
statehood is often not what they aspire, and this misconception about self-
determination has frustrated constructive debate about what indigenous peoples 
understand by it and how it should be applied for and by them. 
The substance of the norm of self-determination is to be distinguished from 
its remedial prescriptions.197 Where the substantive content of the norm is 
applicable to all, the remedial prescriptions that follow from it differ and are 
necessarily only relevant to groups that have suffered from violation of 
substantive self-determination.198 Anaya stated that substantive self-determination 
is build up out of two normative strains: first, its constitutive aspect, which holds 
that the governing institutional order is the outcome of processes guided by the 
will of the peoples, and secondly, an ongoing aspect, which requires that the 
governing order is one under which people live and develop their lives in 
freedom on an ongoing, continuous basis.199 In positing this framework, Anaya 
rejected the internal/external dichotomy, which according to him is premised 
on the - rejected - view of a “limited universe of peoples comprising mutually 
exclusive spheres of community.” As argued in this work, the internal/external 
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distinction is confusing, since “internal” self-determination for indigenous 
peoples necessarily comprises both internal and external elements. Nevertheless, 
the terminology will be upheld, since it is also instructive in explaining the 
concept of free, prior and informed consent. Furthermore, in order for self-
determination and FPIC to become workable concepts, a degree of 
categorization and delineation is needed.  
Constitutive self-determination is linked with the provision’s text that all 
peoples “freely determine their political status,” thereby imposing variable 
standards of participation and consent that aim to guarantee that the political 
order reflects the will of the people or peoples concerned.200 Ongoing self-
determination is coupled with the phrase “freely pursue their economic, social, 
and cultural development.” It thus requires a political order in which all are free 
to make meaningful decisions about their own paths and pace of development 
on a continuous basis.201 Culturally differentiated groups, in exercising their 
ongoing right to self-determination, require a political order in which the group 
is able to retain its culturally distinct character, while at the same time having 
this character reflected in the governmental institutions.202 
Anaya stressed that the remedial prescriptions, like secession in the colonial 
context, ought to be distinguished from its substantive groundings, where these 
prescriptions aim to remedy violations of the substantive right. The remedies 
may vary, and ought to be in accordance with the aspirations of the group 
concerned. For many indigenous peoples, Anaya agreed, secession may be a cure 
worse than the disease.203 
Focusing on the variety of remedial measures that may be available seems an 
appropriate way to finding constructive solutions to the problems that many 
indigenous communities face.  
Although this view is an attractive one, Will Kymlicka took a critical stance 
towards Anaya’s theoretical exposition and claims that he leaves some 
fundamental questions unaddressed.204 He stated that Anaya’s claim that 
substantive self-determination is applicable to all groups, does not reflect 
international legal reality and that the remedial aspect of self-determination does 
not fit easily within a permanent “rights” framework, since remedies are of a 
more temporal nature.205  
Kymlicka’s main arguments centre on the difficult legal distinction between 
indigenous peoples and other minority groups. This distinction is difficult to 
uphold from a theoretical point of view, but is a factual reality in international 
conventions and documents. Kymlicka convincingly argued that the willingness 
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to grant indigenous peoples a right to self-determination, where for national 
minorities this willingness is definitely absent, is based on security considerations, 
rather than on principled argument.206 
Nevertheless, Anaya provided some compelling argumentation that self-
determination for indigenous peoples is based on precepts of freedom and 
equality, and that the remedies for specific violations of substantive self-
determination may vary. This way he emphasized that self-determination can be 
and should be exercised in different ways, certainly not only by independence. 
For indigenous peoples this is most often not what they aspire and the focus 
should be more on the arrangements between them and the governments of the 
states in which they live. The available and appropriate remedies (like forms of 
self-government, land and resource rights, and autonomy) are to be found in a 
fair process of negotiation. Anaya stresses that indigenous peoples have the same 
right to self-determination that all other peoples have, but it is in the remedies of 
violations of this right, that a diverging approach is discernible and 
appropriate.207  
Anaya thus denoted self-determination as a human right and sees the 
reference to “peoples” as “designating rights that human beings hold and 
exercise collectively in relation to the bonds of community or solidarity that 
typify human existence.”208 As a human right, self-determination “cannot be 
viewed in isolation from other human rights norms but rather must be 
reconciled with and understood as part of the broader universe of values and 
prescriptions that constitute the modern human rights regime.”209 For Anaya, 
the essential content of self-determination, seen as a human right, is: “that 
human beings, individually and as groups, are equally entitled to be in control of 
their own destinies, and to live within governing institutional orders that are 
devised accordingly.”210 Anaya concluded: 
 
Self-determination is an animating force for efforts toward 
reconciliation — or, perhaps more accurately, conciliation — with 
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peoples that have suffered  oppression at the hands of others. Self-
determination requires confronting and reversing the legacies of 
empire, discrimination, and cultural suffocation. It  does not do 
so to condone vengefulness or spite for past evils, or to foster 
divisiveness but rather to build a social and political order based on 
relations of mutual understanding and respect.211 
 
Benedict Kingsbury advocated another “participatory” approach to self-
determination and although he takes a critical stance towards arguments 
reconciling the self-determination regime with the human rights discourse, his 
view is very much in line with the stance taken in this study.212 Kingsbury’s 
relational approach is instructive in explaining the linkages between indigenous 
self-determination and FPIC, since both concepts are participatory or 
cooperative in nature.  
Describing the law of self-determination as a “conceptual morass” he rightly 
concedes that claims of indigenous peoples to self-determination require some 
rethinking of the traditional meaning of self-determination in international 
law.213 If self-determination is to be an important tool for indigenous peoples, 
the “end-state” approach is to be abandoned and a relational one is to be 
acquired, since, as discussed earlier, most indigenous groups expect to continue 
an enduring relationship with the state(s) in which they reside.214 
A relational approach may capture many of the aspirations indigenous 
peoples have and it is in line with the UNDRIP, which emphasizes that a spirit 
of cooperation and respect between indigenous peoples and states is to be 
promoted. Self-determination is about the relationship between host-state and 
communities, about legal principles concerned with creating, maintaining, or 
altering existing and enduring relationships between indigenous peoples and 
states.215 As described in this study, informed consent processes are important 
tools to build and maintain such relationships.216 
The UNDRIP specifies self-determination as entailing “self-government” 
and “autonomy” rights, but such rights are only to be acquired through a fair 
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process of negotiation and participation.217 The focus should thus be on the 
relations between the autonomous entities and their institutions. These relations 
require complex governance structures that may require the consent of all 
affected groups.218 
Autonomy in this sense is not just “freedom” but concerns a complex and 
continuous relationship. Kingsbury’s relational conceptualization of self-
determination embodies the aspiration to define the relationship between 
indigenous communities and states. What is vital in establishing such relations is 
that a central focus is on the terms and dynamics of the relational aspects.219  
This is a key point for this study: fair processes of communication and 
participation are the essential requirements for establishing arrangements 
between indigenous groups and other entities that can be characterized as “free.” 
Autonomy is thus to be found via participatory processes, and it is such processes 
that require further attention, as this study aims to explain.  
Kingsbury conceded that the relational approach to self-determination 
requires a crossing of boundaries between the self-determination and human 
rights discourses.220 Both Daes and Anaya, albeit in different ways, 
acknowledged that self-determination for indigenous peoples should be 
understood from a human rights perspective. The UNDRIP supports this view, 
in posing self-determination as an umbrella right which is specified by the 
subsequent provisions.221 
Kingsbury concluded that a relational perspective on self-determination may 
be the best one for progressing towards reaching global agreement on political 
and legal issues connected with indigenous peoples.222 
Taking into account these views and more recent developments like the 
adoption of the UNDRIP, it is possible to come to an informative 
understanding of self-determination for indigenous peoples. The different 
interpretations have in common that self-determination is a participatory concept, 
which is in line with the principles underlying the UNDRIP.223 One of the 
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most important goals of the Declaration is to strengthen partnerships between 
indigenous peoples and states in a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation.224 
Just like self-determination, FPIC is also about building partnerships, about 
recognition and cooperation between entities that have decision-making powers 
in diverging areas. The following paragraphs will support this view. Although 
there can be conflicts between self-determination as a state-centered and as a 
human rights based concept, the view that is supported here is that both lines of 
reasoning are important and are reconcilable in an understanding of self-
determination for indigenous peoples. 
What is called internal self-determination for indigenous peoples vis-à-vis 
the state thus has to be a dual concept, aiming on the one hand at respect for 
autonomy and cultural integrity, and on the other hand at participation through 
democratic representation and inclusion in the larger political order in which the 
indigenous nation is situated.225 As mentioned earlier, autonomy arrangements 
can only be achieved through a fair system of participation. Furthermore, 
participation and respect for autonomy are based on the precept that it truly is 
the indigenous people as a whole that is respected, represented, and entitled to 
equal participation.  
This implies that in order to adhere to these external norms, internal 
participatory standards are necessary. Here it becomes clear that “internal self-
determination” is a confusing term in this context. Two dimensions in which 
internal self-determination operates are distinguished. First, in what will be 
called the “internal dimension”, that is, within the indigenous group itself, and 
secondly, between the indigenous nation as a self-determining collective entity 
and the larger political order in which it is situated. Building on the previously 
outlined models, this places an indigenous people as a self-determining entity in 
a rather peculiar situation. Contrary to the ideal models of liberal, nationalist, 
and liberal nationalist self-determination, internal self-determination for 
indigenous peoples does not estimate congruence between the nation or people 
and the state. This said, internal self-determination for indigenous peoples, posed 
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This simplified model, on which of course countless variations are possible, illustrates 
the particularities that a right to self-determination for indigenous peoples entails. 
Moreover, as will be shown later on, this model will aid in getting a better insight 
into  FPIC processes. 
 The most important way in which indigenous peoples can exercise their right to 
self-determination is through control over lands and resources. A key feature of this 
study is that FPIC cannot be detached from the right to self-determination and rights 
to lands and resources.  
II.2 Self-Determination through Control over Land and Resources 
Self-determination can be exercised in a number of ways, but for indigenous 
peoples the principle is directly related to their lands, territories and resources. As 
discussed above, it is through effective and equal participation that indigenous 
peoples may acquire such control. FPIC is becoming a central principle or tool 
to realize that indigenous peoples indeed have a say in decision-making processes 
concerning their lands and resources.  
The following paragraph will provide a brief introduction into why land and 
resources are so fundamentally important for indigenous peoples. Since the 
remainder of this study, especially Part V, will elaborate upon land and resource 
rights in detail, an introduction about why they matter suffices here.226 
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II.2.1 Indigenous Peoples’ Special Relation to their Lands 
Self-determination through control over land is of primary importance to 
indigenous peoples for a number of reasons. Indigenous communities require 
land for their subsistence. Furthermore, they often have a special spiritual 
relation to their traditionally occupied territories. Land rights therefore are 
important to indigenous peoples’ physical survival as well as their cultural 
survival.227 This claim appears to require a large degree of control over decisions 
pertaining to these lands. This paragraph will briefly explain the special value of 
land for indigenous communities and will indicate some of the most common 
contemporary threats indigenous peoples face in relation to their lands. 
 In her seminal 2001 study, Erica-Irene Daes explained that the gradual 
deterioration of indigenous societies can be traced to the non-recognition of 
their lands, and to a lack of understanding of how profound the relationship of 
indigenous peoples with their lands is.228 Colonization of indigenous peoples’ 
territories affected them in a number of negative ways, as is well known. Daes 
mentions: maltreatment, enslavement, punishment for resistance, warfare, 
diseases and outright extermination as some of those effects. Indigenous 
populations in some areas declined with 95% and they were generally perceived 
as inferior or uncivilized beings with no rights to the lands they occupied. 
Doctrines of dispossession, mainly the discovery doctrine and the concept of 
terra nullius, were devised – in international law – to allow the colonizing 
powers to gain title to indigenous lands without having to pay any form of 
compensation.229 
 Contemporary issues frustrating indigenous land rights are unfortunately also 
numerous. In the name of national development, indigenous territories are 
expropriated and indigenous communities are often relocated and resettled. The 
integrity of the environment is often threatened by state supported projects and 
indigenous peoples often lack any form of legal protection. A number of cases in 
which these problems arose will be discussed in this study.  
 Already in the early eighties, José R. Martínez Cobo described the special 
relation indigenous peoples have to their lands in his groundbreaking and vast 
study on the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations. He 
stated: “It is essential to know and understand the deeply spiritual special 
relationship between indigenous peoples and their land as basic to their existence 
as such and to all their beliefs, customs, traditions and culture.” Furthermore:  
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For such peoples, the land is not merely a possession and a means of 
production. The entire relationship between the spiritual life of 
indigenous peoples and Mother Earth, and their land, has a great 
many deep-seated implications. Their land is not a commodity which 
can be acquired, but a material element to be enjoyed freely.230  
 
Later on in this study, when a number of landmark cases dealing with 
indigenous peoples before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights will be 
discussed, a closer examination of this special relation to land will be provided.  
 An important point that Daes makes is that while there may be some degree 
of recognition of land rights available, real control by means of having a say in 
decision-making concerning development, use of natural resources, 
management, and conservation measures, is often absent. This is necessary for 
indigenous peoples to exercise their right to self-determination and as the topic 
of this study suggests, FPIC processes are instruments that help to realize such 
control.  
 In sum, one central claim that indigenous peoples make in international law 
is the claim to control and own their territories. Jérémie Gilbert elaborates: 
“Even though indigenous peoples reflect the tremendous diversity of the world, 
living in some of the most remote parts of the globe, it is striking to realize how 
they all share the same attachment to their lands, which plays a central cultural, 
social and economic role within indigenous societies globally.”231 In this light, 
the preamble to the UNDRIP states: 
 
Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments 
affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable 
them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and 
traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with 
their aspirations and needs.232 
 
The claim to control over lands is essentially also a claim to property. 
Nevertheless, indigenous and western conceptions of property may differ 
substantially, and ownership of the land in indigenous societies is often not 
centered on the individual, but is held by the community collectively. 
Interpretations of the human right to property, expanding it to include collective 
property rights for indigenous peoples over their lands, will be one of the central 
topics of Part V. 
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This connection between the human right to property and protection of 
indigenous peoples’ lands was first recognized in the milestone Awas Tingni v. 
Nicaragua case in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decided 
that the right to property includes a right for indigenous peoples to collective 
land ownership. In particular, this right is perceived as important to guarantee 
the continuing physical and cultural survival of indigenous communities in light 
of the special spiritual relation that indigenous peoples have with their lands, to 
accommodate different perceptions on the concept of property or ownership, 
and to guarantee indigenous peoples their means of subsistence and the 
protection of their environments. The related concept of native title to 
indigenous peoples’ lands has also been recognized by other - regional and 
national - judicial bodies.233 It is vital to understand that indigenous perspectives 
on land and property can differ substantially from other ideas about private 
property.234 Current developments in international law recognize that 
indigenous peoples require collective land rights in order to protect their 
livelihoods.235 These developments will be examined closely later on and it will 
be illustrated that FPIC plays a pivotal role in respecting these rights. 
Indigenous peoples’ rights to land may have to include – to some extent – 
their right to utilize the natural resources that can be found there. Nevertheless, 
there is still a lot of discussion about to what extent indigenous peoples should 
also be allowed to manage and exploit the natural resources found on their lands 
and territories. 
II.2.2 Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
As discussed above, Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes asserted that 
indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition of their property and 
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ownership rights with respect to lands.236 In a 2004 study, Daes reiterated that 
there is a growing trend in international law to extend the concept and principle 
of self-determination to peoples and groups within states. Daes concluded that in 
order for this to be meaningful for indigenous peoples, it must logically and 
legally carry with it the essential right of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources.237 She suggested that international law has now reached the point 
where it recognizes this right for indigenous peoples. Daes articulated this right 
as: “a collective right by virtue of which the State is obligated to respect, protect, 
and promote the governmental and property interests of indigenous peoples (as 
collectivities) in their natural resources.”238  
However, indigenous sovereignty, as was noted earlier, remains a highly 
controversial concept in contemporary international law, since the doctrine 
remains primarily attached to statehood or the whole population (people) of a 
State.239 Absolute sovereignty implies the need for full consent (in international 
law, the consent to be bound), but absolute state sovereignty is nowadays a 
fiction.  
James Tully, whose work will be discussed extensively later on, explains that 
absolute sovereignty, as a single locus of power is a false depiction of sovereignty 
today. This is so because the exercise of political power is dependent on and 
limited by the consent of the people, by all sorts of international relations and 
divided among a diverse number of representative bodies.240 This non-absolute 
sovereignty could be defined as the authority of a culturally diverse people or 
association of peoples to govern themselves by their own laws and ways free 
from external subordination.241 Similarly, indigenous peoples’ sovereignty could 
be understood to entail a more moderate, shared or parallel form, that aims to 
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include indigenous peoples equitably in the democratic decision making 
processes of the state.242  
Without any doubt, it is necessary for indigenous peoples to control their 
natural resources to a large extent, but applying Daes’ progressive interpretation 
of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, remains 
controversial. Nigel Banks explains: “The extent to which indigenous peoples 
may also be beneficiaries to the doctrine of permanent sovereignty is 
contentious, since that doctrine explicitly makes use of the language of 
sovereignty, language that has typically been reserved by states for their own 
use.”243  
Nico Schrijver, leading expert on sovereignty over natural resources also 
takes a more modest position although he acknowledges that indigenous 
peoples’ claims to natural resources may require more participatory approaches 
to resource management. Schrijver also states that resource management will 
have to go hand in hand with protection of the ecosystem.244 As will be pointed 
out in Part V, this is indeed the direction that sustainable development is taking; 
there is an increased attention for FPIC in this field. 
As Daes explained, indigenous peoples suffer from unfair and unequal 
economic arrangements. The natural resources that originally belonged to them 
where in most cases not freely and fairly given up and there is a need to level the 
economic and political playing field and protect indigenous peoples against 
unfair and oppressive economic decisions.245  
Daes concluded that: 
 
The right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is critical 
to the future well-being, the alleviation of poverty, the physical and 
cultural survival, and the social and economic development of 
indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples, if deprived of the natural 
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resources pertaining to their lands and territories, would be deprived 
of meaningful economic and political self-determination, self-
development, and, in many situations, would be effectively deprived 
of their cultures and the enjoyment of other human rights by reason 
of extreme poverty and lack of access to their means of 
subsistence.246 
  
Although it can be concluded that control over natural resources is essential for 
indigenous peoples, it can also be said that linking up resources with doctrines 
on sovereignty makes it highly controversial in international law. Extending the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources to indigenous peoples 
remains contested, but if we rephrase Daes’ argument a bit, it is certainly fair to 
say that political self-determination would be pointless for indigenous peoples if 
it did not include a form of economic self-determination, that is having a say - 
to a certain extent - over natural resources. 
II.3 Conclusion: Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples: 
Autonomy, Participation and Control over Lands and Resources  
In summary, a historical account has been provided to illustrate the complexities 
surrounding the right to self-determination and to indicate that it is an evolving 
concept that is adaptable to contemporary societal issues, needs, and ideologies. 
Throughout its history, self-determination evolved from a political principle into 
a genuine legal standard within contemporary international law. 247 Its basic 
premises are deeply entrenched in the liberal democratic conviction that 
government should be legitimized by the consent of the governed people. 
Furthermore, nationalist perceptions - that nations and peoples ought to be self-
governing - shaped its content. Self-determination is at its core a democratic 
entitlement that calls for consent and free expression of the will of “a people.” 
Until the adoption of the UNDRIP, self-determination did not emerge 
within international law as a right for indigenous peoples. In contemporary 
international law, however, a slow but certain move away from the state-
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opinions on Namibia (1971) and Western Sahara (1975). The Erga Omnes character was 
reaffirmed bij the ICJ in: Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied 




centered Post-Westphalian model can be distinguished. For indigenous peoples, 
self-determination at least entails the right to internal self-determination, which 
is best conceived as a participatory model that aims to secure respectful 
cooperation and equal participation. Self-determination lies at the heart of 
indigenous peoples’ protection, by itself and by granting legitimacy to the other 
provisions in the UNDRIP. It serves as the basic precondition for the 
enjoyment by indigenous peoples of their fundamental rights and the 
determination of their future.248  
The provisions in the UNDRIP are a first step in according indigenous 
peoples substantive rights of autonomy and self-determination that work within 
the framework of the state.249 Since indigenous peoples, as collective entities, are 
included in the framework of the state, or any other larger political order, there 
are two spheres or dimensions that need to be distinguished; internally, within 
the indigenous nation itself and externally, between the indigenous nation as a 
collective entity and the larger political order in which it is situated. These 
dimensions are necessarily at least partially overlapping and interwoven.  
One set of legal arguments assumes that indigenous peoples should exercise 
self-determination since they possess attributes of sovereignty that pre-date and 
parallel state sovereignty. A complementary set of arguments is articulated within 
a human rights frame, which emphasizes that self-determination is essentially a 
human right - an umbrella right - needed for the protection of often vulnerable 
indigenous communities.250 Although both lines of argument are important, 
within international law a human rights based approach is becoming the more 
important one, and is often the one with the best prospects for effective 
protection of indigenous peoples.251 Both lines confront public international law 
with some of its defects, and challenge it to overcome these. 
Internal self-determination for indigenous peoples appears to entail at least a 
right to autonomy; i.e. the possession of separate and distinct administrative 
structures and judicial systems, determined by and intrinsic to the people or 
community concerned.252 However, for autonomy-arrangements to become 
real, this should include the possibility for indigenous peoples to participate, in a 
position of equality, in the decision-making procedures of the state.253 Internal 
self-determination, in its external conception is therefore a dual right, aiming at 
                                                        
248 José Martinéz Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, page 74, at 580. 
249 See also: Kymlicka W, ‘Theorizing Indigenous Rights’, University of Toronto Law Journal 
49, 1999, p. 285.  
250 Anaya S J, ‘Superpower Attitudes Toward Indigenous Peoples and Group Rights’, Am. 
Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 93, 1999, p. 252. 
251 As will be illustrated in the examination of case-law from different human rights bodies. 
252 This description is derived from: José Martinéz Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the 
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and 
Recommendations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, page 53, at 272. 
253 Also see: Knop K, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p. 263. 
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autonomy on the one hand and participation in the larger political order on the 
other. Internally, it requires fair participatory standard in line with internationally 
recognized human rights. 
Self-determination for indigenous peoples requires control over their lands 
and resources. Indigenous peoples not only require protection of their lands and 
resources for their subsistence, but also have a special spiritual and cultural 
attachment to their lands.  
This way, self-determination for indigenous peoples has important political, 
cultural and economic elements. In part III and V of this study, these elements will 
be examined in more detail. In the paragraph on freedom, it will be exposed 
that the political element of self-determination can be respected by providing 
indigenous peoples with a large degree of discursive control in decision-making 
processes that affect them. It will be illustrated that the political ideal of non-
domination is to be upheld to give indigenous peoples a fair say in political 
processes. In relation to the cultural dimension of self-determination, it will be 
explained what kind of intercultural dialogue is needed for accommodating 
indigenous peoples’ claims in multi-nation states. Regarding the economic 
dimension of self-determination, the international and regional legal systems on 
land and resource rights will be examined in detail.254 
The right to self-determination for indigenous peoples – in most cases – 
does not amount to a right to full independence. Similarly, rights to lands and 
resources are not absolute and may be restricted under certain circumstances. In 
the same way, we will see that FPIC is not an absolute right, but that its scope is 
determined by the nature of the rights involved and the impact a proposed 
decision may have on those. 
Although the different views on self-determination examined above diverge 
to some degree, they have in common that they stress the participatory nature of 
self-determination for indigenous peoples. Self-determination for indigenous 
peoples should be understood as types and degrees of participation and 
autonomy based on the ideals of freedom and equality.255 This is in line with the 
spirit of the UNDRIP. Through its framework of substantive and participatory 
rights, the Declaration indicates how indigenous peoples can exercise their right 
to self-determination.  
As will be illustrated, within the context of the UNDRIP, free, prior and 
informed consent is the most far-reaching of these participatory provisions and it 
is becoming one of the central principles for protecting indigenous rights 
worldwide. It is argued in this study that FPIC is the most practical expression of 
- and one of the most important tools to realize - self-determination. For 
indigenous peoples self-determination expresses their fundamental desire to 
choose their own pace and path of development. Part III of this study will 
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Having dealt with the substantive issues underlying the need for FPIC and 
participation rights: indigenous peoples’ claim to self-determination, with its 
political, cultural and economic elements, and the related claims to rights over 
land and resources, it is now time to turn to the procedural part of this study. 
Procedural tools and mechanisms are invaluable in establishing agreement on the 
substantive rights involved and facilitate their implementation.  
This part will explore the - primarily international - procedural or 
participatory framework that is emerging for indigenous peoples. This 
framework of “effective participation” will be examined and it will be argued 
that free, prior and informed consent is an important principle for qualifying 
how such effective participation processes ought to be structured. In other 
words, effective participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making 
processes of their concern is vital to ensure substantive equality and FPIC spells 
out the basic criteria for such processes. The FPIC principle bears on both the 
process that is to be followed and the desired outcome of such processes.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of problems and misconceptions related to 
FPIC, and therefore this part will also “dissect” free, prior and informed consent 
and offer a critical examination of its different elements. 
 It is often emphasized that effective participation and the related principle of 
FPIC should be the norm, but without proper explanations about what these 
key-concepts amount to. Obviously, participation and FPIC processes should be 
tailored to specific situations and cultural contexts, but that does not mean that 
some general observations and insights cannot be found. Examining the 
significance and substance of effective participation and FPIC is therefore the 
main task of this part. 
 This part will expose that FPIC should not be perceived as a stand-alone 
concept or right, but that it should include a system of fair and effective 
participation seen in tandem with the substantive rights at stake. The system is 
described in terms of the norms that exist and in terms of their justifications.  
 Finally, this in this part we will aim to reveal why “consent” requires strong 
additional requirement for securing its validity, and will describe what these 
requirements are. Any FPIC process should include effective participation and 
consultation, but what is meant by effective participation, and what is the 
relation between “effective participation” and “free, prior and informed 
consent?” Both participatory standards emerge in the context of the international 
protection of indigenous peoples. In this part we will analyze what kind of 
procedures are desired to facilitate implementation of the substantive principles 
treated in Part II. It will be argued that recognition, dialogue and cooperation 
on a basis of equality are the goals of any given FPIC process. 
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III.1 Introduction: Participatory Norms for Indigenous Peoples  
International standards and processes in relation to indigenous peoples 
increasingly rely on and require the full participation of indigenous peoples 
themselves; the system of protection is no longer “about them, without them.” 
Indigenous peoples, mainly thanks to their own efforts, are no longer merely 
victims, or objects of protection, but are emerging as full actors, legal subjects in 
the international arena.256 And FPIC is rapidly becoming the concept that 
embodies this movement and its related claims.257 To get to a proper 
understanding of FPIC, it is necessary to explore the underlying framework of 
participatory norms, standards, and their justifications.  
These contemporary norms reflect the move from non-discrimination and 
integration towards self-determination and participation of indigenous peoples as 
distinct cultural collectives in broader society. The replacement of ILO 
Convention 107 by Convention No. 169 illustrates the shift in thinking about 
indigenous peoples. Participatory frameworks are seen in this study as key to the 
implementation of substantive indigenous rights to self-determination, lands and 
resources. Two core concepts are studied in this part: Effective participation and 
free, prior and informed consent. The right to effective participation is posited as 
the general framework and FPIC as the central principle qualifying the 
requirements for effective participation. 
 Besides explaining the central place that effective participation and FPIC take 
in the discourse on the international protection of indigenous peoples, a number 
of authoritative perspectives on both concepts will be explored.  
 
The paragraphs in Part III are structured as follows: 
 
III.2 Effective Participation  
 
This paragraph will trace the development of ideas and norms pertaining to the 
equal participation of minority and indigenous groups. In line with what was 
argued in the paragraphs on self-determination, effective participation is seen as 
the basic norm for relations between indigenous peoples and states. The concept 
of “effective participation” was devised within the framework of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities in the context of the European minority 
protection regime. Effective participation was meant to avoid the connotations 
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of national self-determination that were unacceptable for states.258 However, the 
concept is vague and subject to multiple and conflicting interpretations. More 
recently, it is observed in a number of studies that a “right to effective 
participation” is becoming a central idea in the discussions about the 
international protection of indigenous peoples.  
 
III.2.3 The United Nations System: The Right to Effective Participation as a General 
Framework for Indigenous Peoples 
 
This paragraph will provide a description of the existing framework in the 
different instruments that exist for indigenous peoples. Most prominently, the 
participatory framework of the UN Declaration will be examined, in order to 
find out what kind of procedural standards there are, and to clearly illustrate the 
place of FPIC within this frame. 
 
III.2.4 Participation: James Tully and the Preconditions for an Intercultural Dialogue 
 
Since situations of indigenous self-determination, in which participatory norms 
and FPIC are relevant, are always intra-state situations, James Tully’s theory 
which he developed in “Strange Multiplicity” was used to get to an 
understanding about how such an intercultural dialogue should take place. Tully 
described how a constructive intercultural dialogue between different political 
entities in the same state could be made possible. Moreover, he provided a 
framework for interaction between different “peoples” or “nations” within the 
same state. Such interaction should be based on three conventions, namely: 
mutual recognition, consent, and continuity.  
 
III.3 Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
 
As illustrated in the preceding sections, FPIC is emerging as one of most 
important participatory norms for indigenous peoples. However, the scope and 
content of this claim are unclear, which hampers its effective implementation. 
The following paragraphs will try to analyze the different elements of “free, 
prior and informed consent” in order to clarify its meaning.  
 
III.3.1 Free: Discursive Control and Non-Domination 
 
The following paragraphs will take Philip Pettit’s “Theory of Freedom” to gain 
insights into what is meant by “free” consent, in other words; what is meant 
when it is said that an indigenous people acts in a capacity that is depicted as 
“free.” Both personal freedom, entailing the area of free will, and political 
freedom are covered by Pettit’s account. Pettit’s freedom theory is very well 
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suited to explain the connotations of “free” in FPIC, since he reasoned that 
freedom has an interpersonal dimension and FPIC processes of course always 
take place between different actors.  
 
III.3.1.1 Personal Freedom and Consent: Discursive Control 
 
This paragraph will elaborate on what is meant by stating that indigenous 
peoples should give their consent in a way that can be described as “free.” It will 
explain which requirements must be met to speak of “free consent.” Moreover, 
Pettit’s account explains how freedom in FPIC processes can be described 
without leaving room for - hostile forms of - coercion.259 
 
III.3.1.2 Political Freedom and Self-Determination: Non-Domination 
 
This part will examine which political principle is most suitable to preserve or 
guarantee the political freedom of an indigenous group. It will be observed that 
non-domination should be the guiding principle in participatory processes like 
FPIC and in all relations or decision-making processes between indigenous 
peoples and the state. Since claims to self-determination and FPIC are not only 
of a legal, but also political nature, it is important to investigate questions on 
political freedom.260 
 
III.3.2 Prior: Ex-Ante Contestation and Ex-Post Revision 
 
It seems logical that consent has to be obtained prior to the commencement of 
certain intrusive activities. Nevertheless, perceived as a contestatory right, FPIC 
is not only relevant before any projects take place, but may also have to entail 
standards for revision and evaluating existing arrangements. An important 
argument in line with what is stated about effective participation is that FPIC 
includes an element of continuity, and perhaps should not always be seen as a 
process with a definite beginning and end. 
  
III.3.3 Information and Communication 
 
This part will describe that it is not just the transfer and disclosure of information 
that is important for FPIC, but also, or maybe primarily, the way in which the 
communicative process takes place. 
 The concept of “informed consent” was devised after the Second World 
War, in the context of medical research and practice. Within the field of 
“bioethics” there is a large debate on the meaning, relevance and justification of 
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of coercion. 
260 The political nature of self-determination for indigenous peoples was subject to elaborate 
examination in part II of this study. 
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informed consent requirements. This debate is highly instructive for clarifying 
FPIC for indigenous peoples.  
 
III.3.4 FPIC: Participation, Representation and Consent 
 
When “consent” is given or withheld, it necessarily involves an act of 
representation on behalf of the community or people involved. Representation 
is one of the most important and difficult elements of an FPIC process. A 
number of problems could arise in this respect. The central question in this 
paragraph is: What are the particular difficulties related to consulting or 
obtaining consent from an indigenous people? For instance, problems might 
occur in connection to territorial or social overlap, urban areas, communities 
living in (partial) voluntary isolation, or with regard to possible “illiberal 
practices” - that might conflict with human rights standards - within 
communities; e.g. in relation to women’s or youth participation. Consent may 
also be misused, manufactured, or obtained “pro forma.” Different issues related 
to “external” and “internal” participation are discussed.  
 
III.4 Effective Participation for Indigenous Peoples: Dialogue, Communication and 
Consent in Multi-Nation States 
 
This paragraph will combine the findings of part III in some general conclusions. 
In part V, these findings will be tested in a number of cases and examples that 
are discussed. 
III.2 Effective Participation  
III.2.1 Effective Participation for Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 
It is widely recognized that for minorities and indigenous peoples effective 
participation in decision-making processes that may affect them will lead to 
better, more representative protection.261 In a way, this is what self-
determination amounts to. In order to better understand FPIC and its 
implications, its associated framework of “effective participation” needs to be 
explained first.  
The right to effective political participation is recognized as a general human 
right in the main international and regional human rights instruments.262 For 
                                                        
261 Both ILO Convention No. 169 and the UNDRIP are based on principles of participation 
and consultation. 
262 See e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976, Article 25. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General 
Assembly resolution 2106, (XX) of 21 December 1965, entry into force 4 January 1969, 
Article 5(c). Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 3. American 
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minorities and indigenous peoples this right may take a number of different 
forms, including special representation rights at the institutional level and, for 
our purposes most important, the right to participate in decision-making 
processes that may affect them.263 
On the international level, the Human Rights Committee made some 
important decisions. The HRC observed in the Apirana Case, recalling its 
general comment on Article 27 of the ICCPR, that: “Especially in the case of 
indigenous peoples, the enjoyment of the right to one’s own culture may 
require positive legal measures of protection by a State party and measures to 
ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in 
decisions which affect them.”264 An active duty for the state to consult 
indigenous peoples is similarly observed in the two well-known “Länsman” 
cases before the Committee concerning alleged violations of Saami cultural 
rights under Article 27.265 In Part IV, further statements of the HRC on 
indigenous participation rights and FPIC will be examined. 
As discussed above, ILO Convention No. 169 also emphasizes that 
consultation and participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making 
procedures is essential. Where ILO Convention No. 107 still focused more on 
non-discrimination and progressive integration of indigenous people into the 
majority culture, ILO 169 represents a change in commitment, influenced by 
indigenous peoples themselves, towards self-determination, equal participation, 
and cultural integrity.266  
On the regional level, the developments within the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, foremost in the judgments and decisions of the Court and 
Commission respectively, indicate the need for effective mechanisms for the 
participation of indigenous peoples and point out the necessity to consult 
                                                                                                                              
Convention on Human Rights, Article 23. African Convention on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Article 13. 
263 Barelli M, Guliyeva G, Errico S and Pentassuglia G, ‘Minority groups and litigation: A 
review of developments in international and regional jurisprudence’, Minority Rights Group 
International, 2011, p. 24. 
264 HRC, Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (2000). In: Alcidia Moucheboeuf, Minority Rights 
Jurisprudence, Council of Europe Publishing, 2006, Belgium, pp. 262-263. Also See: General 
Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27),. 08-04-1994. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, General Comment No. 23. (General Comments), paragraph 7: With 
regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article 27, the Committee observes 
that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the 
use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such 
traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law. 
The enjoyment of those rights may require positive legal measures of protection and measures 
to ensure the effective participation of members of 
265 HRC, Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994). & Jouni Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 
671/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1996). 
266 Anaya, 2004. 
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indigenous peoples in relation to decisions that affect them through to culturally 
appropriate processes.267  
Participation of indigenous peoples is also widely recognized as fundamental 
in an international and regional context. Like in the case of the UNDRIP, 
indigenous peoples actively participated in the drafting process that led to the 
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.268 
In spite of some controversy over the use of the term “indigenous peoples” 
in the African context, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
has called for respect for the right to free participation in government and the 
right to self-determination.269 After some debate,270 none of the African states 
voted against the Declaration, which is in line with the African Commission’s 
view on indigenous peoples.271  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights codifies particular 
rights of peoples to non-domination, self-determination, wealth and resources 
and economic, social and cultural development.272 These collective rights, 
formulated as rights of “peoples,” should be available to sections of populations 
within nation states, including indigenous peoples and communities.273 
Moreover, the African Commission has elaborated on these rights and the need 
for non-dominated equal participation in a number of reports and decisions.274 
                                                        
267 The Inter American Court and Commission’s jurisprudence will be examined in-depth in 
part V of this study. 
268 Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, approved by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at its 1333rd session, 
95th regular session, OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6 (1997). 
269 See, Resolution on Nigeria, Eighth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, ACHPR/RP/8th , Annex VII, quoted by Murray, unpublished. 
In: Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities, Submitted in accordance with the “Resolution on the Rights of 
Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa,” Adopted by The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 28th ordinary session, 2005. 
270 See, Genugten W J M van, The African Move towards the Adoption of the 2007 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Substantive Arguments behind the 
Procedures, Draft, 28 January 2008. Also see: Genugten, W. v. (2010). “Protection of Indigenous 
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Am. J. Int’l L.,104(1). 
271 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communique on the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Brazzaville, 28 November 2007. 
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Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force, October 21, 1986. 
Articles 19-24. 
273 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/ 
Communities, Submitted in accordance with the “Resolution on the Rights of Indigenous 
Populations/Communities in Africa” Adopted by The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights at its 28th ordinary session, 2005. 
274 See e.g., African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Malawi African Association 
and Others v. Mauritania, Comm. Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98, 
2000. Also see, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, The Social and 
Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, 
PROCEDURES 
82 
International and regional documents and cases progressively stress the 
importance of effective participation for indigenous peoples. But the concept 
was devised within the framework of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, in the context of the European minority protection regime.275 
 According to Will Kymlicka, effective participation was meant to avoid the 
connotations of national self-determination, which states would consider 
unacceptable276 Patrick Thornberry argues in favor of group differentiated 
participatory rights in stating that: “The principle of participation in decision-
making by persons belonging to minorities looks beyond a ‘neutral’ public 
realm, dedicated to abstract decision-making for the benefit of an 
undifferentiated citizenry.”277 But still, the concept is vague and subject to 
multiple and conflicting interpretations.278 
Kymlicka exposes a range of meanings of effective participation, between a 
minimal right to non-discrimination and voting, to a more robust reading that 
requires forms of representation in the legislature.279 Taken literally, effective 
participation seems to mean that participation should have “effect,” a real impact 
on the outcome of decision-making.  
Such a maximalist reading, which requires counter-majoritarian forms of 
power-sharing, is obviously the reading that many minorities endorse, but it is 
strongly opposed by most states - who further a more moderate account - for 
exactly the same reason that ideas of self-determination - and in the context of 
indigenous peoples, a requirement of consent - are resisted.280  
So according to Kymlicka, agreement on a right to effective participation 
has been possible precisely because it has been interpreted as an alternative to, 
not a vehicle for, minority self-government.281 The UN Minority Rights 
Declaration282 includes broad notions of participation and Article 15 of the 
                                                                                                                              
Comm. No. 155/96, 2001. Also see, Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on 
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Council of Europe Framework Convention provides that parties “shall create 
the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to 
national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, 
particularly those affecting them.”283  
According to Thornberry, this emphasis on effective participation is a strong 
indication that minority involvement in decision-making is a legitimate demand. 
These international norms on participation do not specify precise modalities and 
do not aim to “model” national approaches.284 As will be illustrated throughout 
this study, searching for a single procedure for effective participation and FPIC is 
similarly neither feasible nor desirable.285 
However, participation is a key aspect of the contemporary politics of 
recognition and not confined to the political sphere but implicates wide areas of 
social and public life.286 So, although the concept is ambiguous and Kymlicka 
fears that a right to effective participation may in the end reproduce rather than 
resolve the problems faced by minorities, he contends that “effective 
participation is becoming a new and important site for playing out the tensions 
between short-term security and long-term justice” although it does not by itself 
provide a formula for resolving those problems.287 
 In the context of indigenous peoples, there is more support for a self-
government norm and more robust forms of participation.288 Effective 
participation seems to be an important concept, but it is in itself not clear 
enough to meet indigenous peoples’ demands. Effective participation 
nevertheless provides a framework for any FPIC process,289 but its content and 
relation to FPIC is underexposed. An important argument in the following 
paragraphs is that FPIC is a central principle that qualifies and gives substance to 
the “vaguer” norm or right to effective participation. FPIC provides the right to 
                                                        
283 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
Strasbourg, 1.II.1995, European Treaty Series - No. 157. 
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effective participation for indigenous peoples with a set of teeth, and makes a 
more targeted approach possible. 
For both indigenous peoples and minorities, effective participation seems to 
be an essential element in claiming their rights and pursuing self-
determination.290 The need for effective participation is well described by 
Patrick Thornberry: 
 
We will not hear minority and indigenous voices unless they have a 
platform,  unless they ‘participate in decisions affecting them’. 
Participation suggests a voice for communities, not just 
‘disembodied or decontextualized’ individuals. We need to hear 
‘voices’ and, to hear them, they need the security to articulate their 
concerns, which is their human right, including their economic 
right. The texts of minority and indigenous rights go beyond the 
simplicities of participation such as placing a vote in the ballot box, 
towards broad participatory principles and a more complex notion 
of participatory democracy.291 
 
So although effective participation is fundamental to realize minority and 
indigenous peoples rights, and pervasive throughout the different international 
instruments, the concept itself remains vague and susceptible to a myriad of 
interpretations. A number of very recent reports and studies on the right to 
effective participation within the UN framework may shed further light on this 
issue.  
In order to get a clear picture of which kind of participatory provisions are 
under examination and what the place of FPIC is within the framework of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, it is useful to start with a 
brief overview. 
III.2.2 Participatory Provisions and FPIC in the UN Declaration 
A short recapitulation is useful here. As was examined in Part II, self-
determination is the heart and soul of the indigenous peoples movement. In the 
perception that is defended in this study, self-determination for indigenous 
peoples is a dual right aimed at respect for autonomy of indigenous groups on 
the one hand and at equal participation in the larger political order on the 
other.292 This is consistent with the views of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples on the internal and external dimensions of the 
right to effective participation, which is examined in the next paragraph. But the 
                                                        
290 Effective participation is thus also an exponent of the principle of self-determination, as was 
described in Part II of this study. 
291 Thornberry P, 'Minority and indigenous rights at the end of history', 2 Ethnicities, 2002, p. 
532. 
292 The perception of Self-Determination as a dual right, entailing autonomy and participation 
is also supported by James Anaya. See: Anaya, 2004.  
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right or principle of self-determination is a general one and other norms are 
needed for it to have practical implications. Effective and truly equal 
participatory processes are necessary precepts for exercising self-determination.293  
The participatory provisions in the UNDRIP can be understood to specify 
the “umbrella” concept of self-determination, to make it more tangible and 
applicable in a wide number of situations. 
Within the Declaration the terminology used in the different participatory 
provisions diverges and expresses a varying range of “discursive” requirements.294 
The Declaration seeks to condition a process of participation as an engagement 
between two autonomous collectives, i.e. the state and the indigenous nation 
residing in it.295 This relational concept is firmly articulated in the preamble to 
the Declaration whereas:  
 
The General Assembly, convinced that the recognition of the rights 
of indigenous peoples in this Declaration will enhance harmonious 
and cooperative relations between the state and indigenous peoples, 
based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, 
non-discrimination and good faith, solemnly proclaims the 
following United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of 
partnership and mutual respect.296 
 
The Declaration thus emphasizes dialogue, participation, and mutual respect, 
thereby underlining the focus on internal self-determination, firstly in securing 
indigenous cultural and political autonomy through its catalogue of substantive 
rights for indigenous peoples,297 and secondly, as a participatory process instead 
of a substantive right to secede from the host state.  
The participatory, discursive provisions in the Declaration are framed in 
different vocabulary expressions ascending in force. This layered system of 
participatory provisions serves to demarcate different levels of indigenous and 
state autonomy. Such a delineation of degrees of participatory competences is a 
                                                        
293 See also: Clavero B, ‘The Indigenous Rights of Participation and International 
Development Policies’, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 22, 2005. 
Clavero indicates that participatory rights are a manefestation of Self-Determination. 
Furthermore, Free, Prior and Informed Consent is consistent with this right to unrestricted 
participation. (p. 41/42) 
294 Cf. Miller R A, ‘Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self-
Determination’, American Indian Law Review 31, 342 2006-2007. 
295 Following Russel Miller who states that the UN Declaration maps the procedural 
commitments necessary for discourse. Miller R A, ‘Collective Discursive Democracy as the 
Indigenous Right to Self-Determination’, American Indian Law Review 31, 342 2006-2007.. 
296 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN A/RES/61/295, 
preamble, paragraph 19 and 25. 
297 Miller R A, ‘Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self-
Determination’, American Indian Law Review 31, 342 2006-2007, page 366. 
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very delicate and complex issue, but illustrates the ambitious efforts in the 
context of the Declaration.  
The least powerful terminological standard is “in conjunction with,” used in 
the Declaration to impose a set of positive obligations on states. The “in 
conjunction with” criterion is enshrined in Article 11(2) on redress, Article 
12(2) on access and repatriation of ceremonial objects and human remains, 
Article14(3) on education in the indigenous language, Article 22(2) on 
economic and social development, Article 27 on the recognition of indigenous 
laws, traditions, customs, and land tenure systems, and in Article 31(2) on 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and other cultural or indigenous ways 
of expression, like science, technology, medicine, and knowledge on flora and 
fauna. 
As mentioned, these are all positive obligations for the state. Whereas states 
are obliged to provide service and support for indigenous peoples, they do so “in 
conjunction with” them, instead of “at their bidding.”298 The distinction 
between the criterion “in conjunction with” and the possibly stronger standard 
of “in consultation and cooperation with” indigenous peoples is less clear; a 
discursive standard also used in relation to positive obligations of the state to 
implement legislative measures.299  
This standard is used in Article 15(2) on the promotion of tolerance and the 
elimination of discrimination, Article 36(2) on maintaining and developing 
contacts, relations and cooperation with their own and other peoples’ members, 
and Article 38 on legislative measures in general with the aim of achieving the 
ends of the Declaration.  
Article 30 uses the different requirement of “prior effective consultations” in 
relation to military activities on Indigenous lands and territories. The meaning of 
the word “effective” in Article 30 is not completely clear. It seems that genuine 
consultation and cooperation should always be aimed at being effective. In this 
light, the word “effective” could even be seen as weakening the discursive scope 
of the other provisions in which “consultation and cooperation” is codified.300  
The standard of consultation and cooperation is also used in Articles 19 and 
32(2) together with the strongest expression of indigenous self-determination, 
that of “free, prior and informed consent.” The central principle in this study 
can also be found in Article 10 on relocation, Article 11(2) on cultural, spiritual, 
intellectual, and religious property, Article 28 on redress for damage, 
confiscation, or occupation of their lands, and Article 29(2) on the storage and 
disposal of hazardous materials.  Free, prior and informed consent is rapidly 
gaining ground as one of the most important principles guiding indigenous 
                                                        
298 Miller R A, ‘Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self-
Determination’, American Indian Law Review 31, 342 2006-2007, page 371. 
299 Russel Miller calls these norms 'discursive standards', see: Miller R A, ‘Collective 
Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self-Determination’, American Indian Law 
Review 31, 342 2006-2007. 
300 Miller R A, ‘Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self-
Determination’, American Indian Law Review 31, 342 2006-2007, page 372. 
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peoples protection. Its consensual element, at first sight, might even entail a 
“veto” power or a “right to say no” on behalf of the group affected. This study 
argues that FPIC should not be seen as a veto power but that the concept’s 
general aim is to fully integrate indigenous peoples into decision-making 
processes that affect them. It is therefore better to focus on how these processes 
should be shaped than to restrict the debate to whether FPIC includes a right to 
block decisions. Taken together, the UNDRIP contains more than 20 
provisions that relate to the right of indigenous peoples to participate in 
decision-making.301  
 Thus, the participatory provisions in the Declaration have an external 
perspective, they focus on the interaction between indigenous peoples as distinct 
collectives versus the larger political order in which they reside, the state.302 
Nevertheless, as will be argued later on in this study, the participatory provisions, 
and FPIC in particular, are also important in light of the internal dimension of 
self-determination.  
 Accordingly, effective participation is “layered” in the Declaration. There are 
diverging participatory provisions along a spectrum of which its most powerful 
expression is found in the terms free, prior and informed consent. FPIC is more 
than a procedural requirement in some key provisions in the Declaration and has 
become a central principle that pervades a wide variety of standards pertaining to 
the protection of indigenous peoples. Examination of the international and 
regional standard setting and cases will be dealt with in part V of this study. The 
adoption of the UNDRIP triggered a number of research projects on its scope 
and applicability, particularly in relation to participation rights. A number of 
studies conducted in the UN Context will be examined next.  
 After exploring the current state of affairs within the UN context, James 
Tully’s theory of intercultural constitutionalism will be explored, since it offers 
an attractive conceptual lens through which effective participation and FPIC 
could be perceived. Tully explores the preconditions necessary for effective 
participation of indigenous groups in contemporary constitutionalism. 
 
                                                        
301 A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 23 
August 2010. The report mentions: (a) the right to selfdetermination; (b) the right to 
autonomy or self-government; (c) the “right to participate”; (d) the “right to be actively 
involved”; (e) the duty of States to “obtain their free, prior and informed consent”; (f) the 
duty to seek “free agreement” with indigenous peoples; (g) the duty to “consult and 
cooperate” with indigenous peoples; (h) the duty to undertake measures “in conjunction” 
with indigenous peoples; and (i) the duty to pay due “respect to the customs” of indigenous 
peoples. 
302 Recall this distinction between internal and external 'internal' self-determination, that was 
explored in Part II. 
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III.2.3 The United Nations System: The Right to Effective Participation as a 
General Framework 
So far it was argued that effective participation is an essential element for the 
protection of minorities and indigenous peoples. Within the framework of the 
United Nations, there have been a number of recent studies and reports dealing 
with the right to effective participation, consultation, and FPIC. The following 
paragraph examines this research, starting with the study on indigenous peoples 
and the right to participate in decision making, by the UN Expert Mechanism 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.303  
 The report observes the connection between self-determination, effective 
participation, and free, prior and informed consent and points out that although 
these concepts are of vital importance to indigenous peoples, there are still a 
number of ambiguities that require further research. 
 One of the main objectives of the programme of action for the Second 
International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples is:  
  
To promote the full and effective participation of indigenous 
peoples in decisions which directly or indirectly affect their lifestyles, 
traditional lands and territories, their cultural integrity as indigenous 
peoples with collective rights, or any other aspects of their lives, 
considering the principle of free, prior and informed consent.304 
   
In October 2009, the Human Rights Council requested the Expert Mechanism 
to study the right to effective participation in accordance with its mandate, and 
to present a progress report in 2010 and a final report in 2011. The Expert 
Mechanism reports can be seen as the most comprehensive studies this far on the 
subject and the findings will therefore be examined next. 
 Indigenous participation in decision-making on the full spectrum of matters 
that affect their lives is seen as the fundamental basis for the enjoyment of the full 
range of human rights. The principle is related to self-determination and, as was 
explored in the preceding paragraphs, a “corollary of a myriad of universally 
accepted human rights, and at its core enables indigenous peoples to be freely in 
control of their own destinies in conditions of equality.”305 The Expert 
                                                        
303 See: A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 23 
August 2010. A/HRC/EMRIP/2011/2, Final study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision-making, Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 26 May 2011. A/HRC/18/43, Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples on its fourth session (Geneva, 11-15 July 2011), 19 August 2011. In part 
IV, the mandate and characteristics of the Expert Mechanism will be discussed. 
304 GA, A/60/270, Draft Programme of Action for the Second International Decade of the 
World’s Indigenous People, 18 August 2005, p. 4. 
305 A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 23 
August 2010, p 3. 
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Mechanism found that without this right, both the individual and collective 
human rights of indigenous peoples, cannot be fully enjoyed. 
 The UNDRIP distinguishes between internal and external participation 
since it affirms the right of indigenous peoples to develop and maintain their 
own decision making structures while they also have the right to participate - 
externally - in decision making processes and the political order of the state in 
which they reside.306  
 In his 2010 interim report to the General Assembly, James Anaya, the second 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, explained that the 
internal aspect of the right to participation relates to indigenous peoples’ 
autonomy and self-government, which is necessary for them to take control of 
their own affairs and to ensure that matters affecting them are aligned with their 
own cultural patterns, values, customs, and world-views.307 
 The external dimension relates to decision-making by actors that are external 
to indigenous communities and related concerns.308 Similar to what is argued in 
the paragraphs on self-determination, effective participation - and as will be 
shown further on, FPIC – entail these internal and external components. In the 
paragraph on FPIC and representation, these components are discussed more 
thoroughly. 
 Anaya identified three main areas in which this external participation is 
relevant. Firstly, it is important in relation to participation of indigenous peoples 
in public life, although this area concerns mainly individual rights. The second, 
and for our purposes most important point, that Anaya mentioned relates to the 
participation of indigenous peoples in decision making by state actors about 
measures that affect indigenous peoples’ rights or interests in particular. The 
Special Rapporteur noted that: 
 
In this regard article 18 of the UN Declaration states that 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-
making in matters which would affect their rights.” This right 
includes a corollary duty of States to consult with indigenous 
peoples in matters that affect their rights and interests in order to 
obtain their free, prior and informed consent, as recognized, 
especially, by article 19 of the Declaration. Last year, I devoted part 
of my annual report to the Human Rights Council to the duty of 
states to consult with indigenous peoples and have continued to 
address this issue in various aspects of my work. Given the 
complexity the issue, the Expert Mechanism's examination of the 
                                                        
306 A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 23 
August 2010, p 3. 
307 A/65/264: Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya 9 August 2010, p. 14. 
308 A/65/264: Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya 9 August 2010, p. 13. 
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matter of consultation and the right to free, prior and informed 
consent in connection with its study on the right to participation is 
extremely  important.309 
 
Anaya thus admitted the need for further study and stresses the importance of 
this type of external participation. He stated that it is evident that adequate 
consultation mechanisms are lacking throughout the world and that indigenous 
peoples do not adequately control their territories in many cases.310 Moreover, in 
nearly all the countries he visited as Special Rapporteur, he heard reports of lack 
of adequate participation in design, monitoring, and delivery of policies that 
affect indigenous peoples in particular.311 As a third area, he mentioned the 
relevance of effective participation of indigenous peoples on the international 
level. In Part IV and V - Platforms and Practices - more attention will be 
directed to this area. 
 That effective participation is closely connected to self-determination and 
FPIC is clearly articulated in paragraph 5 of the progress report: 
 
The principle of participation in decision-making also has a clear 
relationship with the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination, including the right to autonomy or self-government, 
and the State obligation to consult indigenous peoples in matters 
that may affect them, based on the principle of free, prior and 
informed consent. These legal concepts form an inherent part of any 
discussion of the right of indigenous peoples to participate in 
decision-making, and will be considered throughout the report as 
important aspects of that right.312 
 
The report described the relation between self-determination and participation, 
and is in line with the meaning ascribed to self-determination in part II of this 
work. Moreover, FPIC is posited as an important associated principle. These 
three legal concepts and their interrelation are closely examined in the Expert 
Mechanisms study. 
 Self-determination is the normative basis for the right to participation and 
should be seen as an ongoing process of participation in which indigenous 
peoples are enabled to control their destinies and pace of economic, cultural, and 
                                                        
309 Statement of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, Human Rights Council, Expert Mechanism on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 12 July 2010. 
310 A/65/264: Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya 9 August 2010, p. 14. 
311 A/65/264: Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya 9 August 2010, p. 15. 
312 A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 23 
August 2010, p 3. 
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social development.313 Free, prior and informed consent is seen by indigenous 
peoples as a requirement, prerequisite, and manifestation of the exercise of their 
right to self-determination.314 The Expert Mechanism identifies FPIC as of 
fundamental importance for indigenous peoples’ right to effective participation 
since it establishes the framework for all consultations relating to the acceptance 
of projects affecting them.315 FPIC thus qualifies and specifies what a right to 
“effective participation” amounts to. The remainder of this study is largely 
dedicated to exploring how FPIC could do this. 
 The normative “roots” of self-determination and effective participation are 
thus expected to be specified by reference to FPIC. The report concludes that:  
 
The right of indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent 
forms an integral part of their right to self-determination. […] As 
the right to free, prior and informed consent is rooted in self-
determination, it follows that it is a right of indigenous peoples to 
effectively determine the outcome of decision-making processes 
impacting on them, not a mere right to be involved in such 
processes.316 
 
As was identified in part II, FPIC is especially important in relation to the 
struggle of indigenous peoples to gain control over their lands and resources. 
Not surprisingly, the Expert Mechanism report emphasizes the need for clarity 
concerning the implementation of FPIC in relation to projects affecting 
indigenous livelihoods. It is stressed that “pro forma consultations” are not 
enough, and that effective participation and FPIC implies real influence in the 
decision making processes.317  
 Unfortunately, many decisions relating to development projects on 
indigenous territories are taken without respecting FPIC or without any form of 
effective participation. These decisions often drastically affect indigenous 
                                                        
313 Recall that self-determination was described as an ongoing process as well. In the next 
paragraph it will be illustrated that James Tully sees continuity as one of the fundamental 
principles for an intercultural dialogue. 
314 A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 23 
August 2010, p 10. 
315 A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 23 
August 2010, p 10. 
316 A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 23 
August 2010, p 12. Italics added. 
317 Les Malezer has indicated that such ‘pro forma’ consultation processes are often 
manipulated as public relations tools to endorse proposals regarding development projects, by 
demonstrating so-called community support, citing irrelevant comments and downplaying 
dissenting voices. A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and 
the right to participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 23 August 2010, p 21. 
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communities and may have profound effects on indigenous peoples’ social and 
economic structures, both in the short and the long term. It is therefore not 
strange that FPIC is seen as most needed in these situations. 
 This right to effective participation also includes a corresponding duty for the 
state to consult indigenous peoples. Effective participation and the duty to 
consult have recently been studied by the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya.318 
 
The Corollary Duty to Consult 
 
In his 2009 report to the Human Rights Council, Anaya noted that often and in 
a wide variety of situations there is a lack of adequate implementation of the 
duty of states to consult with indigenous peoples concerning decisions affecting 
them. He also commented that involvement of indigenous peoples at the earliest 
stages of such decision-making processes is vital, and that lack thereof leads to 
conflictive situations, anger, mistrust, and in some cases, violence.319 
 Anaya focused on two important areas in which the duty to consult is 
essential: in the context of constitutional and legislative reforms that affect 
indigenous peoples and in relation to development projects concerning resource 
extraction.320 Anaya stated that the duty to consult is a corollary of a myriad of 
universally accepted human rights, like the rights to cultural integrity, equality, 
and property.321  
 More fundamentally, Anaya contended, the duty to consult derives from the 
overarching right of indigenous peoples to self-determination and from related 
principles of democracy and popular sovereignty.322 
 Self-determination responds to the aspirations of indigenous peoples 
worldwide to be in control of their own destinies under conditions of equality 
and to effectively participate in decision-making that affects them. Moreover, 
Anaya argued that self-determination is a foundational right consistent with 
                                                        
318 A/HRC/12/34, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 15 July 2009. 
A/HRC/15/37, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 18 July 2010.  
319 A/HRC/12/34, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 15 July 2009, p. 12. 
320 Anaya observes that such development programmes and projects, despite their specific 
effects on indigenous peoples and their territories, are often undertaken without adequate 
consultation with them or without their free, prior and informed consent. These two areas 
reflect the text of Articles 18, 19 and 32 of the UNDRIP. 
321 A/HRC/12/34, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 15 July 2009, p. 14. 
322 A/HRC/12/34, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 15 July 2009, p. 14. 
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principles of popular sovereignty and democracy.323 These principles imply a 
duty to consult indigenous peoples in decisions affecting them, with the aim to:  
 
reverse the historical pattern of exclusion from decision-making, in 
order to avoid the future imposition of important decisions on 
indigenous peoples, and to allow them to flourish as distinct 
communities on lands to which their cultures remain attached.324 
  
For indigenous peoples, this may require special, differentiated consultation 
procedures when state activities affect them.325 The justification of such 
differentiated procedures arises from the nature of the interests involved. 
Indigenous peoples have distinct cultural patterns and histories, and usually the 
normal democratic and representative processes do not work adequately to 
address their particular concerns.326 They are often marginalized in the political 
sphere, and therefore there is a need for special measures to address their 
disadvantaged position.327 
 Anaya conceded that it would be unrealistic to say that the duty to consult 
applies whenever a state decision may affect indigenous peoples, since this is very 
often the case. Nevertheless, a purposive interpretation of the UN Declaration 
in light of other international instruments and case law lead him to the following 
assessment of the scope of the duty to consult:  
 
It applies whenever a state decision may affect indigenous peoples in 
ways not felt by others in society. Such a differentiated effect occurs 
when the interests or conditions of indigenous peoples that are 
particular to them are implicated in the decision, even when the 
decision may have a broader impact, as in the case of certain 
legislation.328  
 
Importantly, in relation to lands and resources, Anaya noticed that this duty does 
not only arise when rights to land or other legal entitlements are already 
recognized, but whenever their particular interests are at stake.329  
                                                        
323 Self-determination as a core democratic entitlement was explored in Part II. Also see: 
Franck T ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ Am. J. Int’l L. 86, 1992. 
324 A/HRC/12/34, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 15 July 2009, p. 15. 
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326 A/HRC/12/34, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 15 July 2009, p. 15. 
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This paragraph has sought to illustrate the central place that a right to effective 
participation takes within contemporary international law on indigenous 
peoples’ protection. In the 2011 report to the Human Rights Council, co-
author John Henriksen highlighted the three crucial concepts in relation to 
effective participation of indigenous peoples in decision making: self-
determination, the duty to consult, and the duty to obtain free, prior and 
informed consent.330 Effective participation is intimately connected to and 
grounded in indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.   
 As Anaya has convincingly argued, the duty to consult indigenous peoples is 
a corollary to the right to effective participation. The principle of free, prior and 
informed consent may clarify the content and objective of effective participation 
and could allow for a more targeted approach. Nevertheless, although the recent 
reports and studies shed light on the issues involved, they also indicate that there 
are still a number of questions left unanswered and problems to solve. 
  The lack of indigenous peoples’ participation, consultation, and consent 
remains a major problem, especially in relation to development projects and 
resource extraction activities on indigenous territories.331 Without effective 
participation in decision making on matters concerning their livelihoods, 
indigenous peoples will not be able to fully enjoy their rights to lands, resources 
and the overarching right to self-determination. 
 Implementation of participatory norms on the national level is all too often 
absent. While the details of participatory arrangements are contexts specific, 
some general observations can be made on how multi-nation states can 
accommodate intercultural negotiation processes. This is the question that James 
Tully posed in “Strange Multiplicity.” The constitutional framework of the state 
has to be susceptible to indigenous demands to effective participation and FPIC. 
Tully’s research deals with the question of how such recognition of cultural 
diversity is made possible. He provides a principled framework for 
implementation of participation and intercultural dialogue on the national level, 
and his theory will therefore be examined next. 
 Subsequently, the remainder of Part III will be dedicated to examining the 
different elements and requirements of the concept of free, prior and informed 
consent. In order to examine FPIC further, it is necessary to first provide a basic 
contemporary understanding of the concept. Different perspectives on FPIC and 
on its separate elements - mainly free and informed - are presented. It is 
illustrated that for a successful FPIC process, securing that consent is given “free, 
prior and informed” is vital. Afterwards, the paragraph on FPIC and 
                                                                                                                              
study, when examining the position of the Orang Asli on the Malaysian Peninsula, it will be 
shown why this is such an important observation. 
330 A/HRC/18/43, Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
on its fourth session (Geneva, 11-15 July 2011), 19 August 2011. 
331 Also see: A/HRC/15/37, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 18 July 2010. 
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representation will pinpoint a number of specific issues that make obtaining 
FPIC in the context of indigenous peoples problematic.  
 However, first James Tully's views on the need for participation and dialogue 
in states with multiple nations are examined.  




Participation rights and free, prior and informed consent are seen as essential 
instruments to realize indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and to 
negotiate constructive agreements about their rights to lands and resources. An 
important precondition for implementation, is that the national - political and 
legal - system has to be susceptible to accommodation of these participatory 
standards for indigenous peoples.332 The following paragraphs will explore James 
Tully’s framework for an intercultural dialogue and examine a central issue in 
this study: what kind of principles and mechanism need to be in place to make 
constructive and lasting agreements between indigenous peoples and their host 
states, or other parties, possible? And what are the justifications for these 
suggested self-rule mechanisms? 
 Indigenous peoples’ struggles are struggles for constitutional recognition of 
their collective identity and their collective rights to self-determination, lands, 
resources, and participation. The central question therefore is: What kind of 
constitutional or legal viewpoints can accommodate such culture-differentiated 
participation rights on the national level? James Tully discussed this question in 
his influential work, Strange Multiplicity.333  
 FPIC is primarily relevant in relation to the situation that Tully describes, 
situations of “internal self-determination” where indigenous groups are to 
coexist and participate with others in the framework of a larger state.334 In this 
framework, indigenous peoples are to conclude and negotiate agreements that 
may have profound effects on the social structures of communities and may lead 
to long-term arrangements and relations. Tully’s work is therefore directly 
related to an important question in this study: Why should states accept this 
FPIC principle for indigenous peoples?335 What is most important to the present 
study is that Tully provided the foundations for an intercultural dialogue on the 
national level, a dialogue in which similarities and differences between 
                                                        
332 As was described earlier, a number of states expressed their doubts about the desirability of 
indigenous peoples rights to self-determination and FPIC in the context of the UNDRIP. 
333 Tully J, Strange Multiplicity, Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversit (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) (Tully, 1995). 
334 Consistent with the view of self-determination as a continuous participatory process, 
examined in paragraph II.1. 
335 Tully, 1995. James Hamilton Tully is the Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Law, 
Indigenous Governance and Philosophy at the University of Victoria, Canada. 
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indigenous groups and others can be mapped in order to get to a common 
understanding about appropriate forms of self-rule.336 Tully offered a method or 
structure for effective participation and self-determination by laying out the 
parameters of an intercultural dialogue on the national level. This structure will 
be supplemented in later paragraphs, mainly in the paragraph on freedom, and 
will be guiding in explaining the legal infrastructure FPIC requires. 
 Tully explained that demands for cultural recognition are ultimately claims to 
a form of self-rule, or self-determination.337 Recognition of cultural identity thus 
could entail certain “self-government” rights. Denying such claims for a certain 
community – misrecognizing them – may inflict serious harm and even threaten 
their survival.338 Tully sought to: “outline both the philosophy and practice of 
constitutionalism informed by the spirit of mutual recognition of cultural 
diversity. Both the philosophy and the practice consist in the negotiation and 
mediation of claims to recognition in a dialogue governed by the conventions of 
mutual recognition, continuity and consent.”339  
 Tully’s powerful argumentation will be discussed next. His theory provides a 
normative framework for implementation of indigenous peoples’ right to 
(internal) self-determination. Moreover, a number of important preconditions 
for successful FPIC processes can be found in Tully’s work. 
 FPIC is a corollary to indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and 
concerns a claim situated in politics and international law. If states are to be 
persuaded to accept FPIC, merely determining its current legal status might be a 
bit helpful, but certainly not enough. FPIC and its related “right to effective 
participation” have to fit into the constitutional framework of the state, whereas 
it is a claim to alter or retain the contemporary “constitutional” arrangements 
between indigenous peoples and other political actors.  
 James Tully’s theory of intercultural dialogue, or what he calls a multilogue, 
provides a framework for realizing FPIC on the national level. Furthermore, by 
perceiving FPIC in light of Tully’s theory, it will be exposed that there are 
                                                        
336 Forms of self-rule or self-determination, like rights to FPIC or other participatory 
structures. 
337 Sharp A, 'What is the constitution of “The Spirit of Haida Gwaii”? Reflections on James 
Tully's strange multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity', 10 History and 
Anthropology, p. 243, 1997, p. 243. (Sharp, 1997).  
338 Ivison D, 'Does The Spirit of Haidi Gwaii Fly Only at Dusk?', 1 Theory & Event, at 4, 
1997. Also see: Taylor C, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism, 
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995), p. 25. 
Charles Taylor has described the demand for recognition as being a vital human need, and the 
misrecognition of someone or some group as being capable of: “inflicting a grievous wound, 
saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred.” Since our identity is partly shaped by 
recognition of others, and misrecognition could result in real damage and distortion to a 
person or group, it is a notion to take seriously. Also see p. 62, where Taylor accuses 
‘difference-blind liberalism’ that it cannot provide the neutral ground on which people of all 
cultures can meet and coexist, since liberalism itself is a ‘fighting creed’, a particular perception 
that cannot and should not claim complete neutrality. 
339 Sharp, 1997, p. 244, citing Tully, 1995. 
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certain fundamental problems involved in seeing FPIC as a concept that is 
unilateral in application and can be brought under a single comprehensive 
definition.340  
 Moreover, it will become clear that a requirement of consent is not 
something new or invented recently as a procedural solution for the problems 
that indigenous communities face but rather is a basic convention of interaction 
between and within political entities, derived from the core democratic principle 
quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur (what touches all, must be approved by 
all).  
 International law is predominantly an extension of the Western language of 
liberal democratic theory, and an important question therefore is: How could 
FPIC, as a term expressed in the classic language of international law, become an 
effective concept on the national level for this most differentiated situation of 
cultural diversity; that of the global indigenous peoples movement?  
 Tully’s answer, which provides a framework for FPIC and effective 
participation processes is that when such negotiations are held in accordance 
with the principles of mutual recognition, continuity, and consent, they will be 
respectful of cultural differences. As an elegant example, Tully described the 
sculpture “The Spirit of Haida Gwaii” made by Bill Reid, which depicts a black 
canoe with a culturally diverse set of passengers, who, in spite of their 
differences, will have to navigate some common course.341  
 




The parts of Tully’s argument that are most relevant to this study will be 
explained. The - very broad - question Tully addressed is: can a modern 
constitution recognize and accommodate cultural diversity? Strange Multiplicity 
starts by providing examples of the current struggles for recognition and explains 
that if sharp boundaries are drawn around these types of struggles, their 
similarities are overlooked. Tully took aboriginal struggles for recognition as his 
main example.342  
Three important elements are mentioned: first, demands for recognition are 
aspirations for appropriate forms of self-rule, secondly and complementarily, 
                                                        
340 The argument that seeking for a uniform standard of FPIC is not desirable, is further 
elaborated upon in the paragraph on information and communication.  
341 Cf. Sharp, 1997, p. 247: Each of the creatures in the canoe sees and lives a life differently 
from the others, they see the others from their individual points of view, they communicate 
their understandings and desires, they argue as to their destination and as to a thousand other 
matters, their own identities are not set (the identiy of each consisting in the innumerable 
ways it relates to and interacts with the others), they live together as well as apart, they are in 
the same canoe, they belong together because they live with the others.  
342 Tully, 1995, pp. 1-3. Tully mentions six examples of struggles for cultural recognition that 
intersect and overlap each other to a large extent. These are: (a) national, (b) supranational, (c) 
intercultural, (d) feminist and (e) aboriginal struggles for recognition. 
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there is the claim that the basic laws, institutions, and methods of interpretation 
of modern societies are unjust insofar as they do not allow for appropriate forms 
of self-government, and thirdly, the ground for these claims is the assumption 
that culture is a constitutive and irreducible aspect of politics.343 The link with 
contemporary international law on indigenous peoples as described in this study 
immediately becomes visible. Self-determination related claims are claims to take 
cultural diversity into account in decision-making processes that affect 
indigenous peoples. 
Constitutions, understood in a broad sense, cannot ignore this cultural 
dimension of politics and the argument therefore is that if the cultural ways of 
the citizens were recognized and taken into account in reaching agreement on 
certain constitutive arrangements, the order would be perceived as just with 
respect to this dimension of politics.344 The first step towards this is to establish a 
just form of constitutional discussion that recognizes these aspirations to self-rule 
in alignment with one’s own customs and ways. Tully argued that these are 
struggles for liberty, understood as self-rule and non-domination345 and stated 
that what is distinctive of our age is the multiplicity of demands for recognition 
at the same time, calling for a variety of forms of self-rule.346 
For indigenous peoples, claims to self-rule are expressed in their claims to 
self-determination and derivative rights. Reaching agreement on important 
issues through culturally appropriate processes is the essence of self-
determination processes and Tully provided the basic framework that ought to 





According to Tully, the key question is: “whether a constitution can give 
recognition to the legitimate demands of the members of diverse cultures in a 
manner that renders everyone their due, so that all would freely consent to this 
form of constitutional association.”347 This first step – mutual recognition – 
cannot entail classic nationalist assimilation of one culture at the expense of 
another, nor can it mean the recognition of each culture in the same 
constitutional form, for cultures are not analogous to the classic constitutional 
concept of a nation (as in one nation – one state).348 Nations can – or should be 
able to - achieve just recognition within multinational federations of various 
kinds.  
                                                        
343 Tully, 1995, pp. 4-6. 
344 Tully, 1995, p. 6. 
345 In paragraph III.3.1, it is explained that a principle of ‘non-domination’ is best suited to 
guard the political freedom of indigenous peoples. ‘Non-dominance’ is a central element in 
the working definitions of indigenous peoples. 
346 Tully, 1995, p. 6. 
347 Tully, 1995, p.7. 
348 Tully, 1995, pp. 7-8. 
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An important point that Tully stressed is that the outdated conception of 
cultures as separate, bounded, and internally uniform has to be replaced by a 
view of cultures as (a) overlapping, (b) interactive, and (c) internally 
negotiated.349 Cultures do not only overlap geographically and come in a variety 
of types; they are also densely interdependent in their formation and identity, 
and exist in complex historical processes of interaction with other cultures.350 
Moreover they are not internally homogenous but continuously contested, 
imagined, and negotiated, both by their members and through interaction with 
others; this means that identity is constructed in a way that Tully called 
“aspectival” rather than essential. Cultural identity changes as it is approached 
from different views so cultural diversity entails a “labyrinth of intertwining 
cultural differences and similarities.”351  
 As a consequence of the overlap, interaction, and negotiation of cultures, the 
experience of cultural difference is internal to a culture.352 Contrary to an 
essentialist view, in which cultural horizons are fixed and the concept of 
“otherness” is per se associated with another culture, the aspectival view entails 
that one’s cultural horizon changes as one moves about.353 The experience of 
otherness is internal to one’s own identity, which consists in being oriented in 
an aspectival intercultural space characterized by overlap, interactivity, and 
internal negotiation.354 As such, citizens are always on some sort of common 
ground with diverse others who exhibit both cultural similarities and 
differences.355 This new view complicates mutual recognition, but according to 
Tully, also makes it possible by the exposure of a common ground.356  
Nevertheless, according to Tully most theorists still continue to uphold 
variations of the old (imperial) view; that of humans situated in closed, 
homogenous, and independent societies and cultures.357 For a good 
                                                        
349 Tully, 1995, pp. 10-11. An important insight that helps in explaining FPIC processes, and 
possible problems that may arise in such processes. 
350 Tully, 1995, pp. 10-11. This old “billiard ball” conception of cultures, led in the past to 
principles like the Wilsonean idea of “one nation, one state.” This has proven to be 
unattainable and undesirable.  
351 Tully, 1995, p. 11. 
352 Tully, 1995, p. 13. 
353 Tully, 1995, p. 13. Tully explains that on an essentialist reading of culture, the “other” and 
the experience of “otherness” were per se associated with another culture. The “own” culture 
provides an identity shaped as a seamless background or horizon against which it was 
determined where one stood on fundamental questions. Losing such a fixed horizon led to an 
“loss of all horizons” and subsequently to an “identity crisis.” On Tully’s “aspectival” view, 
cultural horizons change as one moves about, just like natural horizons. 
354 Tully, 1995, p. 13. 
355 Tully, 1995, p.14. 
356 Tully, 1995, p.14. Citizens are from the outset on a negotiated, intercultural, and aspectival 
middle ground, with some degree of experience of cross-cultural conversation and 
understanding; of encountering and being with diverse others who exhibit both cultural 
similarities and differences. 
357 Tully, 1995, p.14. 
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understanding of FPIC, the overlapping nature of culture is essential.358 This is 
so, because FPIC processes take place in dynamic settings of overlapping and 
interdependent identities and allegiances; especially in cases in which large scale 
development projects trigger rapid change in indigenous societies. 
These claims for cultural recognition constitute grave problems in the 
present age and should not be separated from other social relations; culture is a 
way of relating to others in any interaction, a way of following or challenging a 
social rule, and consequently a dimension of any social relation. Modern 
constitutionalism, first devised as a solution to these kinds of problems, now 
forms part of them.359 
 Modern constitutionalism developed over two main forms of recognition; 
i.e. equality of self-governing nation-states and equality of individuals.360 
Moreover, it developed in opposition to imperialism. Recently this development 
is characterized by claims to cultural recognition.361  
This “stage”, as was also described in the paragraphs on self-determination, 
is not concerned with “peoples” acquiring independent statehood; but seeks 
recognition within and across existing nation-states. In this way it is also a 
counter-imperial movement, but one that cannot simply be accommodated 
within the framework of conventional modern constitutionalism or international 
law. Tully investigates how much of the inherited forms of modern 
constitutionalism need to be adapted to accommodate these “new” demands for 
cultural recognition.362 
 A post-imperial dialogue on the just constitution of culturally diverse 
societies must be one in which the participants are recognized and allowed their 
own language and customs. Such a transition from an imperial system of 
imposed procedure to a situation of genuine inter-cultural popular sovereignty, a 
multilogue, is according to Tully the most important and most difficult first step 
towards what he called contemporary constitutionalism.363 Such a multilogue is 
exactly what is required in FPIC processes, if it is to become a realistic and 
effective instrument to facilitate intercultural decision-making. 
                                                        
358 One of the points that is stressed throughout this study is that any successful application of 
FPIC entails external as well as internal participation and has to leave room for internal dissent 
and negotiation. More on this is examined in paragraph III.3.4, on consent and representation. 
359 Tully, 1995, p. 15 
360 Self-determination of individuals and of peoples. P. 15. 
361 Tully explains that such opposition against imperialism developed first externally against the 
Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy in Europe and internally against the feudal absolutist 
systems, secondly, by the external self-determination movements of former colonial peoples, 
and now by the politics of cultural recognition.  
362 Tully, 1995, p. 17. Destruction of present constitutions through revolution and violent 
conflict does not seem desirable. 
363 Tully, 1995, p. 24. 
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This ability to perceive relations from multiple viewpoints, or reflective 
disequilibrium, changing perspectives – or see and understand aspectivally – is 
acquired only through participation in the inter-cultural dialogue itself.364 
  A constitution, according to Tully, can be both the foundation of 
democracy and, at the same time, can be subject to discussion and change in 
practice. To understand the place of FPIC and participation rights of indigenous 
peoples in this context - as expressions of their struggle for self-determination - 
it is noteworthy that Tully sees a constitution as an endless series of contracts and 
agreements, reached by periodical intercultural dialogues.365 The chapters of 
“Strange Multiplicity” explored the viability of such a system.366 Claims to FPIC 
- flowing from claims to self-determination - can be perceived as a similar type 
of dialogue and agreement. 
 
Diversity and Contemporary Constitutionalism 
 
A contemporary constitution can recognize cultural diversity if it is reconceived 
as “a form of accommodation” of cultural diversity. A constitution should be 
understood as an intercultural dialogue in which the diverse citizens of a 
contemporary society negotiate agreements on their form of association in line 
with three basic conventions or principles: (a) mutual recognition, (b) consent, 
and (c) continuity.367 
Tully investigated the main conventions of contemporary constitutionalism 
comprising dominant, modern, and subordinate “common” language, and their 
theorists main responses to questions of cultural diversity.368 He employed 
Wittgenstein’s methodology: not by presenting another comprehensive solution, 
but by a survey which brings to light the unexamined conventions that govern 
the language games in which both the problem and the range of issues arise.369  
                                                        
364 Tully, 1995, pp. 25-27. This dialogue should be perpetual, since recognition can never be 
definitive (or identities fixed or determined); There should always be a willingness to listen to 
voices of doubt and dissent within and to renegotiate the present arrangements: Tully calls this 
‘a sovereignty of the existing peoples’ instead of a sovereignty of existing constitutions.  
365 Tully, 1995, p. 26. Tully opposes views of constitutions as an original contract, ideal-
speech situation or mythical unity of the community. His strong critique on other democratic 
theorists falls outside the scope and purpose of this research. What is important here, is under 
what conditions an intercultural dialogue is best accommodated. 
366 Tully, 1995, p. 29. 
367 Tully, 1995, p. 30. The next paragraph will further explain these conventions. 
368 Tully, 1995, pp. 30 – 34. Also see these pages for an overview of the subsequent chapters 
and the general argument. This immensely complex dominant vocabulary is for the purpose of 
‘Strange Mulitplicity’ divided into three main authoritative schools of interpretation: 
Liberalism, Nationalism and Communitarianism, the narrow usage of these schools will be 
defined as ‘modern constitutionalism’. The broader language of ‘contemporary constitutionalism’ will 
be shown to be more complex than the three schools, and neither exclusively imperial nor 
European in nature. 
369 Tully, 1995, p. 35. By means of this method, it will be possible to critically assess which 
conventions unjustly frustrate cultural recognition and need revision, and conversely which 
conventions remain standing and show other claims to recognition to be unjust. 
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The first, but often overlooked, step in any inquiry into justice, is investigating if 
the language in which the inquiry proceeds is itself just; i.e. capable of rendering 
the relevant speakers their due.370 This is invaluable within the politics of 
cultural recognition since one of the central objections is that people are not 
recognized in their own cultural language or voice: “audi alterem partem.”371 
  Claims for recognition by e.g. indigenous peoples, firstly, are to be made in 
the prevailing language of constitutionalism if they are to be recognized as 
constitutional demands at all.372 Secondly, these claims are then critically 
examined according to these conventional criteria; e.g. people, nation, 
sovereignty, self-determination. This is not to say that these conventional criteria 
remain the fixed and unquestioned norms; the recognition claim is of course a 
demand to revise and adapt these norms.  
 Tully explained that the modern constitutions came into being in opposition 
to the “ancient constitutions” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in 
Europe and comprise seven main features or conventions that are shared among 
the authoritative schools of interpretation and serve as a common blue-print.373  
 The challenge cultural recognition poses does not fit within this existing 
frame, where it entails the claim that forms of recognition fail to take into 
account cultural diversity from the outset, resulting in exclusion or assimilation 
of cultural difference.374 Tully explains that criticism from different sides has 
pointed out this exclusionary nature of the dominant tradition and that a 
dialogue is needed in which other modes of speaking and the overlapping, 
negotiated, and interacting nature of culture are recognized.375 
                                                        
370 Tully, 1995, p. 34. 
371 Tully, 1995 pp. 34-35. The language in which a people is constrained to bring their claims 
is that of the ‘master’, European, colonial, western. Tully states that therefore the ‘ethical 
watchword’ of the post-Imperial age is ‘listen to the voices of others’ and to abide by the 
principle of self-identification, in international law and elsewhere. 
372 Tully, 1995, p. 39. E.g. indigenous peoples seek recognition as ‘peoples’ with the ‘right to 
self-determination. Indigenous groups do not only take their refuge to international law and 
human rights discourse, but are also forced to use it, before they can critically examine the 
language itself. 
373 Tully, 1995, p. 41. These features will be exposed in the next paragraphs. 
374 Tully mentions three non-authoritative schools that aim to challenge the hegemony of the 
authoritative traditions: (a) post-modernism, (b) cultural feminism and, (c) interculturalism. 
These schools share the argument that the three authoritative schools (formed by European 
men in an age of imperialism) do not challenge the foundation or framework of their own 
theory. 
375 Tully, 1995, pp. 45-54. Post modernism regards the language of modern constitutionalism as 
an imperial meta-narrative that needs to be thoroughly deconstructed. The shared concept of 
identity by the authoritative schools is unable to account for a crucial feature of contemporary 
identity: that it is always different from itself, as well as from others.  
 Cultural feminists claim that participation of women within existing institutions is not 
sufficient, since these have been established by men, to the exclusion of women, and have a 
masculine partiality. The institutions and traditions themselves thus have to change, allowing 




The confrontation between the politics of cultural recognition and modern 
constitutionalism thus faces an impasse: How can the proponents of recognition 
bring forth their claims in a public forum in which their cultures have been 
excluded or demeaned for centuries?376 “Strange Multiplicity” seeks to expose the 
way a just dialogue is precluded by the conventions of modern 
constitutionalism. The imperial assumption that defenders of modern 
constitutionalism uphold is that when they take up claims for recognition, 
understanding what the claimants are saying needs placing it within an inclusive 
language or conceptual framework in which it can then be adjudicated.377 
According to Tully, there is not one such comprehensive language or view; in 
post imperial dialogue - multilogue - one must listen not only to what is said, 
but also in which language it is spoken; an inter-cultural dialogue which does 
not presuppose one comprehensive language.378 
 According to Tully, modern theorists work under the assumption that the 
identity of modern constitutions consists of some combination of seven 
predominant features he discussed, thereby providing the comprehensive rule by 
which all political associations are ranked and identified.379 This comprehensive 
                                                                                                                              
 Intercultural citizens seek liberation by means of the constitutional recognition of suppressed 
indigenous and non-European traditions of interpretation and corresponding degrees of self-
rule. Interculturalists remain skeptical to attempts to stretch the dominant traditions and 
institutions to accommodate their needs (Kymlicka, Sandel), and point out that these miss the 
first step, i.e. questioning the sovereignty of the authoritative traditions the serve to legitimate. 
They remain critical of homogenous conception of identity, but also reject the post-modern 
deconstructive conclusions. Their challenge starts from the three features of cultural diversity; 
that cultures overlap, interact and are negotiated and re-imagined. 
376 As was stated, international law is trying to cope with this question now, but the language 
of international law has always been one which was largely incompatible with indigenous 
peoples demands. 
377 Tully, 1995, p. 56 
378 Tully, 1995, p.57. 
379 Tully illustrates seven core conventions of modern constitutional theory and proceeds by 
providing a range of examples on how these seven features of modern constitutionalism have 
been employed to misrecognize and suppress the cultural diversity of the world: Tully, 1995, 
pp. 64 – 96. (I) The first feature comprises three forms of popular sovereignty which eliminate 
cultural diversity as a constitutive aspect of politics; (a) the people are in a state of nature-like 
situation and aspire to constitute one uniform political association; (b) the people are in a 
society of equal individuals that have attained a ‘modern’ level of historical development and 
recognize an authoritative set of European institutions, manners and traditions; and (c) the 
people are seen as a community bound together by an implicit and substantive common good 
and a shared set of European institutions and traditions. 
 (II) Secondly, the modern constitution is defined in contrast to an ‘ancient’ or historically 
earlier constitution. This imperial character of modern constitutions is made in reference to the 
stage of development and the irregularity of other, non-European, pre-modern constitutions. 
The stages view has been contested in the 20th Century, since in it, cultures are seen as 
separate, closed, internally uniform and relative to a stage of socio-economic development. 
 (III) Third, the irregularity of ancient constitutions, as multiform, is contrasted to the 
modern concept of a (legally and politically) uniform constitution 
 (IV) The fourth feature concerns the recognition of custom within the theory of progress; 
modern constitutions recognize the (unintended) transformed character of modern societies. 
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map is projected over the whole and hides the diversity that actually exists 
beneath.380 
 Tully explains that Wittgenstein calls this the “Craving for Generality,” 
which, having its source partly in scientific method, has “shackled” 
philosophy.381 This craving generates a contemptuous attitude towards those 
specific cases – the multiplicity of concrete usages – that are incompatible with 
the general concepts.382  
 Not a single comprehensive rule is discovered, but rather a “complicated 
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail,” like the constitution of an ancient 
city.383 Therefore, the meaning of a word is not bounded by rules everywhere; 
but if the freedom of language must still be described in terms of rules, it is like a 
game, where we play and make up the rules as we go along.384 
                                                                                                                              
 (V) Fifth, a modern constitution is identified with a specific set of European institutions; in 
light of the convergence between European societies, constitutions will inevitably establish a 
uniform type of legal and political institutions (inter alia: representative government, separation 
of powers, rule of law, individual liberty, standing armies and a public sphere). 
 (VI) Sixth, since the American and French revolutions, the constitutional state is seen to 
possess an individual identity as a ‘nation’, an imaginary community to which all nationals 
belong and in which they enjoy equal dignity as citizens. Formal equality of citizens and 
equality of authority among states is characteristic of modern constitutionalism. 
 (VII) Finally, a modern constitution comes into being at some founding moment and 
provides the rules for democratic politics. It is enforced by the assumption that a modern 
constitution is something universal, where people agreed upon at some particular time; but for 
all time. The constitution thus seems to precede democracy, and this anti-democratic feature is 
mitigated by the assumption that ‘the people’ gave rise to it at a certain time, and that we 
would consent today if we were reasonable (contractarian). 
380 Tully, 1995, p. 105.  
381 Tully, 1995, p. 105. 
382 Tully, 1995, pp. 106 – 107, Tully explains two of Wittgenstein’s arguments for exposing 
the fault in this assumption and presents a correct way to understand general terms. (I) The first 
argument shows that understanding a general term is not the theoretical activity of interpreting 
and applying a general theory or rule in particular cases. No matter how elaborate such a rule 
might be, there is always the possibility of interpreting and applying it in various ways. If there 
is doubt or the possibility of endless interpretations of a rule, such a rule and its interpretation 
do not determine meaning. Rather, understanding a general term is nothing more than the 
practical activity of being able to use it in various circumstances. The uses of general terms, are 
intersubjective practices or customs – like tennis or the practice of law – and our understanding of 
them consists in the mastery of a technique or practical skill exhibited in being proficient players 
in the particular cases of language games in which they are used. Language thus becomes a 
game in which meanings are the on-going outcome of a perpetual ‘batting’ back and forth 
between users of their meaning of a term, from which a collective meaning coagulates. (II) 
Secondly, Wittgenstein argues that the ‘grasp’ exhibited in ‘obeying’ or ‘going against’ a rule 
in actual cases cannot be accounted for in terms of following general rules implicit in practice 
because the multiplicity of uses is too various, tangled, contested and creative to be governed 
by rules. 
383 Tully, 1995, p. 107. 
384 Tully, 1995, p. 108. 
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The knowledge and concept of a game is completely expressed in the 
description of various kinds of games. Hence, understanding a general term 
consist of being able to give reasons why it should or should not be used in any 
particular case by describing examples with similar or related aspects, drawing 
analogies or disanalogies of various kinds, finding precedents and drawing 
attention to intermediate cases so that one can pass easily from familiar cases to 
the unfamiliar and see the relation between them.385  
 An important element of Wittgenstein’s argumentation is the dialogical 
nature of understanding: this always takes place in interaction with others who 
see things differently and any monological view is always partial.386 
 Tully summarized his Wittgensteinian argument as follows: to understand a 
general term and know your way around its maze of uses, it is always necessary 
to enter into a dialogue with interlocutors from other regions of the city, to 
listen to their further descriptions and come to recognize the aspects of the 
phenomenon in question that they bring to light. These are aspects that may go 
unnoticed from one’s own familiar set of examples; that is why consultation of 
those on the different sides of a case is always necessary. As a result of these 
exchanges of views, a grasp of the multiplicity of cases is gradually acquired: 
understanding is dialogical.387 
 Tully concluded that Wittgenstein’s philosophy offers an alternative view to 
modern constitutionalism in that it: (a) provides a way of understanding others 
without comprehending what they say within one’s own language of re-
description, (b) it is a philosophical account of how intercultural dialogues 
promote diversity awareness by enabling the interlocutors different perspectives, 
and (c) it is a view of how understanding occurs in the real world of 
overlapping, interacting, and negotiated cultures.388 This analysis explains why it 
is so vital to listen to the descriptions and arguments of each party involved, and 
enter the conversation ourselves in order to find re-descriptions acceptable to all. 
In this way it becomes possible to mediate the differences that we want each 
other to recognize.389 
 These general terms of constitutionalism – and international law – like 
nation, people, self-determination and FPIC are like games, or can be seen as 
                                                        
385 Tully, 1995, pp. 108-109, The aim is to employ intermediate examples which make 
manifest a connection with other cases so that a person understands why or why not the term 
should be used in this case. Calling this activity of finding intermediate cases ‘the giving of 
further descriptions’ Wittgenstein compares it to the way reasons are given in a court of law. 
This exchange of descriptions and rediscriptions does not amount to the formulation of a 
general rule, since there is none; it (a philosopher’s work) simply consists of assembling 
reminders for a particular purpose. 
386 Tully, 1995, p. 109, So, there is no comprehensive view of the uses of a general term; any 
monological view is always partial to some degree – noticing some aspects at the expense of 
others. Any one description, therefore, will always remain one heuristic way characterizing the 
case in question; not a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. 
387 Tully, 1995, p. 110. 
388 Tully, 1995, p. 111. 
389 Tully, 1995, p. 111. 
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family resemblances.390 Within constitutional associations, the rights, institutions, 
and laws are not identical in every case, but vary with the interacting cultural 
diversity of the members, again forming a family. Rejecting the very progressive, 
scientific method of thinking typical to European civilization, a more “common 
law” like approach is advocated by Tully.391  
 Cultural diversity can be recognized in an intercultural dialogue that does not 
presuppose one comprehensive language. Tully continued with explaining 
which principles guide this dialogue. They provide a framework for the 
participation of indigenous peoples on the national level. 
  
III.2.4.2 Three Principles for Intercultural Negotiations 
 
The most important part of Tully’s work for the purposes of this study is his 
illustration of the three conventions of common (or contemporary) 
constitutionalism; (a) mutual recognition, (b) consent, and (c) continuity. The 
principles are also essential to take into account for applying indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination and in implementing FPIC processes. These 
conventions or norms come to be accepted as authoritative in the course of 
constitutional practice, including contestation and criticism of that practice. Tully 
claimed that: “These three conventions form the sturdy fibers of Ariadne’s 
thread through the labyrinth of conflicting claims to cultural recognition which 
currently block the way to a peaceful 21st century: if they guide constitutional 
negotiations, the negotiations and resulting constitutions will be just with respect 
to cultural recognition.”392 These principles are guiding in explaining what kind 
of legal structure is needed to implement FPIC requirements. 
 The first principle of intercultural negotiations is to agree on a form of mutual 
recognition of the parties involved.393 Without this initial step, fair negotiations 
and any concept of effective participation regarding self-rule or self-
determination is unattainable. This difficult first step and the form that 
recognition should have is to be determined by means of the intercultural 
dialogue. Such recognition can of course take different forms, and for 
indigenous peoples this is often a form of recognition as “indigenous people” 
wit - some form of - rights to self-determination. Later on in this study, a 
number of examples will be given of why recognition matters. Constitutional 
recognition may be highly important for a people’s sense of identity and 
belonging. Recognition of juridical capacity is essential for entering into 
procedures and for claiming diverse rights. Recognition of - some form of - 
                                                        
390 Tully, 1995, p. 112. 
391 Tully, 1995, pp. 113-119, According to Tully, the great tragedy of modern 
constitutionalism is that most European philosophers followed Hobbes’ monological and 
scientific method, turning their backs on dialogue just when non-European peoples were 
encountered, and dialogue and mediation were most needed.  
392 Tully, 1995, p. 117, for the examples, see p. 117 ff. 




ownership over their lands and resources is often essential for indigenous 
peoples’ cultural and physical survival. These types of recognition are invaluable 
preconditions for the successful implementation of FPIC processes. 
 When the correct form of mutual recognition is worked out the second, and 
most important principle for changing or constituting arrangements on the 
substantive issues involved, is the principle of consent.394 This is of course the 
central theme of this study. “Consent” (quod omnes tangit ab omnibus comprobetur – 
what touches all should be approved by all), is the most fundamental 
constitutional convention, it applies to any form of constitutional association, 
ensuring that a constitution or an amendment to it rests on the consent of the 
people, or the representatives of the people who are touched by it. The way it 
should be applied depends on how the “people” are recognized.395 The form of 
consent should always be tailored to the form of mutual recognition of the 
people involved.396 Analogously, FPIC is essential for negotiating fair agreements 
when indigenous communities’ rights to land, resources, and self-determination 
are under threat.  
 The third principle or convention guiding intercultural negotiations is 
continuity. The mutually recognized cultural identities of the parties are 
continuous - that is to say that they continue throughout the association agreed 
upon, unless the participants explicitly consent to amend them.397 Continuity 
forms the spirit of “ancient constitutionalism” expressing the view that customs 
and ways of peoples are the manifestation of their free agreement; to discontinue 
them without their explicit consent would breach the convention of consent.398 
Self-determination, in its internal form, requires continuous and respectful 
relations between indigenous peoples and the state. As mentioned, this is also the 
“spirit” of the UNDRIP. Furthermore, situations in which FPIC comes into 
play, for example when large-scale development projects on indigenous lands are 
proposed, will also often create long-term relations and commitments. It is 
essential not to see FPIC as a single moment of decision-making, but as the 
foundation for interaction on an ongoing basis. 
 In the specific example mentioned by Tully,399 the treaties give rise to a 
constitutional association of interdependence and protection, but not to 
discontinuity or subordination to a single sovereign.400 Tully aims to explore the 
                                                        
394 Tully, 1995, p. 121, Tully uses the example the Crown in North America where 
establishment of sovereignty or acquisition of land could only happen when the consent of the 
Aboriginal Nations was gained. 
395 Tully, 1995, p. 122. 
396 Tully, 1995, p. 123. Following the Marshall example. 
397 Tully, 1995, p. 125. 
398 Tully, 1995, p. 125. The convention of continuity stands in contrast to ‘discontinuity’ 
theories of constitutionalism as for example exposed in Hobbes’ Leviathan. In situations of 
cultural diversity, the modern view that a constitutional association must give rise to one 
uniform sovereign state that is unlimited by external and internal interdependency is 
inadequate. 
399 Marshall cases, p. 126. 
400 Tully, 1995, p 127. 
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treaty system from an Aboriginal perspective. He asserted that it is extremely 
important for Aboriginal people to have the capacity to delegate or share various 
powers of self-government while retaining sovereignty. As such, they will be 
able to work out, by mutual consent, the degree of self-government appropriate 
to their particular circumstances, without fear of domination or discontinuity.401 
 An intercultural constitutional dialogue itself is also guided by the three 
conventions.402 The intercultural dialogue entails that each negotiator 
participates in his own language, mode of speaking and listening, form of 
reaching agreement, and way of representing the people(s) for which they speak 
– the conditions of audi alteram partem.403  
 Tully argued that the presupposition of shared, implicit norms is manifestly 
false and that the aim of the negotiations over cultural recognition is not to reach 
agreement on universal principles and institutions, but to bring negotiators to 
recognize their similarities and differences, so that they can reach agreement on a 
form of association that accommodates their differences in appropriate 
institutions and their similarities in shared institutions.404 
 The presumption of an implicit consensus or a universal goal seems to mis-
identify the aim of this type of constitutional dialogue, which is filtering out the 
diverse similarities, and differences the speakers try to voice. In Tully’s 
vocabulary, the world of constitutionalism is not a “uni-verse” but a “multi-
verse.”405 Similarly, FPIC processes aim to map these similarities and differences, 
in order to come to a shared vision on how to appropriately make a decision, 
respectful of each other's culture and interest. 
 Mutual understanding is very difficult to achieve, but if it is to be 
approximated it is through engaging in “the volley of practical dialogue.”406 The 
participants in the dialogue are gradually able to see the association from the 
points of view of each other and work out an acceptable inter-cultural language 
capable of accommodating the truth in each of their limited and complementary 
views, thereby setting aside the incompatible ones.407  
 Where in modern constitutional theory, the agreement reached in dialogue 
is foundational, universal, comprehensive, exclusive, and the fixed background 
for democracy, in Tully’s contemporary view, it is open to review and 
renegotiation in a future dialogue if it is not as fitting as it appeared at the 
                                                        
401 This is exactly where self-determination and FPIC are about, deciding on the appropriate 
form of self-rule through a fair intercultural dialogue. 
402 Tully, 1995, p. 129. 
403 Tully, 1995,. p. 129. Of course the dialogue continues when the negotiators turn to their 
diverse constituents, what was described earlier as ‘internal internal self-determination’. 
404 Tully, 1995, p. 131 The three schools of modern constitutionalism disregard the hidden 
diversity of actual constitutional dialogue by their simplistic concepts of popular sovereignty 
and their corresponding concepts of constitutional dialogue – monological work that aims to 
establish agreement on universal principles or norms implicit in the practice (e.g. Habermas).  
405 Tully, 1995, p. 131, see 132 for a - negative - example from Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia. 
406 Tully does not think, that it is impossible though; Cf. his comments on Young, p. 134. 
407 Tully, 1995, p. 134. 
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time.408 As a result of this more flexible and pragmatic image, the concept of 
reaching agreement is different from the modern one and, in Tully’s view, more 
open to mutual understanding, accommodation, and conciliation among the 
participants.409 
 Tully’s important argument is that when indigenous peoples claim injustice 
has been done and demand redress, they appeal to the three conventions to 
justify their case, arguing that their status as nations or peoples has been 
misrecognised and their powers of self-rule discontinued and their consent bypassed. 
The biases and unfounded arguments involved can be bypassed; not by creating 
a comprehensive model to which reality must correspond, but, as Tully does in 
his book, to survey the practice from Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
perspectives; a practical activity of critical reflection that gradually leads to a 
critical understanding when approaching “the labyrinth” from different 
perspectives. This is the type of “surveying” that should guide FPIC processes, 
in order to map the similarities and differences necessary for consensual decision 
making.410 
 
III.2.4.3 Conclusions: Dialogue and Diversity in Multi-Nation States 
 
Concluding, Tully argued that negotiations in the context of cultural struggles 
for recognition need to adhere to three principles. These principles - mutual 
recognition, consent and continuity - also are vital for the successful 
implementation of self-determination derived rights for indigenous peoples. 
 The aspectival character of the intercultural dialogue needed is not grasped 
by a comprehensive representation, but by participation in a practical dialogue, 
or better: a multilogue. They preserve legal and cultural plurality, and consist of 
a diversity of criss-crossing contested narratives through which citizens 
participate in and identify with their association. Constitutions, like self-
determination or FPIC arrangements are not fixed and unchangeable 
agreements, but chains of continual intercultural negotiations in accord and 
discord with the conventions of mutual recognition, continuity and consent.411 
 Wittgenstein’s arguments point out that there is no single comprehensive 
model appropriate for accommodating the diverse claims to cultural recognition, 
whereas the domain of human action is aspectival. Instead of a grand theory, 
                                                        
408 Tully, 1995, p. 135, 
409 Tully’s scheme of continuous renegotiation and revision exposes an important issue in 
FPIC processes: How to ensure decision making with “due care” while remaining effective?  
410 In the next paragraph on “freedom” Philip Pettit’s idea of “freedom as discursive control” 
will be explained to further elaborate upon the requirements for FPIC processes. 
411 Tully, 1995, p. 184 ff. Contemporary constitutionalism includes common constitutionalism 
and modern constitutionalism trimmed of its features that violate the three conventions. 
Contemporary constitutionalism is seen as ‘just’ because it rests on the three conventions, 
being those that ‘survived’ the critical survey of ‘Strange Multiplicity’. Moreover, it furthers 
the liberty of self-rule, or self-determination. 
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constitutional knowledge appears to be a humble and practical dialogue.412 This 
is also the way in which indigenous peoples demands for recognition (for 
instance in FPIC processes) are to be approached. 
 Progress in contemporary constitutionalism is not the move towards 
uniformity, but rather it consists in learning to recognize, converse with, and 
accommodate present day diversity. Its value lies in continuing the overlapping, 
interacting, and contested cultures we have.413 
 The assumption that general terms of constitutional language can be applied 
identically in each instance leads to an insistence upon a uniformity that the 
aspectival and diverse constitutional phenomena of real life just do not 
represent.414  
  
A Normative Framework for Indigenous Self-determination and Participation Rights 
 
Without a political climate that is susceptible to indigenous demands for self-
determination and participation rights, FPIC cannot become an effective 
concept.415 Tully argued how and why these self-rule claims for indigenous 
peoples could fit well within the constitutional framework of the state; how they 
can become acceptable in constitutional practice.416 An important barrier to 
implementation of FPIC is the lack of political will on the part of states to 
enshrine FPIC in national legislation.  
 Tully’s account explains why and how room should be made for different 
forms of self-determination, within the framework of the state. Self-
determination – the power to choose one’s own pace and path of development 
– is to be achieved largely through fair participation in decision-making 
processes that affect indigenous peoples, as was argued before. 
 This politics of recognition leaves space on the national level for the 
accommodation of claims to culturally differentiated rights. Tully convincingly 
argues that a multilogue within and across cultures provides a way of 
understanding which does not entail thinking that one can comprehend what 
others say within one’s own language. This is the way understanding occurs in 
the real world of overlapping, interacting, and internally negotiated cultures. 
This insight is extremely important for understanding a concept of FPIC, where 
it reveals that both externally and internally, there - necessarily - ought to be 
room for dialogue and dissent. Moreover, we should not look for one 
                                                        
412 Tully, 1995, p. 185. An important argument in this study is that FPIC processes should not 
be seen as entailing a single comprehensive standard, but as flexible procedures, with different 
implications in different contexts, ‘a gliding scale’.  
413 Continuity is, as was discussed earlier in the paragraphs on self-determination, also a central 
theme in the contemporary global indigenous peoples movement; recognition of cultural 
identity and self-determination instead of progressive integration into ‘main-stream society’. 
414 Tully, 1995, p. 199. 
415 The legal and other cases explored later on in this study, exemplify this statement. 
416 Refer to constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples in Latin America. 
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comprehensive explanation or definition of FPIC, considering the wide variety 
of cultural contexts in which it is applicable. 
 The survey of encounters with non-European cultures, and common law 
and international law application, lead Tully to extract three essential principles: 
mutual recognition, continuity, and consent. These are norms of justification, 
which can be engaged and criticized from a multiplicity of vantage points.417 
These conventions do not presuppose a comprehensive form of dialogue, nor a 
single way of participating in such a dialogue. Accommodation of cultural 
diversity consists in the negotiation and mediation of claims to recognition in a 
dialogue governed by the three conventions.418 Vital for this study, these three 
principles are also the basis for the legal model developed mainly in the context 
of the Inter-American Human Rights system, and subsequent paragraphs will 
illustrate the importance of recognition, consent and continuity when trying to 
establish a fair legal model for indigenous land, resource and self-determination 
rights. 
 Tully’s framework emphasizes the need for a flexible interpretation of self-
rule standards. Especially the procedure itself should be open to re-negotiation. 
Searching for a fixed, uniform standard for FPIC and effective participation 
processes is neither realistic nor desirable. What is needed, is an intercultural 
dialogue in which the culturally distinct ways of speaking and acting are 
mutually recognized, in order to reach agreement on the type of self-rule 
arrangements that fit the particular situation and cultural context. It is through 
and in this dialogue that people and peoples are to recognize each other’s 
similarities and differences and by this process of mediation discover common 
ground and reach agreement on appropriate types of self-rule. 
 Tully illustrated the central importance of a principle of self-determination 
for indigenous peoples that works within the framework of the state, provides 
powerful arguments for national recognition of indigenous peoples and forms of 
participation in the state that recognize cultural differences and appropriate forms 
of self-rule.   
 Furthermore, he explained what kind of framework is necessary for 
implementing such self-rule structures: an intercultural dialogue guided by 
principles of mutual recognition, continuity, and consent. These are essential 
preconditions for making FPIC work. Without a situation of mutual respect and 
trust between indigenous peoples and states, and without a dialogue in which 
                                                        
417 Ivison D, 'Does The Spirit of Haidi Gwaii Fly Only at Dusk?', 1 Theory & Event, at 4, 
1997. 
418 Tully, 1995, p. 210-212. A ‘just peace’, in Tully’s opinion, is always a ‘mediated’ peace. 
The Chief of the Canoe ‘Spirit of Haida Gwaii’ that served as the metaphor for Tully’s theory, 
is in the last sentence of the book, revealed to be the mediator: this appears to be the State. 
Tully’s study also entails a model for both non-aboriginal and aboriginal people to map their 
similarities and differences, and to ‘mediate’ between peoples. International forums and 
platforms may perform such a mediating task, and provide discursive space. The ‘common law 
like’ system of reasoning in international adjudication is in line with what Tully requires for a 




indigenous voices are heard, effective participation is impossible to realize. 
Consequently, without such an intercultural dialogue, FPIC can never become a 
successful tool; an effective instrument to solve the problems indigenous 
communities face when confronted with powerful actors in decision-making 
processes that affect them.  
III.3 Free, Prior and Informed Consent  
After having explored the importance and status of effective participation for 
indigenous peoples, the next paragraphs will examine the connected concept of 
FPIC - in particular its different elements - more closely. It will be illustrated 
that it is vital to secure that consent – when given – is provided in a way that 
qualifies as “free and informed.” The following paragraphs will focus on what 
these two requirements could entail, and why they matter so much. A shorter 
paragraph will be devoted to the requirement that consent has to be provided 
“prior” to any decision. 
 But, as a vantage point for the remainder of Part III, this paragraph will firstly 
describe the current understanding of the different elements of FPIC. The most 
widely cited and elaborate document in which these different elements are 
explained is the report of the 2005 UNPFII Workshop on FPIC.419 
 
The 2005 Workshop on FPIC 
 
In 2004, the Inter-Agency Support Group on Indigenous Issues420 published its 
report on free, prior and informed consent at the Third session of the UNPFII, 
in which it put forth a questionnaire to 18 UN Agencies.421 The main outcomes 
of the report stated that although no formal definition of FPIC was present 
within the UN agencies, they all recognized the principle as being embedded 
within the human rights framework. Meaningful participation and consultation 
were regarded as essential for implementing FPIC.  
 Subsequently, in February 2005, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
published its report on the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, held in New York 
in January of that year.422 The Workshop was attended by 67 observers and 
                                                        
419 E/C.19/2005/3, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, 17 February 2005, presented at the 
Fourth session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, 16-
27 May 2005. 
420 The Inter-Agency Support Group (IASG) was established to support and promote the 
mandate of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues within the United Nations 
system. See: http://undesadspd.org/IndigenousPeoples/InterAgencySupportGroup.aspx. 
421 Inter-Agency Support Group on Indigenous Issues, report on free, prior and informed 
consent, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Third session, New York, 10-21 May 2004, 
E/C.19/2004/11. 
422 E/C.19/2005/3, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, 17 February 2005, presented at the 
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experts from Governments, indigenous organizations, United Nations, and other 
intergovernmental organizations. The report and its accompanying documents 
still contain the most comprehensive elaboration on the elements of FPIC seen 
in light of the UNDRIP and will therefore be discussed next. 
The principle of free, prior and informed consent was recognized as one of 
the core methodological challenges concerning the protection of indigenous 
peoples at the Permanent Forum’s first, second, and third sessions. In accordance 
with ECOSOC decision 2004/287,423 which authorized the Workshop, the 
Permanent Forum’s secretariat organized a three-day session, in which United 
Nations and other intergovernmental organizations representatives,424 indigenous 
organizations’ experts, interested state representatives, and members of the 
Permanent Forum participated.425 The workshop’s conclusions and 
recommendations somewhat cautiously stated that progress was made in 
establishing a more common understanding of the FPIC.  
 
Workshop’s Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The overall opinion was that FPIC was integral to the exercise of the right to 
self-determination and essential in effectively protecting indigenous peoples’ 
rights to land, territories, and resources.426  
FPIC is described as an evolving principle that should be adaptable to 
different realities. The principle was identified as: “a process that could possibly 
lead towards equitable solutions and evolutionary development which may lead, 
in their turn, to co-management and decision-making.”427 This rather cautious 
                                                                                                                              
Fourth session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, 16-
27 May 2005. 
423 ECOSOC decision 2004/287, 49th Plenary Meeting, 22 July 2004. 
424 The UN and other intergovernmental organisation participating in the Workshop were: 
Division for the Advancement of Women of the United Nations Secretariat, Department of 
Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, Department of Public Information of the 
United Nations Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat, European Community, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), International Labour Organization (ILO), Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
secretariat of the United Nations Forum on Forests, United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 
World Health Organization (WHO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and 
the World Bank Group. 
425 E/C.19/2005/3, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, 17 February 2005, presented at the 
Fourth session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, 16-
27 May 2005, (E/C.19/2005/3), page 3. 
426 E/C.19/2005/3, page 10. 
427 E/C.19/2005/3, paragraph 42. 
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approach towards FPIC, however, does not seem to explicitly preclude any 
requirement of full consent. Nevertheless, the statement does not expressly 
declare that in some cases, FPIC can be regarded as a “right to say no.” The 
indigenous participants at the workshop did believe that any given process of 
free, prior and informed consent could result in a narrow understanding of 
“consent or non-consent.” In turn, such an outcome should not be considered 
as a good or a bad result, as long as appropriate mechanisms were in place.428 
The Workshop’s report noted that legal norms and methodologies regarding 
FPIC have been practiced and should continue to be practiced in order to: 
“build a culture of respect and mutual understanding in the relations between 
indigenous peoples, states, intergovernmental organizations and the private 
sector in development projects that affect indigenous peoples’ land, territories, 
resources and their ways of life.”429 As noticed in paragraph III.2.2 concerning 
the participatory provision in the UN Declaration, the focus on a “spirit of co-
operation” is invaluable in creating effective participatory mechanisms for the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights.  
The Workshop report identified the main areas in which FPIC is relevant. 
Amongst others, and in line with what was argued in Part II of this study, the 
principle is important with respect to indigenous lands and territories, treaties 
and agreements with the states and other actors, development projects, policies 
and legislation affecting indigenous peoples, and in relation to United Nations 
and other intergovernmental organizations dealing with indigenous issues.430 
FPIC thus appears to be an important principle aimed at guiding the decision-
making processes of in a wide range of issues related to indigenous peoples. 
The most important outcome of the Workshop is enshrined in its 
conclusions on the “elements of a common understanding of free, prior and informed 
consent,” in which the different elements of the principle are defined by the 
leading opinion of the participants. According to the report, these elements 
“emerge towards a common practical understanding of free, prior and informed 
consent” based on international and national policies, jurisprudence and 
practices.431 In dissecting the principle, the Workshop report concluded that: 
 
1. Free should imply no coercion, intimidation or manipulation. 
 
2. Prior should imply that consent has been sought sufficiently in advance 
of any authorization or commencement of activities and that respect is 
shown for time requirements of indigenous consultation/consensus 
processes. 
 
3. Informed should imply that information is provided that covers (at least) 
the following aspects: 
                                                        
428 E/C.19/2005/3, paragraph 42. 
429 E/C.19/2005/3, paragraph 43. 
430 E/C.19/2005/3, paragraph 45. 
431 E/C.19/2005/3, paragraph 44 and 46. 
CHAPTER III 
115 
a. The nature, size, pace, reversibility and scope of any proposed 
project or activity; 
b. The reason(s) for or purpose(s) of the project and/or activity; 
c. The duration of the above; 
d. The locality of areas that will be affected; 
e. A preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural and 
environmental impact, including potential risks and fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing in a context that respects the precautionary 
principle;  
f. Personnel likely to be involved in the execution of the proposed 
project (including indigenous peoples, private sector staff, research 
institutions, government employees and others); 
g. Procedures that the project may entail.432 
 
In line with what was discussed above, consultation in good faith and 
participation are seen as the most crucial components of a consent process. The 
focus should be on the establishment of a dialogue in an atmosphere of mutual 
respect with full and equitable participation.433 Another implicit reference to 
self-determination is made by stating that indigenous peoples should be able to 
participate through their own freely chosen representatives and customary or 
other institutions, thereby underlining the importance of taking into account 
indigenous law in participatory processes. As will be illustrated in Part V, the 
Inter-American human rights entities attempted to clarify these requirements.  
 Finally, the concluding remarks regarding consent state that: “This process 
may include the option of withholding consent,”434 thereby neither confirming 
nor denying the existence of a collective “right to say no.” The possibility of 
such a narrow conception of “consent,” however, is definitely not excluded.  
 The elements of a common understanding of FPIC, stated in the January 
2005 Workshop report and reaffirmed in the August 2005 Workshop report, 
can be seen as the most comprehensive elaboration on the principle of FPIC. 
The emphasis is on a consent-process, meaningful participation, and 
consultation.435  
The following paragraphs will explore these different elements of FPIC 
more in-depth. First, it is examined how the requirement “free” is best 
understood in the context of FPIC processes. As will be shown, Philip Pettit’s 
account of interpersonal freedom as discursive control offers an attractive 
perspective in this light. Next, some remarks on the prior requirements will be 
                                                        
432 E/C.19/2005/3, paragraph 46. 
433 E/C.19/2005/3, paragraph 47. This is in line with what was discussed at length in the 
paragraph on effective participation and specifically with the paragraph that examined the 
concept in light of James Tully’s description of an intercultural dialogue.  
434 E/C.19/2005/3, paragraph 47. 
435 For more recent work, reiterating most of the viewpoints developed during the workshop, 
see e.g.: Doyle C and Cariño J, ‘Making Free Prior and Informed Consent a Reality, 
Indigenous Peoples and the Extractive Sector’, Middlesex University, 2013. 
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made. Subsequently, the informed criterion will be examined. In the latter 
paragraph, a perspective from the field of bioethics will be taken, since it is in 
this field that informed consent requirements were developed first. This 
perspective offers a number of relevant insights that explain the complexities 
involved in “informing”. It is argued that informing in the context of FPIC 
entails complex communicative transactions. A number of standards that are 
important for successful communicative transactions will be described. 
Afterwards, some particularly pressing issues related to obtaining FPIC in the 
context of indigenous peoples will be exposed. Part III ends with a paragraph 
containing an overview and conclusions. 
III.3.1 Free: Discursive Control and Non-Domination 
Introduction 
 
As the first step in “dissecting” FPIC, and exploring its different elements, this 
paragraph will examine what is meant by the requirement “free” in FPIC. 
When can it be said that an indigenous people makes a free decision? Or when 
can it be said that a consultation process is conducted in a manner that is “free?” 
In other words, what sort of capacity can be ascribed to an agent that bears the 
predicate “free?” Philip Pettit’s theory of freedom as discursive control will be 
examined, since this theory provides an attractive and, importantly, practical way 
of explaining what the requirement “free” could imply. It will be argued that 
there are certain specific criteria that we can link to a requirement of freedom, 
criteria that make it tangible and applicable. 
Pettit’s account does not only cover personal freedom, but also links up with 
the political freedom, the political ideal that is best upheld by a state in order to 
guarantee the freedom of, in this study, indigenous peoples. In this way, it is 
again possible to expose the relation between FPIC and the broader concept of 
self-determination. This account therefore clarifies what is meant by “to freely 
determine” in the text of the different provisions on self-determination. 
Pettit’s account of freedom is very attractive for our purposes, because it 
defines freedom as an interpersonal, relational concept, something that you 
experience when interacting with others. This is of course the way “free” in 
FPIC processes is meant to function. 
The two main questions that will be examined in these paragraphs are 
therefore: What do we mean if we say that an indigenous people “as a whole” is 
to consent to a certain proposal in a state that can be described as “free?”436 And 
                                                        
436 As the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights explained, consent has to be 
acquired on behalf of the community as a whole, whereas this entails at a minimum that all of 
the members of the community are fully and accurately informed of the nature and 
consequences of the process and provided with an effective opportunity to participate 
individually or as a collective. See, IACHR, Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo 
District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Report No. 40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2004), October 12 
2004, paragraph 142. At a minimum, ‘free’ requires that consent is given or withheld in the 
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which political principle should be guiding to secure that indigenous 
communities are able to “freely determine” their political status and freely 
pursue their own way of economic, social and cultural development? 
 
III.3.1.1 Personal Freedom and Consent: Discursive Control 
 
Free Agency under Discursive Control Theory: Pettit’s Theory of Freedom 
 
It was argued in paragraph II.1 that indigenous self-determination functions as an 
intra-state concept that requires equal participation of indigenous peoples and 
that FPIC is a procedural tool aimed at operationalizing indigenous self-
determination by means of a targeted approach of integrating indigenous peoples 
the decision-making processes that affect them. 
 It was also argued that consent as a procedural justification is in need of 
strong additional requirements, since it may have profound implications for 
indigenous communities, taking into account the types of decisions in which it 
is relevant.437 In paragraph III.2.4 the type of intercultural dialogue that is 
needed for appropriate forms of self-rule and the principles that support such a 
“multilogue” were clarified by exploring Tully’s famous work “Strange 
Multiplicity.” 
Now it is examined under what kind of perception on freedom an 
indigenous people can operate in a state that can be described as “free.” This 
question will be answered with the help of Philip Pettit’s book “A Theory of 
Freedom” (2001), in which the author presented a comprehensive theory of 
freedom that encompasses the area of free will as well as that of political 
liberty.438  
   
The Priority of the Responsibility Connotation: Freedom as Fitness to be Held Responsible 
 
Pettit’s core assumption was that there is a single, unequivocal concept of 
freedom at issue when we speak of freedom in the person, freedom of the self, 
and freedom of action.439 Such an account must explain why three connotations 
of freedom are valid. First, the agent should be held rightly responsible for what 
he or she did, secondly, an action is only free if it is one that the agent can own 
                                                                                                                              
absence of coercion. See, E/C.19/2005/3, Report of the International Workshop on 
Methodologies regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, 17 
February 2005, presented at the Fourth session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, New York, 16-27 May 2005. Also see, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2005/WP.1, 
Motoc I A,'Standard Setting: Legal Commentary on the Concept of Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent', UNPFII, 2005. This paragraph will explore this requirement in-depth. 
437 Further elaboration on the need for strong requirements securing the validity of consent 
agreements is provided in amongst others paragraph III.3.3. 
438 Pettit P, A Theory of Freedom - From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) (Pettit, 2001). Philip Pettit is Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of 
Politics and Human Values at Princeton University, United States. 
439 Pettit, 2001, p. 6. 
PROCEDURES 
118 
and identify with, and thirdly, the agent’s choice has to be one that is not fully 
determined yet.440  
These are called respectively; the responsibility, the ownership and the 
underdetermination connotation. Pettit prioritized the responsibility 
connotation, which in his view leads to a satisfying view of the overall area. He 
argued that any action for which an agent can be held responsible is going to be 
underdetermined in a significant way and is going to be something that the 
agent can and must own. So whereas underdetermination and ownership do not 
necessarily entail responsibility, Pettit argued that the priority should be given to 
freedom as fitness to be held responsible since there is a certain 
underdetermination and ownership implied in the very idea of being fit to be 
held responsible.441   
These connotations all have their own conundrum or central problem. 
Underdetermination raises what Pettit calls “the modal problem,” which means 
that for anything to be freely done, the agent must have been able to have done 
something else instead.442 In relation to the ownership connotation, the core 
problem is defined as the first person conundrum. For anything to be done 
freely it must be the case that the agent is able, and indeed compelled, to see the 
action as his/her (or their) own. The agent must not be a mere bystander, they 
must identify with what is done by their hands.443 The conundrum for the 
responsibility connotation is that it is recursive in character; it constitutes a 
procedure that can repeat itself indefinitely. 444 
 It is essential that the agent is fit to be held responsible, in other words, the 
agent must be effectively reactionworthy for a certain action to be seen as free.445 
Pettit’s general idea behind depicting freedom as fitness to be held responsible 
was that we engage with others in a distinctive manner that involves the 
spontaneous attribution of responsibility. Consequently, we conceive of freedom 
as that property of human beings and the actions performed by them that make 
such attribution appropriate under the rules of the practice.446 When the agent is 
fully reactionworthy, then it is proper to speak of freedom; being free is such 
that the reaction is appropriate; it is being fit to be held responsible.447 
                                                        
440 Pettit, 2001, p.6. 
441 Pettit, 2001, p. 8. 
442 Pettit, 2001, p. 9. 
443 Pettit, 2001, p. 10. 
444 Pettit, 2001, p. 10/11. If an agent is responsible for a certain action, this means that he 
must be responsible for the particular beliefs and desires that led to such action, and that can 
only be the case is you can be held responsible for some sort of further factor in your make up, 
and so on, indefinitely. The recursive nature of responsibility according to Pettit, appears to 
entail an indefinite regress back along the lines of controlling influences in virtue of which an 
action is put down to an agent in the first place. 
445 Pettit, 2001, p. 12/13. 
446 Pettit, 2001, p. 13. 
447 Pettit, 2001, p. 12/13. To be fully fit to be held responsible for a certain choice is to be 




Intuitively, Pettit argued, you will not be fully free in respect of a choice, i.e. it is 
not sufficiently underdetermined, if you are not aware of A or B, or if your 
capacity or resources are not present.448 Furthermore, you will not be a free self 
if you are subject to problems that make it difficult or impossible to claim A or B 
as something that you did, something that you can fully identify with. Finally, 
and particularly important for our purposes, you will not be a free person, if you 
are the victim of an unwelcome form of duress, pressure, or coercion.449 These 
conditions diminish or excuse someone from being held responsible, and 
consequently, they infringe upon one’s freedom. 
 Pettit assumed three further conditions for conceiving of freedom as fitness 
to be held responsible. First, you must count as free to be held responsible prior 
to choice, secondly, you must be fit in a personalized way - not just according to 
received social standards, and thirdly, you must be properly free to be held 
responsible, i.e. not merely fit to be treated as if you are free to be held 
responsible.450 
 
The Main Argument for Conceptualizing Freedom as Fitness to be Held Responsible 
 
Pettit argued that there is an a priori connection between freedom and being 
responsible.451 The main argument accordingly starts from the intuition that it 
does not make sense to say that if someone did something freely, they still 
cannot be held responsible.452  
 Subsequently, while this a priori connection will be unsurprising and credible 
under the approach of freedom as fitness to be held responsible, it remains 
mysterious under the ownership and underdetermination approaches. Fitness to 
be held responsible itself is a condition that breaks down into a variety of 
interconnected constraints; a number of distinguishable circumstances. This way 
it is possible under this approach to invoke the freedom of an agent in 
explaining why we hold them responsible.453 
                                                        
448 Pettit, 2001, p. 13. 
449 Pettit, 2001, p. 13. Most accounts of the element ‘free’ in FPIC explain it as a requirement 
of no coercion. Pettit’s account of freedom does not leave room for hostile coercion, as will 
be argued further on, but does distinguish between friendly and unfriendly forms of coercion. 
This is important, since FPIC processes virtually always entail some form of coercive action, 
when offers are being made or rewards promised. It is important to examine what kind of 
coercive action is or is not allowed. 
450 Pettit, 2001, p. 14 – 18. We often treat others ‘as if they are fit to be held responsible’ 
because of the effects this may have on their performance, for developmental purposes. 
451 A connection that we all understand, without having to seek further evidence in support. 
Pettit, 2001, p. 18. 
452 Pettit, 2001, p. 18-19. Pettit explains that we think of freedom as the “can” which an 
addressing of “oughts” presupposes. Freedom as such can be seen as “the appropriate 
addressing of ought.” We will be able to recognize that sometimes it is appropriate to address 
“oughts” to others and that sometimes it is not. We think of freedom as that capacity that 
makes a difference between such situations. 
453 Pettit, 2001, p. 19. 
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Therefore, Pettit’s main idea is that we live and think within the practice of 
holding one another responsible, which makes it credible to talk of freedom as 
fitness to be held responsible. It makes it possible to talk about freedom as 
freedom of action, freedom of the self and freedom in the person.454 
 There are a number of other advantages in seeing freedom as fitness to be 
held responsible. It clarifies for one why “offers” are generally not seen as 
diminishing a person’s freedom, while “threats” are. Most important for our 
purposes is that this view on freedom makes it something more than a 
philosopher’s plaything.455 Since the practice of holding people responsible for 
certain actions is deeply rooted in human behavior, asserting that fitness to be 
held responsible is what we mean by “freedom” makes the concept very 
concrete and tangible. In this way, we can apply it in practical situations in 
which FPIC is required and to explain what is meant by “free.”  
 
Free Agency under Discursive Control Theory 
 
Subsequently, Pettit aimed to show that his theory of freedom as discursive control 
allows us to speak of freedom of action, self and person. Pettit first covered two 
other theories: the theories of freedom as rational and volitional control. He 
used Rawls’ method of the reflective equilibrium to illustrate that they both 
have necessary elements for a comprehensive theory of freedom, but that they 
do not quite suffice.456 It would be far beyond the scope of this thesis to go into 
Pettit’s argument in full and since our purpose is to find a theory or perception 
of freedom that is relevant for a better understanding of “free” in FPIC - one 
that does not allow for a variety of forms of hostile coercion - we will focus on 
Pettit’s argument in relation to freedom in the person under the theory of 
freedom as discursive control. It is argued that Pettit’s notion of discursive 
control provides an accurate and attractive view on “free” in FPIC. 
Nevertheless, since rational and volitional control are essential elements in the 
make-up of freedom as discursive control, we will have to make some remarks 
about both. 
  
Freedom as Rational Control 
 
The responsibility perspective allows us to think of freedom in purely functional 
terms, it is conceived as that capacity, whatever it involves in itself, in virtue of 
which an agent is fit to be held responsible, satisfying the various constraints that 
                                                        
454 Pettit, 2001, p. 21. An agent will be a free person to the extent that their position in relation 
to others allows them to choose in such a way that they are fully responsible for what they do, 
a free self to the extent that their relationship to their own psychology allows the same. An 
action is free when it materializes in such a way that allows the agent to count as fully fit to be 
held responsible. In this way the free person, self and action are fully responsibility-compatible. 
455 Pettit, 2001, pp. 20-22.  
456 Pettit, 2001, pp. 34-35. 
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that involves.457 Such a functional characterization poses the question as to what 
that capacity of freedom involves.458 This is Pettit’s starting point and main 
question in constructing a theory of freedom.459 
 Freedom as rational control takes free action as its starting point. Rational control 
means that an action is free just as far as it is an exercise of rational control or 
power on the part of the agent. Rational control has two components: firstly, it 
is action related in the sense that the agent will do whatever is rational in the 
light of beliefs and desires that are present, and secondly, it is evidence related; 
the agent has to be disposed to update those beliefs and desires if the obtainment 
of new information requires so.460  
Pettit stated that the rational control theory applied to action is subject to 
the recursive problem. When applied to the free self, rational control theory 
does not explain how the person can see himself as the author, as the self 
responsible for what occurs in their psychology. Rational control theory applied 
to the free person is not inconsistent with hostile coercion. Nevertheless, 
freedom as rational control is also necessary, since fitness to be held responsible 
seems to presuppose at least a satisfactory measure of rational control.461 
 
Freedom as Volitional Control 
 
The second theory Pettit explored was the theory of freedom as volitional control, 
which is in the first place a theory of the free self. A self will be free so far as: 
“there is nothing about the psychology of the agent in virtue of which they are 
distanced from what they want or think or do, and have to look on those 
attitudes as a helpless bystander.”462 Volitional control theory explains that 
rational control has to be supplemented with volitional control in order to 
                                                        
457 Pettit, 2001, p. 32. 
458 Pettit, 2001, p. 32. 
459 Pettit’s method is an extension of Rawls’ “Reflective Equilibrium,” the idea being going 
back and forth between a general description of the freedom capacity and the intuitions that 
we have about whether there is freedom present in this or that imagined or actual case, in 
order to come to a stable equilibrium between the two. Pettit, 2001, pp. 34-35. 
460 Pettit, 2001, pp. 34-38. Such action can be construed narrowly as being the actual causal 
result of desires and beliefs, but according to Pettit it should be construed more broadly, so 
that such action can also be under the virtual influence of those states. 
461 For the argument in full, see: Pettit, 2001, pp. 32-48. 
462 The theory of volitional control Pettit describes is the one developed by Harry Frankfurt. 
The core of Frankfurt’s thesis to solve the bystander problem can be summarized as follows. 
Frankfurt’s thesis states that agents are capable of having first and second order desires, and 
second order desires are those that can only be specified by reference to first order desires. 
Among those second order desires there may be a desire that the agent is effectively moved by a 
certain first order desire. Such second order desires are characterised as second order volitions. To 
the extent that agents act according to these second order volitions, they can identify fully 
with it, see the action as one of their own making, and avoid the bystander problem. Pettit 
argues that the bystander problem is not avoided in Frankfurt’s theory, since these second 
order volitions can be subject to the very problem it tries to solve. See Pettit, 2001, pp. 50-51. 
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constitute fitness to be held responsible and subsequently freedom. Rational 
control itself is not sufficient to pass this bystander problem.463  
 In relation to the theory of volitional control regarding freedom of action 
and freedom in the person, Pettit explained that it is subject to the same 
problems as the theory of rational control. That the action must be rationally 
controlled by rationally held beliefs and desires that conform to the volitional 
requirement - and the desires are those that the agent wants to be effective - is 
subject to the problem of recursiveness.464 
That agents will be free persons so far as their relations are consistent with 
their being free selves, i.e. are consistent with their enjoying rational-cum-
volitional control of what they do, again does not exclude the possibility of 
hostile coercion.465 Nevertheless, volitional control is also a necessary element in 
any conception of freedom; if there are higher order volitions in place, they 
must play a controlling role.466  
 
Rational and Volitional Control and Coercion 
 
It is argued that both the theories of rational and volitional control are necessary 
but not sufficient for a theory of freedom as fitness to be held responsible. 
Subsequently Pettit constructed an addition to these theories, and argued that a 
theory of freedom as discursive control enriches the theories of volitional and 
rational control in such a way that we can think of freedom as inconsistent with 
different forms of hostile coercion. We can now turn to this - for our purposes 
highly relevant - step in Pettit’s conception of freedom.  
What do we mean by coercion? People are coerced when they are subject 
to threats of penalty in the event of taking or not taking something that is 
currently available as an option.467 People are coerced, in a hostile way, when the 
threats are not dictated by the avowed or at least the avowable (ready to be 
avowed) interests of the coercee.468 Because the agent does retain original 
choice, people who are coerced are still in a position to exercise rational and also 
volitional control; i.e. they are in a position where they can act in a way that 
answers to the beliefs and desires relevant to the situation and, in particular, 
                                                        
463 Pettit, 2001, p. 49. 
464 Pettit, 2001, pp. 58-60. 
465 Pettit, 2001, pp. 61-62.  
466 Pettit, 2001, p. 63. Certain “higher order desires” can be seen as “volitions proper” when 
two conditions are fulfilled. First, they are desires to be effectively moved by lower level 
desires. Secondly these second order volitions must bear the agent’s active stamp of approval. 
467 Pettit, 2001, p. 61. 
468 Pettit, 2001, p. 61. Pettit uses the example of Ulysses, tied to the mast of his boat, coerced 
by his fellow shipmen to remain tied up so he could listen to the song of the sirens. In this 
case, the coercive action was in line with the avowed interests of Ulysses. That the interests of 
the coersee, do not necessarily have to be already avowed but can also be ‘ready to be avowed’ 
is evident, since new interests may become clear in the process of interaction.  
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where they can act in fidelity to their higher-order desires as to what lower 
order desires should effectively move them.469  
So how does the theory of freedom as discursive control counter this 
problem? How can an agent be free in such a manner that leaves no space for 
hostile coercion, and what kind of coercive action does preserve freedom? These 
questions are of vital importance in FPIC processes because if consent is not 
given freely, it is useless. Pettit’s account of freedom as discursive control 
pinpoints exactly those issues that have to be taken into account in FPIC 
processes in order to safeguard the freedom of indigenous peoples. 
 
Freedom as Discursive Control 
 
While it is impossible and beyond the scope of this study to present Pettit’s 
arguments from his compact but dense book in full, the most important 
elements of his view on freedom as discursive control will be explored. It will 
become clear that this view is very attractive to serve as a way to perceive the 
element of “free” in FPIC since it requires that indigenous groups must enjoy 
discursive control in decision-making processes process to preserve their 
freedom. Furthermore, it also allows for a distinction between a number of 
coercive actions that may or may not jeopardize “freedom.” 
Discursive control theory starts from a perception of freedom in the person. 
The theory of the free person (abstracted from environmental freedom) relates 
to the standing that an agent must have among other persons if he or she is to be 
regarded as free in the choices they make.470 This relational aspect is most 
important for the situation we describe; that of an indigenous people acting 
freely in relation to the state or other agent,471 involved with obtaining consent. 
Such an interpersonal relation is most prominent within the process of FPIC; it 
necessarily involves different agents in a “dialogical” process. Therefore, the 
focus will be on the discursive control conception of freedom as it bears on the 
free person. 
 As indicated above, a richer conception of freedom as fitness to be held 
responsible is needed - in addition to the theories of rational and volitional 
control - if it is to rule out, not just the obstruction of choice, but also a myriad 
of other coercive and quasi-coercive ways in which people may intrude upon a 
person or hinder them.472  
                                                        
469 Pettit, 2001, p. 61. e.g. when a robber threatens you with a physical beating if you don’t 
hand over your money, you retain rational and volitional control in handing over your wallet. 
Analogous examples with regard to indigenous peoples can easily be imagined. 
470 Pettit, 2001, p. 65. Pettit’s theory is about ‘freedom in the agent’ by which he amongst 
others tries to make clear that it abstracts from dealing with environmental constraints that may 
infringe upon one’s freedom, like for instance a constraining social system or harsh natural 
circumstances. In the part on political freedom these environmental considerations do play a 
role, where the principle of non-domination also requires that the state does what it can to 
reduce these environmental constraints.  
471 FPIC operates on different levels; local, national, regional and international. 





Pettit asked: Does any relationship mean that those involved, the influenced as 
much as the influential, retain a full and equal title to be held responsible? His 
answer is affirmative. According to Pettit this is the interaction that occurs when 
people attempt to resolve a common discursive problem by common discursive 
means.473  
 To discourse is to reason, in dialogue with others, which implies the 
recognition of a common problem. To discourse, in this sense, refers to a method 
of taking turns with the aim of solving a problem by reference to what all parties 
regard as inferentially relevant considerations or reasons.474 While there are many 
views on practical discourse, there is no doubt about the fact that such discourse 
may solve a large number of problems.475 Moreover, when a problem is 
recognized as a common problem, the next step is to search for the relevant 
considerations for its resolution. Subsequently, it is often possible to agree upon 
such a resolution when it is supported by those relevant considerations.476 
 There are two ways in which this form of discursive interaction takes place: 
first, in a discourse-friendly manner and secondly, in a discourse-unfriendly 
manner.477 Pettit argued that relationships are discourse-friendly when they do 
not obstruct, endanger, or limit discursive influence between parties. They have 
to be relationships that allow people to exercise discursive influence over each 
other.478 Such associations do not allow for influences of the kind that would 





Pettit’s central claim was that discourse-friendly relationships preserve a person’s 
freedom. We see such relationships as those in which we each undergo the 
influence of others but not in a way that compromises our fitness to be held 
responsible and our freedom among other persons.480 
 So, in the theory of freedom as discursive control, being a free person will 
naturally be identified with the form of control that people enjoy within 
discourse-friendly relationships, and this is fully consistent with someone 
                                                        
473 As was explained in the previous paragraphs on Tully’s intercultural dialogue, FPIC in such 
a sense can never be one-sided, it is a meditative process in which mutual consent and 
recognition are required. 
474 Pettit, 2001, p. 67. 
475 Pettit, 2001, p. 67. 
476 Pettit, 2001, p. 67. 
477 Pettit, 2001, p. 69. 
478 Pettit, 2001, p. 69. 
479 Pettit, 2001, p. 69. Cf. the preamble to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. 
480 Pettit, 2001, p. 70. 
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undergoing the discursive influence of others.481 This is of course the ideal 
situation of how FPIC processes are to be shaped; at best they should entail full 
discursive control for the indigenous communities involved.  
 Pettit explained that discursive control in this way has a ratiocinative and a 
relational aspect; i.e. the ratiocinative capacity to take part in discourse and a 
relational capacity that goes with enjoying relationships that are discourse-
friendly.482  
 It is essential for discursive control that the person is authorized as a 
discursive partner and publicly recognized as a locus of discursive authority.483 
Indigenous peoples’ struggle for recognition, reflected in the Declaration, is 
aimed at recognition of a process of participation in a spirit of cooperation and 
mutual respect, in other words; at obtaining discursive control in the decision-
making processes that affect them. 
 Pettit agreed that incorporation of an agent in a dialogue will establish the 
sure and secure position of the relational capacity associated with discursive 
control. He contends that there will be no case of second-class treatment when 
the person is appropriately incorporated in discourse.484  
In short, agents will be free persons to the extent that they have the 
ratiocinative capacity for discourse and the relational capacity that goes with 
enjoying discourse-friendly linkages with others. That capacity - with its dual 
aspects - is what constitutes discursive control. Agents will exercise such freedom 
as persons as far as they are engaged in discourse with others, being authorized as 
someone worthy of address, and they will be reinforced in that freedom so far as 
they are publicly recognized as having the discursive control it involves.485 
 Discursive control, and recognition that you are entitled to this, is therefore 
what is required by the element “free” in FPIC processes. And there are a 
number of different ways in which this type of freedom can be compromised. 
 
Discursive Control and Coercion 
 
Pettit argued that under the theories of rational and volitional control the agent 
retains these forms of control even in cases where others coerce them by 
threatening some penalty if they go in a certain way. However, the relationship 
with the coercer does not allow an agent, the coercee, to be seen as fit to be 
                                                        
481 Pettit, 2001, p. 70. 
482 Pettit, 2001, pp. 70-71. The relational capacity involves two complexities: firstly that a 
relational capacity cannot exist without the occurrence of some interactions with others. The 
capacity presupposes that those relationships are actually in place. The second complexity is 
that discursive control in its relational aspect strengthens the ratiocinative control by exercise. 
483 Pettit, 2001, p. 72. 
484 Cf. Taylor C, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism, Examining 
the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995). Also see Paragraph 
III.2.4 on the type of intercultural dialogue that is needed to respect cultural diversity in multi-
nation states. 
485 Pettit, 2001, p. 73. 
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held responsible, and subsequently, not as properly free.486 This is vital for 
understanding what “free” in FPIC entails since it is the goal of this requirement 
to prevent indigenous peoples from being coerced into certain actions in an 
unfriendly manner. However, there are a number of different ways in which 
coercion may occur – and will occur in the processes in which FPIC is required 
- and some may restrict freedom, while others do not. 
 Discursive control requires in addition to the ratiocinative power – the 
psychological capacity for discursive interaction - that others not try to influence 
them in a discourse unfriendly manner.487 This rules out all interventions by 
others that restrict, undermine, or jeopardize discourse, and hostile coercion will 
count as one of those.488 
 Hostile coercion is therefore unfriendly to discourse, since it inevitably 
transforms the relationship between the parties involved in such a way that the 
range of discursive interaction is restricted. A coercive threat places limits on 
how far discourse is to guide our interaction, and therefore coercion is not 
compatible with a theory of freedom as discursive control.489 
 However, there are a number of ways in which one may be “coerced” that 
do not restrict a person’s discursive control and which are allowed. For instance, 
it may be possible that a “plea” or a “bid” is made in which new discursive 
considerations are put on the table, or a contractual “bid” is made that influences 
the parties. These do not pose a coercive threat.490 There is also the possibility 
that a certain reward is promised in the form of an “offer.” If this does not turn 
into bribery – Pettit argued that it should be made out of considerations for your 
avowable interests – this is also consistent with preserving discursive control.491 
 These types of action are therefore allowed in discourse; they do not 
diminish the discursive control of the parties, where hostile forms of coercion 
will. Friendly coercion, and more broadly, any form of friendly interference, is 
therefore consistent with discursive control as long as is it guided by the 
coercee’s avowable interests.492 This way, the coercee remains fully responsible 
for what happens.493 
 The theory of discursive control leaves no space for thinking that hostile 
coercion is compatible with someone being regarded as a free person. Pettit 
completed his theory by pointing out that under discursive control an agent can 
count as a free self, when they own or endorse a large part of the legacy they 
inherit from their accumulating personal history, and succeed in living up to this 
                                                        
486 Pettit, 2001, p. 73.  
487 Pettit, 2001, p. 73. 
488 Pettit, 2001, p. 73. 
489 Pettit, 2001, p. 74. 
490 Pettit, 2001, p. 74. 
491 Pettit, 2001, p. 75. 
492 Pettit, 2001, p. 76. Those interests are the discursive considerations that are intuitively 
relevant to what should happen.  
493 Pettit, 2001, p. 76. 
CHAPTER III 
127 
legacy so that the self will be neither weak nor elusive.494 An action under this 
theory counts as free as long as it is discursively controlled - in a virtual or actual 
mode - and is consistent with the freedom of the person and the freedom of the 
self.495  
 This way, it is exposed that hostile coercion is inconsistent with freedom as 
fitness to be held responsible under the theory of discursive control. Since the 
theory this far focused primarily on individual agents, and we are dealing with a 
collective subject (an indigenous people, that is to act in a state that can be 
depicted as free) Pettit’s complex argument that states that the theory of 
discursive control allows for an extension towards collective agents, will be 
briefly inspected. 
 
Collective Agency and Discursive Control 
 
Pettit stated that everything so far said about the individual agent applies in a 
parallel way to the collective agents that individuals often constitute.496 It is, 
however, a particular collective subject that can enjoy freedom of self, person, 
and action; something that Pettit called “social integrates.” Such collective 
subjects are fit to be held responsible, just as individuals, so far as they enjoy 
discursive control. 497 
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497 See, Pettit P, ‘Groups with Minds of Their Own’, in: Schmitt F (ed.), Socializing 
Methaphysics (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). Also see, Pettit, 2001, Chapter 5. 
Pettit’s argument starts from what he describes as the discursive dilemma. It is beyond the 
scope of this study to cover the argument in full, but the core reasoning will be mentioned. 
The dilemma illustrates that whenever groups have to make a judgement following from a 
particular set of premises, it faces a hard choice between adopting a conclusion based and a 
premise based approach. If the group adopts a conclusion based approach, and thereby 
individualizes reason, the possibility exists that the group itself will not satisfy reason, since the 
individual votes on the different premises could suggest a different outcome. The other way is 
that the group forms a collective premise-based judgment, which theoretically might not 
support the individual conclusions. Pettit argues that this second method of collectivizing 
reason is almost inevitably the method to follow for purposive groups. His argument is 
summarized as follows. Any group in the pursuit of an assumed purpose will generate a history 
of (recorded) judgements that constrain the judgments that groups ought to make in present 
and future decisions. This way, the group will over time find itself confronted with the 
discursive dilemma, and face the choice between individualizing and collectivizing reason. 
Since groups do not effectively promote their assumed purpose if it reasons inconsistently and 
will need to become an effective promoter of this purpose, it will be forced to collectivize 
reason. Since the group will not be considered an effective promoter of its purpose if it 
frequently renounces past commitments, that should be avoided and those judgements that are 
required in consistency and coherence of past commitments should be taken. The discursive 
dilemma also illustrates that collective intentions can run counter to individual intentions of 
the group members. According to Pettit, this discontinuity claim “vindicates in the most 
compelling way possible that there are indeed collective subjects and agents.” 
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Pettit portrays groups that collectivize reason as social integrates (as opposed to 
social aggregates) in order to emphasize the fact that the collectivity involved 
integrates members into collective patterns of judgment and decision that respect 
the demands of reason at the collective level.498 Such social integrates may take 
on a variety of decision-making methods, can extend over a long or short period 
of time, may change or fix their membership patterns, and so forth.499 
These social integrates are intentional and personal subjects as far as they 
pursue certain goals as a collective,500 and satisfy two further conditions; firstly, 
they display a certain rational unity in the sense that there must be a basis in the 
behavior of participating members for ascribing judgments and intentions and 
such attitudes to the collective, and secondly, there must also be a basis for 
thinking of the collectivity as a subject that is rationally unified in such a way 
that within feasible limits and under favorable conditions, we can expect it to 
live up to the constraints of rationality.501  
 The theory of freedom illustrates that agents count as free - i.e. fit to be held 
responsible - because of how their actions materialize, their self operates, and 
their person relates to others. So a collective agent, a social integrate, can only 
count as free as long as it is a centre of personhood, selfhood, and action.  
 Social integrates can be persons in their own right and have the first person 
plural point of view that is essential in ascribing self-hood to an agent. Collective 
agents can engage in dialogue with individuals as well as with each other, as they 
are capable of being held to an expanding record of commitments in the 
judgments they make and the intentions they form. Similar to the individual 
agent, social integrates will prove to be the same institutional person at a certain 
moment in time compared to an earlier moment, just as far as the latter agent 
can be held answerable - under discursive standards - for the judgments and 
actions of the former. And it will be the same self over time, just as in the 
individual case, to the degree that it still owns or endorses the judgments, 
intentions, and actions of the former. That we usually do not talk of a collective 
self, Pettit argued, is not subject to any incoherence in the idea, but has more to 
do with the fact that we usually mean living, breathing individuals when we 
speak of a “self.”502  
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These social integrates can be free in the same way that the individual agent can 
exercise freedom.503 The agent will be a free person to the extent that it enjoys 
discourse friendly relationships with other persons. It will be a free self, as far as 
the self is not elusive or weak in the sense that it does not see itself as a mere 
bystander and is capable of sustaining the commitments it owns.504 And thirdly, 
the agent’s action will be free if it materializes under discursive control.505 There 
is thus nothing inconsistent with groups, like indigenous peoples, acting freely – 
fit to be held responsible - under discursive control theory. 
 
III.3.1.2 Political Freedom and Self-Determination: Non-Domination 
 
Politicization and Democratization of Freedom 
 
So far, it was argued that an agent can be free on the level of self, person, and 
action under Pettit’s theory of discursive control and it was concluded that 
discursive control is the best way to perceive “free” in FPIC, especially as it 
bears on personal freedom - freedom as it is experienced in relation to others in 
discursive interaction. Discursive control is above all a relational principle, and it 
explains why hostile coercion may diminish an agent’s freedom, while a number 
of other influences may not. 
 Subsequently we examined how a collective agent can enjoy freedom, since 
we are dealing with an indigenous people as a whole. As far as indigenous 
peoples count as social integrates - not just aggregates - such collective agents 
have the same capacity for freedom as individual agents have. These social 
integrates furthermore need to collectivize reason and have a common purpose 
over time.  
Now it will be explored what kind of political principle is best suited to 
safeguard indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. It was illustrated that 
indigenous self-determination is not a right to secession or independence, but 
that it can - and should - be regarded as an intra-state concept that is primarily a 
participatory principle that aims to give indigenous peoples the determinative 
voice in how and at which pace their social, economic and cultural development 
is to take place. 
When we depict such a perception on indigenous self-determination, this 
implies that the state - the larger political order - has to be susceptible to such a 
                                                        
503 Pettit, 2001, p. 119. While there are many similarities between individual human beings 
and social integrates, Pettit stresses that there are of course many differences as well. The 
groups form collective minds only on a restricted range of matters that are bound to the 
collective purposes of that particular collective agent. Pettit states that the most natural way to 
think of them is as agents to which individuals give life by now and then suspending their 
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individuals that make it up. 
504 Pettit, 2001, p .120. 
505 Pettit, 2001, p. 103. This may be in “active” or “virtual” mode. For the argument, see 
Pettit 2001, pp. 90-102. 
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concept. In the previous paragraph, we already explored this question in relation 
to what kind of constitutional negotiations are just in respect of cultural 
diversity. The state structure has to be disposed to integrate demands for self-
determination and corollary participation rights into its democratic fabric. 
Pettit explored a similar question, which will help to uncover what is meant 
by “freely determine” in the legal definition of self-determination.506 In this final 
section, we will first examine what kind of political ideal the state should adopt in 
order to be an active promoter of - indigenous - equality. Secondly, we will 
look into the democratic structure such a state should cherish, and illustrate that 
electoral democracy alone is not enough for facilitating a fair system that 
constrains state nation building and accommodates a multi-nation state in which 
different cultures are allowed to flourish at a level of equal recognition.507 
 
The Political Ideal of Non-Domination 
 
Pettit argued that the state is a particular collective agent, since it has the power 
of coercion and does not, generally, grant its inhabitants a right of exit. 
Therefore, the republican ideal of non-domination is the political ideal that should 
be preferred above the ideals of non-limitation and non-interference.508 Here it 
is possible to distinguish how Pettit connected the areas of “free will” and 
“political liberty” that started to become clear when personal freedom as 
discursive control was discussed.  
Pettit argued that psychological freedom of the person connects directly 
with political concerns, once we take freedom of the person, under the theory 
of discursive control, to involve a social power in relation to others, not just a 
psychological capacity.509 As stated before, this relational perspective is also the 
one that is essential to understand indigenous peoples’ claims to self-
determination and FPIC.  
 Pettit explained that the political ideal of freedom is that the polity or state 
should do what it can to enable its members to enjoy freedom. The main 
question in this section is: which ideal of liberty could be guiding taking into 
account the idea of freedom as discursive control?510  
 Other than a division into positive and negative liberty, Pettit conceived of 
three contesting ideals. First, there is the ideal of freedom as non-limitation, 
secondly, freedom as non-interference, and thirdly, freedom as non-domination. 
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Pettit rejected freedom as non-limitation and non-interference and favored the 
ideal of freedom as non-domination.511 The ideal of non-domination is of 
course a central theme in the discourse on the protection of indigenous 
peoples.512  
Freedom as non-limitation entails that the state is equally concerned with 
removing impersonal and more or less intentional interpersonal limitations. In 
that way it does not make a distinction between compromising and conditioning 
liberty.513  
Non-interference tries to counter this problem and entails that intentional, and 
quasi intentional, interference compromises liberty, while non-intentional 
interference conditions it. There are two main problems with this ideal 
according to Pettit. The first problem is that non-interference is what he called 
“constitutionally impoverished,” since it sees all state-coercive action as bad, 
regardless of whether it is arbitrary or not. Secondly, non-interference is 
sociologically impoverished as well, since it suggests that only actual interference 
can undermine discursive control.514  
Pettit subsequently argued that the political ideal of non-domination 
articulates the requirements of discursive control that we might reasonably 
expect the state to monitor and do something about.515 Non-domination does 
not indict interference as such, but only so far as interference is arbitrary. 
Interference in this perception is arbitrary where it is not forced to track the 
avowable interests of the interferee.  
Moreover, non-domination indicts not only the experience of arbitrary 
interference but also any exposure to a power of arbitrary interference, whether 
or not that power is actually being exercised.516 By targeting and condemning 
only arbitrary interference, the ideal of non-domination attempts to establish a 
polity that can possess coercive powers but is constrained to such an extent that 
these powers tend not to be arbitrary.  
 The idea is that when the state is forced to track only the people’s common 
avowable interests, this does not represent an assault on people’s possession of 
discursive control.517 The fact that sometimes non-arbitrary state coercion is 
required, can be explained by the assumption that although a people’s common 
                                                        
511 For the full argument, which falls outside the scope of this study, see Pettit, 2001, Chapter 
6.  
512 The general trust of the indigenous peoples movement is one for non-dominated equality. 
In this study, the goal is to explain FPIC as a means to achieve non-dominated decision-
making for indigenous peoples. A key reference is also the “Cobo definition” of indigenous 
peoples, which mentions “non-dominant sectors of society” as an important element. 
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avowable interests may support a given form of state action, their self-serving 
interests may not do so occasionally.518  
 Furthermore, the non-domination ideal is attractive since it expresses that 
discursive control can be jeopardized by exposure to a power of arbitrary 
interference, not just by the actual experience of such interference. Pettit 
denoted such an exposure as “in potestate domini,” i.e. without the actual 
presence of such interference.519 In this light, state action may be required just 
by the bare fact of asymmetrical powers of interference, in other words, by a 
mere exposure to such arbitrary interference.520 The political ideal of non-
domination expresses that non-interfering masters can jeopardize the freedom of 
their subjects so far as they have and are seen to have an arbitrary power - when 
they are not forced to track the common avowable interests - of interference in 
the lives of those individuals.521 
 Another reason for adherence to the ideal of non-domination is that, like 
non-interference, it lends itself to a distinction between factors that compromise, 
and factors that condition freedom.522 In this way, a distinction is made between 
primary “compromising” evils and secondary “lesser” evils that only “restrict” 
liberty to some extent. Pettit stated that impersonal and non-intentional 
obstacles can condition freedom as non-domination, and thus qualify as a 
secondary evil. Restrictions imposed on agents in the enactment and 
administration of non-arbitrary laws can condition freedom as well, and these 
restrictions also count as a secondary evil.523 Therefore, there are definite 
grounds for reluctance about imposing legal restrictions even though they do 
not necessarily compromise freedom, 524 Since this concern for reducing the 
factors that condition freedom as non-domination are built in to the concept, 
the ideal has an environmental as well as an agency aspect.525  
 Pettit concluded that the ideal of non-domination describes a concern that 
can be put into the hands of the state and it described this concern in such a way 
that if the state does well in living up to it, then the people living under that 
polity stand a fair chance of enjoying a high level of discursive control.526 Non-
domination allows the state to act as a non-mastering interferer that does not 
compromise freedom. It does allow for the conditioning of freedom, so far as 
the arbitrariness of this conditioning can be reduced. Furthermore, non-
domination recognizes that “masters” that do not actually interfere with others 
can jeopardize a subject’s freedom. The experience of possible exposure to non-
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arbitrary interference, a form of mis-recognition, may be in itself harmful to 
indigenous communities.527 
In this way, freedom as non-domination is the most attractive ideal for the 
state to follow if it is to respect indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. 
“Freely determine” therefore implies that the state abides by the principle of 
non-domination in such a way that it only uses its power, and recognizes that it 
will only use this power, for non-arbitrary interference. When perceived in this 
light, it becomes easier to assert when indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination is respected. 
 
A Conception of Democracy that is Hospitable to Minority Rights 
 
So far, we have proposed indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as a 
concept that is aimed at regulating the interaction between different actors and 
which entails requirements of autonomy and equal participation. As such, self-
determination is about assessing the boundaries and modes of interaction. Free, 
prior and informed consent is devised to function as the procedural principle for 
guiding such interaction. Through Pettit’s freedom theory as discursive control, 
it was argued that indigenous peoples, as far as they count as social integrates, can 
have the capacity for freedom as discursive control.528  
Non-domination is the political ideal that is to be preferred in a society that 
furthers such discursive control and, particularly important for indigenous 
peoples, non-domination does not mean that the actual experience of arbitrary 
interference can compromise such freedom (mis-recognition). Indigenous 
peoples, as far as they count as social integrates, can count as free persons, and 
this freedom is compromised when this interpersonal capacity is influenced by 
hostile coercion.  
 One more question will be dealt with in this paragraph on Pettit and 
indigenous freedom. Since indigenous peoples are intra-state entities that are 
often in a non-dominant position, what kind of conception of democracy can 
accommodate the exercise of indigenous self-determination, as entailing special 
participation rights for minorities and indigenous peoples? In Tully’s vocabulary; 
what is needed to realize such appropriate forms of self-rule for indigenous 
peoples?  
As explored earlier in this study, special minority rights serve to protect 
certain minorities in the way that general rights may also do, but what makes 
them special is that they are group differentiated.529 These rights are accorded on 
a basis of group membership. Such special rights can be individual as well as 
collective, but their common feature is that they are exclusive to the minorities 
they favor.  
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Kymlicka saw them as mechanisms that protect minorities against the possible 
injustices of state nation building.530 In the previous paragraphs on Tully’s ideas, 
it was argued that these are tools to determine forms of self-rule by means of a 
“multilogue.” Pettit argued that in order to accommodate such minority rights, 
the concept of electoral democracy needs to be supplemented with what he calls 
a contestatory dimension.531  
Electoral democracy generally approximates three principles; firstly, 
government is elected by the people, secondly, the people enjoy full and equal 
electoral standing (the no exclusion/equality principle), and thirdly, the people 
are collectively sovereign.532 
Pettit noticed that there are problems for vulnerable minorities in the 
context of the second principle - that of electoral equality - but stated that there 
is a more fundamental problem with the sovereignty of the people principle. 
The equality problem can be solved by stating that although special rights’ 
implementation may provide unequal treatment, it still treats people as equals.533 
The rights can still be regarded as general in character. Each has the right, should 
the conditions in question apply to them, to receive the treatment offered.534  
The more serious problem is that minority rights appear to restrict the 
sovereignty of the people in a way that is inconsistent with that principle.535 The 
contrast between these and other special rights, for handicapped people, amongst 
others, which are consistent with majority sovereignty, is that special minority 
rights are inherently counter-majoritarian in character. In other words, whatever 
the majority wants, there are still certain rights that are accorded to minorities.536  
Pettit claimed that as long as we think of democracy in the image of the 
electoral conception alone, special minority rights cannot be defended as 
essential to democracy, since in this perception they are perceived as counter-
majoritarian constraints that are imposed upon democracy from outside. To 
solve this, democracy is in need of a second dimension. Apart from a first, 
electoral dimension, a second, contestatory dimension is needed.537 
He meant that the relevant interests of governed are not their special or 
sectional interests, but their common interests.538 A certain good will represent a 
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common interest to the extent that cooperatively avowable considerations 
support its collective provision.539 Pettit described such cooperatively avowable 
consideration as those considerations that could not be dismissed as irrelevant if 
the members of the population were holding discursive discussions about in 
which field they should cooperate and collectively provide for.540  
Pettit claimed that this has immediate consequences on how democracy 
should be organized; it demands that two kinds of institutions are needed. First, 
there is a need for institutions that reduce false negatives, by which the non-
identification of certain common interests is meant.541 Such reduction of false 
negatives serves to promote democratic effectiveness.542 Secondly, institutions 
are required that guard against false positives; i.e. the misidentification of certain 
interests as common interests. This is needed in order for no group or individual 
to have a “lesser” place in that community.543 Preventing false positives to enter 
the democratic arena serves to promote democratic equality.544 
Democratic institutions are less likely to do well in avoiding false positives, 
whereas electoral institutions are vulnerable to both majoritarian and 
manipulative control, to the detriment of the voice of vulnerable groups, for 
example indigenous peoples. Therefore, there is a need for institutions that try 
to guard against interests masquerading as common interests and, more generally, 
against interest having an impact on how government is conducted. Pettit stated 
that such a guardian can be found in what he calls the contestatory dimension of 
democracy.545  
Pettit described this contestatory dimension as a form of editorial control 
that complements the electoral, authorial mode of control over government 
decision making.546 Such an editorial mode of democratic control should not 
just rely on the availability of ex post objections but should also allow for forms 
of ex ante control.547 Such ex ante measures should serve first to provide the 
authors with guidelines on the editorial policy and make clear that breach of 
those would be objected to. This involves the imposition of general restrictions 
on how government is to act, for example by means of a bill of rights, bicameral 
structure etc., but they can also entail specific procedural guidelines.548  
An important ex ante measure is to insist that at least in certain areas, 
government should put out its proposed initiatives for public consultation and 
seek to ascertain the opinions of those likely to be affected by a proposed 
decision.549 In these areas FPIC is to provide such a contestatory measure for 
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indigenous peoples. Necessarily, ex post measures should also be present in the 
form of for example judicial review or other forms of revision mechanisms.  
These provisions all represent ways in which it may be possible for different 
groups among the governed to be reassured that they are protected in some 
measure against unequal treatment.550 Pettit noticed that there are not only 
institutions imaginable, but also in existence that give people a contestatory 
power that parallels their collective power to determine who shall be in 
government.551  
In implementing this contestatory dimension, Pettit proposed an addition to 
the three electoral principles. He introduced a fourth principle that provides 
individuals and collectives with full and equal contestatory standing. 
Furthermore, he adapts the principle of collective sovereignty to include 
contestatory elements.552  
Pettit’s two dimensional model were aimed at implementing a form of 
participatory democracy that enriches one dimensional, electoral democracy. 
The model’s purpose is implementing a continuous process of accountability and 
transparency of government action.553  
Pettit argued that such ex post and ex ante contestatory constraints should not 
be seen as limitations on democracy, but rather as aspects of it since they provide 
for editorial control.554 While there is an obvious contrast between electoral and 
contestatory action, they both represent moments in the assertion of the interests 
of the governed and forms of governmental accountability.  
 
Group Differentiated Rights and Two-Dimensional Democracy 
 
What makes the contestatory addition to electoral democracy more hospitable to 
minority claims? Pettit agreed that unless special minority rights are put in place, 
electoral-cum-contestatory democracy will not be able to function properly in 
many circumstances.555  
 There are a number of circumstances that call for special minority rights, 
circumstances that we recognize in the position and status of indigenous peoples. 
These are, (a) the presence of a robust minority; (b) the particular minority has a 
common set of interests; (c) those interests are at least partially distinctive; (d) 
these interests are vulnerable to collective decision-making; and (e) all these 
things are a matter of common awareness.556 
Pettit stated that in situations of cultural diversity - to use Kymlicka’s 
vocabulary; multi-nation states in which different national minorities reside - it 
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may take much stronger institutions of contestation to assure that decisions that 
the minority culture does not like are really just the product of bad luck instead 
of the result of false positives.557 The fact that a society is multicultural means 
that the democratic state is going to have to take special steps to try and establish 
the equal and full contestatory power of those in minority groups. Therefore, 
Pettit reasoned, the only recourse is the recognition of minority claims of 
various sorts.558  
Pettit distinguished between three levels of severity that such special 
minority rights can entail. These forms or levels of severity are, to some extent, 
similarly reflected in the UNDRIP. The first and least severe measure would be 
a minimal right of specific consultation. Such minimal consultation rights should 
be put in place where a minority is generally respected in the larger society.559 A 
second level is needed in situations where there is more divergence of interests; 
here specific exemptions or provisions in favor of the minority are required.560 A 
third and most “severe” level of minority rights might be necessary in situations 
where neither rights of consultation nor rights of special treatment suffice. As we 
have explored, regarding indigenous communities, the cultural diversity may be 
such that the only recourse for the state is to give over its decision-making 
powers on a range of issues that affect the community to their own 
representatives and their own government. Pettit referred to Tully and agreed 
that such situations (situations in which indigenous peoples often find 
themselves) require stronger forms of self-rule.561 There is a need for forms of 
self-determination that entail control and rights over lands and resources. 
 Pettit agreed that particularly within indigenous nations incorporated in the 
democratic state, where differences in relation to the significance accorded to 
land and traditions of land holding occur, the only recourse to implement 
electoral-cum-contestatory democracy would be granting the minority suitable 
powers of self-government.562  
Although such a society involves different nations, the rationale for minority 
self-government continues to derive from the need to give people equal 
contestatory standing within one and the same democratic system.563 This is in 
line with our perception on indigenous self-determination as non-dominated 
and intra-state participation.  
Pettit did state that if the case for minority self-government is made to 
derive only from the distinctness of the nations as such, and not from the 
contestatory, participatory problems to which the distinctness gives rise, then it 
may be too strong to comfort.564 This again confirms the current understanding 
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on indigenous self-determination, since this would imply a choice between 
suffering the majority culture and becoming a separate state; this was in 
particular not the way perceived as feasible. 
In summary, Pettit’s claim can be described as follows: If we think that 
democracy requires a regime under which people have equal and full 
contestatory as well as electoral standing, then we should have no difficulty in 
seeing special group differentiated rights for indigenous peoples as a natural part 
of the democratic structure.565 There should be no hesitation about asserting that 
multicultural democracy is bound to make room for establishing such rights, 
whether at a minimal or at an intensive level.566 Special minority rights are 
therefore not undemocratic under an electoral-cum-contestatory democratic 
model, but, on the contrary, enhance the democratic fabric of the state.567  
In conclusion, indigenous self-determination and corollary forms of self-rule 
do not compromise democratic demands in a society that fosters both an 
electoral and contestatory conception of democracy. A participatory democratic 
regime like this, in which the state upholds a principle of non-domination, can 
preserve indigenous peoples’ political freedom.  
 
Conclusions: Qualifying “Free” 
 
This paragraph started with two related questions that are an important part of 
this study’s objective, which is to explore what FPIC for indigenous peoples 
could amount to: How can we explain the requirement of “free” in FPIC, and 
which political principle or ideal is needed to secure that indigenous 
communities are able to “freely determine” their political status and freely 
pursue their own way of economic, social and cultural development? The 
answer to the first question will make it easier to determine, in a more practical 
manner, whether the requirement of “free” has been upheld. 
That consent has to be provided in a way that can be depicted as free, so 
that it is possible to speak of “fitness to be held responsible,” means that 
indigenous peoples should be involved in decision-making processes in such a 
manner that they have discursive control in those processes.  
Pettit’s theory of freedom allows us to see indigenous peoples, to the extent that 
they count as purposive social integrates, as being capable of sustaining discursive 
control. This makes it possible to qualify “free.” It is in the first place a form of 
personal freedom, since FPIC processes take place between indigenous peoples 
and some other party.  
As long as the interaction in FPIC processes is discourse-friendly, indigenous 
peoples’ freedom is preserved. But discursive control prohibits all action that is 
“discourse-unfriendly;” action that may obstruct, endanger, or limit discursive 
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influence between parties. As such, it rules out all interventions by others that 
restrict, undermine, or jeopardize discourse.  
Pettit’s account does not only expose that it is discursive control that is 
meant when requiring that consent is given “freely” but also explains what kind 
of actions in FPIC processes will preserve the freedom in the agent, and what 
kind of actions will not.  
 As long as the interaction is discourse friendly, the element “free” will be 
respected. Coercive actions like bids, offers, or pleas – which will often be 
present in situations in which FPIC plays a role - will not violate the “free” 
requirement. However, when these actions turn into forms of hostile coercion, 
or hostile threat, they will violate the freedom criterion.  
This insight is crucial, since these sorts of coercive actions will often be 
present in FPIC processes. When a logging concession is discussed, or a large 
extractive industry project is planned, the other party will inevitably use some 
form of coercion to gain indigenous peoples’ consent. It is in this area that it is 
now possible to determine if such actions compromise the discursive control and 
consequently the freedom of indigenous peoples. It also makes it possible to see 
that freedom can come in “degrees,” by indicating a range of measures or 
actions that may restrict freedom to a certain extent.  
Indigenous self-determination is aimed at protecting distinct cultural 
minorities by requiring on the one hand a form of autonomy and self-
government and on the other hand by facilitating more equal participation in 
the larger democratic order. In other words, self-determination for indigenous 
peoples is aimed at protecting indigenous communities from the adverse effects 
of state nation building and allows for indigenous nation building within a 
participatory framework in one and the same democratic system. 
The political ideal of non-domination is the best principle for guiding state 
action in multi-nation states, whereas it forces the state to track the people’s 
common avowable interests in such a way that relations between individuals and 
groups in society can be perceived as non-dominated; either through actual or 
virtual interference.  
 An electoral perception on democracy is not particularly hospitable to 
minority rights since they are inherently countermajoritan in nature. A second, 
contestatory dimension, allows us to think of democracy as compatible with 
indigenous self-rule structures, entailing self-determination and control over 
lands and resources in order to protect their cultural identity and survival. 
Indigenous self-determination and FPIC are about the distribution of non-
majoritarian forms of power sharing and creating appropriate forms of self-rule. 
FPIC provides indigenous peoples with a form of “editorial control” and as such 
enforces democratic decision-making instead of compromising it. 
Explaining freedom as being fit to be held responsible together with the 
concept of discursive control make it possible to assert in a very practical 
manner, what is meant by the requirement of “free” in FPIC and when such 
freedom is respected or breached. If discourse friendly interaction guides the 
process, the freedom of the parties – the personal freedom that is involved in 
FPIC processes - will be guaranteed. 
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III.3.2 Prior: Ex Ante Contestation and Ex Post Revision 
An act of “consenting” does not only function as a procedural justification for 
what otherwise would count as an infringement upon rights, but it often also 
serves as the basis for a new relation between the actors involved; e.g. when a 
transnational corporation carries out a long-term mining or logging project on 
indigenous lands.568 An important question therefore is: should FPIC only 
function until the moment of the decision, ex ante, or should it continue to 
guide certain processes ex post? 
 Of course, it is essential that indigenous peoples have enough time to discuss 
any proposed activity that affects them amongst themselves. For successful FPIC 
processes, there has to be sufficient time for internal debate and decision-
making. How much time is needed depends on many variables and evidently 
varies from case to case. Recall the 2005 UNPFII workshop concluding 
observations: 
 
Prior should imply that consent has been sought sufficiently in 
advance of any authorization or commencement of activities and 
that respect is shown for time requirements of indigenous 
consultation/consensus processes.569 
 
Nevertheless, as discussed throughout this study, FPIC is not just a single 
moment of decision-making, but an iterative process that is meant to help create 
a climate of trust and respect between indigenous peoples and states. Like a 
participatory view on self-determination, FPIC is a principle with a continuous 
or ongoing relevance. James Tully already exposed that continuity is an essential 
principle for sustainable relations between different nations in one state, to make 
his multilogue possible. Philip Pettit explained that in a democracy indigenous 
or minority groups require both ex ante and ex post powers to guard against 
arbitrary decision-making. In this way, FPIC provides indigenous peoples with a 
form of “editorial control” over certain political decisions.  
 Moreover, full priority may often be difficult to uphold as a criterion, since 
initial stages of projects may very well be under way and may already negatively 
affect indigenous communities. One could think of examples such test-drilling, 
preliminary seismic scoping, or the “discovery” of traditional plants or 
medicines. In practice, these cases will often arise and the FPIC process will 
commence while some intrusive activity is already taking place. 
 In short, prior is an important requirements and for any genuine FPIC 
process, there should be ample time allocated for internal debate and decision-
making according to a community's own cultural customs. Nevertheless, FPIC is 
not only relevant prior to any agreement between indigenous peoples and 
others, but it is also concerned with sustaining respectful relations over time. 
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FPIC may include revision of existing arrangement in light of new information 
or changed circumstances. A proper balance has to be struck between effective 
decision-making and powers to revise and adapt FPIC agreements. The most 
important requirement that “prior” denotes is that indigenous peoples are given 
sufficient time - taking into account their cultural decision-making structures - 
for deliberation, discussion, and the formation of their standpoints. 
 One of the most essential requirements for successful FPIC processes is that 
parties are properly informed about the relevant implications a decision may 
entail. This is the topic of the next paragraph, where a perspective on FPIC 
from the field of bioethics is presented. 
III.3.3 Information and Communication 
 Introduction 
 
After having explored that “effective participation” for indigenous peoples 
should be achieved through an intercultural dialogue and having argued that 
“free” in FPIC processes requires a sufficient amount of discursive control, it is 
time for the next step in getting to a better understanding of FPIC and its 
different elements. This paragraph will look into what is meant by informed 
consent. The “informed requirement” together with the requirement that 
consent is provided “freely” form the two key pillars of successful FPIC 
processes; they safeguard the validity of consent. Unfortunately, it is also often 
regarding these two requirements that participatory or consultation processes fail. 
A more developed understanding of these criteria may therefore contribute to 
better FPIC processes. 
 In this paragraph, the contemporary debate on informed consent within the 
field of bioethics will be analyzed and compared with FPIC requirements in the 
indigenous context. The goal of this paragraph is to expose the debate and reveal 
the relevance to the debate on free, prior and informed consent for indigenous 
peoples. Apart from explaining that current accounts on the requirement of 
“informed” in the indigenous rights context are too shallow, the bioethics-
debate will also disentangle the notion of “informed consent” as a whole. 
 Since informed consent requirements have been present within the 
bioethical field for a long time – in fact, they were first developed here - and 
have been subject to a lot of reflection, it is useful to conduct some “internal 
comparative legal research” to gain insights that are particularly relevant to this 
study. It will be argued that, just like in the field of bioethics, ever more 
stringent or uniform standards of consent may not be the proper way to 
proceed. Furthermore, Manson and O’Neill’s 2007 study illustrates that only 
focusing on “disclosure of information” hides a number of relevant 
considerations that should play a role when we speak of “informing.”570 
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Moreover, the bioethics debate is highly instructive in coming to terms with 
what exactly the functions are of a legal concept of informed consent. 
 In brief, in this paragraph it is examined what “informing” in FPIC entails by 
exploring another field of law in which informed consent requirements have 
played a central role for a long time; the field of bioethics.571  
 Nevertheless, this paragraph is not only about informing but about the legal 
concept of informed consent as a whole as well. By exploring the notion of 
informed consent in research on bioethics, it is possible to provide a detailed 
legal analysis of the concept of informed consent. Some new perspectives on the 
legal concept of consent will provide insights for its application in the 
indigenous rights context. 
 The following paragraphs will explore Manson and O’Neill’s 2007 study on 
informed consent in bioethics at length.572 Their main argument was that the 
focus in these procedures should not only be on disclosure requirements, but 
that informed consent processes concern communicative transactions that are as 
much about the way the communicative process is structured, as they are about 
disclosing information. Manson and O’Neill provided a clear and well-argued 
theory on how communication should take place within the context of informed 
consent requirements. 
  A number of questions will be discussed. Certainly, it may be instructive to 
have a look at where informed consent requirement come from: Where were 
they first developed? And how? Better insight into the following questions may 
be gained by looking at the field of bioethics: What are the justifications for 
FPIC processes and what is its role or function as a legal concept? Which 
standards are important for successful communicative transactions? How should 
“informing” and the requirements this includes be perceived in relation to 
indigenous peoples?  
 This paragraph will indicate that the “informed” criterion is (together with 
the previously discussed element “free”) the most essential requirement in an 
FPIC process. Moreover, it will be argued that “informing” entails much more 
than just “informational disclosure.”   
                                                                                                                              
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, Lancaster University, United Kingdom. Onora 
O’Neill is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and crossbench member of 
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571 A considerable body of literature on informed consent and autonomy in bioethics exists. 
However, these paragraphs will primarily examine Manson and O’Neill’s study, since this 
recent work conceptualizes informed consent as a communicative process. This way it aligns 
with one of the main arguments in this thesis; that FPIC processes are essentially about 
effective participation and communication. Other well known works on informed consent in 
bioethics include the ‘classic’ work: Faden R, Beauchamp T and King N, A history and theory 
of informed consent (Oxford University Press, USA, 1986) and the standard textbook: 
Beauchamp T and Childress J, Principles of biomedical ethics (Oxford University Press, USA, 
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A richer account reveals that communication is context based and dependent 
upon implicit knowledge of the shared interests, competences, and 
commitments of the parties involved.573 Furthermore, provision of fully specific 
information seems impossible; relevant communication always involves the 
withholding of some details that could have been disclosed.574 Finally, and in 
line with earlier paragraphs, it will be argued that ever more strict and uniform 
FPIC requirements are undesirable and infeasible. 
  
 The “Informed” Requirement for Indigenous FPIC 
 
Informing indigenous peoples of the impact and consequences of a proposed 
project or decision is essential to FPIC but in practice this is often were things 
go wrong. Indigenous peoples may - and often are - misinformed in many ways. 
Moreover, effective communication between indigenous groups and other 
actors is often complicated by cultural or language differences. 
 With respect to the international protection of indigenous peoples, the 2005 
“elements of common understanding,” mentioned earlier, are the most referred 
to clarifications of the requirements of FPIC.575 In relation to the requirement of 
informed, recall that: 
 
Informed should imply that information is provided that covers (at 
least) the following aspects: 
 
a. The nature, size, pace, reversibility and scope of any proposed 
project or activity; 
 
b. The reason(s) for or purpose(s) of the project and/or activity; 
 
c. The duration of the above; 
 
d. The locality of areas that will be affected; 
 
e. A preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural and 
environmental impact, including potential risks and fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing in a context that respects the precautionary 
principle;  
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f. Personnel likely to be involved in the execution of the proposed 
project (including indigenous peoples, private sector staff, research 
institutions, government employees and others); 
 
g.  Procedures that the project may entail.576 
 
The accompanying legal commentary by Iulia Motoc, explained in its 
conclusions regarding development projects that FPIC is important since this 
way: “Indigenous peoples have full information about the scope and impacts of 
the proposed development activities on their lands, resources and well-being.”577 
Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights explained in 
the “Dann Case” that informed requires that “all of the members of the 
community are fully and accurately informed of the nature and consequences of 
the process.” 578  
 There have been more elaborations on what informing in FPIC denotes, but 
these have been devised mainly within specific areas, and deal mostly with 
environmental protection schemes like REDD+ or criteria for sustainable forest-
management (SFM).579 
 This is not strange, because it is obviously very difficult to devise a “blanket 
approach” for informational requirements, since these vary per case and per 
context. Moreover, and very importantly, the requirements of FPIC should 
always be tailored to the right or value that is at stake in informed consent 
processes. 
 While a number of these more specific requirements will be discussed in part 
V, for now, it is important to note that “informed” so far focuses almost 
exclusively on informational disclosure; on which type of information is to be 
provided. But of course there is far more to “informing” than only determining 
what kind of information is to be provided.580 In the following paragraphs some 
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III.3.3.1 Informed Consent in Bioethics: Development, Scope and Justifications 
 
Informed consent has been the subject of extensive academic debate within the 
field of medical ethics, where the concept is seen as one of the cornerstones of 
that discipline. The notion of a specific prior informed consent procedure 
emerged in the wake of the Second World War, especially in the field of 
Bioethics in light of the horrible Nazi-experiments that took place during 
WWII. The academic debate within this field on informed consent is quite 
substantial and has, over the last four decades evolved legal and ethical thinking 
on consent in many ways.  
 As was illustrated before, for indigenous peoples a legal notion of informed 
consent, as a specific right, is a rather new phenomenon (although the political 
idea of consent is not new). In this paragraph, the contemporary theoretical 
debate concerning the notion of informed consent in bioethics will be exposed, 
in order to illustrate some of its benefits and drawbacks. Conscious of the 
differences in context an exposition of certain issues from this debate will 
provide clarifying information relevant to the idea of free, prior and informed 
consent, within the indigenous rights framework.  
 In particular, it will be argued that the focus should not only be on which 
type of information is provided, but also on how this information is offered. An 
important aspect of FPIC is that it concerns communicative transactions.  
 The role or function of FPIC is also explored. It will be shown that consent 
is a “secondary” right, and therefore cannot serve as the primary justification of 
particular action. Consenting concerns a waiver of other, more fundamental 
entitlements. Since consenting may - and very often will - have profound effects 
for indigenous communities, it should be accompanied with certain standards - 
free, prior, informed - that secure its validity. 
 
Development of Informed Consent in Bioethics 
 
Since the Nuremberg Code of 1947, informed consent is widely seen as 
fundamental to medical and research ethics.581 Consent requirements were 
extended from research to clinical ethics, and later on to procedures regulating 
the acquisition, possession, and use of personal information. More recently this 
requirement has become popular in a number of other fields, amongst others the 
one we are concerned with: the field of indigenous rights. Within the bioethical 
field, consent requirements also evolved as more specific and explicit standards 
were endorsed.  Under the banner of respect for autonomy, ever more 
elaborate consent procedures were created. But recently, this movement towards 
ever more strict, uniform and demanding consent requirements has been 
questioned.582 Manson and O’Neill, in their study “Rethinking Informed 
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Consent in Bioethics,” stressed that an overemphasis on personal choice and 
autonomy neglects and obscures a number of other relevant considerations that 
have to be taken into account in an FPIC process. Those other relevant 
considerations will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 Informed consent, according to Manson and O’Neill, should be sought and 
obtained by distinctive sorts of communicative transactions. We have already 
mentioned that a focus on process and dialogue is vital for a successful 
application of FPIC. Manson and O’Neill concurred that it is unlikely that 
informed consent is understood well enough unless the sorts of communicative 
transactions it requires and the particular standards they must meet are included 
in the considerations.583 This is particularly so in the context of indigenous 
peoples, since factors like language, culture, and isolation certainly complicate 
communication. 
 Contemporary accounts of informed consent only represent these sorts of 
transactions passively, as “information transfer.”584 Information in these views is 
seen as located or held in one place, or flowing from one place to another. 
Information flows are seen as the transfer or transmission of information from 
one source or container to another, through a conduit, or channel. This is what 
Manson and O’Neill described as the “container” or “conduit” metaphors.  
 These metaphors provide a common vocabulary for discussion of the transfer 
of information, but, according to Manson and O'Neill, they obscure the fact that 
informing and communicating should be seen in light of the normative 
framework that governs successful communicative transactions between 
people.585  
 Manson and O’Neill explored the standards that informed consent processes 
should meet if they are to be used to successfully waive obligations, rights, and 
prohibitions.  
 
Development of Informed Consent in the Field of Bioethics 
 
As discussed previously in the paragraphs on self-determination, the political idea 
that freely given consent legitimates governmental (coercive) action that would 
otherwise be unacceptable developed in the enlightenment debates, mainly 
within the framework of social contract theory. Over the past thirty years or so, 
these traditional debates have been revitalized and reshaped.586 This move has 
been paralleled in biomedical ethics and currently informed consent is the most 
discussed theme and most central principle in medical ethics and research 
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ethics.587 Over the years, the conceptions on informed consent have changed in 
relation to its scope, standards, justification and regulatory use.588  
 The Nuremberg Code of 1947 is generally seen as the first authoritative 
statement of the requirement of informed consent in biomedical ethics. It came 
as a response to the atrocities committed by the Nazi’s before and during World 
War II.589 Initially drafted by two doctors who worked on the Nuremberg trials, 
it outlined the most important points that should guide all research on human 
beings. Although the legal status of the Code remained unclear, it became a 
landmark document. Most importantly, the Code stated that: 
 
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. 
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to 
give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free 
power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, 
fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of 
constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and 
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to 
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. 
This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an 
affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be 
made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the 
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; 
all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the 
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his 
participation in the experiment. 590 
 
The reasons given for the statement that “the voluntary consent of the human 
subject is absolutely essential” echo those traditionally offered by political 
theorists about the nature of the social contract; i.e. grounding obligations of 
citizens in a requirement of consent.591  
 The legal capacity to give consent is seen as essential, and involves the free 
exercise of choice. Furthermore, it is clear that forms of force, fraud, duress, and 
coercion are prohibited, similar to the requirements that “freedom as discursive 
                                                        
587 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, Also See: Beauchamp T and Childress J, Principles of biomedical 
ethics (Oxford University Press, USA, 2009). 
588 This move towards an increasingly wider scope, higher standards, better justifications and 
regulatory reinforcements has created a number of problems. This is one of the main 
arguments Manson and O’Neill put forward in their research. 
589 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 2. 
590 The Nuremberg Code is excerpted from Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10. Nuremberg, October 1946 - April 1949. 
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FPIC. 
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control” imply, as was discussed earlier. Requirements of informing and 
autonomy are only implicitly present in the Nuremberg definition. 
 Since the 1960s, wider application of consent requirements has been 
promoted. Not only research ethics but also clinical ethics are now generally 
seen to be governed by a principle of informed consent. Although this 
expansion was clearly problematic from the beginning – refusing all medical 
treatment without informed consent is clearly unpractical – it has acquired 
central importance in all bioethical areas.592 More importantly for our purposes, 
contemporary discussions about informed consent have sought to raise and 
expand standards.  
 The Nuremberg code was open to a number of objections. It requires a 
“legal capacity to give consent” and “sufficient knowledge and comprehension 
of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an 
understanding and enlightened decision.” This seems to imply that capacity by 
itself is sufficient, so that implicit or tacit consent is a genuine possibility. 
Moreover, it does not seem to imply that the subject actually makes an 
enlightened decision. The development of the discussion was led again by the 
debate in the field of research ethics, and contemporary discussions usually do 
not refer to the Nuremberg Code, but to a later document, and successive 
versions thereof: the Helsinki Declaration.593 
 The most recent version of this important statement was approved in 2004 
and frames strong requirements for highly explicit and specific consent. The 
relevant passages read: 
 
The subjects must be volunteers and informed participants in the 
research project. In any research on human beings, each potential 
subject must be adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources 
of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations 
of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential risks of the 
study and the discomfort it may entail. The subject should be 
informed of the right to abstain from participation in the study or to 
withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal. After 
ensuring that the subject has understood the information, the 
physician should then obtain the subject's freely-given informed 
consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot be obtained in 
writing, the non-written consent must be formally documented and 
witnessed.594 
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Manson and O’Neill argued that the Helsinki requirements go further than the 
Nuremberg Code in that they demand that the subjects grasp - albeit in a 
general way - what is proposed and which risks are involved. Furthermore, it 
puts a duty of informing on the researcher. However, these standards may be 
too much. They seem to require ever more explicit and specific consent. This 
entails the risk that the Helsinki requirements may be going too far, that they are 
too explicit in their application, which might render their application 
impractical.595 As was argued earlier, this is also a danger in relation to FPIC 
requirements for indigenous peoples; an overly uniform standard may cause it to 
become unrealistic and insensitive to context. 
 Manson and O’Neill explained that fully explicit and fully specific consent is 
not attainable, and that standards should not require this. Explicit consenting 
concerns a two way process; it concerns explicit statements from both parties. On 
the other hand consent can also be implied, when it is derived from the subject’s 
action.596 Fully explicit consent is simply not always achievable.597 
 The distinction between specific and generic bears not on the act of consenting, 
but on the propositions over which consent is given.598 Ever more specific or 
exacting consent requirements are problematic, since they will be “unavoidably 
indeterminate,” 599 
 Manson and O’Neill showed that in effect demands for explicit and specific 
consent insist on formalistic, uniform and, strictly speaking, impossible 
procedures and standards. Rather, they stated, such demands should focus on 
feasible, proportionate, and normatively justified requirements.600  
 Fully specific consent cannot be ethically necessary, because it cannot be 
properly defined; how specific it ought to be is a question that cannot be 
answered, as this varies from context to context.601 Manson and O’Neill thus 
explained that neither full explicitness nor complete specificity is possible in 
informed consent processes.602 
 In general they argued that consent is a propositional attitude, which makes it 
opaque; “there is no guarantee that when X and Y consent to Z, they both have 
the same views of the implications of Z.”603 Therefore, conclusions will vary 
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with the inferences the subject is able to draw from the terms used, and may differ 
even where the terms used refer to the same things.604  
 Their main point was that agents have varying beliefs, inferential 
commitments and vocabulary, and that therefore: “the best that we can hope for 
is a mutually agreed level of specificity in the disclosure for a particular transaction. 
And once this point is conceded, it becomes clear that explicitness and specificity 
cannot be general requirements on all consent.”605 There can be no single 
standard for the content and way in which information is transferred and 
disclosed. 
 These are important insights, and they explain why the focus in FPIC 
processes should be as much on the way in which communication is taking 
place between indigenous peoples and other actors, as it should be on 
informational disclosure. The following paragraphs will explore this perception 
in more depth.  
 
Consent and Autonomy 
 
Respect for autonomy is widely seen as the value underlying the consent is 
requirement, but it is not the only, and according to Manson and O’Neill, 
maybe not even the primary justification for informed consent.606 The discussion 
will be briefly explained here, because self-determination and inherently forms 
of autonomy are also at the heart of the justifications for FPIC within the field of 
indigenous peoples protection. But FPIC processes for indigenous peoples are 
not just about “autonomous decision-making” or self-determined decision 
making, they may also entail a wider range of different interests and values that 
matter, since FPIC is secondary to other more important norms. In these 
processes, considerations regarding the environment or public health may also 
play a crucial role. In the debate on FPIC in bioethics, different views on the 
importance of “autonomy” exist. 
 Respect for the autonomous choice of persons is subject to a variety of 
interpretations regarding its scope, nature or strength.607 In their 2009 study 
“Principles of Biomedical Ethics,” Beauchamps and Childress aimed to show 
that respect for autonomy is not excessively individualistic, not excessively 
focused on reason, and not unduly legalistic.608 They expressly stated that they 
do not hold that the principle of autonomy has moral priority over and overrides 
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all other moral principles, but they did conclude that it is certainly a vital value 
for justifying informed consent requirements.609 
 Autonomy, derived from the Greek autos (self) and nomos (rule, governance 
or law), originally meant the self-governance of independent city states. Its 
meaning has been extended to individuals but the precise meaning of the term is 
disputed. Personal autonomy encompasses - at least - self-rule that is free from 
both controlling interference by others and from certain limitations such as an 
inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice.610 
 Theories of autonomy view two elements as essential: first, liberty or freedom 
- independence from controlling influences - and second, agency, which can be 
described as the capacity for intentional action.611 Disagreement exists regarding 
the meaning of these elements and whether additional requirements are needed.  
 The reasons why “respect for the autonomous agent” is so important are to 
be found foremost in the theories of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Kant 
argued that respect for autonomy flows from the recognition that all persons 
have unconditional worth, and that each person has the capacity to determine 
his or her moral destiny. Derived from Kant’s famous categorical imperative, 
violation of an agent’s autonomy is to treat persons merely as means instead of as 
ends themselves.612  
 Mill was primarily concerned with the “individuality” of autonomous agents. 
In his version of liberty, persons should be allowed to develop to their own 
convictions, as long as these do not interfere with similar expressions of freedom 
by others, or unjustifiably harm them.613 However, Mill also argued that in some 
cases, it is mandatory to persuade others when they have false or ill-considered 
views.614 Mill thus argued both for non-interference and actively strengthening 
autonomous expressions, while Kant’s conception of autonomy and freedom 
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entails a moral imperative of respectful treatment of persons as ends in 
themselves.615  
 The principle of “respect for autonomy” can be stated as both a negative and 
a positive obligation. Formulated negatively, it means that autonomous actions 
should not be subjected to controlling constraints by others. As a positive 
obligation, the principle requires both respectful treatment in disclosing 
information and actions that foster autonomous decision-making. In other 
words, material cooperation is needed for a lot of options to become available.616 
These positive and negative sides of autonomy are capable of supporting a range 
of more specific moral rules, like the principle of informed consent before 
intrusions are made upon rights or other standards.617  
  
Rethinking Informing: An Agent Based Model 
 
Manson and O’Neill’s main critique on informed consent requirements was that 
the focus of these requirements is too much on informational disclosure, and not 
enough on the communicative processes that they should entail. Therefore, 
Manson and O’Neill distinguished between a “standard” or “disclosure” view 
on informed consent and another, richer model; the “agent based” view. 
 In the standard “disclosure” view, informed consent is required in order to 
respect autonomy, and the informational obligations are seen as justified because 
they enhance individual decision making.618 
 Acts of informing and communicating relevant in FPIC processes usually 
only succeed within a rich practical and normative framework in which speaker 
and audience (a) have certain practical and cognitive commitments; (b) know 
something of each other’s commitments; (c) adhere to, and act in accordance 
with such norms; and (d) assume that the other party is acting in accordance 
with such norms.619  
 Information should be identified as action rather than as only as content. A 
narrow approach to informational obligations might distort the reality of 
informed consent transactions by downplaying or hiding their rich, multifaceted 
character, which involves much more than the “transfer” of information.620  
 Manson and O’Neill persuasively argued that the conduit/container model 
leads to two levels of distortion: firstly, an overemphasis on disclosure of 
information and decision-making, and secondly, a perception on information 
“content” alone. They warn that information cannot be seen as detachable from 
the norms that govern action. The next paragraph considers aspects of such 
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action that are often hidden or ignored when we focus too narrowly on the 
transfer of content.621  
 As was illustrated in the introduction, informational requirements, as they 
have been developed in relation to FPIC for indigenous peoples, are focused 
mainly on the type of information that is to be disclosed, rather than on the 
elements necessary for successful communicative action.  
 
III.3.3.2 Informing as Communicative Action 
 
So far, it was argued that an overemphasis on informational disclosure hides a 
number of important aspects of communication. Manson and O’Neill explained 
that what is essential for “informing” is focusing on intentional communicative 
acts and the normative questions that arise in this context.622 They subsequently 
developed an “agent based” model of communication. The argument is that 
“informing” in informed consent procedures is a specific type of communicative 
action. before exploring informed consent itself, it will be examined what is 
meant by communicative action, and what standards should be held in mind for 
such action to be successful. 
 Intentional action is a “species of action,” one that can be done only by 
agents with certain basis capacities.623 Some of these capacities and properties 
collective agents should have were explored in the paragraphs on freedom, 
when Philip Pettit’s idea of social integrates was discussed. For present purposes, 
it is enough to mention that at a bare minimum, agency involves practical and 
cognitive commitments.624  
 Agents need to grasp inferential relations between their commitments; the 
action must be “worth doing” in light of these commitments.625 Furthermore, 
such actions are guided by all sorts of inferences agents make during 
communicative processes. Agents can – and most often do - make a vast number 
of reasonable inferences from all sorts of propositions that may be put forward in 
communicative processes, because normally they have a vast supply of 
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background knowledge. These inferences are indispensable both for 
communicating successfully and for acquiring new knowledge.626  
 Manson and O’Neill explained that these key features of agency draw 
attention to the fact that it involves commitments with different “directions of 
fit,” the ability to grasp rational relations between propositions and the ability to 
put one’s commitments to act into action. Actions are a manifestation of the 
agent’s point of view, but they are often “hidden.” The conduit and container 
models that are often invoked when talking about communication downplay or 
“hide” the complex set of rationally evaluable practical and cognitive 
commitments, and the inferential relations between them.627  
 Communication essentially involves the commitments of agents in two broad 
ways: firstly, communication, as a “species of action,” presupposes the practical 
and cognitive commitments both of those who seek to communicate and of 
those with whom they seek to communicate. Secondly, these types of actions 
have to take account of the commitments of others, and may aim to alter 
those.628 
 Through these insights it is possible to discern some essential features of 
successful intentional communication. Firstly, speaker and audience must share a 
language, secondly, speaker and audience must share a great deal of background 
knowledge about the world and about the social conventions that govern their 
behavior. Thirdly, speaker and audience must be able to draw upon that 
knowledge in making the right kinds of inferences: both must exercise 
inferential competence. Fourthly, speaker and audience must have some 
knowledge of each other’s commitments and competences.629  
 This said, Manson and O’Neill came to a working definition of 
communicative action: speech acts take place against a background of a shared 
acceptance of complex sets of cognitive and practical commitments, 
entitlements, expectations, and social roles, and shared understanding of ways in 
which others’ commitments can be modified.630 Communicative actions play a 
role in allowing agents to do things that affect their own and others’ 
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Manson and O’Neill contended that because communication is so diverse, there 
is a variety of different ways in which speech acts can go wrong. Successful 
communicative actions are evaluable against multiple kinds of norms.632  
 Successful agency, and with it successful communication, requires a certain 
kind of responsibility, described by Manson and O’Neill as “epistemic 
responsibility.” This includes a number of norms, or standards for judgment, that 
have to be taken into account if informing in FPIC processes is to be 
successful.633 Firstly, given that we cannot check every fact that is communicated 
to us, we have to rely upon, and trust other parties as sources of knowledge.634 
Secondly, and contrary to the conduit/container model, the agency model of 
epistemically responsible communication requires that we view communicative 
transaction as a rich and complex, two way exchange through which agent X may 
come to adjust her cognitive commitments in line with agent Y’s.635 Thirdly, 
apart from the fact that a speaker needs to be competent, need to be capable of 
speaking a language, is truthful, has reasons for taking what she claims to be true, 
and is willing to share these reasons with others, good communicative practice 
must also be relevant to the intended audience. Communicative transactions thus 
ought to be sensitive to others’ commitments to acquire relevant knowledge.636 
Fourthly, good communication takes account of what others already know, and 
of what they want and need to know at that time, in that context. Epistemically 
adequate communication is relevant communication, and has to be limited to 
what is appropriate to the actual context. Good communicative practice 
therefore always involves withholding information; comprehensible, true, grounded 
information – that could have been conveyed.637 This way, it becomes clear that 
requiring “full information” is neither possible nor desirable.  
 Of course, these are just a few - albeit very important - norms that should be 
guiding in respect of the informed requirement. Other standards include those 
that make information accessible, intelligible, adequately accurate, and assessable 
by intended audiences. 638 
 Manson and O’Neill rightly argued that these are all constitutive norms of 
communication and that these norms also set standards in the light of which 
communication can either succeed or fail seriously. Both failure to adhere to 
these norms and the assumption that others are not living up to them may 
undermine communicative transactions. If these norms are flouted or 
disregarded, either no information will be conveyed or what is conveyed will be 
irrelevant or unreliable. These requirements remain hidden under the conduit/ 
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container model, and subsequently under an informed requirement that focuses 
only on informational disclosure.639 
 
Summary: An Agent Based Theory of Communication 
 
there are two distinct models of thinking about informing and communicating. 
Firstly, the conduit/container model and secondly, the agency or agent based 
model. Manson and O’Neill did not argue that the former model is entirely 
mistaken; they simply illustrated that the conduit model hides too much that is 
relevant in communicative action.640 This is highly important to FPIC 
procedures, because it reveals that “informing” is more complex than some 
accounts indicate. It does not just mean that someone should unilaterally convey 
a “piece” or “chunk” of information to a recipient.  
 The agency model can be viewed as simply making explicit or highlighting 
aspects of communication and information that are ignored or hidden on the 
conduit/container model. Attention is drawn to the fact that a great deal of 
communication is done by and between agents. Communication, Manson and 
O’Neill explained, is a normative affair that presupposes a rich framework of 
shared norms, and shared background commitments as well as the requisite 
inferential competences. There is a wide variety of norms, epistemic and ethical, 
that are important for successful communicative action.641  
 The agency based model does not view information as some kind of “stuff” 
or “content” of communication: once the importance of agents in communicative 
transactions is recognized, it becomes clear that information is a term that is 
parasitic upon, and derived from, certain kinds communicative action. Acts of 
informing are typically inferentially fertile; when you tell someone something, 
you license them to make a large number of inferences about that statement.642 
  This has serious consequences for the way “informing” is to be perceived. 
The agent based model views information as only the content of a broader 
framework of informing, and such communicative transactions succeed only 
where participants are sensitive to one another as agents with their own 
cognitive and practical commitments, and assume one another’s adherence to a 
range of communicative epistemic and ethical norms.643  
 Manson and O’Neill’s main argument was that it is all too easy to think 
about information and communication in a way that fails to give due weight to 
the rich but implicit, social, rational inferential, and normative framework that is 
essential for communication – including acts of informing, and thus information 
– to take place.  
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III.3.3.3 Informed Consent: Justification, Role and Function 
 
By illustrating two different models of information and communication, Manson 
and O’Neill aimed to pave the way for enriching the current debate on 
informed consent. The standard way, the conduit/container model, by which 
informing is discussed in abstraction from the agent and speech acts involved, 
regards information as “flowing” or being “transferred” between agents. The 
message of content is highlighted in this model, but the act of communicating is 
hidden.644  
 By contrast, the agency model focuses not only on content, but also on the 
speech acts by which agents communicate proposals, understand others’ 
proposals and respond to them. This model takes account both of what is said - 
the speech content - and of what is done - the speech act - which recognizes the 
transactional or interactive character of successful communication.645 
 These models provide different conceptions of consent: in the 
conduit/container model, informed consent is focused on disclosure for decision 
making, which hides other elements that are essential for giving or refusing 
consent. The agency model locates informed consent in communicative 
transactions between agents.646 This way, it provides a framework for a 
transactional model of informed consent, which emphasizes what is said and what 
is done both by those who request consent, and by those who respond by giving 
or refusing their consent.647  
 
Justifications and Functions of FPIC: Consent as Waiver 
 
Informed consent is a distinctive type of communicative transaction - one that is 
typically used to waive important ethical, legal, and other requirements in limited 
ways in particular contexts.648 We have already explored this earlier in this study, 
where it was argued that informed consent is not a stand-alone concept, but that 
it is always dependent upon other, more fundamental norms, such as the right to 
land, resources, or self-determination in general. Its application is always reliant 
upon its underlying values, norms or rights, and these may of course differ 
substantially. 
 In consenting to a certain proposition, we waive certain requirements or 
rights that we have in relation to others not to treat us in certain ways. We set 
aside certain expectations, or license action that would otherwise be ethically or 
legally unacceptable. Informed consent thus has a role only where activity is 
already subject to ethical, legal, or other requirements and the question of setting 
them aside arises.649  
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“Consenting” thus justifies acts that would otherwise be unacceptable, or 
illegitimate. Waiving prohibitions on wrongful action and waiving legitimate 
expectations is a normal practice by which we permit selected others to act in 
ways that would otherwise be unacceptable, and thereby justify their action.650 
Manson and O’Neill confirmed that any justification of informed consent 
therefore has to start from recognition of the underlying legal and ethical claims and 
legitimate expectations that are waived by consent transactions.651 This may 
seem like an obvious point, but it is sometimes forgotten in contemporary 
discussions on FPIC. 
 Consent requirements may offer a routine way of obtaining a limited waiver 
of requirements that are generally inviolable. They confer a special right - a 
permission - on certain agents to act in ways that would otherwise be 
prohibited. Consent may not be sufficient to waive such norms in all cases, but it 
functions as a reliable way for waiving certain standards.  
 Consent can thus be perceived as a procedural justification for some action 
that would otherwise count as illegitimate and which subsequently amounts to a 
change in position or a new relationship. Therefore, in addition to consent as a 
defense against a breach of rights, it can also function to create new rights and 
duties.652 The conception that consent neutralizes what would otherwise be a 
wrongful activity - a waiver - and may subsequently provide the basis for a new 
relationship can be seen as its two core functions.653 
 informed consent justifies action only against the background of other 
important ethical and legal norms and it is used to give limited permission to act 
and intervene in ways that would otherwise do wrong to others, or otherwise 
fail to meet legitimate expectations.654 This observation is as valid for the field of 
biomedical practice as it is for the field of the international protection of 
indigenous peoples. 
 
Scope and Standards: The Need for Flexibility 
 
While consent is important, it does not have to be sought and given in a 
uniform way or adhere to a uniform standard.655 Since consent requirements 
presuppose other, more basic ethical and legal standards, procedures for 
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consenting and the specificity of consent sought and obtained must both take 
account of the underlying norms that are to be waived in particular cases.656  
 To give one example, procedures and specificity of FPIC may and should 
differ greatly when a large mining project is proposed in the middle of an 
indigenous community’s traditional territory, or when a small logging 
concession is planned that would only affect a distant part of a community’s 
forest. Obviously, FPIC is important in both examples. 
 informed consent is important only when a proposed intervention would 
violate important norms, or disrupt a legitimate expectation. Manson and 
O’Neill argued that the scope of informed consent requirements is set by a range 
of norms which must be waived or set aside if the proposed intrusion is to 
become acceptable. 657  
 Manson and O’Neill referred to the Nuremberg and Helsinki codes, which 
proposed a single set of standards, applicable to all research and medical 
interventions, to be met by informed consent requirements. Where the 
Nuremberg criteria set an arguably too low standard, the Helsinki requirements 
may be just too demanding. Difficulties arising from both views indicate that it is 
pointless to look for uniform standards for all informed consent transactions, for 
all consent procedures, or for all consent forms.  
 If there are no uniform standards, trying to fix the scope of informed consent 
requirements in the abstract may be pointless, and have little chance of 
success.658 Adequate consent requirements may legitimately differ for different 
sorts of intrusive action, depending on the norms that would otherwise be 
breached. Therefore, the thought that a single standard can be set for all 
research, and by analogy for FPIC requirements in relation to indigenous 
peoples, is illusory.659  
 As Brownsword and Beyleveld have repeatedly emphasized: “the lifeline 
offered by consent as a justification should not be abused.” They argued against 
the “routinization” of consent and stress that safeguarding the adequacy of 
consent is essential.660 Consent is susceptible to abuse, and therefore it is of the 
essence that it is indeed provided in a manner that can be qualified as free and 
informed. 
 More demanding standards may be relevant where the impact and broader 
content of proposed actions are more difficult to understand, where going ahead 
without consent would violate important norms, and where risks are high. This 
is in line with how FPIC is conceived in this study, as a concept that is flexible, 
and may be a more demanding requirement when certain intrusions have a 
larger impact. The building of a large hydroelectric dam, for instance, may 
involve complex technical prognoses and details that, depending on the impact, 
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may require far more elaborate consultation processes than the construction of a 
road. 
 Those who consent to any particular action thus need to know what the 
implications will be, what risks they may run, and what benefits will be gained. 
In complex, risky, and unfamiliar cases there may be good reasons to seek 
relatively explicit and relatively specific consent.661  
 However, a blanket approach to consent requirements that seeks to 
standardize procedures for consent for all action shows a lack of understanding of 
the reasons why consent matters. Consent is a way of ensuring that those 
subjected to invasive action are not abused, manipulated, undermined, or 
wronged in comparably serious ways.662 It seeks to ensure that such action is 
done only when specific norms are waived, and is not undertaken if it would 
breach important ethical or legal requirements.663 And this is as much true for 
FPIC in the context of indigenous rights as it is in relation to the field of 
bioethics. 
 This aim of FPIC cannot be secured by making consent disclosures more and 
more “complete,” or by tailoring them to some uniform standard: what matters 
will vary depending on the case at hand; and more is not always better.664 
Obviously, indigenous representatives are not to be flooded with technical 
details that obscure the most relevant points of certain propositions, and the way 
or frequency in which consent is to be given may of course differ greatly with 
the nature and duration of the proposed project, plan or decision. 
 Cases vary immensely, and while standardized consent procedures and forms 
may be useful for certain ranges of cases, there is no reason to think that 
standardized procedures - let alone the same procedures - will be adequate in all 
cases.665 A flexible interpretation of FPIC is therefore needed.666  
 In short, there is no simple way of fixing the scope of consent requirements. 
Equally, there is no simple way of fixing the standards for consent procedures; 
consent procedures must be robust enough to ensure that action that would 
otherwise breach norms is not performed unless those norms have been waived, 
and this most certainly demands different standards in different cases.667  
Informed consent is indeed a secondary concept, and lacks a context unless the 
other norms and standards on which it is predatory are recognized and 
examined.668 It is the impact of the proposed intrusion on those other norms and 
standards that further determine the scope of FPIC. 
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III.3.3.4 Informed Consent Processes: Standards for Successful Communicative 
Transactions 
 
Where consent is invoked to waive other ethical or legal norms, it must be 
requested and given in ways that meet certain standards. It was agreed upon that 
it is not possible to set uniform standards, but certainly a range of considerations 
can be given that are relevant if the communicative transactions by which 
consent is sought, given, or refused are to succeed.669  
 Since informed consent transactions are specific communicative transactions, 
they must also respect those norms that are required or important for successful 
communication. As was illustrated, successful communication must use a 
language that its audiences can follow, so that what is said is intelligible. It must 
also be relevant to its audiences, rather than for instance overwhelming. The 
communicating parties must also have some grasp of each other’s backgrounds 
and - for our purposes particularly important – cultural context, if they are to 
communicate in ways that are relevant and intelligible.670  
 But intelligibility and relevance are sometimes not enough for successful 
communication; speech acts that make truth-claims aim to inform and tell their 
audiences about something. They succeed only when they respect specific 
epistemic norms, in particular norms of truth and truthfulness.671 
 According to Manson and O’Neill, norms of truth and truthfulness are 
perhaps best thought of as regulative rather than constitutive norms for making and 
responding to truth-claims and responses, since their violation does not 
invariably undermine but rather disrupts and damages both communication of 
truth-claims and responses to others’ truth-claims. For these reasons, audiences 
are often cautious about others’ truth-claims regarding accuracy or honesty.672 
Indigenous communities may often have good reasons for being cautious about 
information given by - for instance - mining companies, in light of earlier 
experiences. 
 What matters, is a core of norms of truth and truthfulness: communication of 
intelligible truth-claims is normatively adequate, provided it is at least adequately 
accurate for the purposes at hand and not dishonest.673  
 Informed consent transactions are communicative transactions that include 
truth-claims; for example, when a company makes certain statements about the 
environmental impact of a mining project. These transactions will therefore 
succeed only if the various parties are what Manson and O’Neill described as 
epistemically responsible. Consent transactions require agents to respect the 
epistemic norms that are required for successful communication, including not 
only norms of intelligibility and relevance but also norms for making, 
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understanding, and responding to truth-claims.674 Any request for consent will 
include some account of a proposed action or intervention and of the effects – 
including risks and benefits – that are thought likely.675 Therefore, informed 
consent transactions incorporate truth-claims, and they will only succeed if they 
respect the norms for making successful truth-claims. 676 
 Disclosure alone is not sufficient for successful communicative transactions, 
and it is in particular not enough for successful informed consent transactions. 677 
In effect, Manson and O’Neill remarked, the notion of informed consent is a 
pleonasm; uninformed consent is not really a type of consent, since it is based on 
unintelligible, irrelevant, or inaccurate truth-claims.678  
 Speech acts are often used to make, adjust, and convey practical and 
cognitive commitments. Consent transactions are not merely exchanges of 
semantic content. They consist of speech-acts by which each party both 
communicates with the other, reveals and makes commitments. Requests for 
consent are made in speech acts that communicate what is proposed, and that the 
proposers commit themselves to act in accordance with any consent given, and 
not otherwise. Those who consent to others’ proposals do so in speech acts that 
convey that they understand what is proposed and that they commit themselves 
to view subsequent action that accords with those proposals as acceptable.679  
 More specifically, those who seek others’ consent communicate proposals 
that include truth-claims about proposed action, and commit themselves to act 
in accordance with their proposal if consent is given. The speech acts by which 
consent is sought have a dual function: (a) to communicate the content of a 
proposal, and (b) to make a conditional commitment.680  
 Speech acts by which consent is given or refused have three functions: (a) they 
communicate the subject’s grasp of what was proposed, (b) they make or refuse 
to make a conditional commitment, and (c) they communicate that 
commitment.681 Such acts request, give, or refuse consent and fail unless they 
meet the standards needed for effective communication of the content 
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conveyed, and those necessary for making the relevant (conditional) 
commitments.682  
 Manson and O'Neill made an important point in stating that for successful 
FPIC processes, parties have an obligation to communicate. This is in line with what 
is argued throughout this study: What is key for successful FPIC processes is the 
obligation - of all parties - to establish a good dialogue.  
 Once consent is given or refused, requesters in turn must respond 
appropriately to respondents.683 FPIC is a process of taking turns, an intercultural 
dialogue in which parties enjoy discourse friendly relations and therefore 
discursive control. 
 Manson and O’Neill concluded with stating that informed consent is 
achieved only when both parties respect both the epistemic norms that are 
relevant to communicative transactions, and the ethical norms that are relevant 
to making commitments.684  
 
Summary: Information and Communication in Informed Consent Processes 
 
Manson and O’Neill’s reconceptualization of informed consent as a particular 
type of communicative transaction can be summarized as follows. Manson and 
O'Neill proposed an agency model for thinking about informed consent 
transactions. They use this to explain the role of informed consent and the 
surrounding standards that matter for its successful application. By thinking of 
consent as waiving important norms, it becomes clear that it can never provide a 
complete justification for action, since it presupposes other, more important, 
ethical, legal or professional standards, norms and rules.685 This is why it is so 
essential to map the rights and norms over which consent is to be given or 
refused; informed consent transactions are seen as waiving those standards, norms 
and rules in a limited way, for a limited time.  
 This understanding of informed consent transactions affirms the importance 
of informed consent, and gives a valuable insight into the role of FPIC. It traces 
its importance to the way in which informed consent transactions can provide 
(a) protection against serious wrongs, (b) evidence that violations of rights have 
not occurred, and (c) assurance that systematic ways of preventing these 
violations are in place.686 
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Successful consent transactions can protect against serious wrongs, by placing 
control of invasive interventions that might otherwise in the hands of those who 
would be wronged or harmed. Only those whose consent is requested can 
waive the norms at stake. When such norms are waived, those who consent 
provide evidence that can later be cited to show that no serious wrongs have 
occurred, and used by those who perform invasive interventions to justify their 
action. The systematic use of informed consent can provide assurance to third 
parties that action that would otherwise be seriously wrong is routinely 
prevented. Conversely, without free and informed consent requirements, 
individuals or groups may not be protected against force or fraud, deceit or 
duress, constraint or coercion.687  
 In brief, Manson and O’Neill argued that consent can be used to waive 
important norms, rules, and standards, and so it has considerable ethical 
importance. However, since its use always presupposes whichever norm is to be 
waived, it cannot be the only normative justification of a proposed project, 
action or decision.  
 Manson and O’Neill warned that thinking about consent can become 
distorted and unrealistic if certain deeply entrenched ways of thinking about 
information and communication are taken too literally.688 Manson and O’Neill’s 
theory on informed consent as communicative transactions provides valuable 
insights into what is meant by the “informed” requirement in FPIC for 
indigenous peoples and disentangles the role of informed consent as a whole. 
 
III.3.3.5 Conclusions: Informed Consent in Bioethics and FPIC for Indigenous 
Peoples 
 
The similarities between “informing” in informed consent requirements in 
bioethics and in relation to indigenous peoples have already been mentioned 
throughout these paragraphs. In principle, all that has been said about informed 
consent in the context of Manson and O’Neill’s 2007 study is directly relevant 
for “indigenous FPIC.”They started from the point that informed consent 
cannot be achieved, and therefore cannot be required, unless it sets feasible 
standards for those who are to seek, give, or refuse consent. They indicated that 
this may look like a trivial point, but that it is widely ignored.689 Indeed, this is a 
vital point and one of the elements of the central research question in the 
present work. If FPIC is to be successfully implemented, and enforces 
indigenous peoples’ position in relevant decision-making processes, the standard 
setting must be capable of being met. Realistic implementation models must be 
developed. The feasibility of these models will be discussed in Part V of this 
study. 
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Most discussions on informed consent in bioethics and, as was illustrated also 
beyond, in relation to indigenous peoples, focus rather narrowly on the disclosure 
of information by those who seek consent and on decision-making by those whose 
consent is sought. Throughout Part III of this study, it was argued that the 
emphasis is not only on outcome, but on the process itself. This is fundamental to 
successful FPIC processes. It was argued that this process should recognize 
cultural similarities and differences and in an intercultural dialogue guided by 
principles of mutual recognition, continuity, and consent, in which discourse-
friendly interaction preserves the freedom of the parties. FPIC is more about a 
process of participation than it is about a single moment of decision-making. 
 This paragraph described that what is actually required by the “informed 
criterion” is effective communication and commitments between the parties.690 For 
anyone involved in FPIC processes, it is important to not only focus on 
informational disclosure, but also on the how communication takes place. A 
balanced, culturally appropriate model of adequate communication is vital for 
successful communicative transactions in FPIC processes. 
 A more convincing account of the “informed” requirement and informed 
consent in general should focus on the communicative transactions by which it 
is sought, given, and refused. Each element of a successful informed consent 
transaction must meet adequate standards.691  
 Genuine informed consent cannot be achieved by communicative transactions 
that do not take into account norms of intelligibility and relevance; those norms are 
essential for effective communication. Moreover, Manson and O’Neill 
persuasively argued that a number of epistemic and ethical norms, including 
norms of accuracy and honesty, must also be met. Essential features of successful 
communication include that parties share a language, share at least some 
background knowledge, and are able to take each other’s inferences and commitments 
into account. This is to be guiding for successful application of the “informed” 
requirement. 
 Beyond “informing” the broader concept of informed consent is seen not 
merely as desirable and important, but as a standard way of avoiding breaches of 
significant obligations. Consent is important where interventions would otherwise 
breach underlying obligations and corresponding rights. Consent thus provides a 
way of waiving such obligations and rights.  
Informed consent transactions are used to waive other requirements in specific 
ways and for specific purposes. Informed consent has a role to play only where 
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certain underlying requirements, such as ethical, legal, and professional 
obligations and legitimate expectations of various sorts, are accepted. In this 
study we have identified a number of the most important international legal 
norms for indigenous peoples in Part II. 
 When these norms are waived by giving consent, they are not discarded or 
marginalized; they are merely waived in limited ways, for a limited time, for a 
limited purpose.692  
 In this way the Manson and O’Neill debate sheds light on what exactly the 
functions of FPIC are. Informed consent matters because it offers a standard 
(though not a uniform one) and controllable way of setting aside obligations and 
prohibitions for limited and specific purposes. In specific circumstances, there 
might be good reasons to waive certain rights and obligations. Informed consent 
is used where an agent has reason to permit derogation from a significant 
obligation or expectation that would otherwise be breached.693 FPIC is therefore 
a way of granting permission for such, otherwise intrusive, action. When 
consent is viewed in light of the norms, values or rights it is concerned with, it 
becomes clear that its content may vary depending on the rights at stake and the 
impact of the proposed intrusion. 
 In line with what was explored earlier - in the paragraphs on Tully’s 
intercultural dialogue - it was argued that there is a need for a flexible 
interpretation of self-rule standards like FPIC and that especially the procedure 
itself should be open to re-negotiation. Searching for a fixed, uniform standard 
for FPIC processes is neither realistic nor desirable. Its scope is determined - in a 
practical dialogue - on a case-by-case basis. There can be no single standard for 
the content and way in which information is transferred and disclosed. 
 It is communication to relevant audiences that matters, besides disclosure and 
dissemination.694 These paragraphs explained that “informing” should be 
understood more broadly. FPIC is about a communicative process in which all 
parties are involved and heard, and have the opportunity to reciprocate acts of 
informing. In short: The “informed” requirement applies to communicative 
transactions, and these transactions may be distorted when they are seen as 
bearing primarily on the informational or propositional content. Informed in 
FPIC thus means more than informational disclosure about a certain 
proposition. For successful information, and successful FPIC, it is essential that a 
wide range of norms that guide communicative transactions are taken into 
account.  
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III.3.4 FPIC: Participation, Representation and Consent 
The previous paragraphs have explored, more abstractly, what effective 
participation and free, prior and informed consent ideally amount to. Before 
turning to the examination of the application and content of FPIC in practice, 
in part VI and V, first some more general comments on FPIC and representation 
will be made. As was argued in the paragraphs on self-determination, a 
distinction is to be made between internal and external elements of indigenous 
participation, within the framework of the state. Self-determination, forms of 
effective participation, and FPIC share these internal and external elements, and 
have to some extent already been explored by the Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Expert Mechanism, in the framework of 
the United Nations.695 
 These paragraphs will explain the internal and external elements of FPIC 
processes and will indicate - broadly - what kind of issues should be held in 
mind in relation to representation. In part V, these elements of attention will be 
further examined in light of a number of practical examples of the problems that 
arise in this respect. 
The main insight is that participation presupposes representation. There is 
no “we” without someone saying there is a “we.” But how does the process of 
representation take shape in an FPIC procedure; who provides consent, to 
whom, and in which phase(s) of the process? How do the internal and external 
elements of representation influence each other, where consent is to be given by 
a community as a whole, entailing the participation of every member?696 
Important questions that will be dealt with are: What are the problems that 
might occur in acts of representation and in obtaining consent? What are the 
particular difficulties related to consulting with, or obtaining consent from, an 
indigenous people? The present paragraphs will pose some introductory 
comments on these intricate questions that arise in relation to FPIC and 
representation.  
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III.3.4.1 Participation and Representation 
 
Representation of indigenous peoples has always been one of the most complex 
issues in relation to safeguarding their rights. Van Genugten reiterated the point 
made by José Martínez Cobo in his landmark study: 697 
 
The representation of indigenous peoples remains inadequate and is 
sometimes purely symbolic. The necessary measures must be taken 
to ensure that their representation in public office is genuine and 
just.698 
 
Van Genugten explained that still - 30 years after the Cobo study - there is a 
wide gap between the standard setting, legally binding or not, and reality.699 
Cobo already mentioned in 1983 that:  
 
There are increasingly few provisions which discriminate against 
indigenous peoples in the sphere of political rights, and it is 
therefore in the de facto state of affairs that the reasons why 
indigenous peoples cannot effectively exercise their legally 
recognized rights must be sought.700  
  
The main argument in this thesis is that in order for indigenous peoples’ rights 
to become effective, there is a need for procedural and participatory 
arrangements that allow indigenous groups to have a fair say in decision-making 
processes of their concern.  
Standards and laws that promote indigenous rights are meaningless unless 
they are implemented, and this can only happen if the indigenous communities 
themselves are fairly represented. Rodolfo Stavenhagen has stated, maybe 
somewhat cynically, that there is a major gap between legislation and practice. 
He stated: “If we look at the laws on the books and the accompanying rhetoric 
we may believe that indigenous peoples have indeed made enormous progress in 
the past few decades, but, alas, this is far from true.”701 Indigenous voices are still 
not heard, in spite of the legal standard setting and indigenous peoples are 
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increasingly disappointed and frustrated.702 Stavenhagen explained that this has 
lead to numerous protests and sometimes to their violent break-up by states. The 
main goal of FPIC, giving indigenous peoples a say and a strong voice in 
decisions that affect them, is clearly not met by standard setting alone.  
 Fair representation of indigenous peoples is an essential element for these 
participatory arrangements to be successful and FPIC therefore necessarily 
entails- different forms of - representation. Anna Meijknecht argued that “The 
mere existence of a will of minorities and indigenous peoples to exist as an entity 
and to preserve certain characteristics for future generations is not enough for its 
realization.”703 She explained that the space between existence of the will and 
expression and realization thereof needs to be bridged by intermediary 
structures.704 
FPIC processes are meant to provide indigenous peoples with such 
“intermediary structures” to realize their right to self-determination. However, 
representation of a certain culturally distinct group remains a complex issue. 
While systems of direct democracy may work in small and coherent 
communities, in larger groups a form of representation is inevitably needed in 
order to express the will of the individuals in those groups.705 
 As was explored in the paragraphs on freedom, there are certain elements 
necessary for group agency and subsequently for the representation of the 
collective. Pettit explained that the group has to qualify as a “social integrate.” 
These are intentional and personal subjects as far as they pursue certain goals as a 
collective, display a certain rational unity and can be expected to maintain their 
position. There must also be a basis for thinking of the collectivity as a subject 
that is rationally unified in such a way that within feasible limits and under 
favorable conditions, we can expect it to live up to the constraints of 
rationality.706  
 Pettit’s requirements for group agency made clear that it is not so easy to 
form and maintain purposive groups. Indigenous communities, however, will 
often share collective purposes and will be inclined to maintain their 
commitments over time, especially when it comes to protection of their 
traditional territories and natural resources. Nevertheless, collective 
representation of the group is subject to a number of complex issues that relate 
to its internal and external aspects. 
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The internal aspect relates to the internal procedures according to which 
representatives are chosen.707 It is vital that the representatives are internally 
recognized as spokesmen or women of the group. Later on in this paragraph, it 
will be argued that in relation to such internal representation in FPIC processes, 
it is vital that culturally appropriate processes are followed, while ensuring that 
the voices of vulnerable groups within communities are also taken into account. 
 The external aspect bears on the recognition of the representative, and the 
group or community as a whole, by the external actors that take part in the 
relevant FPIC processes. Recognition is, as was explored in the paragraphs on 
James Tully’s intercultural dialogue, a necessary precept for any participatory 
process to succeed.  
 Both the internal and external aspects of representation are essential to take 
into account for successful FPIC processes. The following paragraph will briefly 
examine some further insights on the external and internal elements of 
participation in the framework of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and the Expert Mechanism. 
 
III.3.4.2 FPIC: External and Internal Representation 
 
As was explored earlier in Part III of this study, effective participation and the 
duty to consult indigenous peoples imply that such consultations are undertaken 
in good faith and with the objective of achieving agreement or consent. An 
important conclusion is that FPIC is thus always relevant when indigenous 
peoples are consulted or are allowed to participate in decision-making. FPIC 
should always be the goal of processes of “effective participation.”  
 The UN Declaration also provides that in general consultations with 
indigenous peoples are carried out in good faith in order to obtain their free, 
prior and informed consent. FPIC is thus a necessary element of the right to 
effective participation and the duty to consult. 
 The scope, nature, and objectives of such FPIC processes are shaped by the 
character of the right or interests at stake, the substantive rights involved. The 
proposed measure’s impact also influences the character of the process.708 Article 





Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making 
in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives 
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own 
procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own 
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States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.709 
 
Both Articles reflect the internal and external elements that participation and 
FPIC entail, and stress that representation of indigenous peoples should take 
place through their own institutions and according to their own procedures and 
by representatives chosen by themselves. This may seem obvious, but 
unfortunately representation is often not in conformity with indigenous 
structures. Representatives may be “appointed” by external actors or consent 
may be “manufactured.”710 There is a clear link between FPIC and 
representation, and this is reflected in Article 19 of the UNDRIP, an important 
but heavily debated article. 
 Anaya argued that Article 19 should not be regarded as according indigenous 
peoples a veto-right over decisions that may affect them, but should be seen as 
requiring consent as the objective of consultations with indigenous peoples.711 
As is noted throughout this study, this observation is correct, and perceiving 
FPIC as an “all or nothing” concept is not in line with the spirit of the UN 
Declaration and the international indigenous peoples’ movement in general, 
because their aim is to establish lasting and respectful relations between 
indigenous peoples and States. FPIC is about a genuine chance to influence the 
decision making process in time, and in a well-informed manner, without 
excessive external pressure. And without a system in which indigenous peoples 
are represented fairly, these goals cannot be met. 
 The power or significance of the objective of reaching agreement and 
consent necessarily varies according to the context and the interests involved, 
and so does the way in which indigenous peoples are represented.712 
Nevertheless, in certain contexts it may very well be that FPIC may harden into 
a requirement that implies that certain projects cannot be executed when 
indigenous consent is absent. ILO Convention No. 169 establishes such a hard 
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requirement in relation to the relocation of indigenous peoples and the in the 
UN Declaration two situations in which full consent is needed are indicated: 
with regard to relocation and the storage of hazardous or toxic waste.713 A third 
situation has been elaborated upon by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in the Saramaka People v. Suriname case. The precise scope of these 
requirements will be examined in Part V, when the legal roots of FPIC will be 
discussed. Nevertheless, it is good to observe at this point that the main goal of 
FPIC is not to give indigenous peoples a veto-power, but to integrate them in 
the decision-making processes that affect them. And this is impossible without 
fair representation.  
 Anaya made an important point in criticizing that: “in many situations the 
discussion over the duty to consult and the related principle of free, prior and 
informed consent have been framed in terms of whether or not indigenous 
peoples hold a veto power that they could wield to halt development 
processes.”714 It has been an obstacle in drafting and adopting the UN 
Declaration and continues to frustrate constructive debate about what it means 
and how to properly implement FPIC procedures. 
 The principles of consultation and consent are designed to facilitate a 
dialogue in which all parties can reach a satisfactory agreement. They do not 
“bestow on indigenous peoples a right to unilaterally impose their will on States 
when the latter act legitimately and faithfully in the public interest.”715 
Indigenous peoples continue to be disproportionately affected by exclusion from 
decision-making processes, and consent coupled with its requirements “free, 
prior and informed” aim to secure that decisions affecting indigenous peoples are 
made under conditions of equality and striving for mutual respect and consensus. 
But there are a number of general and recurring issues that may hamper 
representation and participation of indigenous peoples in important decision-
making processes. Some of the most important of these broad issues will be 
discussed next.  
 
III.3.4.3 Difficulties with Representation and Obtaining Consent 
 
For any effective FPIC regime, it is a necessity that indigenous peoples are 
represented fairly. This paragraph will discuss some of the issues that arise in this 
respect. While the case-law of the Inter-American Commission and Court will 
be discussed at length in Part V, the following citation will be used to clarify the 
                                                        
713 ILO Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the International Labour 
Organisation at its seventy-sixth session, entry into force 5 September 1991, article 16(2). 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN A/RES/61/295, 
Article 10 & 29. 
714 A/HRC/12/34, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 15 July 2009, p. 17. 
715 A/HRC/12/34, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, 15 July 2009, p. 17. 
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different issues with respect to obtaining consent and representation. In the case 
of the Dann sisters, the Commission hints at the internal and external elements 
of FPIC in explaining that determination of the scope of the right to property 
over traditional lands should be: 
 
[…] based upon a process of fully informed and mutual consent on 
the part of the indigenous community as a whole. This requires at a 
minimum that all of the members of the community are fully and 
accurately informed of the nature and consequences of the process 
and provided with an effective opportunity to participate 
individually or as collectives.716 
 
The Commission’s statement illustrates that just like self-determination for 
indigenous peoples, FPIC has external and internal components. Externally, it is 
thus a people as a whole that ought to be represented, while internally the 
members of the community should all be able to participate in the collective 
will-formation.  
 These implementation requirements lead to at least three different 
interwoven issues that complicate the process of obtaining consent from the 
community or people. The purpose of this paragraph is merely to identify and to 
some degree describe these problems in order to indicate broadly the complexity 
of obtaining FPIC. The next three paragraphs will discuss three interwoven areas 
of concern: isolation, overlap, and internal participation. 
  
III.3.4.3.1 Isolation  
 
The first issue that will be mentioned is “isolation.” There are still a number of 
indigenous communities living in voluntary isolation, most of them in the 
Amazon region and on West Papua.717 These small groups have opted for a way 
of life separate from other people due to a variety of different factors. Two types 
of isolated peoples are commonly recognized: first, peoples whose isolation has 
been sustained and who remain isolated today, and second, isolated peoples who 
are in a “first contact” situation, but continue to resist contact with broader 
society. 718 It is extremely unlikely that there are tribes left whose existence is 
                                                        
716 IACHR, Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Int-
Am. C.H.R., (2001), December 27, 2002, Paragraph 140. 
717 Others can be found on the North Sentinel Island near India and some people in South-
East Asia. Estimations are that around 100 tribes worldwide qualify as ‘uncontacted’. These are 
small communities that number from some 50 to 400 people. 
718 Convention on Biological Diversity, Draft Report on Protecting the Rights of Indigenous and 
Local Communities Living in Voluntary Isolation, NEP/CBD/WG8J/AG/2/5/ENGLISH, 16 
April 2007, p. 3. 
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unknown to anyone else and “un-contacted” does not imply that these groups 
have no relations whatsoever with outsiders.719  
 Self-determination for these groups generally does not involve extensive 
participation. In this context it basically means that these tribes just want to be 
left alone, to practice their culture and traditions freely on their territory, 
developing at a pace chosen by themselves. Again, the most important element 
in the protection of these communities is secure use of their lands. These groups, 
especially in the Amazon region, suffer from illegal logging, oil and gas projects, 
mining industry, drug related crimes and a variety of other activities that intrude 
upon their lands.720 Moreover, they are more susceptible to a number of diseases 
that outsiders can - and often do - bring with them. 
While the concept of FPIC is aimed at protecting their territorial and 
cultural freedom, regarding obtaining consent it necessarily poses an external 
infringement as well. Indigenous peoples in general aspire to be - at least to some 
extent - autonomous, but communities living in voluntary isolation form a 
special category, which deserves an extra careful approach.721 
Most probably,722 communities living in voluntary isolation do so because of 
abhorrent experiences in earlier encounters with the outside world. They 
suffered from destruction of their lands caused by development projects, slave 
raids, and alien diseases (so called: “virgin soil epidemics”).723 They can be 
defined as indigenous groups that avoid or limit their relations with individuals 
and groups outside of their community.724 
                                                        
719 See, Survival International: http://www.survivalinternational.org/articles/3109-questions-
and-answers-uncontacted-tribes, consulted June 2012. 
720 Finer M and others, 'Oil and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon: Threats to Wilderness, 
Biodiversity, and Indigenous Peoples', 3 PLoS ONE, 2008, p 1. 
721 It remains exceptionally difficult and unfeasible to distinguish between communities living 
in “absolute” voluntary isolation and an alternative form, e.g. “partial isolation.” One could 
argue that voluntary isolation is almost always partial, since first-contact between indigenous 
communities and the “outside world” has almost always taken place, be it in recent history, or 
long ago. One could also reason that voluntariness (as a deliberate choice to remain isolated) 
implies the awareness of such an “outside world” per definition. On the negative impact of 
such a distinction in relation to Peruvian isolated communities see: Dora A. Napolitano & 
Aliya S. S. Ryan, The Dilemma of contact: voluntary isolation and the impacts of gas exploitation on 
health and rights in the Kugapakori Nahua Reserve, Peruvian Amazon, Environmental Research 
Letters, 2 (2007), doi:10.1088/1748-9326/2/4/045005, IOP Publishing Ltd, United 
Kingdom 2007. page 7. 
722 Since information available about isolated peoples is, per se, either from retrospective 
testimony or second hand. See: Napolitano D A and Ryan A S S, ‘The Dilemma of contact: 
voluntary isolation and the impacts of gas exploitation on health and rights in the Kugapakori 
Nahua Reserve, Peruvian Amazon’, Environmental Research Letters, 2, doi:10.1088/1748-
9326/2/4/045005, IOP Publishing Ltd, United Kingdom 2007, page 2. 
723 Napolitano D A and Ryan A S S, ‘The Dilemma of contact: voluntary isolation and the 
impacts of gas exploitation on health and rights in the Kugapakori Nahua Reserve, Peruvian 
Amazon’, Environmental Research Letters, 2, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/2/4/045005, IOP 
Publishing Ltd, United Kingdom 2007, page 1. 
724 Napolitano D A and Ryan A S S, ‘The Dilemma of contact: voluntary isolation and the 
impacts of gas exploitation on health and rights in the Kugapakori Nahua Reserve, Peruvian 
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Forms of participation and FPIC processes are of course problematic in relation 
to these groups. Individual participation might prove hard, if not impossible, to 
monitor, assess, and verify in communities living in voluntary isolation. 
Establishing consent, or for that matter, proper consultation procedures, of any 
community “as a whole” might therefore be extremely difficult or impossible.  
The problem is situated mainly in the external sphere of self-determination 
and participation, since there simply is no collective or individual will to 
participate in the larger political order. There could be other problems in 
relation to the internal dimension, however, these are difficult to determine. 
Problems within the internal sphere in relation to indigenous peoples living in 
voluntary isolation could arise within the context of participatory defects within 
illiberal communities. This subject will be dealt with later on in this paragraph. 
Cultural interference should be avoided and obtaining “consent” in 
accordance with the indigenous people’s own procedures, customs, and 
traditions of decision-making, might be extremely difficult.  
Nevertheless, FPIC and self-determination in general are also devised with 
the purpose of enabling communities to freely live in (partial) voluntary 
isolation. As stated earlier, self-determination for indigenous peoples implies 
participatory and autonomy rights. A balance has to be struck, where the isolated 
communities are able to participate and make their voices heard, while securing 
their right to be left alone. 725 If possible at all, FPIC procedures have to be 
tailor-made to suit situations of voluntary isolation, constantly appreciating the 
precarious situation of these communities and preventing these procedures from 
becoming too interfering. 
How such a procedure should take shape is anything but clear. Some argue 
that processes of consultation and consent are necessarily infringing the rights of 
isolated indigenous communities and therefore are undesirable altogether.726 The 
Inter-American Development Bank appears to share this view. In its 2006 
Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples it specifically addresses the issue: 
 
In view of the exceptional nature of uncontacted indigenous 
peoples, also known as “peoples in voluntary isolation” as well as 
their special vulnerability and the impossibility of applying prior 
consultation and good faith negotiation mechanisms, the 
Bank will only finance projects that respect the right of these 
peoples to remain in said isolated condition and to live freely 
                                                                                                                              
Amazon’, Environmental Research Letters, 2, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/2/4/045005, IOP 
Publishing Ltd, United Kingdom 2007, page 1. 
725 Not to be taken literally; by choosing to live in voluntary isolation one could for example 
argue for an implicitly assumed position of non-consent, distilled from the community’s 
behavioural pattern, in relation to development projects on their territories. 
726 Napolitano D A and Ryan A S S, ‘The Dilemma of contact: voluntary isolation and the 
impacts of gas exploitation on health and rights in the Kugapakori Nahua Reserve, Peruvian 
Amazon’, Environmental Research Letters, 2, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/2/4/045005, IOP 
Publishing Ltd, United Kingdom 2007, page 7. 
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according to their culture. In order to safeguard the collective and 
individual physical, territorial, and cultural integrity of these peoples, 
projects that may have potential impacts on these peoples, their 
lands and territories, or their way of life will have to include the 
appropriate measures to recognize, respect and protect their lands 
and territories, environment, health and culture, and to avoid 
contact with them as a consequence of the project.727 
 
Initiatives are taken in for instance Peru (Law 28736 on the protection of 
isolated peoples) and Ecuador (the creation of a ‘Zona Intangible’) to protect 
these groups from natural resource extraction and its negative impacts.728 While 
there is virtually no participation or consultation possible, FPIC does play a role 
as an important principle, because it can be asserted from the behavior and 
customs of these tribes that they do not consent to infringements on their lands.  
Peoples living in voluntary isolation are amongst the most vulnerable when 
they are affected by large-scale development projects on their territories. In this 
context, it is also often extremely difficult to implement a truly effective FPIC 
regime. The core external problem is that where FPIC and self-determination 
aim at protecting voluntary isolated communities from outside interference, 
their participatory components are generally not wanted, and might prove 
difficult to monitor and implement. Internally, verification of the representatives 
and the consent of the community as a whole is virtually impossible to monitor 
in any transparent manner. 
One could wonder if contemporary international law is capable of dealing 
with the issues related to indigenous communities living in voluntary isolation, 
and how, ad lege ferenda, it should. In relation to FPIC, the stance taken in the 
CBD Draft Report on isolated communities seems appropriate. In the report it 
is stated that: “Cultural isolation is the expression of the exercise of free 
determination.”729 Clearly, the desire to be left alone should therefore be 
respected and seen as a logical component of the group’s right to self-
determination. For FPIC, this entails, as is stated in the Draft report’s 
conclusions, the need to: “Recognize the condition of isolation as a form of 
negative consent (FPIC) to any form of intervention in the territories of the 
voluntary isolated peoples.”730 For the most isolated communities, this is indeed 
                                                        
727 Inter-American Development Bank, Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples (OP-765) and 
Strategy for Indigenous Development (GN-2387-5), Washington, 2006, O.P., page 9. Emphasis 
added. 
728 Finer M and others, 'Oil and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon: Threats to Wilderness, 
Biodiversity, and Indigenous Peoples', 3 PLoS ONE, 2008, p 6. 
729 Convention on Biological Diversity, Draft Report on Protecting the Rights of Indigenous and 
Local Communities Living in Voluntary Isolation, NEP/CBD/WG8J/AG/2/5/ENGLISH, 16 
April 2007, p. 3. 
730 Convention on Biological Diversity, Draft Report on Protecting the Rights of Indigenous and 
Local Communities Living in Voluntary Isolation, NEP/CBD/WG8J/AG/2/5/ENGLISH, 16 
April 2007, p. 5. 
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the only way to proceed. However, these examples have a wider ring, as they 
illustrate a key-problem in all FPIC procedures. 
A major issue in FPIC processes, and indeed a reason why FPIC is so 
important for indigenous peoples, is that the more isolated a community is the 
more difficult it is to obtain consent and to execute extensive consultation 
processes. The twin concepts of self-determination and FPIC are meant to give 
indigenous peoples more power to decide on their own lives, precisely because 
they are often isolated.  
And this does not bear only on territorial forms of isolation, but on the 
widespread problem of social isolation of indigenous groups. The heart of the 
problem for indigenous groups is that they are often isolated in a myriad of 
ways. They are isolated from participation in decision-making processes, they are 
often isolated from benefits like running or clean water, electricity, or basic 
healthcare, they are isolated from - culturally appropriate - education, from 
access to the judiciary, from transparent and understandable governance, and so 
forth and so on. 
In sum, the broad problem of “social isolation” of indigenous groups is the 
reason why there is such a need for FPIC and self-determination, while at the 
same time their isolated position in society makes it extremely difficult to obtain 
consent or to implement FPIC.731  
 
III.3.4.3.2 Internal Participation 
 
The second problem, which is situated in the internal sphere of FPIC, relates to 
the requirement that FPIC and self-determination respect the wishes of the 
indigenous people as a whole, which means that all members of the community 
should be able to participate in the decision-making. Indigenous peoples’ rights 
are part of the broader body of human rights and can therefore only be 
realistically implemented if they fit and adhere to other fundamental human 
rights provisions.  
The issue is thus related to what some call “illiberal indigenous 
communities” which can be defined as communities that internally do not 
adhere to internationally established human rights norms in relation to 
participation of marginalized groups living in these communities. The problem 
is also often described in terms of “illiberal practices.” The issue is well known, 
and emphasizes the precariousness of the balance between self-determination as a 
right to freely practice one’s own culture according to one’s own customs and 
ways and the other side of the coin; that these customs and ways should be fair 
towards all members in the community. 
 One could think for instance of the position of women and youths within 
some indigenous communities. It is not inconceivable that some traditions and 
customs can be oppressive and unjust. In such situations, it appears to be difficult 
                                                        
731 The problem of isolation is thus mainly an ‘external’ problem, it bears on the relation 
between an indigenous people and external actors. 
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to comply with the requirements of effective participation of every individual 
member belonging to such marginalized groups within the community. This 
problem occurs within the internal sphere, i.e. within the indigenous nation 
itself. Externally, this might result in reluctance to accept indigenous 
representatives when they are evidently not chosen in a manner reconcilable 
with a (western) liberal conception of human rights and political participation. 732 
Two contemporary thinkers have elaborated on the question of how liberal 
theory should deal with illiberal peoples and where the boundaries of liberal 
tolerance are to be drawn. John Rawls addressed the issue in his “Law of 
Peoples,” reasoning from a framework of a society of peoples.733 Will Kymlicka, 
much influenced by Rawls,734 covered similar ground,735 although focusing 
more on a human rights centered approach, in his groundbreaking work on 
minority and group rights “Multicultural Citizenship.”736 For both authors, 
violation of the participatory rights of marginalized groups seems difficult to 
accept from a liberal point of view. Nevertheless, imposition of liberal values on 
illiberal communities does not appear to be easily justified.737 
James Tully also reflected on this issue in “Strange Multiplicity” and argued 
that his system of contemporary constitutionalism does not “shield” illiberal 
                                                        
732 For an excellent discussion on issues related to internal and external representation of 
Indigenous Peoples, see: Meijknecht, 2001, Chapter III, pp. 103 -114. 
733 Rawls J, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 
England, Fourth Printing, 2002). 
According to Rawls, liberal peoples should tolerate and respect illiberal (decent) peoples as full 
and equal partners in his envisaged society of peoples, if they adhere to a number of 
requirements, amongst others a minimum floor of human rights, and an internal decent 
consultation hierarchy. 
734 Van der Burg W and Pierik R, ‘John Rawls: de filosoof van de liberaal-democratische 
verzorgingsstaat’, NJB, Afl. 2003/18, 2003, At: http://njb.juriforum.nl, consulted August 
2010. 
735 Kymlicka notices that liberals have no automatic right to impose their views on non-liberal 
national minorities. In his opinion, however, liberals do have the right and even the 
responsibility to identify their views and thereby contributing to discourse between national 
groups, which should not be seen as the first step down the path of interference, but rather as 
the first step in starting a dialogue. See: Kymlicka W, Multicultural Citizenship (OUP, Oxford 
1995), p. 171. 
736 Kymlicka W, Multicultural Citizenship (OUP, Oxford 1995).  
Kymlicka provided the debate on group or collective rights with a renewed impulse. For 
further discussion on this topic see: Kukathas C, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’, Political 
Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, February 1992. Also see: H Roth H I, ‘Collective Rights, 
Justifications and Problems,’ Centre for Multiethnic Research, Uppsala University, 1999. A 
more communitarian perspective is to be found in the writings of Charles Taylor and Vernon 
van Dyke.  
737 See also: Singer P, One World, the ethics of globalisation (Second edition, Yale University 
Press, New Haven & London, 2004), pp 142 – 144. In exemplifying that if the establishment 
of a consensus on some principles of a common ethic would be possible, this would definitely 
not be a ground for justifying any form of political intervention. Singer rightly assumes that 
the mere fact that a regime is not democratic does not mean that any form of intervention 
should take place if there are no gross and systemic human rights violations taking place. 
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communities, as long as the three conventions - recognition, consent, and 
continuity - also count within the cultures and nations that claim cultural 
recognition.738 In Tully’s system, the internal and external components of 
participation are therefore also recognized. He further explained that appropriate 
forms of self-government also have the effect that they tend to promote 
democratic values within nations. Of course, vulnerable groups within certain 
cultures need adequate attention and protection. However, this is fortunately 
acknowledged in the international structures of indigenous peoples’ protection. 
For instance, the position of indigenous women and youths is an ongoing 
priority theme within the UNFPII framework.739 Without going too far down 
the road of cultural interference, participation in FPIC procedures should indeed 
mean genuine participation by all members of the affected community, should 
they so desire. In the paragraphs on freedom, it was already mentioned that for 
collective agency, the group should be able to further a collective purpose. It is 
vital that such purposive social groups are indeed motivated by common goals, 
in which the internal participation is fairly arranged.  
The issue of participation within illiberal communities is a delicate one, 
which should be handled with the utmost care and as much as possible in 
accordance with indigenous ways of decision-making. Nevertheless, it should 
always be kept in mind that realistic and effective implementation of FPIC 





The final difficulty that will be mentioned in relation to representation and the 
implementation of FPIC, and which has both strong internal and external 
features, is the problem of overlap. As will be examined more closely in Part V, a 
precondition for implementing FPIC is an effective land rights regime, which 
creates a form of territoriality (entailing a positive obligation for the state to assist 
in delineating and demarcating indigenous lands) for indigenous and tribal 
peoples.740 Obtaining consent of a community as a whole might prove to be 
problematic in a situation where there is overlap between communities, peoples 
and/or other entities.  
However, there is a deeper problem related to overlap. This was discussed at 
length in the paragraphs on intercultural dialogue. Tully’s insight that cultures 
are overlapping, interacting, and internally negotiated pinpointed the issue. If 
cultural identity is fluent and in constant motion, how can it be possible to 
genuinely represent such an identity? Tully’s answer, as we have seen, was 
constructive. While this perception on culture does complicate cultural 
                                                        
738 Tully, 1995, p. 191. 
739 The special theme of UNPFII’s third session was the position of Indigenous Women, the 
special theme of the 4th session was the role of indigenous youth. 
740 In Part V, the Inter-American Court’s system of land and property rights for indigenous 
peoples will be examined in more detail. 
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recognition, it also makes it possible by the exposure of common ground. This 
common ground acts at a catalyst for an intercultural dialogue. 
James Anaya also reflected upon this outdated conceptualization of cultures 
as “billiard balls” in the context of international law. He argues against the 
misconception of a world divided into mutually exclusive “sovereign” territorial 
communities.741  
Anaya stated that the traditional Western theoretical perception is founded 
on an over-simplified assumption of a world divided into individuals and states. 
This is indicative of the classic, liberal, post-Westphalian model. In our 
envisaged modern world of peoples, living in pluri-cultural or multi-nation 
states, this conception ignores the need for special protection of certain culturally 
distinct groups, and appears to reject any concept of internal self-determination; 
i.e. the existence of a self-determining entity inter or intra state borders.  
Anaya seemed to agree with Tully in saying that: “The limited conception 
of 'peoples', accordingly, largely ignores the multiple, overlapping spheres of 
community, authority, and interdependency that actually exist in the human 
experience.”742 As was discussed in the paragraphs on self-determination, Anaya 
argued that the human rights character of self-determination is obscured in this 
way, which in his view is the core argument for protecting indigenous peoples’ 
rights. Nevertheless, the other and interwoven strain of argument argued for an 
indigenous right to self-determination - based on the assumption that indigenous 
peoples possess elements of sovereignty that predate the current political entity 
in which they are situated - should not be rejected.743  
While rejecting a perception of cultures as fixed, closed off, and static, for 
self-determination and FPIC processes to apply, it is at least necessary to 
determine who is the people that is affected, in order to secure fair 
representation in decision-making. The overlapping and dynamic notion of 
cultures is a complex issue that has to be taken into account in FPIC processes.  
Katsuhiko Masaki argued that this is indeed the “big problem” with FPIC 
procedures. Masaki asserted that the way FPIC is recognized in the Declaration 
presupposes a dichotomized view of the colonizer – colonized interface.744 The 
central question in his excellent study is: If the identity of an indigenous 
community is hybrid, is it feasible to define a clear cut benchmark of “full 
consent,” drawing on a “centered” image of deliberation – underlying the 
principle of FPIC – that regards decision making as a set of goal-oriented 
activities with a definite beginning and end? 
Masaki illustrated the pitfalls involved in the dichotomized view of FPIC, by 
giving an example of the Pahadi and Tharu populations of Majuwa, Nepal. He 
argues that all sorts of intra and inter group relations and social circumstances 
                                                        
741 Anaya, 2004, page 101. 
742 Anaya, 2004, page 101.  
743 This line of argumentation has been explored at length in the paragraphs on self-
determination. 
744 Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 70. 
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(like gender, status, party affiliation) complicate the perception of FPIC as 
entailing a centered image of decision-making.745 His case study reveals a myriad 
of different interests and affiliations that complicate a single FPIC procedure.  
Masaki stated that the Declaration advocates an “ideal situation,” arbitrarily 
fixating indigenous peoples’ consensus, while disregarding the multiple and 
fragmented nature of the members’ subject positions.746 He referred to Young, 
who calls for a decentered view of decision-making as mediated through and 
dispersed over time and space, giving prominence to flows and exchanges over 
different social actors, and avoiding a definite moment of decision.747 We 
discussed that Tully is also skeptical about single and definite moments of 
decision-making, and that continuity and revision of decisions should be 
possible. Pettit argued, in a similar vein, that ex-post control over decisions is 
vital for a democratic regime that respects minority rights. 
Masaki warned that both indigenous peoples and their “masters” hold 
multifaceted, incoherent identities and it is crucial to avoid dichotomizing a 
colonial relationship into two discrete, opposing forces. But it nevertheless 
remains crucial to promote FPIC, especially in relation to large-scale 
development projects – the effective participation in decision-making is 
invaluable for indigenous peoples.  Masaki argued that a technical concern with 
the “procedures” of FPIC could divert the attention away from the larger 
workings of powers involved. He aims to expose an antinomy in the concept of 
FPIC: it seems fundamentally at odds with the principle of self-determination to 
“enlist” indigenous peoples through their acceptance of an externally conceived 
project.748 It was already argued that the agenda setting in FPIC processes should 
not only be in hands of external actors. Indeed, it is essential for successful FPIC 
processes that indigenous peoples themselves also have a say in the setting of the 
agenda and the procedure that is to be followed. Masaki explained this 
eloquently: “When acting as rights holders – immersed in reciprocal relations by 
which the group is required to assimilate itself to existing norms governing how 
people gain recognition – the indigenous people are likely to exercise their 
rights within parameters laid out by an external agent.”749 
Avoiding that FPIC will lapse into what Masaki called a “political 
technology,” is concerned with the adoption of a “decentered image of 
decision-making as mediated through and dispersed over time” (quoting 
Young’s 2000 work, Inclusion and Democracy). Proponents of FPIC should not 
                                                        
745 Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 79. 
746 Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 71.  
747 Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p 71. 
748 Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 80. 
749 Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 81. 
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focus on the narrow, centered view that FPIC entails a step-by-step sequence of 
goal-oriented discussions.750 He convincingly argued that restrictions on the 
scope of external interference might put the advantage too much into the hands 
of those (e.g. powerful multinationals) who can best present their “reasoned” 
arguments. Moreover, going through a determined set of deliberations to gain 
acceptance to a project potentially blurs alternatives by restricting one’s options to 
one.751 Proponents of FPIC might unintentionally get indigenous peoples to 
embrace externally conceived agendas, and could mistakenly position them as a 
unified entity.752  
 A downside of the decentered approach is that it is less amenable to 
outsider’s blueprints, given the absence of a clear-cut beginning and a definite 
goal. But as Masaki argued, given the different positions of members of an 
indigenous community (economically, politically, socially etc.), and the 
dynamics of community, outside actors should realize that external interventions 
cannot be neutral and must be cautious about tailoring their support strategies to 
a particular unfolding of events.753  
 Masaki concluded that the impossibility of bringing peoples’ struggles under 
decision-making control must be accepted and that a “straightjacket” FPIC 
strategy should be abandoned, if we are truly to act in accordance with the 
principle of indigenous self-determination, which - as is argued throughout this 
study - is the backbone and legitimization of FPIC.754  
 Overlapping and diverging interests, agendas, cultural identities, and 
affiliations complicate the application of FPIC especially in relation to 
representation. It may prove extremely hard to secure fair representation of the 
group(s) involved. But as was explored through Tully’s work, acknowledgement 
of the dynamic overlapping nature of cultures also make it a real possibility to 
achieve cultural recognition. The complexities mentioned above should be 
taken into account, but certainly should not be a reason to abandon FPIC 
processes as “too difficult.”The implementation of FPIC also leads to number of 
less abstract, practical problems related to overlap.  
One could imagine an unlimited number of different territorial types of 
overlap. With regard to the internal dimension, one could envisage a situation 
where only a part of the community is negatively affected and the community as 
                                                        
750 Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 82. We will see in Part V that the Inter-American Ct. in 
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and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 82. 
752 Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 82. 
753 Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 82. 
754Hickey S and Mitlin D, (Eds.) Rights-Based Approach to Development: Exploring the Potential 
and Pitfalls (Kumarian Press, 2009), p. 83. 
CHAPTER III 
183 
a whole needs to consent to the decision, plan, or project affecting just the small 
part. For the larger part of the community or people, the project could be 
beneficial. In such cases, it would be essential for the representatives of the 
indigenous people concerned to take into account all different interests of the 
various groups constituting “the people.”  
However, the main problems related to overlap are situated in the external 
dimension of self-determination, between the collective entity constituting a 
people providing or withholding consent through their (freely chosen) 
representatives and other entities that cover parts of the same territory or 
autonomy sphere. Since the (self-determining) indigenous group is still part of a 
larger state, one could argue that there is always some sort of veil of state 
sovereignty over the indigenous sovereignty-sphere.755  
Therefore, it may be extremely difficult to obtain consent of a community 
as a whole when the affected people territorially extends over several states.756 
Another form of overlap can be distinguished in situations where different 
“communities” or “peoples” coincide territorially or are affected by for example 
a large-scale development plan. Complex systems of representation may be 
needed to measure consent in such situations. A combination of the factors 
mentioned above can be found in urban areas, where there appears to be no 
option of “demarcating or delineating” territory. Another complication arises in 
the case of nomadic tribal peoples. The overlapping nature of culture is 
definitely one of the key concerns in making sure that FPIC processes succeed 




While there is a strong movement that aims to develop FPIC into a genuine, 
effective, and enforceable legal norm, some fundamental issues remain that 
generate complexities in relation to its implementation. This paragraph has 
sought to illustrate these issues in light of the requirement of fair representation. 
 Participation presupposes representation. Standard setting is meaningless 
unless there are intermediate structures that facilitate practical implementation of 
those norms, and this is possible only if indigenous peoples are fairly represented. 
FPIC processes are devised to bridge this gap between standards and reality. 
 Both internal and external aspects of representation are important to take 
into account for successful FPIC processes. Articles 18 and 19 of the UN 
Declaration, which set out the general framework for indigenous participation, 
highlight these aspects. Externally, it is important that it truly is a people “as a 
whole” that is represented, while internally the members should be able to 
participate in the collective will-formation. 
                                                        
755 The main argument of New Zealand to vote against the U.N. Declaration was that the 
requirement of consent for Indigenous Peoples over the lands and territories they traditionally 
occupied could constitute a Veto-right over national legislation and potentially affect all the 
countries’ territories. 
756 Like, for example, the Sami people of Scandinavia and Russia. 
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Different forms of isolation complicate representation and obtaining FPIC. The 
most isolated communities may be extra vulnerable, and FPIC processes should 
be conscious of this. At the same time, it is exactly this social isolation of 
indigenous groups that forms the reason for developing strong participatory 
mechanisms, like FPIC. 
 Internally, FPIC processes have to make sure that the voices of vulnerable 
groups within the community, for example women and youths, are taken into 
account, while at the same time it is vital that these internal processes can be 
conducted in a manner compatible with the cultural structures of the group. 
Appropriate forms of self-government and participation rights may have the 
effect of promoting democratic values within communities. 
 Since cultures are internally negotiated, interacting, and overlapping and 
since it is important to take the multiple overlapping spheres of community, 
authority and interdependency that exist in human experience into account, 
obtaining consent is a complex issue. Without taking into account these insights, 
FPIC becomes impossible to obtain. Perceiving FPIC as a single and centered 
moment of decision-making is undesirable since this may ignore that there are a 
myriad of intra and inter group relations and circumstances that play an 
important role. Cultural identity is dynamic, and this ought to be reflected in 
FPIC processes. 
 The complexities related to “overlap” complicate FPIC processes and 
representation of cultural identities, but should not be seen as a definite obstacle. 
Acknowledging overlap and devising FPIC structures that take this into account 
can expose common ground between the parties involved and may lead to real 
cultural recognition. 
Colchester and Mckay described the two main challenges of “searching for 
the middle ground” and implementing FPIC as the need for mutually agreed 
negotiation processes and the necessity for indigenous peoples to agree about 
means to represent their own collectivities. 757 
 Representation of indigenous communities in FPIC processes is a complex 
issue, but in recognizing the particular issues on a case-by-case basis, fair systems 
of representation can be devised that are respectful to both the cultural ways of 
indigenous groups and the broader body of international human rights norms. 
Strengthening the capacity of indigenous peoples to represent themselves is vital, 
and facilitation thereof is also part of their right to self-determination. 
                                                        
757 Colchester M and McKay F, 'In Search of Middle Ground: Indigenous Peoples, Collective 
Representation and the Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent', Forest Peoples 
Programme, 2004, p. 6. 
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III.4 Conclusions: Effective Participation and FPIC for Indigenous 
Peoples: Dialogue, Communication, and Consent in Multi-Nation 
States 
Contemporary standard setting pertaining to indigenous peoples reflects a 
change in law and policy from protection against discrimination and integration 
into mainstream society towards recognizing rights to self-determination and 
concern for the protection of cultural integrity. Different mechanisms to 
promote effective participation of indigenous peoples - as distinct collectives - in 
decision-making processes are essential to accomplish adherence to these 
principles. Within this participatory framework, FPIC is emerging as one of the 
most important instruments for realizing indigenous peoples' right to self-
determination. The preceding paragraphs described the main justifications for 
FPIC and show and expose how the concept is embedded in the broader 
framework of effective participation. 
 Part III therefore first examined the content and justifications for a norm of 
effective participation and subsequently evaluated the concept of FPIC from 
different - legally relevant - perspectives. The first part of this study illustrated 
that mechanisms for effective participation form the core of what self-
determination means for indigenous peoples, since self-determination is to 
function primarily within the state, and does not amount to full autonomy or 
independence. These participatory structures are also vital for securing 
indigenous peoples control over their lands and resources, which will also be a 
major topic in Part IV and V of this study. 
 
Effective Participation and FPIC 
 
It was necessary to explore the underlying framework of participatory norms, 
standards and their justifications to come to terms with FPIC. Effective 
participation is becoming a central principle in the discussions about the 
international protection of indigenous peoples according to a number of recent 
UN studies on the rights to effective participation. 
 This is also reflected in the UNDRIP, which contains a number of different 
participatory mechanisms. These participatory, discursive provisions in the 
Declaration demarcate different levels of indigenous autonomy. Accordingly, 
effective participation is “layered” in the Declaration. 
 Moreover, the Special Rapporteur has stressed that a duty - for states - to 
consult indigenous peoples is a corollary to the right to effective participation. 
The principle of free, prior and informed consent takes a central place within the 
discussion on effective participation and helps to clarify the content and 
objective of these participatory norms. Moreover, an important argument is that 
FPIC could allow for a more targeted, realistic, and practical approach to the 
problems indigenous peoples face when it comes to including them in decision-
making processes. 
 James Tully's study “Strange Multiplicity” was surveyed to answer the 
questions of why participation in the framework of the democratic processes of 
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the state is so vital and how this could be made possible. Tully’s answer, which 
provides a framework for FPIC and effective participation processes, is that 
when negotiations between indigenous peoples and states are held in accordance 
with the principles of mutual recognition, continuity, and consent, they will be 
respectful of cultural differences, and this is the way to generate peaceful 
relations in multicultural states. 
 It was explained that the multiplicity of demands for cultural recognition 
currently present calls for a variety of forms of self-rule. In other words, there is 
a need for different forms of participation in decision-making, dependent upon 
the claims and interests at stake. Tully explains that the goal of these processes, 
which he rightly describes as dialogues, is to find common ground with diverse 
others who display both cultural similarities and differences.  
 To successfully conduct such a dialogue (or what Tully calls a multilogue), it 
is vital to listen to the descriptions and arguments of each party involved, in 
appropriate languages, in order to find re-descriptions acceptable to all. In this 
way, it becomes possible to mediate the differences that the different parties 
want each other to recognize.758  
 This intercultural dialogue is essential to realize the effective participation of 
indigenous peoples. Participants in a dialogue shaped according to Tully's 
principles are ideally gradually able to see the association from the points of view 
of each other and work out an acceptable inter-cultural language capable of 
accommodating the truth in each of their limited and complementary views, 
thereby setting aside the incompatible ones.759 This is evidently the core purpose 
of FPIC and other participatory processes in which complex arrangements need 
to be discussed and high-impact decisions have to be made. 
 Tully’s framework emphasizes the need for a flexible interpretation of self-
rule standards. Especially the procedure itself should be open to re-negotiation. 
Searching for a fixed, uniform standard for FPIC and effective participation 
processes is neither realistic nor desirable. What is needed is an intercultural 
dialogue in which the culturally distinct ways of speaking and acting are 
mutually recognized, in order to reach agreement on the type of self-rule 
arrangements that fit the particular situation and cultural context. It is through 
and in this dialogue that people and peoples are to recognize each other’s 
similarities and differences, in this process of mediation discover common 
ground, and reach agreement on appropriate types of self-rule. Effective 
participation of indigenous peoples in intercultural decision-making processes is 
rendered possible if it is guided by principles of mutual recognition, consent as 
the basis for concluding and altering arrangements and respect for the continuity 
of the relation over time.  
 
  
                                                        
758 Tully, 1995, p. 111. 
759 Tully, 1995, p. 134. 
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Elements of FPIC 
 
Subsequently, the different elements of FPIC were surveyed from a number of 
different perspectives. First, the contemporary understanding of the different 
elements were exposed and it was shown that the most comprehensive 
explanation is to be found in the “elements of a common understanding of 
FPIC” included in the conclusions of the 2005 UNPFII Workshop report. 





The first question posed is: what could be understood by “free” in FPIC? Phillip 
Pettit's theory of freedom offers an attractive perspective on this element since it 
views freedom from an interpersonal perspective and explains that freedom can 
be guaranteed when an agent has sufficient discursive control in a dialogue or 
decision-making process. This is exactly what indigenous peoples need in FPIC 
processes. 
 It is essential that the agent is fit to be held responsible - in other words - a 
person must be effectively reactionworthy for a certain action to be seen as free. 
Intuitively, it is proper to speak of freedom when we can say that a person - or 
people - is responsible for a certain action or decision.  
 Discourse-friendly relationships preserve a person’s freedom. It is essential for 
such relationships that the actor involved is recognized as a partner for discourse 
and is also authorized to take his place in the decision making process. Pettit 
called this capacity “discursive control” and when the group involved has 
sufficient discursive control in a decision making process, its freedom is 
preserved. 
 Agents in Pettit's view will be free persons to the extent that they have the 
ratiocinative capacity for discourse and the relational capacity that goes with 
enjoying discourse-friendly linkages with others. This capacity, with its dual 
aspects, is what constitutes discursive control. Agents will exercise such freedom 
as persons so far as they are engaged in discourse with others, being authorized as 
someone worthy of address, and they will be reinforced in that freedom so far as 
they are publicly recognized as having the discursive control it involves.760  
 Pettit furthermore illustrated that this concept of discursive control translates 
to the political arena in the form of a principle of non-domination, which is a 
central theme in both definitions and measures to protect indigenous peoples. If 
non-domination is upheld, this means that minority and indigenous groups are 
protected from state interference that amounts to arbitrary decision-making. 
Interference in this perception is arbitrary where it is not forced to track the 
                                                        
760 Pettit explained that this view of freedom leaves no room for hostile coercion, but it does 
allow for a number of other coercive actions, like an offer, bid, or plea. Furthermore he 
argued that his theory also applies to groups, to collective agents (the same way it applies to 
individuals) as long as they count as social integrates. 
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avowable interests of the interferee. Secondly, non-domination indicts not only 
the experience of arbitrary interference, but any exposure to a power of arbitrary 
interference, whether or not that power is actually being exercised.761 By 
targeting and condemning only arbitrary interference, the ideal of non-
domination attempts to establish a polity that can possess coercive powers, but is 
so constrained that these powers tend not to be arbitrary.  
 Pettit acknowledged that this requires a new conception of democracy that is 
hospitable to minority and indigenous contestation rights. In his conception of 
democracy, multicultural nations have to establish special contestatory powers 
for such groups in order to preserve their political freedom, to prevent them 
from becoming dominated by the majority. This necessarily includes various 
self-government rights and participation rights, like FPIC. 
Will Kymlicka describes these as mechanisms that protect minorities against 
the possible injustices of state nation building.762 It was argued that these are 
tools to determine forms of self-rule by means of a “multilogue.” Pettit argues 
that in order to accommodate such minority rights, the concept of electoral 
democracy needs to be supplemented with what he calls a contestatory 
dimension, in which special contestation rights, like FPIC are guaranteed for 
minority groups. 
“Free” in free prior and informed consent is therefore best described as a 
sufficient degree of discursive control in the relevant decision-making processes. 
When indigenous peoples enjoy discursive control, they can be seen as fit to be 
held responsible for the choices they make. FPIC requires co-responsible 
decision-making. The concept of discursive control does not leave room for 
hostile coercion, while more friendly forms of coercion, like offers, pleas, and 
bids, are not ruled out. Politically, the notion of discursive control links up with 
the principle of non-domination, which is a central requirement for realizing 




Prior is an important requirement for any genuine FPIC process since enough 
time should be allocated for internal debate and decision-making according to a 
community's own cultural customs. Nevertheless, FPIC is not only relevant 
prior to any agreement between indigenous peoples and others, but is concerned 
with sustaining respectful relations over time. FPIC may include revision of 
existing arrangements in light of new information or changed circumstances. 
 
  
                                                        
761 Pettit, 2001, p. 138-139. Cf. Taylors argument in his influential essay ‘examining the 
politics of recognition’.  
762 Instead of perceiving minority rights as a special status or privilege. Kymlicka W, Politics in 






In order to be able to freely consent to certain projects or arrangements, it is 
vital that indigenous peoples are adequately informed about the planned activity. 
While the final part of this study will examine in close detail what the content of 
these informational requirements is, this part examined another important part of 
informing, namely that informed consent processes require complex 
communicative transactions.763 In this part it was studied - taking into account 
the extensive debate in the field of Bioethics - what standards are to be taken 
into account to conclude successful communicative transactions. Seen together 
with Tully’s model for an intercultural dialogue and Pettit’s notion of discursive 
control, this provides the outline for the dialogical model FPIC processes aim to 
achieve. Moreover, this part exposes why informed consent requirements matter 
and what legal role they fulfill in general.  
 
The Role of FPIC and Standards for Communicative Transactions 
 
Consenting concerns a waiver of other, more fundamental, entitlements. Since 
consenting may - and very often will - have profound effects on indigenous 
communities, it should be accompanied with certain standards - free, prior, 
informed - that secure its validity. The focus in FPIC processes should be as 
much on the way in which communication is taking place between indigenous 
peoples and other actors, as it should be on informational disclosure. Information 
should be identified as action rather than only as content, since informed consent 
processes involve much more than merely the transfer of information. 
 The role of FPIC is that it justifies acts that would otherwise be unacceptable 
or illegitimate. Waiving prohibitions on wrongful action and waiving legitimate 
expectations is a normal practice through which we permit selected others to act 
in ways that would otherwise be unacceptable, and thereby justify such actions 
or activities.764 Any justification of informed consent therefore has to start with 
recognition of the underlying legal and ethical claims and legitimate expectations 
that are waived by consent transactions.765 This is also the reason why the 
foundations of FPIC (self-determination and rights to lands and resources) were 
treated in detail at the beginning of this study. What also became clear is that in 
addition to consent as a defense against a breach of rights, it can also function to 
                                                        
763 When examining the case law from the Inter-American Court and a number of Voluntary 
Initiatives and implementation models for FPIC in Part V, the specific content of the 
informational requirements will be exposed.  
764 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, pp. 72-73. 
765 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 73. Again, this is highly relevant for FPIC, since it is not 
very useful to examine it in isolation. The underlying claims, to land, property and self-
determination have to be recognized and examined. So it is not only ‘self-determination’ that 
forms the normative justification for FPIC, but also the specific other provisions and rights that 
are at stake. Recognizing and mapping the relevant spectrum of rights that is possible infringed 
if FPIC is not secured, is of the essence for successful FPIC processes. 
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create new rights and duties.766 Since it is an expression of indigenous self-
determination, FPIC also has a role in generating and sustaining relationships 
between indigenous peoples and states. 
 A blanket approach to consent requirements that seeks to standardize 
procedures for consent for all action is neither feasible nor desirable. Consent is a 
way of ensuring that those subjected to invasive action are not abused, 
manipulated or undermined, or wronged in comparably serious ways.767 It seeks 
to ensure that such action is done only when specific norms are waived, and is 
not undertaken if it would breach important ethical or legal requirements.768 
And this is as much true for FPIC in the context of indigenous rights as it is in 
relation to the field of bioethics.  
This survey of FPIC in the context of bioethics provides valuable insights 
into the goals and effects of FPIC. It traces its importance to the way in which 
informed consent transactions can provide (a) protection against serious wrongs, 
(b) evidence that such breaches have not occurred, and (c) assurance that 
systematic ways of preventing them are in place.769 
 Hence, successful consent transactions can protect against serious wrongs, by 
placing control of invasive interventions that might otherwise wrong and harm 
in the hands of those who would be wronged or harmed. Only those whose 
consent is requested can waive the norms or rights at stake. When such norms 
are waived, those who consent provide evidence that can later be cited to show 
that no serious wrongs have occurred, and the norms can used by those who 
perform invasive interventions to justify their action. The systematic use of 
informed consent can provide assurance to third parties that action that would 
otherwise be seriously wrong is routinely, normally, prevented. Conversely, 
without free and informed consent requirements, individuals or groups may not be 
protected against force or fraud, deceit or duress, constraint or hostile 
coercion.770  
 Secondly, FPIC is not only about “mere choice,” but also entails a dialogical 
process that may also include a number of other considerations and principles 
that are relevant for its justification. It was discussed that a narrow focus on 
“informing” ignores or underplays what is actually needed for effective 
communication and commitments between the parties involved.771 We have seen 
                                                        
766 Brownsword R and Beyleveld D, Consent in the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2007), Ch. I, p. 7. 
767 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 82. 
768 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 82. 
769 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 96. 
770 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 96. 
771 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 184. The Conduit/Container metaphors and the ‘disclosure 
view on informed consent’ are not mistaken in themselves, but they highlight and accentuate 
some aspects of knowledge and communication by hiding or downplaying others. Disclosure 
by itself may fail to reach its intended audience, and fail to communicate what is proposed. 
Decision-making by itself may fail to communicate whether consent is given or refused or 
which commitments are assumed in consenting. The disclosure model, according to Manson 




that this far, requirements in relation to “informing” in FPIC processes for 
indigenous peoples, also focus mainly on informational disclosure. A more 
elaborate model of adequate communication is vital for successful 
communicative transactions in FPIC processes. 
Rather than constructing informational obligations as bearing directly on 
types of informational or propositional content, Manson and O’Neill argued that 
they are better construed as obligations that bear on the speech acts and other 
epistemic actions by which information is acquired, used, and conveyed. 
Informational obligations apply to communicative transactions, and are distorted if 
they are seen as bearing solely or primarily upon their informational or 
propositional content.772 This way, the arguments developed here follow the line 
taken in the previous paragraphs: FPIC is primarily about the way in which the 
dialogue and the communicative process is structured. This insight is crucial for 
successful informing and thereby for successful FPIC. The key argument is that 
when informed consent processes are undertaken, it is vital to not only focus on 
what type of information is to be provided, but just as much on how such 
information is conveyed. In other words, for successful information, and successful 
FPIC, it is essential that a wide range of norms that guide communicative 
transactions are taken into account. 
 Genuine informed consent cannot be achieved by communicative transactions 
that do not take into account norms of intelligibility and relevance; those norms are 
essential for effective communication. Moreover, norms of accuracy and honesty 
must also be met. Essential features of successful communication include that 
parties share a language, share at least some background knowledge and are able to 
take each other’s inferences and commitments into account. This is to be guiding for 
successful application of the “informed” requirement. 
 
Consent and Representation 
 
Participation, including participation in FPIC processes, presupposes 
representation. International standard setting is meaningless unless there are 
intermediate structures that facilitate its implementation, and this is possible only 
if indigenous peoples are fairly represented. FPIC processes are devised to bridge 
this gap between standards and reality. 
 Both internal and external aspects of representation are vital to take into 
account for successful FPIC processes. Articles 18 and 19 of the UN 
Declaration, which set out the general framework for indigenous participation, 
highlight these aspects. Externally, it is important that it is a people “as a whole” 
that is represented, while internally the members should be able to participate in 
the collective will-formation. 
 Different forms of isolation complicate representation and obtaining FPIC. 
The most isolated communities may be extra vulnerable and it is especially in 
these communities that FPIC processes are most difficult to organize. At the 
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same time, social isolation of indigenous groups is the reason for developing 
effective participatory mechanisms, like FPIC. 
Internally, FPIC processes have to make sure that the voices of vulnerable groups 
within the community - women and youths - are taken into account, while at 
the same time it is vital that these internal processes can be conducted in a 
manner compatible with the cultural structures of the group. Appropriate forms 
of self-government and participation rights may have the effect of promoting 
democratic values within communities. 
 Obtaining consent is a complex issue since cultures are internally negotiated, 
interacting, and overlapping and since it is important to take the multiple 
overlapping spheres of community, authority, and interdependency that exist in 
societies into account. But without taking these insights into account, FPIC 
becomes impossible to obtain. Perceiving FPIC as a single and centered moment 
of decision-making is undesirable because this may ignore the fact that there are 
a myriad of intra and inter group relations and circumstances that play an 
important role. Cultural identity is dynamic, and this ought to be reflected in 
FPIC processes. 
These complexities related to “overlap” have the effect that FPIC processes 
and representation of cultural identities is highly complex, but this should not be 
seen as a definite obstacle. Acknowledging overlap and devising FPIC structures 
that take this into account can expose common ground between the parties 




The scope of consent itself is dependent upon a number of factors, and as will be 
further investigated in the coming paragraphs, is dependent upon the impact of 
the proposed decision and the nature of the affected rights it is concerned with. 
FPIC may include the option of saying no to a certain project. As was argued in 
this part, FPIC is always important in overarching effective participation 
processes and it is always the goal of such processes. Therefore, the more 
fundamental questions is not if an FPIC right may block a certain decision, but 
how to structure the process so that it becomes a fair dialogue based on 
continuity and recognition of relationships between indigenous peoples and 
other actors. 
FPIC is embedded in the framework of self-determination and the right to 
effective participation. It is indicated in contemporary international law and 
studies that effective participation and FPIC are important in realizing the 
implementation of the set standards. An intercultural dialogue is needed in 
which indigenous peoples enjoy a large degree of discursive control. When they 
are in a non-dominated position co-responsible decision-making will be 
possible. Fair representation and standards that guarantee successful 
communicative transactions are essential in any FPIC process. This part has 
surveyed the central principles that need to be taken into account in order to 
successfully conduct FPIC processes. The following paragraphs will explore, 
firstly, the international and regional platforms for FPIC norms and secondly, the 
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practical legal and quasi-legal implications of FPIC processes, bearing these 










Midway in this study, a short recapitulation of the structure and argumentation 
and a glance into what is still to come may be useful. In part II (Principles) the 
foundations of FPIC were explored, and it was argued that a consent principle is 
indeed fundamental to the claims indigenous peoples worldwide state, because it 
is an expression of indigenous self-determination and vital for securing control 
(to a certain extent) over lands and resources. 
Part III explored the concepts of effective participation and FPIC from a 
number of theoretical perspectives and considered a number of guiding 
principles that these processes could adhere to. Reality unfortunately often 
shows a very different picture. The second half of this study will explore FPIC 
and its related concepts from a more practical perspective. 
 Part IV and V will answer three questions that are instructive for clarifying 
the two elements of the main research question: the current status of FPIC and 
baselines for its successful implementation. Firstly, where can we find FPIC 
requirements in international law and legal documents and which international 
institutions deal with it? Secondly, what is the legal status of FPIC considering a 
number of recent cases dealing with indigenous land and participation rights? 
Thirdly, how could FPIC be implemented in practice, taking the legal status 
into account? 
 To answer the first questions, Part IV will survey the existing international 
platforms and institutions in which FPIC norms are mentioned. At the end of 
this part, some special attention will be given to the UN system of indigenous 
peoples protection. 
 For the second question – regarding the legal status of FPIC – a number of 
landmark cases, mainly from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, will 
be examined in part V. It will be argued that the Inter-American Court’s system 
of property and participation rights offers the most comprehensive legal model 
on how to implement land and resource rights and FPIC processes. 
 The related third question will be answered by examining a number of 
recent FPIC implementation models that have been developed in the context of 
so-called “voluntary initiatives.” These progressive and specific models all deal 
with sustainable use of resources and include detailed FPIC implementation 
schemes. 
IV.1 The International Diffusion of FPIC standards 
IV.1.1 Mapping and Tracing FPIC in International Law 
This part will examine where the requirement of FPIC can be found in 
international law and policy documents. It will provide an overview of the 
relevant platforms and documents in which FPIC is elaborated upon, in order to 
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show that there is a widespread diffusion of FPIC requirements, especially in 
recent years. 
 
IV.1.1.1 FPIC: Diffusion in International Law and Institutions 
 
As mentioned, the participatory rights in the UNDRIP can be seen as 
expressions of the right to self-determination. The standard of FPIC is seen as 
the most far-reaching and important of the participatory rights in the 
Declaration and is becoming an important general principle for indigenous 
peoples. 
 As observed above, FPIC can be found in a number of provisions in the 
UNDRIP regarding relocation, cultural protection, land, and resources and 
environmental protection.773 Article 19, perceived in light of Article 18, contains 
one of the broadest affirmations of self-government, participation, and the 
principle of FPIC: 
 
Article 18 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making 
in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives 
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as 




States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in 
order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect them.774 
 
The provisions expose particular areas in which FPIC should be made 
operational. They emphasize the fields in which indigenous rights are most often 
violated. Furthermore, FPIC is also applied in more fundamental provisions on 
the relation between Indigenous Peoples and the State. Article 18 and 19 
contain a more general principle that consent has to be sought in all matters 
affecting indigenous peoples, emphasizing its political, external dimension in 
relation to the state.  
The codification of free, prior and informed consent in Article 32, which 
addresses development activities affecting indigenous peoples’ land and resource 
rights, is of paramount importance as well,775 since indigenous peoples regard 
                                                        
773 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN A/RES/61/295, 
Articles 10, 11, 28, 29 and 32. 
774 Emphasis added. 
775 E/C.19/2008/CRP.12, 18th of April, 2008, UNPFII 7th Session: “The UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Treaties and the Right to Free, Prior and Informed 
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their ability to survive, culturally and physically, as inextricably bound to 
occupying and controlling their territories and resources.776 In this light Article 
10, which prohibits relocation without the free, prior and informed consent of 
the group concerned, also emphasizes the invaluable connection that indigenous 
peoples have with their traditionally occupied lands.  
Importantly, the UNDRIP is not the only instrument that mentions FPIC, 
nor is it the oldest. The following paragraphs will therefore explore in which 
other documents FPIC requirements are mentioned and explained. 
 
IV.1.1.2 Traces of FPIC in International Law 
 
Traces of a principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent in relation to 
indigenous peoples’ protection can be found in various international instruments 
and documents. The following section will provide a general overview of where 
these elements can be located and how they seek to protect indigenous peoples.  
As early as 1975, the International Court of Justice emphasized that consent 
should be the basis for regulating the relations between indigenous peoples and 
states in its advisory opinion on the Western Sahara, in which the terra nullius 
doctrine was explicitly abandoned. The Court explained that exercising the right 
to self-determination requires the free expression of the will of the people - the 
indigenous people of the territory - involved.777  
 
IV.1.1.3 The Cobo Study 
 
A watershed in UN activities in relation to indigenous peoples’ protection was 
caused by the 1971 ECOSOC resolution authorizing the UN Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to study the 
“Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations.”778 The resulting 
reports by Special Rapporteur José R. Martínez Cobo became a standard 
reference and created a platform for further research.779 Cobo’s conclusions 
produced a series of recommendations and findings that were generally 
supportive of indigenous peoples’ demands.780 Already in his final report of 
                                                                                                                              
Consent: The Framework For a New Mechanism for Reparations, Restitution and Redress.” 
page 7. 
776 Lâm M C, ‘Remembering the Country of Their Birth: Indigenous Peoples and 
Territoriality’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 2, Columbia University, New 
York, 2004, page 130. 
777 I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara (1975), paragraph 62. 
778 Anaya, 2004, page 62.  
779 The original documents published from 1981 to 1983 are: U.N. Docs. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Adds.1-6 (1981), E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Adds.107 (1982) and 
E/CN.4/Sub.2./1983/21/Adds.1-7 (1983). 
780 S Anaya, 2004, page 62. 
PLATFORMS 
198 
1983,781 Cobo stressed the importance of a “consent” principle governing 
indigenous peoples’ land rights. In relation to partition of land, the report 
mentioned: 
 
In any case, the community has a continuing interest and no 
alienation should occur without the informed and verified 
authorisation of the community made through the appropriate 
traditional procedures [...]782  
 
In different words carrying the same message, Cobo concluded that: 
 
The principle of unrestricted ownership and control of land, 
including all natural resources, by indigenous peoples should be 
recognized. The lands, land rights and natural resources of 
indigenous peoples should not be taken, and these rights should not 
be terminated or extinguished unilaterally or without the full and 
informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned.783 
 
Martínez Cobo’s findings guided, and continue to guide, international views on 
indigenous peoples’ protection. 
 
IV.1.1.4 The International Labour Organisation 
 
ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989, mentioned earlier is widely regarded as the 
most important legally binding instrument dealing specifically with indigenous 
peoples’ protection, especially in Latin America.784 In ILO Convention 169 a 
requirement of consent is codified in Article 16, regarding relocation of 
indigenous.785 Articles 6, 7, and 15 of the Convention provide the general legal 
framework regarding the consultation and participation of indigenous peoples.786 
                                                        
781 José Martínez Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8. 
782 José Martínez Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, page 69, at 529. Emphasis added. 
783 José Martínez Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, page 70, at 540. Emphasis added. 
784 ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the International Labour 
Organisation at its seventy-sixth session, entry into force 5 September 1991. 
785 Article 16(2) ILO 196 reads: “Where the relocation of these peoples is considered 
necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and 
informed consent.” 
786 A/HRC/15/35, General Assembly Distr.: General, 23 August 2010, Human Rights 
Council, Fifteenth session, Item 5, Human rights bodies and mechanisms, Progress report on 
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In Article 6(2) the requirement is found that, as a general principle, “the 
consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, 
in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective 
of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.” This way, the 
provision creates a general requirement applicable to all consultation rights in the 
Convention. Such consultation rights can be found in Articles 2, 15, and 33, 
where the Convention includes a mandate for states to fully consult with 
indigenous peoples and to ensure their informed participation.  
Furthermore, Article 4(2) includes the requirement that special measures for 
the protection of indigenous peoples shall not be “contrary to the freely-
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.” ILO 169 thus includes a 
requirement of consent, but it is only an explicit requirement in relation to 
relocation of indigenous peoples. Nevertheless ILO 169 is based on recognition 
of the intrinsic worth of cultural diversity and principles of consultation and 
participation. It proved to be an important source of inspiration for many of the 
provisions in the UNDRIP. 
 
IV.1.1.5 The Human Rights Committee on Consent 
 
In addition to the statements on effective participation and positive obligations 
of the state under article 27 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee 
elaborated on a consent requirement in the 2009 Poma case.787 The Committee 
held that in case of measures which substantially interfere with culturally 
significant activities of a minority or indigenous community the admissibility of 
such measures is to be determined by the degree and opportunity the members 
of the community had to effectively participate in the decision-making process. 
Most importantly, the Committee stated that mere consultation is not sufficient, 
but that the free, prior and informed consent of the community is necessary. 
Furthermore, the principle of proportionality should be taken into account.788 
The Human Rights Committee has referred to FPIC requirements on several 
occasions.789 
                                                                                                                              
the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, Report of the 
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, paragraph 18. 
787 General Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27), 04/08/1994, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, General Comment No. 23. Poma Poma v.Peru, Comm. 
1457/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (HRC 2009). 
788 HRC, Poma Poma v.Peru, Comm. 1457/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 
(2009), p. 11, para. 7.6. 
789 Also see e.g.: Canada, CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, 20 April 2006, para. 22: “It is concerned 
that the discriminatory effects of the Indian Act against Aboriginal women and their children 
in matters of reserve membership have still not been remedied, and that the issue of 
matrimonial real property on reserve lands has still not been properly addressed. While 
stressing the obligation of the State party to seek the informed consent of indigenous peoples 
before adopting decisions affecting them” Panama, CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3, 17 April 2008, 
para. 21: “The absence of a process of consultation to seek the prior, free and informed 
consent of communities to the exploitation of natural resources in their territories; the ill-
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IV.1.1.6 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) - the 
body of independent experts that monitors the implementation of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by its 
member states - referred to the principle in its general recommendation XXIII 
of 1997.790 Paragraph 4(d) calls upon states parties to: “Ensure that members of 
indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of effective participation in 
public life and that no decisions relating to their rights and interests are taken without 
their informed consent.”791 The Committee thus presented a more general 
requirement than the regime in Articles 18 and 19 of the UN Declaration. 
Where Article 19 refers only to legislative and administrative measures that may 
affect indigenous peoples, paragraph 4(d) covers a wider area and broadens the 
scope to all decisions relating to their rights and interest.  
 The Committee referred to FPIC on several moments in its concluding 
observations. For instance, in 2001 the Committee expressed its concern about 
land rights of indigenous peoples in the United States and called upon the state 
to:  
 
                                                                                                                              
treatment, threats and harassment to which members of the communities have reportedly been 
subjected on the occasion of protests against hydroelectric infrastructure construction projects, 
mining operations or tourism facilities on their territory; and the non-recognition of the 
special status of indigenous communities that are not within a comarca (articles 1, 26 and 27 of 
the Covenant). Nicaragua, CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3, 12 December 2008, para. 21: “The 
Committee voices concern regarding the existence among the general public of racial 
prejudice against indigenous peoples, especially in the Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic 
coast, and the many problems affecting indigenous peoples, including serious shortcomings in 
health and education services, the fact that institutions have few or no branches in their areas, 
and the absence of a consultation process to secure free, informed prior consent to the 
exploitation of natural resources on indigenous communities’ lands.” Colombia, 
CCPR/C/COL/CO/6, 4 August 2010: “The Committee also regrets that no progress has 
been made on the adoption of legislation to criminalize racial discrimination or on the 
adoption of legislation for holding prior consultations and guaranteeing the free, prior and 
informed consent of the members of the relevant community (arts. 2, 26 and 27).” El 
Salvador, CCPR/C/SLV/CO/6, 27 October 2010: “The State party must promote the full 
recognition of all the indigenous peoples and consider ratifying ILO Convention No. 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. With the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous 
peoples and through prior consultation, the State party should include questions in the next 
census that allow the identification of such peoples, design and implement public policies to 
effectively achieve their rights, and take special measures to overcome the marginalization that 
they have experienced.” Togo, CCPR/C/TGO/CO/4, 11 March 2011, at para. 21: “The 
Committee observed “with concern that neither the existence of indigenous peoples in Togo 
nor their right to free, prior and informed consent is recognized (arts. 2 and 27),” and 
recommended that the State party should “ensure that indigenous peoples are able to exercise 
their right to free, prior and informed consent.” 
790 CERD, General Recommendation 23: Indigenous Peoples, 18th August 1997, Fifty-first 
session. 
791 Italics added. 
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ensure effective participation by indigenous communities in 
decisions affecting them, including those on their land rights, as 
required under article 5 (c) of the Convention, and draws the 
attention of the state party to general recommendation XXIII on 
indigenous peoples, which stresses the importance of securing the 
‘informed consent’ of indigenous communities.792  
 
In its 2006 landmark concluding observations concerning Canada, the 
Committee recommended that the state should “explore ways to hold 
transnational corporations accountable.”793 The statement marked the first time 
that a UN Treaty Monitoring Body declared a state responsible to monitor the 
activities of corporations regarding compliance with international human rights. 
This way the Committee emphasized the obligations of the state in relation to 
indigenous peoples and the international community.794 
 Recently, the Committee addressed the United States in its Concluding 
Observations Considering Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 9 of 
the Convention.795 The recommendations by the Committee underline the 
rights of indigenous peoples to FPIC and to participate in decisions affecting 
them.796 Furthermore, the Committee recommends that the UN Declaration on 
                                                        
792 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
United States of America, 14th August 2001, A/56/18,paras.380-407, CERD/C/59/Misc.17 
/Rev.3, 2001. 
793 CERD/C/CAN/CO/18, Paragraph 17, Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Seventy-second session, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties 
Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations, Canada, May 2007 
794 E/C.19/2008/CRP.12, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Seventh 
session, 18 April, 2008, page 19. 
795 CERD/C/USA/CO/6, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Seventy-second session, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 9 
of the Convention, Concluding Observations, United States of America, Advance Unedited 
Version, February 2008.  
796 Also see e.g.: Argentina: CERD/C/65/CO/1, August 2004, par. 18: “The Committee 
takes note that the Co-ordinating Council of Argentine Indigenous Peoples envisaged by Act 
No. 23,302 to represent indigenous peoples in the National Institute of Indigenous Affairs, has 
still not been established. The Committee recalls its General Recommendation 23 on the 
rights of indigenous peoples which calls upon State parties to ensure that no decisions directly 
relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent and urges the 
State party to ensure that the Council is established as soon as possible and that sufficient funds 
are allocated for the effective functioning of the Council and the Institute.” Bolivia: 
10/12/2003. CERD/C/63/CO/2, par. 13: “In this regard, the Committee draws the 
attention of the State party to its general recommendation XXIII which, inter alia, calls upon 
States parties to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, 
control and use their communal lands, territories and resources and, where they have been 
deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used 
without their free and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and territories.” 
Ecuador: 21/03/2003. CERD/C/62/CO/2, par. 16: The Committee therefore recommends 
that the prior informed consent of these communities be sought, and that the equitable sharing 
of benefits to be derived from such exploitation be ensured.” Laos, CERD/C/LAO/CO/15, 
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the Rights of Indigenous Peoples should be used as a guide to interpret the State 
Party’s obligations under the legally binding Convention. In the paragraphs on 
the Saramaka case, more recent reports of the CERD will be examined. 
 
                                                                                                                              
18 April 2005, para. 18: “It recommends to the State party that it study all possible alternatives 
with a view to avoiding displacement; that it ensure that the persons concerned are made fully 
aware of the reasons for and modalities of their displacement and of the measures taken for 
compensation and resettlement; that it endeavour to obtain the free and informed consent of 
the persons and groups concerned; and that it make remedies available to them.” India: 
CERD/C/IND/CO/19, 5 May 2007, para. 19: “The State party should seek the prior 
informed consent of communities affected by the construction of dams in the Northeast or 
similar projects on their traditional lands in any decision-making processes related to such 
projects and provide adequate compensation and alternative land and housing to those 
communities.” Ecuador: CERD/C/ECU/CO/19, 15 August 2008, para. 16: “The 
Committee urges the State party to enforce the Consultation and Participation Act fully in 
practice and that in light of its General Recommendation 23, section 4(d), consult the 
indigenous population concerned at each stage of the process and obtain their consent in 
advance of the implementation of projects for the extraction of natural resources.” Colombia: 
CERD/C/COL/CO/14, 28 August 2009: “ The Committee, while noting efforts of the 
State party to conduct consultations with affected communities, is nevertheless concerned that 
the right to prior consultations and consent is frequently violated in conjunction with 
megaprojects relating to infrastructure and natural resource exploitation, such as mining, oil 
exploration or monocultivation. The Committee recommends that the State party adopt and 
implement in a concerted manner legislation which regulates the rights to prior consultation in 
accordance with ILO Convention No. 169 and relevant recommendations of the CEACR of 
the ILO, in order to ensure that all prior consultations are undertaken in a manner which 
respects the free and informed consent of the affected communities. The Committee 
recommends that the State party seek technical advice from the OHCHR and the ILO for 
this purpose.” Cameroon, CERD/ C/CMR/CO/15-18, 30 March 2010: “The Committee 
recommends that the State party take urgent and adequate measures to protect and strengthen 
the rights of indigenous peoples to land. In particular, bearing in mind general 
recommendation No. 23 (1997) on the rights of indigenous peoples, the Committee 
recommends that the State party: (a) Establish in domestic legislation the right of indigenous 
peoples to own, use, develop and control their lands, territories and resources; (b) Consult the 
indigenous people concerned and cooperate with them through their own representative 
institutions, in order to obtain their free and informed consent, before approving any project 
that affects their lands, territories or other resources, in particular with regard to the 
development, use or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.” Guatemala, 
CERD/C/GTM/CO/12-13, 19 May 2010, para. 11: “The Committee reiterates its concern 
at the fact that the State party continues to allow indigenous peoples to be dispossessed of land 
that has historically belonged to them, even though title to the property in question has been 
duly recorded in the appropriate public registries, and that indigenous peoples’ right to be 
consulted prior to the exploitation of natural resources located in their territories is not fully 
respected in practice. The Committee is also concerned that the traditional form of land 
tenure and ownership is not recognized under the State party’s domestic laws and that the 
State party has not adopted the necessary administrative measures to guarantee this form of 
tenure (art. 5 (d) (v)).” Panama, CERD//C/PAN/CO/15-20, 19 May 2010: “The 
Committee expresses its serious concern at the lack of effective mechanisms for consultation 
with the indigenous peoples, and highlights in particular the need to obtain prior, informed 
and voluntary consent for development projects, resource exploitation and tourism affecting 
their way of life.”  
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IV.1.1.7 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
established under ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985, mandated 
with monitoring the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),797 has referred to a 
requirement of consent on behalf of indigenous peoples on several occasions.  
In 2004, the Committee expressed concern for Indigenous land and 
resource rights in Ecuador, stating that: “The Committee is deeply concerned 
that natural extracting concessions have been granted to international companies 
without the full consent of the concerned communities.”798 The Committee was 
also concerned about the negative health and environmental impacts of natural 
resource extracting companies’ activities “at the expense of the exercise of land 
and culture rights of the affected indigenous communities and the equilibrium of 
the ecosystem.”799  
In 2001, the Committee already noted in relation to Colombia that: “the 
traditional lands of indigenous peoples have been reduced or occupied, without 
their consent, by timber, mining and oil companies, at the expense of the exercise 
of their culture and the equilibrium of the ecosystem.”800 In paragraph 33, the 
Committee subsequently emphasized the requirement of priority, and urged 
Colombia to: “consult and seek the consent of the indigenous peoples prior to the 
implementation of timber, soil or mining projects and on any public policy affecting 
them, in accordance with ILO Convention No. 169.”801 The Committee 
reaffirmed the ILO’s vision on FPIC and even used stronger words to describe 
the need for indigenous peoples to give their consent in matters affecting them. 
In later concluding observations, the Committee explicitly referred to FPIC on 
numerous occasions.802  
                                                        
797 The Committee carries out the monitoring functions assigned to the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Part IV of the Covenant. Unlike the Human 
Rights Council, The Committee is not competent to consider individual complaints, although 
a draft Optional Protocol to the Covenant is currently under consideration which could give 
the Committee competence in this regard. 
798 Italics added. 
799 Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Ecuador. 07/06/2004, E/C.12/1/Add.100, paragraph 12. 
800 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Colombia. 30/11/2001, E/C.12/1/Add.74, paragraph 12. Italics added.  
801 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Colombia. 30/11/2001, E/C.12/1/Add.74, paragraph 33. Italics added. 
802 See e.g.: Mexico, Future E/C.12/CO/MEX/4, 17 May 2006, para. 28: “The Committee 
urges the State party to ensure that the indigenous and local communities affected by the La 
Parota Hydroelectric Dam Project or other large-scale projects on the lands and territories 
which they own or traditionally occupy or use are duly consulted, and that their prior 
informed consent is sought, in any decision-making processes related to these projects affecting 
their rights and interests under the Covenant, in line with ILO Convention No. 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples.” Philippines, E/C.12/PHL/CO/4, 1 December 2008, para. 6: 
“The Committee also notes with satisfaction the various legislative, administrative and policy 
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IV.1.1.8 Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
 
The 2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,803 approved by the 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights at its 
Fifty-fifth session, explicitly mention the principle of free, prior and informed 
consent for indigenous peoples and reaffirm the viewpoints of ILO Convention 
169 in the accompanying legal commentary. Paragraph 10(c) obliges 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and other business enterprises to respect:  
 
The principle of free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous 
peoples and communities to be affected by their development 
projects. Indigenous peoples and communities shall not be deprived 
of their own means of subsistence, nor shall they be removed from 
lands which they occupy in a manner inconsistent with Convention 
No. 169.804  
 
The former UN Centre for Transnational Corporations affirms this in a series of 
reports that examine the activities of multinational corporations in areas with 
indigenous populations.805 It was concluded in the 1994 closing report that: 
“TNCs’ performance was chiefly determined by the quantity and quality of 
indigenous peoples’ participation in decision-making, rather than by the identity or 
nationality of the TNCs.” Participation depended, in turn, on the extent to 
which the laws of the host country gave indigenous peoples the right to withhold 
consent to development, and on the degree to which indigenous communities 
                                                                                                                              
measures adopted by the State party to recognize, protect and promote the individual and 
collective rights of the indigenous peoples living in the territory of the State party, including ... 
(b) The Free and Prior Informed Consent Guidelines, adopted by the National Commission 
on Indigenous Peoples in 2002, which emphasise the right of indigenous peoples to participate 
in decisions affecting them.” Nicaragua, E/C.12/NIC/CO/4, 28 November 2008, para. 11:.” 
The Committee also regrets the many problems affecting indigenous peoples, including 
serious shortcomings in the health and education services; and the lack of an institutional 
presence in their territories; and the absence of a consultation process to seek communities’ 
free, prior and informed consent to the exploitation of natural resources in their territories. In 
this regard, the Committee notes that, more than six years after the Inter-American Court’s 
judgement in the Awas Tingni case, that community still does not have title to its property.” 
Colombia, E/C.12/COL/CO/5, 21 May 2010: “ The Committee is concerned that 
infrastructure, development and mining megaprojects are being carried out in the State party 
without the free, prior and informed consent of the affected indigenous and afro-colombian 
communities.” 
803 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2. 
804 Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2, 
Paragraph 10 (c). 
805 Motoc I A,'Standard Setting: Legal Commentary on the Concept of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent', UNPFII, 2005, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2005/WP.1, 14 July 2005.  
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themselves were fully informed and effectively organised.”806 The report thus leaves a 
certain discretionary power for the state to determine the scope of indigenous 
participation. Nevertheless, the report does not rule out the option that national 
legislation could, or should, entail the option of withholding consent in relation 
to TNCs and other enterprises’ activities.807 
 
IV.1.1.9 The Rotterdam Convention 
 
Although not directly related to indigenous peoples, the Rotterdam Convention 
on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade808 deserves a short reference.809 The 
Convention applies to banned or severely restricted chemicals and hazardous 
pesticides that may affect the environment and public health.810 The significance 
of the Convention lies in its legally binding Prior Informed Consent procedure 
(PIC), which is aimed at obtaining and disseminating decisions of importing 
countries as well as ensuring compliance by the exporting countries. The 
Rotterdam system offers an example of an operational formal consent 
procedure.811 FPIC in relation to the storage of hazardous substances is reflected 
in Article 29 of the UNDRIP. 
 
IV.1.1.10 The Policy of the European Union 
 
In December 2005, the European Council, Parliament and Commission 
adopted a Joint Statement on Development Policy called the “European 
                                                        
806 Report of the Centre on Transnational Corporations submitted pursuant to Sub-
Commission resolution 1990/26, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/40, 15 June 1994, paragraph 20, 
italics are mine. 
807 Noteworthy and highly relevant for the human rights responsibilities of companies are the 
2011 “Ruggie Principles” that will be dealt with briefly in Part IV: A/HRC/17/31, Report 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie. Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, 21 March 2011. 
808 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Rotterdam, 10 September 1998, entry into 
force: 24 February 2004. 
809 Article 29(2) of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has a similar 
aim. It reads: “States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of 
hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without 
their free, prior and informed consent.” Italics are mine. 
810 PFII/2004/WS.2/8, Parshuram Tamang, An Overview of the Principle of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples in International and Domestic Law and Practices, 
contribution to the Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, New York, 17-19 
January 2005, page 4. 
811 For the PIC procedure, see the text of the Convention, 
 http://www.pic.int/en/ConventionText/ONU-GB.pdf, in particular Articles 5 – 14 and 
Annex I, II, IV, V and VI. 
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Consensus on Development” committing the EU to “apply a strengthened 
approach to mainstreaming the following cross-cutting issues: the promotion of 
human rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance, children's rights 
and indigenous peoples, environmental sustainability, and combating 
HIV/AIDS.” 
These cross-cutting issues are seen as objectives in themselves and vital 
factors in strengthening the impact and sustainability of cooperation. According 
to the Statement, the key principle for indigenous peoples is “to ensure their full 
participation and the free and prior informed consent of the communities 
concerned.”812 
Moreover, indigenous peoples’ issues are a priority under the European 
Instrument for Development and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is aimed at 
providing support for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-
EU countries.813 The instrument provides a number of opportunities for specific 
action in the field of indigenous peoples protection. Projects that have been 
funded so far are aimed at supporting indigenous peoples and their 
representatives, international organizations, and at supporting civil society 
activities for promoting ILO Convention No. 169.814 
 
IV.1.1.11 The OAS Human Rights System 
 
The Inter-American Court and Commission are deeply involved in developing 
and explaining the notion of free, prior and informed consent and their 
judgments and decisions will therefore be examined in detail later on. A short 
introduction is provided here.  
As early as 1984, the Commission held that the “principle of consent” was 
the preponderant doctrine applicable to cases involving relocation of indigenous 
peoples.815 More recently, in a series of decisions concerning indigenous land 
rights,816 the Court and Commission emphasized the connection between a 
                                                        
812 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 
European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, (2006/C 46/01), The 
European Consensus on Development, para. 100, 101, 103. 
813 See: European Commission website at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm, consulted April 2014. 
814See: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/UNPFII%20European%20Commission%
20submission.pdf, consulted April 2014. 
815 Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of 
Miskito origin, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc.26. (1984), 120. 
816 Final decisions of the Commission are presented in the form of a Report, which includes 
the facts and conclusions of the Commission. If the case is not brought before the Court and 
no adequate measures have been taken by the responding State, the Commission may decide 
to publish the Report. The Commissions Reports are not formally legally binding, in contrast 
to the final decisions of the Court, which are presented as binding judgments, adopted by a 
majority of the seven judges. 
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collective property right to traditional lands, and a requirement of consent for 
intrusions thereon. In the ground breaking Awas-Tingni case,817 the Court 
developed its reasoning on communal or collective property rights of indigenous 
peoples over their lands and resources, in asserting a violation of human rights 
standards. In the Dann Report,818 the concept of “consent” was explained as 
denoting “consent on the part of the community as a whole” that requires at a 
minimum “the effective opportunity of every member to participate individually 
or as collectives.” These criteria again illustrate the two dimensions in which 
FPIC operates; internally within the indigenous collective itself, and externally 
between the indigenous collective entity (by means of representation) and the 
state (or any other agent charged with obtaining consent).819  
In the Belize Report,820 the communal property rights “doctrine” and the 
Dann criteria for consent were reaffirmed, and it was acknowledged that the 
interrelated concepts of property rights and self-determination are the 
foundations of the concept of FPIC. The most important and recent decision of 
the Court, dealing explicitly with FPIC and the UN Declaration, is the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname case.821 The Court determined that it is an 
obligation for the state to ensure the cultural survival of the Saramaka people, 
expanded its earlier doctrine and explicitly referred to the principle of free, prior 
and informed consent as enshrined in the UNDRIP. A set of safeguards for the 
implementation of an FPIC procedure was developed (requirements of effective 
participation, benefit-sharing, and prior environmental and social impact 
assessments), and the Court confirmed that “consultation” and “consent” are 
clearly different concepts, which nevertheless remain in need of further 
clarification.822 At least in relation to large-scale development projects that have a 
major impact on indigenous territories, effective participation requires - in 
addition to consultation - the free, prior and informed consent of the people(s) 
affected. A core criterion for such a process is that FPIC should be obtained in 
accordance with indigenous custom, practice and tradition.  
The Inter-American Human Rights and the cases and decisions of the Court 
and Commission will be explored in further detail later on in this study, since 
                                                        
817 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79. 
818 IACHR, Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Int-
Am. C.H.R., (2001), December 27, 2002. 
819 Recall the model that was sketched in the paragraphs on self-determination. 
820 IACHR, Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, 
Report No. 40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2004), October 12 2004.. 
821 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007). 
822 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 133. Also see: African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 




these form the most complete elaboration on participation rights and rights to 
lands and resources. 
 
IV.1.1.12 The Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
The Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is an 
important document in the context of the OAS.823 Like the UNDRIP the draft 
outlines those human rights that are specific to indigenous peoples. One of the 
major differences between the Draft American Declaration and the UN 
Declaration is that the former does not grant the right to self-determination to 
indigenous peoples. In Article I(c) it is stated that the term “peoples” as used in 
the American Draft “shall not be construed as having any implication with 
respect to any other rights that might be attached to that term in international 
law.” Nevertheless, although any right to self-determination is not awarded, the 
opening words of Article XV(1) defining the right to self-government are very 
similar to the general formulation of the right to self-determination:824 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social, spiritual and cultural 
development. 
   
Article XIII(7) contains the requirement of informed consent on behalf of the 
indigenous people concerned with regard to natural resource development 
projects. However, the requirement is only applicable in cases where the State 
has declared an indigenous territory as protected area. With regard to property 
rights and exclusive indigenous title, it is stated in Article XVIII(3) that 
indigenous property title may only be changed by mutual consent between the 
state and the indigenous peoples concerned. An additional requirement of “full 
knowledge and appreciation of the nature of or attributes of such property” 
appears to entail the condition that such consent has to be “informed.” 
 Paragraph 6 of the same Article XVIII poses the prerequisite of “free, 
genuine, public and informed consent” in relation to relocation or transfer of 
indigenous peoples from their lands. Nevertheless, this condition can be 
abandoned in exceptional and justified circumstances as to warrant the public 
interest. In relation to indigenous peoples’ right to development, Article XXI(2) 
includes the obligation for states to acquire indigenous peoples’ free and 
informed consent and participation regarding any plan, program, or proposal 
affecting their rights or living conditions. Once again the requirement can be 
disregarded in the case of “exceptional circumstances.”  
                                                        
823 Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, approved by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at its 1333rd session, 
95th regular session, OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6 (1997). 
824 This resemblance will only be noticed. A comparative examination of the concepts of self-
government and (internal) self-determination for Indigenous Peoples unfortunately falls 
outside the scope of this study. 
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Although the principle of FPIC appears to be inextricably linked to the right to 
self-determination in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples,825 the Proposed American Declaration does not explicitly refer to self-
determination, but rather to self-government. However, it does contain 
provisions entailing consent requirements for specific areas of indigenous 
peoples’ protection. The difference between self-determination and the self-
government norm expressed in the American Draft Declaration is unclear. 
 
IV.1.1.13 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The first time indigenous peoples’ representatives participated in a session of the 
African Commission was at the 29th session in Libya on April 2001. Since then, 
indigenous people have been participating actively in the sessions of the 
Commission, speaking in public sessions, lobbying their governments, and 
networking with human rights NGOs across Africa. Their input has been 
important for the promotion the protection of their rights, and several 
indigenous organizations have attained observer status with the African 
Commission. Moreover, they participate in the NGO Forum organized by The 
African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies prior to each of the 
sessions of the African Commission.826 
 In the Endorois decision,827 the Commission noted that Kenya had not 
obtained the free, prior and informed consent of all the Endorois before 
designating their land as a Game Reserve and commencing their eviction. The 
Commission repeatedly referred to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in its decision. The Saramaka People v. Suriname 
judgment was quoted extensively in the Commission’s argument. The 
Commission was of the opinion that in case of: “Any development or 
investment projects that would have a major impact within the Endorois 
territory, the State has a duty not only to consult with the community, but also 
to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and 
traditions.”828 The Endorois decision will be discussed at length later on. 
 
  
                                                        
825 For the connection between Self-Determination and the participatory provisions in the 
Declaration, FPIC in particular, See conclusions Part II. 
826 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Indigenous Peoples’ Participation in 
the ACHPR Sessions, www.iwgia.org/sw8772.asp, last visited 6th of June, 2009. 
827 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010.. 
828 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, para. 291. 
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IV.1.1.14 The World Bank System and the Extractive Industries Review  
 
In 2003, the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) called upon the World Bank 
Group to respect the principle of free, prior and informed consent, with regard to 
extractive industries affecting indigenous peoples. 829 The final report stated that 
free, prior and informed consent should be seen as the “principal determinant of 
whether there is a social license to operate.”830 According to the EIR, FPIC 
counts as an important tool in establishing support for extractive industry related 
activities. Nevertheless, the EIR also recognized that there are real issues that 
need to be resolved in order to make the instrument of FPIC more effective and 
clear.831 This clarification of the principle, according to the EIR, should be 
worked out in cooperation with international expert bodies.832 did not appear to 
regard FPIC as entailing a collective veto-right per se. Instead, FPIC should be 
seen as a process, “by which indigenous peoples, local communities, 
government, and companies may come to mutual agreements in a forum that 
gives affected communities enough leverage to negotiate conditions under 
which they may proceed and an outcome leaving the community clearly better 
off.”833 While recognizing that this consent-process should take different forms 
in different cultural settings, the EIR regards FPIC as always applicable in order 
to achieve inclusion of indigenous peoples in the decision-making processes.834 
In spite of the EIR recommendations, the World Bank does not require 
consent in relation to its policy on indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, in its new 
Operational Policy and Bank Procedures on Indigenous Peoples,835 the World 
Bank requires free, prior and informed consultation where indigenous peoples are 
affected. Paragraph 10 of OP 4.10 reads: 
 
(10.) Consultation and Participation. Where the project affects 
Indigenous Peoples, the borrower engages in free, prior, and 
informed consultation with them. To ensure such consultation, the 
                                                        
829 Striking a Better Balance, The World Bank Group and Extractive Industries. Final Report 
of the Extractive Industries Review, Vol. I, December 2003. 
830 Ibid., page 21. 
831 Ibid., page 21. 
832 Ibid., page 21. 
833 Ibid., page 50. 
834 In this context see also: E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2002/3, Report of the Workshop on 
Indigenous Peoples, Private Sector Natural Resource, Energy and Mining Companies and 
Human Rights, held in Geneva on 5-7 December 2001 in which the workshop 
recommendations stated that: “Consultation between Indigenous Peoples and the private 
sector should be guided by the principle of free, prior, informed consent of all parties 
concerned.” The wording “of all parties concerned” could indicate that FPIC should not be 
seen as a collective VETO-right for Indigenous Peoples, but more as a principle guiding 
effective participation and consultation processes. 
835 OP and BP 4.10 together replace OD 4.20, Indigenous Peoples, dated September 1991. 
These OP and BP apply to all investment projects for which a Project Concept Review takes 




(a) establishes an appropriate gender and intergenerationally inclusive 
framework that provides opportunities for consultation at each stage 
of project preparation and implementation among the borrower, the 
affected Indigenous Peoples’ communities, the Indigenous Peoples 
Organizations (IPOs) if any, and other local civil society 
organizations (CSOs) identified by the affected Indigenous Peoples’ 
communities;  
(b) uses consultation methods appropriate to the social and cultural 
values of the affected Indigenous Peoples’ communities and their 
local conditions and, in designing these methods, gives special 
attention to the concerns of Indigenous women, youth, and 
children and their access to development opportunities and benefits; 
and  
(c) provides the affected indigenous peoples’ communities with all 
relevant information about the project (including an assessment of 
potential adverse effects of the project on the affected Indigenous 
Peoples’ communities) in a culturally appropriate manner at each 
stage of project preparation and implementation. 836 
 
The Operational Policy does not recognize any consent requirement; thereby it 
seems to establish a different, weaker definition of FPIC, imposing no more than 
the obligation to consult indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, the Operational 
Policy requirement of free, prior and informed consultation is applicable at each 
stage of project preparation and implementation and in all situations where the 
project affects indigenous peoples. Furthermore, broad support from the 
indigenous community affected is required and the Bank does not proceed 
further with project processing if it is unable to ascertain that such support 
exists.837 
  Paragraph 2 of BP 4.10 further clarifies the Bank’s principle of free, prior and 
informed consultation: 
 
(2.) Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation. When a project affects 
Indigenous Peoples, the TT assists the borrower in carrying out free, 
prior, and informed consultation with affected communities about 
the proposed project throughout the project cycle, taking into 
consideration the following: 
 
(a) “free, prior and informed consultation” is consultation that 
occurs freely and voluntarily, without any external manipulation, 
                                                        
836 World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policies, OP 4.10, July 2005, Indigenous 
Peoples. 
837 World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policies, OP 4.10, July 2005, Indigenous 
Peoples, Paragraph 6, 10 and 11. Not proceeding without affirmation of support appears to 
entail some consensual elements. 
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interference, or coercion, for which the parties consulted have prior 
access to information on the intent and scope of the proposed 
project in a culturally appropriate manner, form, and language;  
(b) consultation approaches recognize existing Indigenous Peoples 
Organizations (IPOs), including councils of elders, headmen, and 
tribal leaders, and pay special attention to women, youth, and the 
elderly;  
(c) the consultation process starts early, since decision making 
among Indigenous Peoples may be an iterative process, and there is 
a need for adequate lead time to fully understand and incorporate 
concerns and recommendations of Indigenous Peoples into the 
project design; and  
(d) a record of the consultation process is maintained as part of the 
project files.838 
 
Paragraph 2(a) thus provides an elaboration on the principle where “free” refers 
to a process of consultation that takes place voluntary, without any external 
manipulation, interference, or coercion. The Bank’s policy is aimed at 
protecting indigenous communities from outside interference and emphasized 
that the structural framework for consultation is to be found within the 
indigenous traditional systems.  
 It seems that the World Bank did not consider the “consent” principle 
sufficiently clarified, or believed it was too strong, to enshrine it in its 
Operational Policy and Bank Procedure 4.10. Consultation appeared to be a 
safer route for indigenous participation in World Bank projects.839 Where the 
EIR acknowledges the need for FPIC as entailing “consent,” for the World 
Bank it subsequently appears to fail in clarifying this principle to an extend that it 
could function as a general effective instrument applicable in extractive industry 
activities affecting indigenous peoples. The principle is seen as guiding extractive 
industries and other private enterprise activities affecting indigenous peoples 
although its exact meaning still has to be determined. According to the EIR 
report, such clarification should be conducted in conjunction with expert organs 
on indigenous issues like the UNPFII.840 
 
IV.1.1.15 The International Finance Corporation: Performance Standard 7 
 
In its latest version of the Policy and Performance standards for indigenous 
peoples, the International Finance Corporation, part of the World Bank Group, 
refers to a number of activities that require FPIC. If the proposed activities (a) 
                                                        
838 World Bank Operational Manual, Bank Procedures, BP. 4.10, July 2005, Indigenous 
Peoples. 
839 E/C.19/2008/CRP.12, 18th of April, 2008, UNPFII 7th Session: According to the 
Indigenous Peoples understanding of FPIC, consent is clearly distinct from consultation. 
840 Striking a Better Balance, The World Bank Group and Extractive Industries, Final Report 
of the Extractive Industries Review, Vol. I, December 2003, page 50. 
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are to be located on or make commercial use of natural resources on lands 
subject to traditional ownership or under customary use by indigenous peoples; 
(b) require their relocation; or (c) have a possible impact on the cultural 
resources that are central to indigenous peoples' identity, obtaining FPIC is a 
necessary requirement.841  
 The IFC standards go further than the World Bank Policy, by requiring 
consent instead of consultation. FPIC processes are seen as expanding 
consultation and participation processes as they require agreement by the 
culturally appropriate decision-making body within the affected community of 
indigenous peoples. According to the new standard, consent does not necessarily 
require unanimity and may be achieved when individuals or sub-groups 
explicitly disagree.842  
 If companies do not respect FPIC, the IFC will not finance the project. 
However, the standard is not entirely clear on what the requirement exactly 
entails. Nevertheless, companies are using the Performance Standard as an 
important reference. 
 
IV.1.1.16 The Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes the importance of securing 
agreement or consent of indigenous peoples in relation to access to genetic 
resources (Article 15) and traditional knowledge.843 According to Article 8(j) 
each contracting party has to respect, preserve, and maintain knowledge, 
innovation, and practices of indigenous and local communities. Furthermore the 
parties should promote wider application with the approval and involvement of 
the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their utilization.844 FPIC is seen as 
an essential guarantee in this respect.845 In paragraph V.2.1 the CBD's “Akwé: 
Kon Voluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social 
impact assessments regarding developments proposed to take place on, or which 
are likely to impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally 
occupied or used by indigenous and local communities” will be discussed at 
length, since these guidelines entail a detailed model for conducting integrated 
impact assessments, which, as we shall see, are important elements of FPIC 
processes. 
                                                        
841 International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group, Performance Standard 7, Indigenous 
Peoples, 1 January 2012. 
842 International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group, Performance Standard 7, Indigenous 
Peoples, 1 January 2012. 
843 Convention on Biological Diversity, Concluded in Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992. 
844 Convention on Biological Diversity, Concluded in Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, Article 8(j). 
The text does mention that this provision is “subject to national legislation.” 
845 Perrault A and Oliva M J, ‘ICTSD/CIEL/IDDRI/IUCN/QUNO Dialogue on 
Disclosure Requirements: Incorporating the CBD Principles in the TRIPS Agreement On 
the Road to Hong Kong’, WTO Public Symposium, Geneva, April 21 2005. 
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IV.1.2 A Closer Look at the United Nations System of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Protection 
Within the UN system, three mechanisms - that were already mentioned - are 
mandated to work specifically on indigenous peoples' issues. These are: the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. The following paragraphs will briefly explain their characteristics and 
functioning. 
 
IV.1.2.1 The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
 
The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) is an 
advisory body to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), mandated to 
discuss a broad range of indigenous issues related to culture, environment, 
economic and social development, education, and human rights.846 
 Indigenous peoples and other experts involved in the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (WGIP) determined that there was a need for stronger 
and more effective indigenous participation in the United Nations system. For 
this reason, indigenous peoples and others proposed the establishment of a new 
body that would address global issues related to indigenous peoples and would 
facilitate a platform for genuine indigenous participation.847 
 ECOSOC resolution 2000/22 provided the mandate and established the 
Permanent Forum on July 28, 2000.848 According to paragraph 2 of the 
resolution, the Permanent Forum, in dealing with its mandated areas, shall: 
 
(a) Provide expert advice and recommendations on indigenous issues to 
the Council, as well as to programmes, funds and agencies of the 
United Nations, through the Council. 
(b) Raise awareness and promote the integration and coordination of 
activities relating to indigenous issues within the United Nations 
system. 
(c) Prepare and disseminate information on indigenous issues.849  
 
The UNPFII is comprised of sixteen independent experts of whom eight are 
government representatives and eight are representatives of indigenous 
organizations. They each serve a three-year term and may be reappointed for an 
additional period. The Forum holds annual two-week sessions at the UN 
                                                        
846 UNPFII Website, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/. Consulted 10th January 2009. 
847 UNPFII Website, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/about_us.html, consulted 
27th June 2008. 
848 Economic and Social Council Resolution 2000/22, Establishment of a Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues, 45th plenary meeting, 28 July 2000. 
849 Economic and Social Council Resolution 2000/22, Establishment of a Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues, 45th plenary meeting, 28 July 2000, Paragraph 2. 
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headquarters in New York, however, other locations for the sessions may be 
appointed by the Forum.  
 The Forum is the only place in the international arena where indigenous 
peoples are represented permanently and it facilitates their main international 
participatory process. The Permanent Forum is to be both the principal organ 
that facilitates indigenous peoples’ voices to be heard on a global level and the 
organ that monitors the implementation of the Declaration. According to Article 
42 the UNPFII is to “promote respect for and full application of the provisions 
of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness of this Declaration.” 850 The 
Forum provides a platform for constructive dialogue between indigenous 
peoples’ and state representatives and identifies the principal areas that require 
attention. It is a unique platform for indigenous peoples because they participate 
on a level of full equality with state representatives. 
 
IV.1.2.2 The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) is the 
second and newest UN body that deals with indigenous issues exclusively. The 
EMRIP was established by the Human Rights Council in 2007 and is a 
subsidiary body of the Council. 851The EMRIP is made up of five independent 
experts who are appointed by the Human Rights Council. In choosing the 
members, the Council takes into account geographical distribution, gender 
balance, and indigenous origin.852 During its annual sessions, representatives 
from states, indigenous peoples, civil society, IGO’s, and academia take part in 
the debate about the current issues. According to its mandate, the EMRIP 
studies specific pressing themes and presents them in the form of studies and 
research to the Council. The EMRIP may also suggest certain proposals for 
research to the Council.853 In 2009 the EMRIP completed its first study on the 
right to education. It has also produced studies on the role of languages and 
culture in the promotion and protection of the rights and identity of indigenous 
peoples, on best practices regarding possible appropriate measures and 
                                                        
850 Genugten W J M van et. al, The United Nations of the Future, Globalisation with a Human 
Face (KIT publishers, 2006), p. 67. Also see Article 42 of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall 
promote respect for and full application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the 
effectiveness of this Declaration. See: Report of the international expert group meeting on the 
role of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in the implementation of article 42 of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/C.19/2009/2, 4 
February 2009. 
851 Website of the Expert Mechanism: 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/ipeoples/emrip/pages/emripindex.aspx 
852 Website of the Expert Mechanism: 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/ipeoples/emrip/pages/emripindex.aspx 
853 Human Rights Council, Resolution 6/36. Expert mechanism on the rights of indigenous  
peoples, 17 December 2007. 
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implementation strategies in order to attain the goals of the UNDRIP and, most 
importantly, a number of studies on the right of indigenous peoples to 
participate in decision-making.854 These studies have been examined in detail in 
Part III. The expert mechanism’s studies focus on those areas in which the most 
pressing controversies or issues exist. 
 
IV.1.2.3 The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
In 2001, the Commission on Human Rights appointed Rodolfo Stavenhagen as 
the first Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. He was 
succeeded in 2008 by James Anaya.  
 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur can be found in Human Rights 
Council resolution 6/12, in which the Rapporteur is requested:  
 
To examine ways and means of overcoming existing obstacles to the 
full and effective protection of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, in conformity with his/her 
mandate, and to identify, exchange and promote best practices;  
 
To gather, request, receive and exchange information and 
communications from all relevant sources, including Governments, 
indigenous people and their communities and organizations, on 
alleged violations of their human rights and fundamental freedoms;  
 
To formulate recommendations and proposals on appropriate 
measures and activities to prevent and remedy violations of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people;  
 
To work in close cooperation, while avoiding unnecessary 
duplication, with other special procedures and subsidiary organs of 
the Human Rights Council, relevant United Nations bodies, the 
treaty bodies, and human rights regional organizations  
 
Apart from these activities, the Special Rapporteur is also requested to work in 
close cooperation with the UNPFII, and to participate in its annual sessions. 
Furthermore, the Rapporteur is held to promote the UNDRIP and to develop 
                                                        
854 A/HRC/15/35, Progress Report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision making, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 23 
August 2010. A/HRC/EMRIP/2011/2, Final study on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision-making, Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 26 May 2011. A/HRC/18/43, Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples on its fourth session (Geneva, 11-15 July 2011), 19 August 2011. 
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a cooperative dialogue with all relevant actors. He should also take into account 
the special situation of children and women.855 
 The Special Rapporteur is an important figure for indigenous peoples. James 
Anaya, the second Special Rapporteur, had an important role to play as a 
mediator in situations in which conflicts between indigenous peoples and other 
actors were escalating. Furthermore, his annual and country reports provided 
valuable insight into the most pressing issues today. Anaya solved disputes 
through fair and equal negotiations, and had a very practical outlook on conflict 
resolution. His statements and reports have been discussed throughout this study.  
 As we will see when discussing the aftermath of the Saramaka People v. 
Suriname Case, the Rapporteur’s task is a difficult one and he cannot always 
succeed in solving deep rooted differences between governments and indigenous 
representatives. The role of the Special Rapporteur is highly complex and he has 
to maneuver in tense, polarized conflict situations. His reports - country, 
thematic and annual - are influential and authoritative. Without a doubt, the 
Special Rapporteur has an important role to play in alleviating tensions and 
promoting indigenous rights.  
IV.1.3 Conclusion: the Widespread Diffusion of FPIC Requirements 
The preceding section indicated that FPIC requirements are present in a variety 
of different international developments and documents dealing with indigenous 
peoples. Participatory requirements - entailing consultation and consent, as 
much as possible in accordance with indigenous ways of decision-making - are 
becoming the standard in guiding relations between indigenous peoples and 
other actors.  
The UN Human Rights Mechanisms have all taken up FPIC as an 
important norm for the protection of indigenous communities and FPIC is 
becoming a standard reference in a wide variety of policy instruments of 
international organizations.  
Within the UN System, three mechanisms focus on the specific protection 
of indigenous peoples. The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues is a 
unique platform in which indigenous representatives can discuss their concerns 
on the international level on an equal level with state representatives. The 
Expert Mechanism, although still a rather new body, has provided detailed 
studies on a number of important and pressing issues. The UN Special 
Rapporteur, in exercising his broad mandate, has an important role to play in 
alleviating tensions in conflict situations between indigenous peoples and states. 
Nevertheless, the formal legal status of FPIC remains unclear: different 
interpretations exist about its scope and content. Therefore, the following 
paragraphs will examine a number of cases and decisions from (mainly) the 
                                                        
855 Human Rights Council Resolution 6/12. Human rights and indigenous peoples: mandate 
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, 28 September 2007. 
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Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights. It is in this OAS 
framework that the most elaborate explanation about land and resource rights 
and FPIC is developed. It is of particular importance to review existing case law 
on FPIC, since the Courts are held to apply and explain the concept in relation 
to existing cases. Later on in Part V of this study, a number of implementation 







Part V of this study will discuss the most important legal and semi-legal cases on 
indigenous peoples’ rights to land, resources and FPIC. Furthermore, a number of 
implementation models for FPIC that can be found in voluntary schemes for 
sustainable resource management will be examined and explained. In short, part V 
will discuss case law about, and implementation models for, FPIC. 
V.1 Case Law: Legal and Semi-Legal Decisions  
V.1.1 Introduction: Regional Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights and the 
Inter-American Human Rights System 
Where Part IV illustrated the diffusion of FPIC norms in international law and 
policy, this paragraph will continue providing the most comprehensive legal 
explanation of FPIC, seen in combination with indigenous rights to land and 
resources. It will focus primarily on the Inter-American Human Rights system of 
the Organization of American States, since this is the platform in which the most 
progressive jurisprudential developments have taken place over the last decade.  
 While other regional platforms have contributed to the development of 
indigenous rights, specific judgments on land and participation rights have not 
been issued. One important exception is the decision of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Endorois v. Kenya.856 However, since the 
African Commission relies heavily on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court, the case will be integrated in the last part of these paragraphs. 
 Within the system of the European Court of Human Rights no landmark case 
on indigenous peoples land and participation rights has been delivered as of yet, 
even though the Court has jurisdiction over a number of states with indigenous 
populations.857 
 Conversely, the human rights entities of the OAS have issued a number of 
decisions and judgments that aim to build a comprehensive system of indigenous 
land and participation rights, which is in line with existing international norms on 
indigenous rights. Furthermore, it is only within the Inter-American System, that 
                                                        
856 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010. 
857 Koivurova T, 'Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Regarding 
Indigenous Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects,' 18 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights 1, 2011. Koivurova mentions the Saami in Norway, Sweden, Russia and 





FPIC is explained and applied. Therefore, the documents of the Inter-American 
Court and Commission will form the key materials for these paragraphs. 
V.1.2 FPIC and Self-Determination in the Inter-American Human Rights 
System 
The most important legal exposition of a system of self-determination, land rights, 
and participation has taken place in the framework of the human rights entities of 
the Organization of American States (OAS). The last decade there have been a 
number of interrelated decisions by the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that clarify a number of 
questions concerning indigenous land and participation rights, and which are 
aimed at building a structural framework for the implementation of indigenous 
self-determination.858 The Inter-American Court and Commission create the most 
comprehensive system of land and resource rights for indigenous peoples and, as 
will be illustrated, effective participation and FPIC play a vital role in this system. 
 These paragraphs will discuss the most relevant of these decisions and 
judgments, leading up to the most important case with regard to FPIC, the case of 
the Saramaka People v. Suriname from 2007.859 This case will be explored in 
more detail for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is one of the more recent cases on 
indigenous land rights. Secondly, it is the first case in which FPIC is explicitly dealt 
with and it is the upshot to a more elaborate explanation of rights to consultation 
and consent. Thirdly, the Saramaka judgment reveals a number of issues that will 
have to be resolved in order to successfully implement FPIC processes, and finally, 
the Saramaka case is referred to by other regional and international human rights 
platforms frequently. Next, some cases and pending decisions in the aftermath of 
Saramaka people v Suriname will be explored, taking into account the difficult 
implementation process in “Saramaka” and the preceding decisions of the Court 
and Commission.  
As observed in the first paragraphs of Part IV of this study, elements and traces 
of the principle of free, prior and informed consent can be distinguished in a 
number of international legal and quasi-legal documents. In order to further 
examine the scope of the standard setting on FPIC, it is necessary to examine it in 
light of existing cases. The remainder of this study is dedicated to examining the 
practical implementation of FPIC and participatory norms and argues that the 
flexible approach advocated earlier offers the best chance of successfully 
implementing FPIC processes. Instead of seeing FPIC as a single moment of 
decision-making, or a “veto-right” for indigenous communities, a better view of 
FPIC is that it entails a process of negotiation and consultation with the aim or 
requirement of reaching an agreement; a substantially more flexible interpretation. 
                                                        
858 ‘the Commission or IACHR’ and ‘the Court or IACtHR’. 
859 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007). 
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However, there may be a number of situations in which full consent is a legal 
requirement.  
 There are a number of recent decisions within the framework of the Inter-
American Human Rights system that involve indigenous peoples’ rights to their 
lands and resources in which the Commission and Court have elaborated on the 
scope of FPIC and participatory structures.  
The first decision to be examined is the Awas Tingni case, which was judged 
before the Inter-American Court in August 2001.860 The Awas Tingni Judgment 
will be discussed at some length, because the Court explained its principled 
grounds for providing a system of protection for indigenous peoples’ livelihoods in 
this case. Subsequently, two important decisions by the Commission will be 
discussed. The first one concerns the Commission Report on the well-known case 
of the Western Shoshone Dann sisters, published in December 2002.861 The next 
decision deals with alleged land rights violations of Maya communities in Belize, 
dated October 2004.862 
Next, two of the Court’s judgments involving indigenous communities in 
Paraguay will be explored: the Sawhoyamaxa and Yakye Axa cases.863 The Moiwana 
community v. Suriname case will also be briefly explored.864 Although these cases 
involve a large number of legal issues of importance to indigenous peoples, the 
focus will be on land and property rights and its connection with participation and 
FPIC. 
 As mentioned, the most relevant case that will be assessed involves the 
November 2007 judgment of the Court in relation to the Saramaka people of 
Suriname.865 In the paragraphs on the aftermath of the Saramaka case, some very 
recent petitions and cases from Suriname and the wider OAS region will be 
analyzed briefly. Especially the June 2012 Sarayaku case is highly relevant for 
consultation and consent rights.866 While all cases deal with a number of important 
topics for indigenous peoples, when we will explore them in the context of the 
Inter-American System, the emphasis will be on those elements most relevant for 
our purposes.  
                                                        
860 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79. 
861 IACHR, Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Int-
Am. C.H.R., (2001), December 27, 2002. 
862 IACHR, Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, 
Report No. 40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2004), October 12 2004. 
863 IACtHR, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of March 29, 
2006, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C), No. 146.  IACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C 
No. 125. 
864 IACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124. 
865 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007). 
866 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245. 
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In brief, the paragraphs will illustrate that the Inter-American Human Rights 
System offers the most progressive and expansive legal model on how to ground 
and implement property rights-standards for indigenous communities. They offer 
a critical analysis of the case law of the Court and explore the advantages and 
drawbacks of the system in light of the substantive issues discussed in Part II and 
the participatory framework explained in Part III of this study. Before going into 
the substance of the cases and in order to make the content of these paragraphs 
understandable, a brief overview of the OAS human rights system and its 
preoccupation with indigenous rights is provided.  
 
V.1.2.1 The OAS and Human Rights 
 
The Organization of American States is a regional institution, created by states of 
the American continents. Formally established in 1948 at the Bogotá 
Conference, where the OAS Charter was signed on April 30, the OAS replaced 
the Pan American Union of 1910. Together with the Charter, the 21 
participants of the Conference also adopted the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man.867 Currently all 35 states of the Americas are 
members to the OAS and have ratified the Charter.  
The OAS policies address five general areas: first, it aims at strengthening 
democracy. Second, it promotes peace and stability in the region. Third, the 
organization aims at improving the rule of law. Fourth, the OAS aspires to 
strengthen the regional economy, and finally, the organization seeks to protect 
and promote human rights, especially regarding women’s rights, children’s rights 
and cultural rights.868  
The Charter of the Organization of American States869 established two main 
institutions designed specifically for protecting and promoting human rights in 
the Americas; the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.870  
The Commission is the oldest entity, established in 1959.871 Under Article 
106 of the Charter, the Commission promotes and observes the protection of 
human rights.872 The structure, competence, and procedure of the Commission 
are regulated in the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which was 
adopted in 1969 and entered into force in 1978. The Commission is composed 
                                                        
867 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by 
the Ninth International Conference of American States in 1948. 
868 http://www.hrea.org/index.php?base_id=150, The Human Rights Education Associates, 
consulted 16th of June 2008 
869 Charter of the Organization of American States, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 
December 13, 1951. 
870 http://www.hrea.org/index.php?base_id=150, The Human Rights Education Associates, 
consulted 16th of June 2008. 
871 Declaration at the 5th Meeting of Consultation, Santiago, Chile, August 12-18, 1959. Final 
Act, OAS Official Records, OEA/Ser. C/II.5, page 10-11. 
872 Charter of the Organization of American States, Chapter XV, Article 106, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. 
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of seven independent experts, all elected for a four year term by the General 
Assembly of the OAS.  
 Complaints (petitions) against a Member State have to be brought before the 
Commission first, which subsequently examines the admissibility, investigates 
the allegations, and tries to achieve friendly settlement of the dispute.873 If 
necessary, the Commission prepares a report on the case.874 An individual, group 
of individuals, or an NGO recognized in at least one OAS Member State may 
file a petition.875 Problems with admissibility of group claims, like in relation to 
the Human Rights Committee before “Lubicon Lake Band” are therefore 
overcome in the OAS process. 
The Commission can pursue the matter further and present a claim before 
the Inter-American Court if the state is a party to the American Convention and 
has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court conducts a new evaluation 
resulting in a binding judgment with possible, monetary and other, 
compensatory measures. The Court was established with the adoption of the 
American Convention of Human Rights876 and was formally inaugurated in 
1979 in San José, Costa Rica.877 The American Convention on Human Rights 
was concluded within the OAS framework and officially entered into force in 
1978.878 Final decisions of the Commission are presented in the form of a 
Report, which includes the facts and conclusions of the Commission, based on 
possible violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man.  
If the case is not brought before the Court and no adequate measures have 
been taken by the responding State, the Commission may decide to publish the 
Report. The Commission’s Reports are not formally legally binding, in contrast 
to the final decisions of the Court, which are presented as binding judgments, 
adopted by a majority of the seven judges.879 As will be illustrated in the 
paragraphs on the Saramaka case, the Court also has the possibility to monitor 
compliance with its judgments and clarify interpretation issues. 
 
  
                                                        
873 The friendly settlement procedure is not always that successful, for a discussion hereon, see: 
Anaya, 2004, pp. 258 -266. 
874 Sands P and Klein P, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (Fifth Edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2001), page 398. 
875 The criteria for an admissible petition are listed in Articles 44 through 47 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights and in the Commission’s Regulations. 
876 American Convention on Human Rights, Article 33. 
877 Sands P and Klein P, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (Fifth Edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2001), page 398. 
878 American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123, entered into force July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights 
in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992). 
879 Sands P and Klein P, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (Fifth Edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2001), page 400. 
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V.1.2.2 The OAS and Indigenous Peoples 
 
The protection of indigenous peoples is an area of special concern for the 
entities of the Inter-American Human Rights System. In 1972, the Commission 
stated that for historical reasons and for humanitarian and moral principles, states 
have a “sacred compromise to provide special protection for indigenous 
peoples.” Since the 1980s, the Inter-American Human Rights bodies have 
systematically paid attention to indigenous peoples’ protection through the case 
and report system.880 A Special Rapporteurship on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples was established in 1990 with the purpose to bring the vulnerable 
position of indigenous peoples in the Americas under attention.881  
The Commission expressed particular concern for the rights of indigenous 
peoples to their lands and resources, since the protection of these rights does not 
only imply the protection of an economic unit but is also aimed at shielding a 
community from outside interference with their cultural and social 
development, which is inextricably linked to their relationship with their lands. 
The Commission’s concern for indigenous peoples’ land and property rights is 
perhaps best illustrated in the 1993 report on the human rights situation of the 
Maya communities in Guatemala: 
 
From the standpoint of human rights, a small corn field deserves the 
same respect as the private property of a person that a bank account 
or a modern factory receives. 882 
 
Regarding the right to property, the Inter-American Court and Commission 
have established considerable jurisprudence on indigenous land and resource 
rights.883 Apart from providing integrated argument on the position of 
indigenous peoples in international law, the Court and Commission present 
substantial information on the implementation of land rights and related norms 
                                                        
880 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2007, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130,Doc. 22, rev. 1, 29 December 2007, (Original: Spanish), point 56. 
881 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2007, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130,Doc. 22, rev. 1, 29 December 2007, (Original: Spanish), point 55. 
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their Human Rights, (Original: Spanish). 
883 See, IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement 
of August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79. Also see,  IACtHR, Case of the 
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11.140, Report No. 75/02, Int-Am. C.H.R., (2001), December 27, 2002. Also see: IACHR, 
Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Report No. 
40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2004), October 12 2004.  
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of participation, consultation, and consent. Moreover, the Court’s methods of 
awarding reparations to indigenous peoples - as collectives - have been highly 
acclaimed and might provide a model that has wider application than in the 
OAS area alone.884 Examination of the relevant documents from the Court and 
Commission not only provided information on the legal status of FPIC, but also 
on how it could make real impact on the situation of indigenous groups, and 
what issues arise in relation to its implementation. But first, some words will be 
devoted to explaining the role of the judge in the development legal norms, 
since this is the central theme in the following paragraphs. 
 
Purposive Interpretive Technique in the Inter-American Human Rights System 
 
The Inter-American Court develops progressive interpretations of human rights 
in its cases on indigenous peoples. Therefore, it is important to first explore in 
what way judges and Court can interpret legal instruments and consequently get 
involved in law making. 
When judges engage in law making, they inherently engage in interpretive 
exercise. Interpreting is not just ascribing meaning to a set of words but also 
concerns an act of persuasion; convincing a particular audience that a particular 
interpretation is the most appropriate meaning to adopt.885 Therefore, it is 
essential that interpretive exercises by Courts are well reasoned and argued. 
Judicial interpretation of human rights treaties is necessary since the meaning of 
human rights provisions is often not clear from the outset.886 In order to serve 
the object and purpose of a human rights treaty, which basically boils down to 
“making human rights provisions effective,” Courts will have to interpret, 
explain, and apply the treaty’s provisions in the context of specific situations. 
 There are of course many ways in which a judge can engage in 
interpretation and different goals that interpretation can pursue. For instance, 
Torben Spaak distinguished between four main interpretive arguments.887 Judges 
can exercise textual interpretation, which serves the predictability of legal texts, 
they can systemically interpret laws, thereby promoting coherence and 
consistency. They can employ a strict intentionalist interpretative method - or 
what former Israeli Supreme Court President Aharon Barak called subjective 
interpretation - and in doing so serve the democratic underpinnings of a legal 
system, since laws give expression to the will of the legislator and consequently 
                                                        
884 Lenzerini F (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples, International and Comparative Perspectives 
(OUP, 2008). Also see: Rombouts S J and Contreras-Garduño D, ‘Collective Reparations for 
Indigenous Communities before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, Merkourios, 
Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, Volume 27/Issue 72, 2010, pp. 04-17. 
885 Tobin J, 'Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty 
Interpretation', 23 Harv Hum Rts J 1, 2010, p. 4.  
886 Killander M, ‘Interpreting Regional Human Rights Treaties’, SUR - International Journal 
on Human Rights, v. 7, n. 13, dec. 2010, p. 145. 
887 See: Spaak T, ‘Legal Positivism and the Objectivity of Law’, research paper for the Swedish 
Research Council, Uppsala University, 2003. 
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the people in ideal democratic theory. Finally, the judge can make use of 
teleological interpretation, which means that the judge regards the statute as a 
means to an end. Such interpretation appeals to our sense of rationality, since we 
intuitively concede that laws should be effective.  
A particular theory on such teleological interpretation (a term better known 
in civil law than in common law countries) can be found in Aharon Barak’s 
preferred method of interpretation, which will be briefly examined in this 
paragraph since it bears resemblances to the IACtHR’s method of evolutionary 
interpretation. 
However, the baseline for treaty interpretation in international law can be 
found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).888 The VCLT 
contains three articles on treaty interpretation, which are now widely used and 
cited by international and regional courts and scholars as tools of interpretation. 
In Article 31 of VCLT the “general rule of interpretation” is provided. In 
Article 32 the “supplementary means of interpretation” is described; and in 
Article 33 the rules in the case a treaty is authenticated in multiple languages are 
laid down. While only states have ratified the VCLT, it is recognized as 
reflecting customary international law and is also applicable to international 
human rights monitoring bodies.889  
In Article 31 it is provided that a treaty “shall be interpreted in good faith and 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” It is often not possible to 
determine the ordinary meaning of a text without considering its context, and 
regional human rights bodies have emphasized the importance of the broader 
context in interpreting human rights provisions. 
Therefore, in Article 31(3) it is explained that, in addition to the context, in 
interpreting treaties one should take into account: “any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation” and “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.” Norms, or emerging norms, of 
customary international law and existing international law are thus taken into 
account to interpret treaties. The Inter-American Court has taken the position 
that it is not necessary that the relevant State has ratified the treaty that is used to 
aid in interpretation.890 
In Article 32 of the VCLT it is provided that supplementary means of 
interpretation may be used to confirm the meaning that resulted from the 
application of Article 31. Such supplementary means, like travaux préparatoires or 
the circumstances under which a treaty was concluded, may be invoked when 
interpretation according to Article 31 leaves the meaning of the provision(s) 
                                                        
888 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. 
Entered into force on 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. 
889 Killander M, ‘Interpreting Regional Human Rights Treaties’, SUR - International Journal 
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ambiguous or obscure, or leads to results that are manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.891 
The Inter-American Court has elaborated upon its system of interpretation 
and the relation with the VCLT on various occasions but perhaps most clearly in 
the Mapiripán Massacre case: 
 
The Court has pointed out, as the European Court of Human 
Rights has too, that human rights treaties are live instruments, 
whose interpretation must go hand in hand with evolving times and 
current living conditions. This evolutive interpretation is consistent 
with the general rules of interpretation set forth in Article 29 of the 
American Convention, as well those set forth in the Vienna 
Convention on Treaty Law. In this regard, when interpreting the 
Convention it is always necessary to choose the alternative that is 
most favorable to protection of the rights enshrined in said treaty, 
based on the principle of the rule most favorable to the human 
being.892 
 
The Court thus perceives human rights treaties as “living instruments” and 
therefore an evolutionary approach towards interpretations is needed. 
Originalism, in other words the real - original - intent of the contracting parties, 
plays a limited role in interpreting human rights treaties. Moreover, the Court 
explained that it is the “pro homine principle” that should be guiding 
interpretation; the alternative most favorable to the protection of the involved 
rights is to prevail. In its case law on indigenous peoples, the Court relied on this 
system of evolutionary interpretation. Therefore it is useful to examine this 
concept in a bit more detail. Aharon Barak’s system of purposive interpretation 
appeals in this respect and will be discussed to clarify the way in which 
interpretative techniques are to be applied. 
Barak proposed a system of purposive interpretation. According to this 
method, it is not possible to know how to interpret the law unless the goal of 
such interpretive exercise is explicit. The goal of interpretation in general is to 
achieve the purpose of the law or a particular legal text. Of course, law has a 
purpose; it is a social device. The goal of interpretation is to achieve the social 
goal a particular law and the legal system as a whole perceive.893  
In general Barak’s conception of interpretation concerns “rational activity 
giving meaning to a legal text,” and that should be perceived as both the 
principal and the most important tool a court possesses.894 Interpretation 
concerns a process where the legal meaning of a text is extracted from its 
                                                        
891 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. 
Entered into force on 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, Article 32. 
892  IACtHR, Case of the "Mapiripán Massacre" v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, par. 106. 
893 Barak A, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005), p. xv. 
894 Barak A, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 122. (Barak, 2006) 
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semantic meaning. In interpreting a legal text, the interpreter thus transforms 
static law into dynamic law.895 In the following paragraph, when discussing the 
Awas Tingni case and later decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, it will be illustrated that this is exactly what the Court engages in.  
Barak sought to answer the question which method of interpretation is the 
most feasible, while he acknowledged that there is indeed a variety of different 
methods of interpretation, as was noted at the outset of this paragraph. What is 
common to these interpretive systems is that they bear on the relation between 
the words and the spirit of the law and adopt a position on the relationship 
between the real and hypothetical intent of the legislator.896  
Barak proposed, as the preferred method, a theory on purposive 
interpretation. Accordingly, the aim of interpretation in law is to realize the 
purpose of the law. The underlying idea is that law is a tool specifically designed 
to realize a social purpose.897 One should therefore interpret a particular legal 
text in the context of society and of the legal systems and underlying values as a 
whole. According to Barak, purposive interpretation is the most proper method 
for achieving these goals.  
The theory of purposive interpretation Barak proposed arguably provides for 
a comprehensive theory and clarifies whether purposive interpretation should be 
regarded as subjective, objective, or a blend of the two.898 He stated that 
“purpose” is a normative concept that entails both a subjective element - the real 
intent of the author - and an objective component - the hypothetical intent that 
a reasonable author would want to realize through the given legal text.899 At a 
high level of abstraction such objective purpose aims to serve the fundamental 
values that are implicit in a given legal system. The true purpose of a legal text 
therefore is determined by the relationship between the various objective and 
subjective elements.900 
The proper relation between these objective and subjective elements is 
determined by the particular text that is under consideration. Barak provided - as 
an example - that one should interpret a constitution in light of what its 
meaning is today, and not for instance what it was in the 19th century.901 This 
way the objective purpose is of greater value. The legal text should be accorded 
a modern meaning and not be frozen in time. In this light, Manfred Lachs has 
noted similarly that: “In law we must beware of petrifying the rules of yesterday 
and thereby halting progress in the name of process. If one consolidates the past 
and calls it law he may find himself outlawing the future.”902 
                                                        
895 Barak, 2006, p. 123. 
896 Barak, 2006, p. 123. 
897 Barak, 2006, p. 124. 
898 Barak, 2006, p.125. 
899 Barak, 2006, p. 126. 
900 Barak, 2006, p. 126. 
901 Similar to the “living instrument doctrine” of the IACtHR, discussed above. 
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However, this is not to be understood as a plea for “judicial activism,” which 
sometimes has some negative connotations. In interpreting legal texts, the judge 
should take into account the normative umbrella of fundamental principles that 
underlie the legal system as a whole. These are of course not the judge’s own 
personal values, but should be reflective of the social consensus that underpins 
the legal system.903 As such, Barak regarded the judge as a partner to the authors 
of the text; the authors formulate a will that they wish to realize and the judge 
locates this will within the larger picture of the text’s role in contemporary 
society. The judge thus must strike a balance between the authorial intent and 
the fundamental values of the legal system (or systems) under scrutiny.904 
Every statute has a particular purpose and, as mentioned, this purpose (or 
ratio legis) comprises both subjective and objective elements. The subjective 
purpose that has to be taken into account in interpretive exercise by courts 
reflects the actual intention of the “legislator” or author of a text. This subjective 
element consists therefore of the real policies that the authors wanted to 
actualize.905 Such subjective purpose is revealed through scrutinizing all relevant 
credible and available sources. 
Focusing only on the subjective purpose of a text inherently entails the 
danger that it is not regarded as a living instrument in a changing environment. 
Rather, it “freezes” a meaning at the moment of enactment without being 
reflexive of current societal needs and problems. Therefore, in addition to 
subjective purpose, the aim of the judge is also to depict the objective purpose of a 
legal text. This objective purpose consists of the interests, values, objectives, 
policies, and functions that the law should realize in a democratic system.906 It 
therefore does not necessarily reflect the authors’ subjective (i.e. real) intent. 
Barak stated that at a low level of abstraction, such objective purpose reflects the 
intent of a reasonable legislator. At a higher level, it concerns the purpose that 
should be attributed to that particular text and at the highest level of abstraction, 
objective purpose should be aimed at the realization of the fundamental values of 
liberal democracy.907  
The judge can learn such objective purpose by looking at the language of a 
text, by examining the subject regulated by it, and by scrutinizing the nature of 
the arrangement.908 Furthermore, consistent with the VCLT, the interpreter can 
reveal the objective purpose by investigating closely related statutes.909 It will be 
shown that the Inter-American Court does not only take into account the 
American Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) but also looks at the 
broader body of international law dealing with human rights, and indigenous 
peoples’ rights in particular. As such the IACtHR also advances forms of 
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systemic interpretation, perceiving the Convention in light of existing 
international law and aiming at building a coherent and consistent system. 
Furthermore, the judge should look at the historical and social development of 
the legal text. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the judge should take into 
account, as said before, the fundamental principles of the legal system, which 
constitute the very spirit of the text. 
Barak’s scheme of purposive interpretation is focused on subjective and 
objective elements, but the objective purpose that can be attributed to a legal 
text is seen as more important, since law is a dynamic notion that should be 
reflexive of society on an ongoing basis. In his arguably correct view, “the 
statute is always wiser than the legislator” and by purposively interpreting a legal 
text, the judge gives it a dynamic meaning and subsequently bridges the gap 
between law and society.910 
In the next paragraphs it will be illustrated that the Inter-American Court 
adheres to such a perception on legal interpretation by understanding the 
Convention in light of contemporary needs of indigenous communities 
throughout the Americas. The Court engages in an exercise of judicial law 
making in purposively interpreting the Convention to include a communal 
property rights and related rights for indigenous peoples, taking into account the 
underlying values of the legal order (the spirit of the Convention).  
In applying what the Court terms a “evolutionary and universalistic 
approach” it focuses on the objective purpose of the Convention and takes into 
account the broader body of international human rights law that pertains to the 
protection of indigenous peoples. The key judgments and decisions will be 
discussed below.  
 
V.1.2.3 Self-determination, Land Rights and Participation in the Inter-American 
System 
 
V.1.2.3.1 Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua 
 
The milestone decision dealing with indigenous peoples’ rights to land and 
resources is the case of the Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua.911 In its 
judgment of August 2001, the Inter-American Court held that the international 
human right to hold property includes the right of indigenous peoples to the 
protection of their customary land and resource tenure.912  
In the opinion of the Court, the State of Nicaragua violated the property 
rights of the Awas Tingni Community by granting logging concessions to the 
community’s territory to a foreign company and by failing to provide effective 
                                                        
910 Barak, 2006, p. 142. 
911 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79. 
912 Anaya S J and Grossman C, ‘The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the 
International Law of Indigenous Peoples’, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 19, 2002, page 1. 
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protection and recognition of the community’s customary land tenure.913 The 
community members found out about these logging concessions only when 
they discovered loggers already working on their territories. When the Mayagna 
Indians of Awas Tingni petitioned the Commission in 1995, problems were 
exposed that continued to persist for the Mayagna, Miskito, and other 
indigenous peoples in the coastal region, even though Nicaragua formally 
recognized indigenous peoples’ land tenure in its Constitution and laws.914  
The Nicaraguan government de facto continued to regard the indigenous 
lands as state-owned, which justified granting the logging concessions. While the 
State agreed to a friendly settlement, as suggested by the Commission, no 
progress was made and after two years the Commission made a determination of 
state responsibility and submitted its confidential report to the government. 
Nicaragua subsequently failed to indicate its willingness to implement the 
Commission’s recommendations regarding securing the Awas Tingni traditional 
lands,915 and the Commission submitted the case to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in June of 1998.916   
In its final ruling of 31 August 2001, the Court reaffirmed that indigenous 
peoples have rights to their traditionally used and occupied territories, and that 
these rights arise autonomously under international law.917 The Court assessed 
that Nicaragua had violated the Convention by failing to make the land and 
resource rights that were already recognized in Nicaraguan law effective.  
The state’s failure in effectively responding to the Awas Tingni community’s 
request for the titling of their lands in combination with the inadequate action 
on behalf of the Nicaraguan courts to timely provide for a legal answer, led to a 
violation of Article 25 of the Convention, which is the right to judicial 
protection.918 The Court acknowledged that the implementation of domestic 
legal protections for indigenous peoples is an obligation arising under the 
American Convention on Human Rights and that states may suffer international 
responsibility if they fail to effectuate these rights.919  
The novelty and most important part of the Court’s decision lies in the 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to property and the subsequent 
                                                        
913 Anaya S J and Grossman C, ‘The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the 
International Law of Indigenous Peoples’, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 19, 2002, page 2. 
914 Anaya, 2004, page 267. 
915 Anaya, 2004, page 267. 
916 S Anaya S J and Grossman C, ‘The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the 
International Law of Indigenous Peoples’, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 19, 2002, page 3. 
917 Page A, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System’, Sustainable Development, Law and Policy 16, 2004, 2004, page 16. 
918 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79, paragraph 173. 
919 Anaya S J and Grossman C, ‘The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the 
International Law of Indigenous Peoples’, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 19, 2002, page 12. 
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violation thereof by the state. Most significantly, the Court held that the concept 
of property under Article 21 of the Convention, for indigenous peoples means a 
communal property-right.  
 
Article 21: Right to Property  
 
Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. 
The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of 
society.  
No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of 
just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and 
in the cases and according to the forms established by law.  
Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be 
prohibited by law.920  
 
Although a grammatical interpretation of the provision suggests an individualistic 
scope, the Court’s interpretation of the American Convention on Human 
Rights constructs the right to property in such a way that the right of an 
indigenous community to govern itself and to collectively hold lands are 
protected as well.  
The Court stated that: “Among indigenous peoples there is a 
communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collective property of 
the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not centered on an individual 
but rather on the group and its community.”921 This form of collective property 
is strikingly different from the “Western” legal notion of private property as:  
 
The close ties of indigenous people with the land must be 
recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their 
cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity and their economic 
survival. For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not 
merely a matter of possession and production but a material and 
spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their 
cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.922  
 




                                                        
920 American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123, entered into force July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights 
in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992). Emphasis added. 
921 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79, paragraph 149. 
922 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79, paragraph 149. 
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It is essential to know and understand the deeply spiritual special 
relationship between indigenous peoples and their land as basic to 
their existence as such and to all their beliefs, customs, traditions, 
and culture. For such people, the land is not merely a possession and 
a means of production. The entire relationship between the spiritual 
life of indigenous peoples and Mother Earth, and their land, has a 
great many deep-seated implications. Their land is not a commodity 
which can be acquired, but a material element to be enjoyed 
freely.923 
 
Cultural and spiritual ties thus played a major role in the Court’s decision. Judges 
Cançado-Trinade, Gómez, and Burelli also underline this in their separate 
opinion in which they stress the importance of the intertemporal dimension of the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and their lands. They stated that:  
 
Without the effective use and enjoyment of these latter (their lands), 
they would be deprived of practicing, conserving and revitalizing 
their cultural habits, which give a meaning to their own existence, 
both individual and communitarian. The feeling which can be 
inferred is in the sense that, just as the land they occupy belongs to 
them, they in turn belong to their land. They thus have the right to 
preserve their past and current cultural manifestations, and the 
power to develop them in the future.924 
 
In establishing this progressive reasoning on communal property, the Court 
looked into recent developments in international law and stated that such 
international legal conceptions have an “autonomous meaning, for which reason 
they cannot be made equivalent to the meaning given to them in domestic 
law.”925 Apparently, the Court assumed the emergence of elements of new 
international customary norms.926 The Court inquired into the core values of 
the American Convention’s property provisions in association with 
contemporary developments in international law and interpreted the right to 
property as also entailing indigenous peoples’ collective rights to their lands.927  
                                                        
923 Martinés Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21 
/Add.8, page 26, at 197. 
924 Joint Separate Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado Trinande, M. Pacheco Gómez and A. 
Abreu Burelli to the Awas Tingni Case, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 19, 2002, page 455. 
925 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79, paragraph 146. 
926 Eide A, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Achievements in International Law during the Last 
Quarter of a Century’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 163, 2006, page 174. 
927 Anaya S J, ‘Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Land 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend’, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005, page 253. 
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The Court used an “evolutionary” method of interpretation,928 taking into 
account modern conceptions of indigenous property rights and the special 
relation indigenous peoples have with their lands and territories.929 The Court 
applied this evolutionary approach or purposive interpretive method from a 
pragmatic point of view, instead of engaging in a more formalistic interpretive 
exercise.930 
For the first time, the Court referred to a violation of human rights 
principles, as set forth in the American Convention, from the standpoint of 
collective property rights of indigenous peoples as subjects of international 
law.931  
The Court assessed that although the Nicaraguan Constitution formally 
recognized such a communal property right, the government had subsequently 
failed in effectively delimiting and demarcating the limits of the indigenous 
territory.932 This is a very important aspect of the Courts decision, since these are 
very practical requirements - and obligations for the state - for upholding land 
rights. The Court found that in order to fulfill its obligations under the 
Convention, Nicaragua was required to: “Carry out the delimitation, demarcation 
and titling of the corresponding lands of the members of the Awas Tingni 
Community, within a maximum term of 15 months, with full participation by the 
Community and taking into account its customary law, values, customs and mores.”933 
Demarcation of the land could only proceed with the participation of the 
community and in accordance with its customary law, which implicitly underlines 
the importance of the principle of self-determination. 
 Although FPIC was not yet explicitly used in this case, the Court held that 
the community’s right to its own property prevents the national government 
from unilaterally exploiting community natural resources.934  
                                                        
928 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79, paragraph 148. 
929 S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Land 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005, page 253. 
930 Cf. Anaya S J, ‘Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and 
Land Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend’, Colorado Journal 
of International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005, p 258. UN Special Rapporteur 
James Anaya remarks that: “Formalist and backward-looking postmodern critical approaches largely 
overlook the evolution in values and power relationships at the expense of genuine problem solving that 
could be achieved on the basis of cross-cultural understanding.” Cf. A. Barak, Purposive Interpretation in 
Law, Princeton University Press, 2005. A. Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
931 Alvarado L J, ‘Prospects and Challenges in the Implementation of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Human Rights in International Law: Lessons from the Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua’, 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 24, 2007, page 612.  
932 IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 
August 31, 2001, Int.-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79, paragraph 153. 
933 Ibid., paragraph 164. Emphasis added. 
934 Page A, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System’, Sustainable Development, Law and Policy 16, 2004, page 16. 
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Such a notion of “veiled” territoriality through the concept of communal land 
rights is essential for the protection of indigenous peoples and the 
implementation of participatory standards. In the Court’s interpretation of the 
American Convention on Human Rights the right to property is constructed in 
such a way that the rights of an indigenous community to govern itself and to 
collectively hold lands are protected as well.  
In the Awas Tingni judgment the importance of the notions of self-
determination and collective rights for indigenous peoples is implicit. 
Furthermore the Court developed the criterion that the form of the 
participatory process as possibly entailing consent requirements should be 
determined by considering and respecting the indigenous practices and 
customs.935  
  The following cases all use the Awas Tingni decision as an important 
precedent. The notion of communal property seen together with its cultural 
value and the relevance of international human rights instruments as developed 
by the Inter-American Court in the Awas Tingni case created a stepping stone 
for indigenous groups to claim control over their lands and resources. In their 
subsequent decisions the Inter-American human rights entities aimed at 
developing a structure for the implementation of land rights regimes. Although 
FPIC is not explicitly mentioned in the Awas Tingni decision, it is the 
foundation from which the development of the Inter-American opinion on 
FPIC departs.  
The model based on Article 21 of the American Convention requires the 
delimitation, demarcation, and titling of indigenous lands with full participation of the 
community involved and taking into account its customary law and decision-making 
systems.  
 
V.1.2.3.2 Decisions from the Commission: The Dann Sisters and Maya Communities in 
Belize 
 
While the Court’s judgments are legally binding, the decisions of the 
Commission have quite some force and authority as well. The Commission has 
been proactive in explaining and developing the Awas Tingni system. Two 
important decisions in which the Commission explains how FPIC fits into this 
system will be debated.936 The first one, from 2002, is about the two sisters Mary 
and Carrie Dann, of the Western Shoshone Band in the US and their struggle to 
gain control over their ancestral lands.  
                                                        
935 Page A, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System’, Sustainable Development, Law and Policy 16, 2004, page 17. 
936 Another interesting case is that of the Hul’Qumi’Num Treaty Group v Canada, it was 
declared admissible by the Commission in 2009, but no decision on the merits has been taken. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report 105/09, Petition 592-07, 
Admissibility, Hul’Qumi’Num Treaty Group v Canada, October 30, 2009. This case will also 
deal with property rights and consultation rights. 
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The second decision, in which the Commission explored the meaning of FPIC 
in relation to indigenous land rights, is one from Belize. A number of Maya 
communities claimed that the State provided concessions for oil drilling on their 
lands without their consent. The Commission published its decision in 2004. 
 
Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States  
 
In 1993 the Dann sisters, leaders of a Western Shoshone band, petitioned the 
Inter-American Commission after decades of struggle in and out of courts in the 
United States to gain control over their lands.937 As in the Awas Tingni case, a 
process of friendly settlement was not effective. After issuing its decision that the 
case was admissible, the US ignored the Commission’s request for information 
for over a year and rejected the proposal for a friendly settlement process.938 The 
United States continued to deny the Dann band and other Western Shoshone 
people access to their lands and it was not until the Commission communicated 
a confidential report to the State that the US Government responded on the 
merits of the dispute.939 In its written response, the US implicitly acknowledged 
to be a subject to international human rights obligations but subsequently 
disagreed with the commissions interpretations940 and rejected the Commission’s 
findings in its entirety.941  
The Western Shoshone or “Newe” people occupied a large part of the 
American west before the European conquest and colonization. The society had 
a decentralized structure, with small communities that came together 
periodically to make decisions for the greater community.942 In 1863 the Federal 
Government signed a treaty with the Western Shoshone people, which affirmed 
their land rights.943 In practice, however, the infringements on their territories 
continued to persist. In 1946, pressured by the declining health and welfare 
within the Indian communities, the US decided to set up an Indian Claims 
Commission (ICC), in order to provide financial relief for the indigenous 
communities whose lands where taken. 
                                                        
937 The sisters’ struggle for Western Shoshone land rights has been going on for over forty 
years, there appears to be no short-term solution to the conflict since the U.S. does not 
recognise the Commissions’ decision. Mary Dann deceased april 23th 2005, her passing was 
caused by an accident working on her ranch. The Western Shoshone bands reside in Idaho, 
California, Nevada and Utah. 
938 Anaya, 2004, page 263. 
939 Anaya, 2004, page 264. 
940 On the grounds for rejecting the Commission’s findings see: Mary and Carrie Dann v. 
United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2001), December 27 
2002, paragraph 150. 
941 IACHR, Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Int-
Am. C.H.R., (2001), December 27, 2002, paragraph 148. 
942 Page A, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System’, Sustainable Development, Law and Policy 16, 2004, page 17. 
943 Known as: “The Treaty of Ruby Valley”. 
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Unfortunately, this led to the practice that the ICC could declare Indigenous 
land titles extinguished in order to provide financial relief alone. In 1977 after a 
doubtful procedure,944 the ICC decided that Western Shoshone land rights had 
been extinguished and that monetary compensation would be provided for. As 
the Dann band was already engaged in litigation over a trespass conflict,945 they 
heard the ICC judgment denying them their land rights without any form of 
participation in the process. The Western Shoshone people persisted in stating 
that they did not want to receive monetary compensation for their lands. This is 
perhaps best illustrated by the words of Carrie Dann, which are once again 
indicative of the special relation indigenous peoples have with their lands:  
 
Maybe as Americans you can sell land to others, but we as 
Indigenous people can not. The word Sogobee (or bia) means Earth 
Mother, the very essence of our life comes from the land (Earth 
Mother).946 
 
After a long process of national litigation, the Danns finally turned to the Inter- 
American Commission in 1993 and invoked similar rights as those in the Awas 
Tingni Case.947 The main conclusions of the Commission regarding the alleged 
violations of Articles XVIII and XIII of the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man948 will be discussed below. 
 In elaborating on the Awas Tingni judgment regarding the value of 
international human rights standards, the Commission concluded that:  
 
In addressing complaints of violations of the American Declaration it 
is necessary for the Commission to consider those complaints in the 
context of the evolving rules and principles of human rights law in 
the Americas and in the international community more broadly, as 
                                                        
944 For more on the ICC procedures see: Page A, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent in the Inter-American Human Rights System’, Sustainable Development, 
Law and Policy 16, 2004. Also see: Anaya, 2004, pp. 146-147. Also see: Gómez V, ‘The 
Inter-American System’, Human Rights Law Review, Volume 3, Number 1, 2003, pp. 127 -
133. 
945 Page A, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System’, Sustainable Development, Law and Policy 16, 2004, page 17. 
946 Statement by Carrie Dann, Western Shoshone grandmother, June 1, 2004, 
www.treatycouncil.org, consulted 13 July 2008. 
947 These included: the right to equality, the right to property and the right to judicial 
protection. 
948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by 
the Ninth International Conference of American States in 1948. Article XVIII, the right to a 
fair trial, reads: Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. 
There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will 
protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional 
rights. Article XXIII, on the right to property, reads: Every person has a right to own such 
private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity 
of the individual and of the home.  
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reflected in treaties, custom and other sources of international law. 
Consistent with this approach, in determining the claims currently 
before it, the Commission considers that this broader corpus of 
international law includes the developing norms and principles 
governing the human rights of indigenous peoples. As the following 
analysis indicates, these norms and principles encompass distinct 
human rights considerations relating to the ownership, use and 
occupation by indigenous communities of their traditional lands.949 
 
Based upon this opinion, the Commission stated that the provisions of the 
American Declaration should be interpreted and applied with due regard to 
those human rights principles particular to indigenous peoples protection.950 As 
will be further clarified in the Belize and Saramaka cases, other human rights 
instruments guide the Inter-American bodies in their decisions. 
  Regarding the right to property the Commission concluded that the US 
processes in adjudicating Western Shoshone land rights were not sufficient “to 
comply with contemporary international human right norms, principles and 
standards that govern the determination of indigenous property interests.”951 
The participatory standard used by the US government was found to be 
inadequate. The Commission thus upheld the communal property regime - that 
arises autonomously under international law - as developed in the Awas Tingni 
case by the Court, and extended it to the applicable provision of the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.952 The Commission then 
proceeded to frame the core criterion for participation with regard to land rights 
for Indigenous Peoples: 
 
The Commission first considers that Articles XVIII and XXIII of 
the American Declaration specially oblige a member state to ensure 
that any determination of the extent to which indigenous claimants 
maintain interests in the lands to which they have traditionally held 
title and have occupied and used is based upon a process of fully 
informed and mutual consent on the part of the indigenous 
community as a whole.953 This requires at a minimum that all of 
                                                        
949 IACHR, Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Int-
Am. C.H.R., (2001), December 27, 2002, paragraph 124. 
950 Ibid., paragraph 131. 
951 Ibid., paragraph 139. 
952 Anaya S J, ‘Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Land 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend’, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005, page 253. 
953 Page A, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System’, Sustainable Development, Law and Policy 16, 2004; Alex Page refers 
to the criterion as entailing “consent of the whole community”. I believe this is inaccurate since the 
criterion that was developed by the Commission, requires “consent of the community as a whole.” 
This requires that the community, as a collective, makes an informed decision, instead of 
requiring unanimity.  
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the members of the community are fully and accurately 
informed of the nature and consequences of the process and 
provided with an effective opportunity to participate 
individually or as collectives.954 
 
Here the Commission elaborated on the criterion of FPIC for indigenous 
peoples. According to the Commission, consent must be given on the part of 
the indigenous community “as a whole” which entails at least optional 
participation by all members. This definition is upheld by the Commission and 
Court in the following decisions. 
In summary, the Commission in the Dann case argued (for the first time) 
that FPIC is an essential criterion for the implementation and safeguarding of 
indigenous land rights. In the decision the Commission restated and extended 
the communal land right doctrine developed by the Court in the Awas Tingni 
case, and underlined its reliance on developments and trends within international 
law in relation to indigenous peoples. Examination of the following decisions 
and judgments will show that the Court and Commission expand their system of 
indigenous land rights, and aim to create a coherent opinion on participatory 
norms and FPIC. 
 
Maya Communities v. Belize 
 
In 2004, the Commission published its Report on a petition presented to the 
Commission against the State of Belize, filed by the Maya Indigenous 
Communities of the Toledo district, represented by the Indian Treaty Council 
and the Toledo Maya Cultural Council.955 Like in the Dann case, the petitioners 
allege violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
with respect to lands traditionally occupied and used, in this case, by the Maya 
people. In particular, the petitioners claimed violations of their rights to 
property, equality, judicial protection, consultation, and self-determination.  
The conflict arose when the Belizean government granted logging and oil 
concessions on Maya lands without obtaining the consent of the Maya 
communities. Belizean law considered these lands under the discretionary 
authority of government, and the actions taken by the State threatened to inflict 
severe harm on more than three dozen Maya villages in Southern Belize.956 
After domestic remedies failed, the Maya communities filed a petition to the 
Inter-American Commission in 1998. Once again, the friendly settlement 
procedure failed,957 and in 2000 the Commission declared the case admissible. 
                                                        
954 IACHR, Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Int-
Am. C.H.R., (2001), December 27, 2002, paragraph 140. Emphasis added. 
955 IACHR, Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, 
Report No. 40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2004), October 12 2004, paragraph 1. 
956 Page A, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System’, Sustainable Development, Law and Policy 16, 2004, page 18. 
957 Anaya, 2004, page 265. 
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The Commission built on the arguments developed in the Awas Tingni case and 
the Dann report, reaffirming the statement that the American Declaration should 
be interpreted and applied in the context of developments in the field of 
international human rights law.958 The Commission referred to the Awas Tingni 
case in assessing the concept of communal property, in the sense that the 
ownership of the land is centered on the group and its community 
collectively.959 Furthermore, the Commission restated its opinion in the Dann 
report, repeating that the State is responsible for:  
 
The taking of special measures to ensure recognition of the 
particular and collective interest that indigenous people have in the 
occupation and use of their traditional lands and resources and their 
right not to be deprived of this interest except with fully informed 
consent, under conditions of equality, and with fair 
compensation.960 
 
The Commission noted that the rights to property and to judicial protection, as 
enshrined in the American Declaration, and further expanded its reasoning: 
 
Specially oblige a member state to ensure that any determination of 
the extent to which indigenous claimants maintain interests in the 
lands to which they have traditionally held title and have occupied 
and used is based upon a process of fully informed consent on 
the part of the indigenous community as a whole. This 
requires, at a minimum, that all of the members of the community 
are fully and accurately informed of the nature and consequences of 
the process and provided with an effective opportunity to participate 
individually or as collectives961 
 
Here the Commission confirmed the consent criterion as developed in the Dann 
report. The Commission continued with reaffirming the Court’s position in the 
Awas Tingni case: 
 
In the Commission’s view, these requirements are equally applicable 
to decisions by the State that will have an impact upon indigenous 
lands and their communities, such as the granting of concessions to 
exploit the naturalresources of indigenous territories.962 
 
                                                        
958 IACHR, Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, 
Report No. 40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2004), October 12 2004, paragraph 86. 
959 Ibid., paragraph 116. 
960 Ibid., paragraph 117. Emphasis added. 
961 Ibid., paragraph 142. Emphasis added. 
962 Ibid., paragraph 142. 
CHAPTER V 
241 
The requirement that consent should be sought prior to the decision is 
illustrated in paragraph 143 where the Commission stated that there is no 
evidence that the State conducted effective consultations with the Maya 
communities prior to the granting of the logging licenses.  
Eventually, the Commission concluded that the Maya people of southern 
Belize have a communal property right over their lands,963 and that by granting 
oil and logging concessions to third parties, the State of Belize violated this right, 
as enshrined in Article XXIII of the American Declaration by: 
 
Failing to take effective measures to recognize their communal 
property right to the lands that they have traditionally occupied and 
used, and to delimit, demarcate and title or otherwise establish the 
legal mechanisms necessary to clarify and protect the territory on 
which their right exists.964 
 
The failure to demarcate the Maya traditional lands further infringes the right to 
property since: 
 
By granting logging and oil concessions to third parties to utilize the 
property and resources that could fall within the lands which must 
be delimited, demarcated and titled or otherwise clarified or 
protected, without effective consultations with and the 
informed consent of the Maya people and with resulting 
environmental damage, [the State] further violated the right to 
property enshrined in Article XXIII of the American Declaration to 
the detriment of the Maya people.965 
 
Building upon earlier decisions, the Commission emphasized the need for a 
form of control over traditional lands, and a corresponding obligation for the 
state to delimit and demarcate these lands in consultation with the indigenous 
people(s) concerned and with the informed consent of the community. The 
failure of the State to engage in effective consultations, in the Commission’s 
view, also led to violations of other provisions of the American Declaration and 
other international human rights and principles: 
 
The failure of the State to engage in meaningful consultation with 
the Maya people in connection with the logging and oil concessions 
in the Toledo District, and the negative environmental effects 
arising from those concessions, constitute violations of several other 
rights under international human rights law, including the right to 
life under Article I of the American Declaration, the right to 
                                                        
963 Ibid., paragraph 151. 
964 Ibid., paragraph 152. 
965 Ibid., paragraph 153. Emphasis added. 
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religious freedom and worship under Article III of the American 
Declaration, the right to a family and to protection thereof under 
Article VI of the American Declaration, the right to preservation of 
health and well-being under Article XI of the American 
Declaration, and the “right to consultation” implicit in Article 
27 of the ICCPR, Article XX of the American Declaration, and 
the principle of self-determination.966 
 
The Commission did not find it necessary to determine the additional violations 
of international law, by stating in its final remarks that these are subsumed within 
the broad violations of Article XXIII of the American declaration. In the light of 
the paragraph quoted above, this illustrates the distinct nature of the right to 
property for indigenous people, considering the central role the traditionally 
used and occupied lands play in their physical, cultural and spiritual vitality.967  
Without distinguishing one independent basis for FPIC in international law, 
the Commission did confirm the special relation between the indigenous - 
territorial land and resource - right to property and the principle of self-
determination. Consultation and consent are the requirements for effective 
protection of indigenous lands and resources and they are based on the 
interrelated concepts of self-determination and communal property rights for 
indigenous peoples. 
In the report in the Belize case the Commission reaffirms the special status 
of indigenous lands, assesses the existence of communal property rights over 
these lands, and acknowledges that the interrelated concepts of property rights 
and the principle of self-determination form the basis of the concept of free, 
prior and informed consent. It is the combination of the Awas Tingni 
jurisprudence, the explanation of FPIC as a necessary requirement for altering 
land rights, and the grounding of this system in the principle of self-
determination, that make this case so important.  
In the domestic litigation that followed the Commission’s report, the Court 
recognized the Maya indigenous title and supported that conclusion. On 
October 18 2007, the Supreme Court of Belize issued its decision, which 
affirmed the rights of the Maya communities to their traditional lands. The 
judgment relied heavily on international law, primarily on the Convention on 
the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. CERD General 
Recommendation XXIII was cited, which recognizes FPIC in relation to the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ communal lands. It is noteworthy that ILO 
Convention 169 was cited and, more importantly, that UNDRIP was referred 
to. The Court mentioned that: “Of course, unlike resolutions of the Security 
Council, General Assembly resolutions are not ordinarily binding on member 
states. But where these resolutions or Declarations contain principles of general 
                                                        
966 Ibid., paragraph 154. Emphasis added. 
967 Ibid., paragraph 155. 
CHAPTER V 
243 
international law, states are not expected to disregard them.” and cited article 26 
of the UNDRIP.968 
 
V.1.2.3.3 Subsequent Cases of the Court: Moiwana, Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa  
 
The Awas Tingni and the decisions of the Commission in the Dann and Maya 
cases confirmed that indigenous peoples have rights to their traditional lands and 
that in order for these rights to become effective, participatory structures have to 
be implemented. Affirmation of the land rights of indigenous peoples, under the 
right to property, led to a number of other questions and rights, connected to 
land and participation.  
In the 2007 Saramaka case the Court would explain how collective property 
rights relate to FPIC and natural resources. It was preceded by three important 
and related cases in 2005 and 2006. In the Moiwana, Yakye Axa and 
Sawhoyamaxa Cases, the Court elaborated upon its earlier judgments, especially 
in relation to dispossession. In all three cases, indigenous or tribal communities 
lost access to their traditional lands and the Court had to argue to what extent 
the land rights of the communities still existed, even though they no longer 
resided there. Since there is much overlap and similarity between the cases and 
the legal issues that arose in them, the three cases form a cluster and will be dealt 
with together. 
 
Dispossession of Traditional Lands 
 
Both in Sawhoyamaxa and Yakye Axa, as well as in Moiwana, the indigenous 
communities lost their traditional lands and wanted to return there. The cases 
offered the Court a chance to further explain its reasoning on indigenous land 
rights. While FPIC is not explicitly mentioned in these cases, they are 
imperative for a proper understanding of the Court’s system. 
In Moiwana v. Suriname, the village of Moiwana was the scene for one of the 
most horrific events of the Surinamese “war of the interior” that was fought 
between 1986 and 1992.969 The village was the target of an incursion by 
government troops in 1986, who suspected that some members of the 
community were allied with the feared “Jungle Commando,” a guerilla 
movement that fought for control over Eastern Suriname. Most of the village 
men were away at the time of events, and government soldiers killed over 40 
people, amongst them a large number of children and women. Up to this day, 
no independent investigation of the events has ever been conducted. The 
remaining villagers fled Moiwana, most of them to French Guiana, and years 
later they dared to return and reclaim their traditional lands. 
                                                        
968 Supreme Court of Belize, consolidated claims No. 171 of 2007 and 172 of 2007, judgment 
of October 18th 2007. 
969 More on the Surinamese history and situation will be provided in the next paragraph on 
the Saramaka case. 
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The twin cases of Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa offer another example of the 
often destitute situation of indigenous communities.970 In these cases, most 
prominently in the Sawhowyamaxa case, the Court further explained its 
standpoint on the right to property, and links this to the right to life.  
The Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa indigenous communities traditionally 
subsisted as hunter-gatherers, but were displaced when non-indigenous groups 
acquired their territories.971 Awaiting the outcome of the legal procedures they 
had started, both communities settled on a small strip of land between a highway 
and the fence that separated them from their traditionally occupied lands. Living 
conditions in these roadside settlements were appalling and the communities did 
not have access to basic health care, water, and food. 972 
In the Yakye Axa case, the Court declared that the restitution of land for 
indigenous populations must be guided primarily by the meaning of the land for 
them.973 Apart from a violation of the right to property and the right to judicial 
protection, the Court also found a violation of the right to life, interpreted as 
entailing positive obligations for the state to protect the conditions necessary for 
life.974  
Although all three cases are filled with important considerations concerning 
indigenous rights in the Americas, the focus here will be on how the Court 
tuned its system of property rights. This explanation is necessary for a proper 
understanding of Saramaka people v. Suriname and to get an accurate view of 
the Inter-American system of indigenous land rights protection.  
 
Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis and the ‘Continuing Violation Doctrine’ 
 
An important element in the three cases was whether the Court had jurisdiction 
ratione temporis, as the states involved claimed that the violation had taken place 
long before the jurisdiction of the Court was acknowledged. Although the 
                                                        
970 IACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125. IACtHR, 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of March 29, 2006, Int.-Am. 
Ct. H.R., (Ser. C), No. 146. 
971 The Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa cases are often mentioned together, since they are very 
similar in nature. However, the more recent decision in: IACtHR, Case of the Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 
August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214, should be mentioned as well.  
972 For a more elaborate overview of the Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa cases, see: Citroni G and 
Quintana Osuna K I, ‘Reparations for Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Court’, in: 
F. Lenzerini, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples, International and Comparative Perspectives (OUP, 
2008). Also see: Keener S and Vasquez J, ‘A Life Worth Living: Enforcement of the Right to 
Health Through the Right to Life in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, 40 
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev., 2008-2009. 
973 IACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125, par. 149. 
974 IACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125, par. 33.  
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debate was more elaborate in Moiwana, it also played a role in Yakye Axa and 
Sawhoyamaxa. 
 In Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa the claims involved title to lands that were 
part of the traditional territory of the people concerned. At the time of the 
proceedings, and many years before, title had been registered in the name of a 
third party as part of a chain of property titles that reached back to the 19th 
century when the lands were sold through certain transactions on the London 
stock exchange.975 Although the state in both cases never complained about the 
jurisdiction ratione temporis, the Commission did explain in its admissibility report 
that this was not an issue: “since the incidents alleged in the petition took place 
at a time when the obligation of respecting and guaranteeing the rights 
enshrined in the Convention”976 
 The “incidents” mentioned were; failure of the government to provide the 
community with sufficient assistance during the procedures that were enacted to 
claim their title in national law, failing to conclude those procedures with any 
satisfactory agreement, and preventing the community to conduct their 
traditional subsistence activities on their lands.977 These incidents had of course 
taken place after 1989 when Paraguay recognized the jurisdiction of the Court. 
 Similar reasoning led the Court to recognize temporal jurisdiction in 
Moiwana, although the matter was somewhat different. The Court reasoned 
that the right to property of indigenous peoples was not time-barred, since the 
state was directly responsible for the displacement of the community.978 The 
continuing violation doctrine was explained in paragraph 128 of the judgment: 
 
In the preceding chapter regarding Article 22 of the Convention, 
the Court held that the State’s failure to carry out an effective 
investigation into the events of November 29, 1986, leading to the 
clarification of the facts and punishment of the responsible parties, 
has directly prevented the Moiwana community members from 
voluntarily returning to live in their traditional lands. Thus, 
Suriname has failed to both establish the conditions, as well as 
                                                        
975 Bankes N, 'International Human Rights Law and Natural Resources Projects within the 
Traditional Territories of Indigenous Peoples', 47, Alberta Law Review, 2010. IACtHR, 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of March 29, 2006, Int.-Am. 
Ct. H.R., (Ser. C), No. 146, paragraph 73.  IACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C 
No. 125., paragraph 50. 
976 Inter American Commission on Human Rights, Report 2/02 on Admissibility, Petition 
12.313, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua People, February 27, 2002, 
paragraph 33. 
977 Bankes N, 'International Human Rights Law and Natural Resources Projects within the 
Traditional Territories of Indigenous Peoples', 47, Alberta Law Review, 2010. Inter American 
Commission on Human Rights, Report 2/02 on Admissibility, Petition 12.313, Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua People, February 27, 2002, paragraph 19. 
978 Alcala D, ‘Indigenous Peoples Right to Property in International Law: A Look at Saramaka 
People v. Suriname, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, Selected Works, 2009. 
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provide the means, that would allow the community members to 
live once again in safety and in peace in their ancestral territory; in 
consequence, Moiwana Village has been abandoned since the 1986 
attack.979 
 
The community’s right to claim property over their lands was therefore not lost, 
and the failure of the state to accommodate restitution entailed the violation of 
the right to property. The Court explained: 
 
[…] it has been argued that the alleged victims were forcefully 
displaced from their ancestral lands. Although this displacement 
supposedly occurred in 1986, their inability to return to those 
territories has allegedly continued. The Court, then, has 
competence to rule upon these alleged facts and their legal 
implications.980 
 
The reasoning by the Court in these cases is highly relevant for indigenous 
communities who seek forms of restorative justice. It is often the case that 
indigenous peoples have been expelled (for diverging reasons) from their 
traditional lands, and the Court’s argumentation makes clear that this does not 
have to extinguish property title to those lands. This way it is possible to apply 
the collective property reasoning to those cases in which indigenous peoples 
have been dispossessed or otherwise lost control over their traditional territories. 
 
Further Elaboration on the System of Collective Property Rights: Restitution and Limitation 
 
In Moiwana village v. Suriname, the N’Djuka people had evidently been 
unlawfully dispossessed of their territories. Therefore, the Court had little 
trouble in ascertaining that the community had a right to property over their 
traditional lands, even though they no longer possessed these. The Court 
reiterated its reasoning from Awas Tingni and stated that:  
 
[…] the Moiwana community members, a N’djuka tribal people, 
possess an “all-encompassing relationship” to their traditional lands, 
and their concept of ownership regarding that territory is not 
centered on the individual, but rather on the community as a 
whole. Thus, this Court’s holding with regard to indigenous 
communities and their communal rights to property under Article 
21 of the Convention must also apply to the tribal Moiwana 
community members: their traditional occupancy of Moiwana 
Village and its surrounding lands – which has been recognized and 
                                                        
979  IACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, paragraph 128. 
980  IACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, paragraph 43. 
CHAPTER V 
247 
respected by neighboring N’djuka clans and indigenous 
communities over the years – should suffice to obtain State 
recognition of their ownership. The precise boundaries of that 
territory, however, may only be determined after due consultation 
with said neighboring communities.981 
 
Restitution of their traditional lands was therefore necessary to end the 
continuing violation of article 21 of the Convention, and the Court therefore 
ordered Suriname to adapt its legislation and repair the situation. 
 In light of its conclusions in the chapter concerning Article 21 of the American 
Convention (supra paragraph 135), the Court holds that the State shall adopt such 
legislative, administrative and other measures as are necessary to ensure the 
property rights of the members of the Moiwana community in relation to the 
traditional territories from which they were expelled, and provide for their use and 
enjoyment of those territories. These measures shall include the creation of an 
effective mechanism for the delimitation, demarcation and titling of said traditional 
territories. 
 
The State shall take these measures with the participation and 
informed consent of the victims as expressed through their 
representatives, the members of the other Cottica N’djuka villages 
and the neighboring indigenous communities, including the 
community of Alfonsdorp.982 
 
Participatory requirements are central in the Court’s order. Informed consent is 
mentioned for the first time and remedying the situation of the Moiwana 
victims is only possible with full participation of the communities involved. 
Furthermore, the Court explained that such participation can only take place 
through the community’s own representatives. The informed consent 
requirement would be expanded and elaborated upon in Saramaka People v. 
Suriname, two years later. 
In the Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, the facts were a bit different, 
which forced the Court to make a more detailed analysis of the right to 
property, its possible limits, and its connected right to restitution. In these cases, 
the lands were lawfully acquired by third parties and restitution was not as 
“easy” as in Moiwana. 
The Court did not fully explain the nature of the continuing property rights 
in Yakye Axa but needed the latter case of Sawhoyamaxa to complement its 
reasoning.983 In the first case, the Court reiterated that indigenous conceptions of 
                                                        
981 IACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, paragraph 133. 
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property are important and protected by Article 21 of the Convention. 
Furthermore, it noted that Paraguay did recognize such communal property 
rights in its constitution and therefore had a national and international obligation 
to respect those rights. The Court also emphasized that the state had failed to 
meet its obligations to demarcate and delimit specific lands. In Yakye Axa, the 
Court’s reasoning in respect of the relation and possible conflicts between 
individual and communal property claims was explored as follows: 
 
Now, when indigenous communal property and individual private 
property are in real or apparent contradiction, the American 
Convention itself and the jurisprudence of the Court provide 
guidelines to establish admissible restrictions to the enjoyment and 
exercise of those rights, that is: a) they must be established by law; b) 
they must be necessary; c) they must be proportional, and d) their 
purpose must be to attain a legitimate goal in a democratic society.  
 
Article 21(1) of the Convention provides that “[t]he law may 
subordinate [the] use and enjoyment [of property] to the interest of 
society.” The necessity of legally established restrictions will depend 
on whether they are geared toward satisfying an imperative public 
interest; it is insufficient to prove, for example, that the law fulfills a 
useful or timely purpose. Proportionality is based on the restriction 
being closely adjusted to the attainment of a legitimate objective, 
interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the 
restricted right. Finally, for the restrictions to be compatible with the 
Convention, they must be justified by collective objectives that, 
because of their importance, clearly prevail over the necessity of full 
enjoyment of the restricted right.984  
 
The Court further explained that it is the State’s duty to assess on a case-by-case 
basis how these standards should be applied to conflicts between private and 
ancestral property claims.985 The state needs to take into account the basic 
arguments from the Awas Tingni case that indigenous territorial rights may 
include a broader en different concept than private property rights. Furthermore, 
the Court interpreted article 21 of the Convention in light of the broader body 
of international law, including ILO Convention No. 169.986 The Court referred 
                                                        
984 IACtHR, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, 
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to its advisory opinion on “The Right to Information on Consular Assistance 
within the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process,” according to which 
provisions of human rights conventions have to be applied taking into account 
the “corpus juris” of existing international law. A systematic interpretation is to 
be applied:987 
 
The corpus juris of international human rights law comprises a set of 
international instruments of varied content and juridical effects 
(treaties, conventions, resolutions and declarations). Its dynamic 
evolution has had a positive impact on international law in affirming 
and building up the latter’s faculty for regulating relations between 
States and the human beings within their respective jurisdictions. 
This Court, therefore, must adopt the proper approach to consider 
this question in the context of the evolution of the fundamental 
rights of the human person in contemporary international law.988  
 
Indigenous property rights may pertain to the collective right to survival “as an 
organized people, with control over their habitat as a necessary condition for 
reproduction of their culture, for their own development and to carry out their 
life aspirations.”989 Disregarding this may lead to violations of other basic rights 
such as the right to cultural identity and restrictions on the right of private 
individuals to private property may be necessary to “attain the collective 
objective of preserving cultural identities in a democratic and pluralist 
society.”990 Indigenous property claims may thus trump private property claims 
by third parties.  
The Court further clarified its reasoning a year later in Sawhoyamaxa v. 
Paraguay, in which the facts were very similar to those in Yakye Axa. In these 
cases, the Court based its reasoning more on the material and spiritual relation 
that indigenous peoples have with their lands, than on the “continuing violation 
doctrine” that was invoked in Moiwana. In Sawhoyamaxa, the Court 
summarized its jurisprudence on indigenous property rights and formulated the 
right to restitution in two central paragraphs, which, because of their 
importance, will be cited in full: 
  
Acting within the scope of its adjudicatory jurisdiction, the Court 
has had the opportunity to decide on indigenous land possession in 
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three different situations. On the one hand, in the Case of the 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, the Court pointed out 
that possession of the land should suffice for indigenous 
communities lacking real title to property of the land to obtain 
official recognition of that property, and for consequent registration. 
On the other hand, in the Case of the Moiwana Community, the 
Court considered that the members of the N’djuka people were the 
“legitimate owners of their traditional lands” although they did not 
have possession thereof, because they left them as a result of the acts 
of violence perpetrated against them. In this case, the traditional 
lands have not been occupied by third parties. Finally, in the Case of 
the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa, the court considered that 
the members of the Community were empowered, even under 
domestic law, to file claims for traditional lands and ordered the 
State, as measure of reparation, to individualize those lands and 
transfer them on a for no consideration basis. 
  
The following conclusions are drawn from the foregoing: 1) 
traditional possession of their lands by indigenous people has 
equivalent effects to those of a state-granted full property title; 2) 
traditional possession entitles indigenous people to demand official 
recognition and registration of property title; 3) the members of 
indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, 
or lost possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even 
though they lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully 
transferred to third parties in good faith; and 4) the members of 
indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost possession of their 
lands, when those lands have been lawfully transferred to innocent 
third parties, are entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain other 
lands of equal extension and quality. Consequently, possession is not 
a requisite conditioning the existence of indigenous land restitution 
rights. The instant case is categorized under this last conclusion.991  
 
A combination of the historic injustice argument and the special relationship 
indigenous peoples have with their lands are thus the main grounds on which 
the Court constructs a right to restitution.992 In determining to what extent 
restitution could compromise private property rights, it seems necessary for the 
state to continue its efforts until a fair balance between public and private 
interests is restored.993 
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Recapitulation: The Inter-American System of Property Rights this Far 
 
In the judgments and decisions discussed, the Inter-American Court and 
Commission have progressively interpreted the right to property to encompass 
collective land rights for indigenous communities. Although the Court 
elaborates on the justification and content of property rights for indigenous 
peoples and stresses that their participation is an essential requirement for 
implementation, there are two main areas that were not sufficiently dealt with. 
First, there is the question of how wide the scope of participation, consultation, 
and FPIC requirements is. Secondly, if indigenous peoples have property rights 
over their lands, what would be the exact implications for competences to use 
the natural resources that are to be found on and in those lands?  
 Participation and natural resource rights have been dealt with in the context 
of the Saramaka decision, which will be dealt with next and which enhanced the 
Courts system of indigenous land rights considerably. However, it may be a 
good idea to first recapitulate the system so far. 
 Awas Tingni proved to be the starting point for granting indigenous peoples 
control over their lands. The Court held to its reasoning that indigenous peoples 
have a special spiritual tie to their traditional territories and that therefore these 
territories require special protection. It also explained that possession of the land 
should suffice for proving the existence of a proprietary interest in the land. To 
effectuate this right, the State has the duty to carry out the delimitation, 
demarcation, and titling of the indigenous lands involved with full participation by the 
Community and take into account its customary law, values, customs and mores.”994  
 The Commission explained in the Dann and Maya decisions that the 
determination of the extent to which indigenous peoples have traditional title to 
their lands is based upon a process of:  
 
fully informed and mutual consent on the part of the indigenous 
community as a whole. This requires at a minimum that all of the 
members of the community are fully and accurately informed of the 
nature and consequences of the process and provided with an 
effective opportunity to participate individually or as collectives.995  
 
The Commission explained that communal property rights and self-
determination require strong participatory rights and FPIC to become effective. 
In Moiwana, the Court explained that these rights may also exist when an 
indigenous community no longer possesses their traditional lands and explained 
that effective - legal, administrative, and other - mechanisms for the 
delimitation, demarcation, and titling are needed to secure the traditional lands 
of the community. Furthermore, the Court declared that the state should 
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implement these mechanisms with the participation, and informed consent of 
the community, expressed through their representatives. 
 The Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa cases also dealt with communities that no 
longer possessed their ancestral lands, but in these cases title had been 
legitimately transferred to third parties. The Court decided that there is indeed a 
right to restitution of traditional territories and that this right may outweigh 
private property rights. Nevertheless, the right to property is not absolute and 
may be restricted if those restrictions are: established by law, necessary, 
proportional, and have the aim of attaining a legitimate goal in a democratic 
society. 
 The duties of the state to implement this scheme are consistently described in 
both negative and positive ways. The State must refrain from alienating 
indigenous lands, but at the same time it must delimit, demarcate, and title 
indigenous territories. This may involve restitution of land, which was lost 
without the community’s consent.996  
 With the basic rationale for granting indigenous peoples collective property 
rights over their lands in place, it is now time to explore the Saramaka case. This 
case has significantly enhanced the land rights system mentioned above and 
became a starting point for an elaborate explanation of FPIC. For this reason, 
the Saramaka case will be contextualized and explored in more detail.  
  
V.1.2.4 The Key Decision: An In-depth Investigation of Saramaka People v. 
Suriname 
 
The Saramaka case will be explored against the background of the situation of 
the indigenous and Maroon peoples of Suriname to explain the possibilities and 
pitfalls that arise in the implementation of indigenous land, resource, and 
participation rights. By contextualizing the Saramaka People versus Suriname 
decision, it will be possible to expose a variety of legal issues relevant to FPIC. A 
detailed examination of Saramaka will also illustrate which mechanisms – within 
and beyond the Inter-American human rights system – are available to effectuate 
regional judicial decisions.  
Amongst others, the Surinamese case touches on resource and development 
rights, integration of environmental law in FPIC processes, property rights, 
relocation, legal recognition, and sustainability. In this case, most issues that arose 
in the preceding judgments are covered, and, importantly, its aftermath clearly 
illustrates the problems that arise with regard to the implementation of FPIC and 
land rights. Issues discussed earlier in relation to representation, misinformation, 
and “prior consent” are present as well. Furthermore, Saramaka expands the 
Court’s system and formed the upshot for a number of detailed studies into 
rights to free, prior and informed consultation and consent. 
 
                                                        
996 When the resettlement or relocation of indigenous peoples is involved, FPIC has a 
mandatory character, as will be explained in the conclusions to this paragraph. 
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V.1.2.4.1 Suriname: Maroon and Indigenous Communities 
 
Suriname has a particularly dynamic history. Being colonized by the Dutch 
(amongst others) led to a number of different waves of immigrants. Apart from 
Africans being brought over to the colony as slaves, large groups of people from 
India, Indonesia (Java) and China now live in Suriname. Moreover, there are 
considerable groups of Brazilian, Lebanese and Jewish people.  
 The original inhabitants of Suriname were different Amazonian and 
Caribbean tribes, which now make up about 3,7% of the population. The four 
most numerous of the different tribes are the Kaliña (or Caribs), the Lokono (or 
Arawaks), the Trio and the Wayana people. Kaliña and Lokono natives live 
mainly in the northern part of Suriname and are sometimes referred to as 
‘lowlands’ natives, while the Trio, Wayana and a number of other Amazonian 
tribes live in the south and are referred to as “highland” indigenous peoples.997  
 Apart from the indigenous peoples, Suriname also harbors a large group of 
tribal people known as the Maroons (from the Spanish word Cimarron). These 
are descendants of Africans who fled the Dutch slave-plantations and continued 
their distinctive identity based on their West African origins. They now make 
up about 14,7 % of the Surinamese population. This entails that almost 20% of 
the Surinamese population qualifies as tribal or indigenous.  
 The Maroons of Suriname are organized in six groups, consisting of two 
main branches. The Eastern Maroons consist of the N’Djuka (or Aukaners), the 
Aluku (or Boni) and the Paramaka people. The central group of Maroons 
consists of the Sarmaka, the Matawai and the Kwinti. 
 The N’Djuka and Saramaka tribes are the most numerous and number 
between 15.000 and 20.000 each. Most of the Maroons speak either N’Djuka or 
Saramakan language.998  
 The Maroons are organized in different clans (lö’s), and represented by 
Captains and head-Captains (Kapiteins). At the head of each Maroon people is a 
Gaa’man, who is the highest authority. Apart from this traditional structure, 
there are different organizations that represent the Maroon people. For the 
Saramaka people, the VSG (Vereniging Saramakaanse Gezagsdragers) unites the 
different captains and representatives. 
 Social organization of the different indigenous peoples of Suriname is more 
diffuse, considering their more diverse nature. The indigenous villages are also 
represented by Captains and Basja’s (Captain’s assistants). Since, as was discussed 
above, there is no official legal recognition of indigenous and tribal peoples in 
Suriname, they have to rely on other forms of legal personality to protect their 
interests. The VIDS (Vereniging Inheemse Dorpshoofden Suriname), which 
                                                        
997 Ooft M, ‘IWGIA 2012 yearbook update article on Suriname’, Policy Officer at the Bureau 
of the Association of Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname (Vereniging van Inheemse 
Dorpshoofden in Suriname, VIDS), www.iwgia.org, consulted August, 2012. 
998 Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples, Maroons, Update June 2008.  
http://www.minorityrights.org/5154/suriname/maroons.html, consulted August 2012. 
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comprises all the different Captains of the indigenous villages - and the formal 
legal person the Buro VIDS - represent the different indigenous communities in 
Suriname. Apart from the VIDS, there are a number of organizations that 
represent Suriname’s indigenous peoples.999 Furthermore, a number of non-
governmental organizations assist indigenous and Maroon peoples in their 
struggles for control over traditional lands.1000 
 In 2006, during a Grankrutu - an important meeting - of indigenous and 
Maroon representatives in Diitabiki - or: Drietabbetje, the capital of the 
Aukaner Maroons- it was decided that indigenous and Maroon peoples would 
join hands to win legal recognition of their land rights. Furthermore, the 
adopted resolution proclaimed that indigenous peoples would be involved and 
have a say in decisions concerning the granting of concessions. The cooperation 
of indigenous and Maroon peoples is meant to solve the land rights issue in 
Suriname through cooperation and the formulation of a joint position.1001 
 Even though indigenous and Maroon peoples are well organized and make 
up almost one fifth of the Surinamese population, their socio-economic situation 
remain troublesome. 
 
V.1.2.4.2 Contemporary Problems and Land Protection in Surinamese Law 
 
Currently, the indigenous and tribal peoples of Suriname are troubled by 
different activities that endanger their traditional lands. The infrastructure in the 
interior of Suriname is being improved, but this is mostly in order to extract the 
valuable resources that are to be found there. Apart from the “legal” extraction 
of gold, oil, and other resources, big problems arise in relation to illegal logging 
and most importantly, gold mining.  
Small-scale illegal gold mining is conducted with the use of mercury, which 
is detrimental to the health of the people living in proximity of the mining sites. 
Mercury poisons the waterways and consequently the fish on which the 
indigenous and maroon people are dependent for their subsistence. Moreover, 
the “gold rush” also leads to a number of social problems, since it attracts 
different groups of illegal gold miners, mainly from Brazil.1002  
 Legal protection for the lands and resources of the indigenous and tribal 
peoples in the interior is needed but Suriname’s legal framework does not 
recognize these peoples and there is no legislation in place that effectively 
protects the endangered communities. Suriname has no constitutional 
recognition of its indigenous and tribal peoples and no specific laws exist on 
                                                        
999 E.g. The Organisatie Samenwerkende Inheemse Dorpen Para (OSIP), The Organisatie van 
Kaliña en Lokono in Marowijne (CLIM) and the Organisatie van Inheemsen in Suriname 
(OIS). 
1000 Most importantly, the UK based NGO Forest Peoples Programme (FPP), 
http://www.forestpeoples.org/. 
1001 Diitabiki Resolution, 2006, English translation. Available upon request. 
1002 Remember the recent allegations of killings among Yanomami Indians in Venezuela by 
illegal Brazilian gold miners.  
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their rights. This gives Suriname a unique position in the region. The state, 
however, argued in Saramaka People v. Suriname, that its legal framework was 
sufficient to protect indigenous and tribal communities. While the Saramaka case 
will be discussed at length in the following paragraph, we will now discuss the 
Surinamese legal framework, especially those laws of which the state argued that 
they protect the land rights of the Maroons. 
 The state argued that: “although it may be correct that land related interests 
of the Saramaka are not recognized as a subjective right in the Suriname legal 
system, it is a tendentious misrepresentation to suggest that legitimate interests of 
the Tribe are not recognized by the system and respected in practice.”1003 The 
representatives of Suriname stated that their domestic laws did recognize certain 
interest of member of indigenous and tribal peoples to land and argued that 
foremost the 1987 Constitution, the L-1 Decrees of 1982, the Mining Decree of 
1986, and the Forest Management Act of 1992 effectively protected indigenous 
land rights in practice.1004  
 The Court had to analyze to which extent these legal provisions recognized 
an interest in the land, while noting from the outset that an “interest” does not 
satisfy the State’s obligations under Article 2 of the Convention with regards to 
Article 21.1005  
 The Constitution of 1987 does not explicitly recognize communal property 
rights for indigenous or tribal communities. While Suriname is not the only 
country in the region where such provisions are absent, the Court noted that 
obligations to recognize collective property systems does not necessarily require 
constitutional provisions.1006 The Court explained that: “Article 2 of the 
Convention requires States to give domestic legal effect to those rights and 
freedoms by ‘such legislative or other measures as may be necessary.’ In the case 
of Suriname, no such legislative or other measures have been adopted.”1007 
 In the L-1 Decree of 1982 on land policy some interest of tribal communities 
in the land is recognized. However, in its explanatory note it is stated that tribal 
communities may have de facto rights, which are to be distinguished from “real” 
de jure rights, which are issued by the state to individuals.1008 The Court 
explained that this constitutes a limitation on the recognition of legal right for 
                                                        
1003 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 106. 
1004 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 106. 
1005 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 106. 
1006 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 107.  
1007 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 107. 
1008 See: Decree L-1 of June 15, 1982, containing basic principles concerning Land Policy, SB 
1982, no. 10, Article 4. 
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the Maroons in Suriname, and was therefore also incompatible with the 
obligations under Article 2 and 21 of the American Convention.1009 
The 1986 Mining Decree similarly fails to give domestic legal effect to 
property rights that the Maroons have as a result of their communal property 
system, where it only recognizes a right to compensation to rightful claimants 
with an interest on land on which mining rights are granted.1010 The Decree, 
however, defines claimants as “persons who have a real property or personal 
property right on private lands.” Therefore, a claimant or third party needs to 
prove it has a registered title or title issues by the State. Instead of protecting 
Maroon communal property, as the State argued, the Mining Decree requires 
that they first acquire a formal title to their lands before any compensation 
would be possible.1011  
The state also referred to the 1992 Forest Management Act as an example of 
domestic legislation that gives legal effect to the rights of the members of the 
Saramaka people to enjoy their communal property, since said law makes it 
possible for the state to grant permits for “community forests.”1012 Such permits, 
however, are not issued as a right but at the sole discretion of the Minister in 
charge of forest management. The Court explained that this does not suffice, 
since: “the ‘community forests’ permits are essentially revocable forestry 
concessions that convey limited and restricted use rights, and are therefore an 
inadequate recognition of the Saramakas’ property rights. Likewise, since the 
laws required to issue community forests have yet to be adopted, the legal 
certainty of said title may be called into question.”1013  
The Court also noted the ambiguous nature of the wording in the Act that: 
“customary rights of tribal inhabitants, with respect to their villages and 
settlements, as well as their agricultural plots, will be respected as much as 
possible.” This fails to take into account the special and all-encompassing 
relationship that indigenous peoples have with their territory as a whole, not just 
with their settlements or agricultural plots.1014 The Court explained that the 
State’s duty is much higher than this for adequately respecting Maroon or 
indigenous communal property structures. 
 All in all, these different provisions do not adequately recognize the 
collective property rights of indigenous and Maroon peoples in Suriname. The 
                                                        
1009 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 108. 
1010 See: Decree E 58 of May 8, 1986, containing general rules for exploration and 
exploitation of minerals (Mining Decree), Articles 47 and 48. 
1011 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 111. 
1012 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 112. 
1013 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 113. 
1014 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 114. 
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Court stated that merely granting a “privilege to use the land” falls short of the 
requirements of the Convention.  
In summary, Surinamese law does not offer explicit recognition to 
indigenous and tribal communities. This is different from other countries in the 
region, most of them offer – at least to some extent – constitutional or other 
legal recognitions of indigenous peoples and collective land rights. Furthermore, 
the legal provisions that do exist in Surinamese law are inadequate to effectively 
protect the special interests that indigenous and tribal peoples have. What is 
required under the Convention and international law has been discussed above - 
the earlier cases of the Court and Commission - and will be discussed at length 
in the following paragraph, in which the Saramaka decision is further analyzed 
and explained. 
 
V.1.2.4.3 Controversy over Land and Resource Rights before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: Saramaka People v. Suriname 
 
In June 2006, the Commission submitted its application against the State of 
Suriname to the Court. The application originated from petition No. 12.338 
which was presented to the Commission in October 2000, on behalf of the 
Association of Saramaka Authorities and twelve Saramaka Captains, as well as on 
behalf of the Saramaka People of the Upper Suriname River.1015  
The Saramakas are one of the six Maroon tribal peoples that inhabit the 
forests of Suriname.1016 As has been explained, Maroons are the descendants of 
Africans who were brought to Suriname by the colonial powers. They are next 
generations of escaped slaves who won their freedom - from the Dutch - in the 
18th Century. Their freedom and autonomy were recognized in treaties 
concluded with the Dutch and through more than two hundred years of 
colonial administrative practice.1017  
The Saramaka People are not indigenous to Suriname, that is, they did not 
form a society there at the time of colonization. Thus, one of the questions for 
the Court to consider was if the Saramaka tribal people were subject to the same 
special protection as indigenous peoples.  
The Saramaka people are organized in twelve matrilineal clans (lös), and it is 
estimated that the contemporary size of the Saramaka population ranges from 
25,000 to 34,000 people.1018 These are divided into 63 communities on the 
Upper Suriname River and in a number of displaced communities located near 
                                                        
1015 Ibid., paragraph 1. 
1016 As mentioned the other five Maroon peoples are: the Aucaner, the Paramaka, the Aluku, 
the Kwinti and the Matawai People. Together they form a population of approximately 
60.000 individuals. Suriname is also home to four main groups of indigenous peoples: the 
Kalinya, Lokono, Trio and Wayana People. They number about 20.000 individuals. The 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of Suriname comprise about 20 percent of the total population.  
1017 Forest Peoples Programme and Association of Saramaka Authorities, Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent: Two Cases from Suriname, 2007, page 2. 
1018 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 80. 
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said area.1019 The social structure of Maroons in general and the Saramaka people 
in particular is different from other sectors of society. As explained above, the 
Saramaka people are organized in matrilineal clans and they govern themselves, 
at least partially, by their own customs and traditions. The different lö recognize 
the political authority of the local leaders, including what they call Captains and 
Head Captains, as well as the Gaa’man, who is the clan’s highest official.1020 
The Court further examined the meaning of land for the Saramaka 
community. It ascertained that land is more than merely a source of subsistence 
for them since it is also a necessary source for the continuation of the life and 
cultural identity of the Saramaka people.1021 This special relation was described 
by Head Captain Wazen Eduards during the public hearings as follows: 
 
The forest is like our market place; it is where we get our 
medicines, our medicinal plants. It is where we hunt to have meat 
to eat. The forest is truly our entire life. When our ancestors fled 
into the forest they did not carry anything with them. They learned 
how to live, what plants to eat, how to deal with subsistence needs 
once they got to the forest. It is our whole life.1022 
 
However, after the end of the “war of the interior” there were new challenges 
to the Saramaka Maroons. The government had issued a number of concessions 
for timber extraction to amongst others Chinese logging companies in the mid-
1990s. The Saramakas had not consented to these activities, and were not even 
consulted or informed about these concessions. As a matter of fact, they only 
found out about the concessions when they found loggers already employed on 
their lands. When national remedies failed, the Saramakas filed a petition to the 
Commission in 2000. The Commission referred the case to the Court in 
2006.1023 
The applicants alleged that Suriname had failed to recognize their land 
rights, which resulted in violations of Article 21 (the right to property) and 
Article 25 (the right to judicial protection) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, in particular regarding development projects and investment 
activities in the area inhabited by the Saramaka. The Saramaka also filed 
complaints about the construction of the Afobaka dam in the sixties, which had 
resulted in the displacements of a large number of Saramaka communities. 
                                                        
1019 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 80. 
1020 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 81. 
1021 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 82. 
1022 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), par. 82.  
1023 Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of 12 Saramaka Clans, 
(Case 12.338) against the Republic of Suriname, 23 June 2006. 
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However, the Court declared the complaint regarding the continuous effects 
related to the construction of the dam inadmissible on grounds of legal certainty, 
since these facts and allegations were not contained in the original application to 
the Commission or Court.1024  
The Court first had to deal with a lengthy set of preliminary procedural 
objections by the State, concerning the lack of legal standing before the 
Commission and the Court,1025 irregularities in the proceedings before the 
Commission,1026 non-compliance with time-limits,1027 non-exhaustion of 
domestic legal remedies,1028 duplication of international proceedings,1029 and lack 
of jurisdiction “ratione temporis.”1030  
After rejecting these objections, the Court formulated eight issues which it 
would address.1031 First, whether the Saramaka People make up a tribal 
community, second, whether Article 21 of the Convention also protects tribal 
peoples, third, whether Suriname recognizes the communal property right of the 
Saramaka, fourth, to what extent the Saramaka are entitled to enjoy their natural 
resources, fifth, whether the State may grant concessions for extracting these 
resources, sixth, whether the current concessions are in line with the safeguards 
under international law, seventh, whether the lack of recognition of the 
Saramaka people as possessing juridical personality makes them ineligible to 
receive communal land title under domestic law, and finally, whether there are 
effective legal remedies in domestic law for the Saramaka People.1032 The parts 
of the judgment most relevant for this study will be summarized below. 
 In light of what was explained above about the make-up of Saramaka 
society, the Court had little trouble to explain that the Saramakas make up a 
tribal people. The Court already recognized that N’Djuka Maroons formed a 
tribal society in the Moiwana case. Although the Saramakas could not be seen as 
“indigenous” or “first inhabitants,” the Court asserted that they are subject to 
the same protection, since they make up a tribal community:1033 
                                                        
1024 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 15, 16 and 17. This could be explained by the fact 
that the Moiwana Case, in which the continuing violation doctrine was explained, was not 
decided by the time the Saramakas filed their petition. 
1025 Ibid., paragraph 19 and 25. 
1026 Ibid., paragraph 30. 
1027 Ibid., paragraph 34. 
1028 Ibid., paragraph 41. 
1029 Ibid., paragraph 45. 
1030 Ibid., paragraph 59. 
1031 Also see: F Mackay F, Saramaka, de Strijd om het Bos (KIT Publishers, 2010). 
1032 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 77. 
1033 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 84: The Court assessed that the members of the 
Saramaka People, although not indigenous to the region they inhabit, make up a tribal 
community: “Whose social, cultural and economic characteristics are different from other sections of the 
national community, particularly because of their special relationship with their ancestral territories, and 
because they regulate themselves, at least partially, by their own norms customs and/or traditions.” One 
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Whose social, cultural and economic characteristics are different 
from other sections of the national community, particularly because 
of their special relationship with their ancestral territories, and 
because they regulate themselves, at least partially, by their own 
norms customs and/or traditions.1034 
 
The reasoning of the Court has implications wider than only in this case, since it 
affirms that tribal communities in the OAS region are indeed subject to the same 
protection as “real” indigenous peoples.1035 
 Subsequently, the Court stated that the right to property is also applicable to 
tribal peoples, who, like indigenous peoples, deserve special protection under 
international law, since both groups share distinct characteristics, amongst others 
regarding the special relation these peoples have with their lands, which requires 
special measures under international human rights law.1036 This special relation 
and subsequent conception of communal ownership is considered in detail by 
the Court in its analysis of the customary land use pattern of the Saramaka 
People.1037 
 As examined above, the communal land doctrine was developed by the Court 
in the Awas Tingni case, and reiterated and expanded in subsequent cases and 
decisions. The Court concluded that the Saramaka communal land rights are 
included in the American Convention’s provision on the right to property. 
Furthermore the Court stressed that this was interpreted in conformity with ILO 
Convention No. 169 and the 1966 UN Human Rights Covenants: the ICCPR 
and ICSECR. In this light, the Court expressly quoted the right to self-
determination as being applicable to indigenous and tribal peoples.1038 The 
IACtHR distilled the relevant norms from the broader body of international law 
and stated that although Suriname had not ratified ILO 169, it was party to a 
number of other international instruments protecting human rights.1039 
                                                                                                                              
could wonder whether the ‘continuing violation doctrine’ would apply to the afobaka case as 
well. 
1034 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 84. 
1035 Mackay F, Saramaka, de Strijd om het Bos (KIT Publishers, 2010), p. 27. 
1036 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 86. The Court also referred to the Moiwana case, 
where another Maroon community was granted the same special protection as Indigenous 
Peoples were. See:  IACtHR, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, 
paragraph 132 and 133. 
1037 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), mainly paragraphs 77 – 101.  
1038 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 93. The Court referred to the right to self-
determination of indigenous and tribal peoples as recognised by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. See: E/C.12/1/Add.94 of December 12, 2003. 
1039 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraphs 97 -107. Also see, Orellana M A, ‘Saramaka 
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Regarding the important issue of natural resources the Court determined that 
members of tribal and indigenous communities have the right to own the 
natural resources they have traditionally used within their territory since: 
“Without them, the very survival of such peoples is at stake. Hence the need to 
protect the lands and resources they have traditionally used to prevent their 
extinction as a people.”1040 The Court considered the community’s land rights, 
in addition to a necessity for physical survival, as essential for the cultural and 
spiritual survival of distinct peoples. Therefore, Article 21 of the IACHR protects 
those resources that are traditionally used by the Saramaka people. The Court 
explained: 
 
From this analysis, it follows that the natural resources found on and 
within indigenous and tribal people’s territories that are protected 
under Article 21 are those natural resources traditionally used and 
necessary for the very survival, development and continuation of 
such people’s way of life.1041 
 
The Court explained, in relation to gold mining concessions, that although these 
may not be qualified as ‘traditionally used resources’ the extraction of those will 
unquestionably affect other natural resources, which are necessary for the 
Saramaka’s survival. 
 Furthermore, the Court emphasized the importance of having collective 
juridical capacity as a precondition for effective participation and the exercise of 
the collective right to property and expands its reasoning and applicable 
remedies in relation to the property rights of indigenous communities. 
Nevertheless, the Court also assessed that Article 21 (the right to property) 
should not be interpreted in such a way that it prevents the state from issuing 
any type of concession for the exploration and extraction of natural resources on 
Saramaka territory. The Court noted that the protection of the right to property 
is not absolute and could be restricted in the interest of society as a whole.1042 In 
elaborating on this the Court stated that: 
 
That is, under Article 21 of the Convention, the State may restrict 
the Saramaka’s right to use and enjoy their traditionally owned lands 
and natural resources only when such restriction complies with the 
                                                                                                                              
People v. Suriname’, American Journal of International Law, 102, 2008, p. 3. Orellana states 
that the Court, in considering that Suriname had not ratified ILO Convention No. 169 and its 
legislation did not recognise a right to communal property, utilized systemic interpretation 
techniques (analysing the matter in light of articles 1 and 27 of the ICCPR) to overcome this 
hurdle. 
1040 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 121, drawing on the Yakye Axa Case. 
1041 Ibid., paragraph 122. 
1042 Ibid., paragraph 126 and 127. 
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aforementioned requirements1043 and, additionally, when it does not 
deny their survival as a tribal people.1044 
 
The Saramaka Criteria: Expanding the System of Collective Property Rights 
 
This brings us to the most significant part of the Saramaka judgment. In ensuring 
that this “denial of survival as a people” does not take place, the Court 
developed three criteria, which are directly related to FPIC and will be dealt 
with at some length below.  
First, the State must ensure the effective participation of the members of the 
Saramaka people, in conformity with their customs and traditions, regarding any 
development or investment plan.1045 Secondly, the State must guarantee a 
reasonable benefit for the Saramaka people from any such plan within their 
territory. Third, the State must ensure that no concession is issued until and 
unless independent and technically capable entities, with the State’s supervision, 
perform a prior environmental and social impact assessment.1046  
Remarkably, in developing this rather innovative doctrine on indigenous 
peoples’ land rights, the Court follows, to a large extent, the findings and 
conclusions of José Martinéz Cobo, as enshrined in his 1983 conclusions. Cobo 
had already affirmed that the natural resources of indigenous lands were entirely 
the property of the indigenous communities, and only they should be 
competent to make decisions regarding the manner and scale of exploitation of 
these resources.1047  
Cobo concluded that full participation of indigenous communities was 
exceptionally important in relation to the granting of exploration and 
exploitation licenses,1048 which appears to coincide with the first criterion the 
developed by the Court. Subsequently, since participation is also essential in 
relation to the profits generated by such operations, a fair share of the revenue 
should be obtained by the indigenous communities affected, and they should 
fully share in mining royalties. Here, the Court’s requirement of benefit sharing 
can clearly be distinguished. 
  
                                                        
1043 Ibid., paragraph 127: The restrictions have to be: Previously established by law, necessary, 
proportional and with the aim of achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society. 
1044 Ibid., paragraph 128. 
1045 Ibid., paragraph 129, footnote 127: By “development or investment plan” the Court 
means any proposed activity that may affect the integrity of the lands and natural resources 
within the territory of the Saramaka People, particularly any proposal to grant logging or 
mining concessions. 
1046 Ibid., paragraph 129. 
1047 José Martinéz Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, page 70, at 542. 
1048 José Martínez Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, page 71, at 543. 
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Finally, in Cobo’s findings it is stated that full participation in the procedures 
determining the damage caused by resource exploitation is invaluable,1049 and 
that the environmental impact of the exploitation should be “seriously and 
urgently investigated.”1050 Moreover, Cobo concluded that the indigenous 
populations concerned should be granted enough time to fully understand any 
past or future consequences of mining or prospecting licenses and activities that 
affect their natural resources so that they can “establish the means and 
procedures necessary to protect their interests.”1051  
According to the conclusions, the protection and preservation of indigenous 
lands from exploitation by multinational corporations, “without the explicit 
consent of the communities concerned,” should be guaranteed.1052 Without 
explicitly noting the Cobo conclusions, the Court appeared to recognize and 
adhere to the very recommendations imposed in the Cobo proposals and 
recommendations in relation to the “special area of action,” i.e. indigenous 
peoples’ land rights.1053 The Court constructs its safeguards for exploitation of 
indigenous lands and resources along remarkably similar lines of those proposed 
in the system of requirements in the 1983 Cobo report. 
The safeguards of prior social and environmental impact assessments and 
benefit sharing can also be distinguished in the “elements of common 
understanding” of the UNPFII 2005 Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent and in the World Bank policy on Indigenous Peoples.1054 
 The Court also regarded these safeguards - in particular the first two on 
effective participation and benefit sharing - in accordance with the observations 
of the Human Rights Committee and the practice in several States Parties to the 
Convention. Furthermore, for our purposes most importantly, these safeguards 
were regarded as consistent with the text of several international instruments. 
The Court explicitly mentioned the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and quoted Article 32: 
 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities 
and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and 
other resources. 
 
                                                        
1049 Ibid., page 71, at 543. 
1050 Ibid., page 72, at 554. 
1051 Ibid., page 71, at 545/546. 
1052 Ibid., page 71, at 547. 
1053 José Martínez Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, third part, XXII proposals and recommendations, K, special 
areas of action, paragraph 509-574. 
1054 See E/C.19/2005/3, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, 17 February 2005, presented at the 
Fourth session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, 16-
27 May 2005. 
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2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in 
order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and 
other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 
 
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any 
such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate 
adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.1055 
 
The citation of the UN Declaration marks the first time this instrument has been 
referred to, after its adoption, in an international human rights judicial body.1056 
Possibly, the Court assumed that some parts of the Declaration acquired the 
status of international customary norms.  
 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Saramaka Case 
 
Subsequently, the Court elaborated on the concept of free, prior and informed 
consent. First, the Court stated that in ensuring effective participation of the 
Saramaka people, the State has a duty to actively consult with the community in 
a way that corresponds with their customs and traditions. Effective participation 
thus includes requirements of consultation and consent. It requires the State to 
accept and disseminate information, and entails a constant communication 
between the parties in good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures, and 
with the objective of reaching an agreement.1057  
The element of “prior” is elaborated upon by the court as well whereas the 
Court noticed that the Saramakas must be consulted at the early stages of a 
development or investment plan, not only when the need arises to obtain 
approval from the community. According to the Court, early notice offers time 
for internal discussion within communities and the opportunity to provide 
feedback to the State, which has a duty to ensure that members of the Saramaka 
are aware of the possible risks involved.1058  
  
                                                        
1055 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN A/RES/61/295, 
Article 32. Emphasis is mine. Cited in: IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of 
November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 131. Later on it 
will be explained that the OAS entities distinguish between a right to consultation, for which 
FPIC is to be the purpose, and three situations in which FPIC is mandatory. 
1056 In a press release, following the UNPFII seventh session, the Forum states: “The Forum 
welcomed, in the document, the ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the 
case of Saramaka People vs. Suriname (28 November 2007), in which the Declaration had 
been invoked to settle a logging case.”  
1057 Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. 
Ct. H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 133. 
1058 Ibid., paragraph 133. 
CHAPTER V 
265 
The Court stressed the importance of taking into account traditional ways of 
decision-making and reaffirmed the criterion developed in the Belize Report 
that a process of fully informed consent entails at a minimum: 
 
That all of the members are fully and accurately informed of the 
nature and consequences of the process and provided with an 
effective opportunity to participate individually or as collectives.1059 
 
Apart from reaffirming the consent criterion as stated in the Belize and Dann 
Reports by the Commission, the Court further explained the concept in 
paragraph 134, cited here in full: 
 
Additionally, the Court considers that, regarding large-scale 
development or investment projects that would have a major impact 
within Saramaka territory, the State has a duty, not only to 
consult with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, 
prior, and informed consent, according to their customs 
and traditions. The Court considers that the difference between 
“consultation” and “consent” in this context requires further 
analysis.1060 
 
Regarding large-scale development projects, the state has a duty to obtain 
consent of the community whose territory is affected. In recognizing that the 
difference between consultation and consent requires further analysis, the Court 
not only illustrated a problem that needs to be solved in possible future cases, but 
also implicitly affirmed that “consent” and “consultation” are legally speaking 
two different concepts, which would be in line with the requirements posed by 
the Court in relation to development projects.  
 This paragraph, in which the Court acknowledged that the scope of FPIC is 
not clear as of yet, provided a kick-start for discussions and studies on the range 
of FPIC processes. These will be discussed in the following paragraphs, where it 
will be shown that within the Inter-American System, there is a both a 
distinction and overlap between a right to free, prior and informed consultation 
and a stronger requirement of free, prior and informed consent. Remarkably, the 
Court did not qualify the impact of the logging activities on Saramaka territory, 
and therefore left open the question whether consultation – with the goal to 
achieve FPIC – would be sufficient or that the stronger duty to obtain FPIC was 
present in this case. 
  
                                                        
1059 Ibid., paragraph 133, citing the Belize Report in note 133. 
1060 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 133. Emphasis added. Here the Court mentions 
the third situation in which FPIC is mandatory, in addition to situations where indigenous 
peoples are relocated or when hazardous materials are stored within their territories. 
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The Court enforced its general argumentation by stating that the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People had similarly observed that: 
 
Wherever large-scale projects occur in areas occupied by indigenous 
peoples it is likely that their communities will undergo profound 
social and economic changes that are frequently not well 
understood, much less foreseen, by the authorities in charge of 
promoting them. […] The principal human rights effects of these 
projects for indigenous peoples relate to loss of traditional territories 
and land, eviction, migration and eventual resettlement, depletion of 
resources necessary for physical and cultural survival, destruction and 
pollution of the traditional environment, social and community 
disorganization, long-term negative health and nutritional impacts as 
well as, in some cases, harassment and violence.1061  
 
Subsequently, the UN Special Rapporteur stated that free, prior and informed 
consent is essential for the protection of human rights of indigenous peoples 
with regard to large-scale development projects.1062 
In relation to the second criterion, that of benefit-sharing, the Court again 
referred to the UN Declaration and determined that this concept is inherent to 
paragraph 2 of Article 21 of the American Convention on compensation.1063 
Apart from developing criteria for the scope of FPIC, the Court also dictates the 
circumstances necessary to implement its regime in the, noticeably far-reaching, 
remedial measures it imposes on the State of Suriname in its judgment. 
 The Court assessed violations of the property right of the Saramaka People 
regarding prior concessions granted by the State. The Court first observed that 
the members of the Saramaka people have a right to enjoy and use their natural 
resources. The logging concessions were found to interfere with the traditional 
economic activities of the community and therefore threatened the resources 
necessary for the Saramaka’s survival as a people. The Court observed that none 
of the three safeguard criteria were applied, which had also resulted in 
environmental damage.1064 The integration of environmental requirements in 
FPIC processes is a novel approach, which may both strengthen the legal 
position of indigenous peoples, as well as broaden the scope for sustainability-
demands. In the next paragraph, the implementation-procedures for such 
integrated FPIC processes will be examined more closely.  
However, before summarizing the remedies on which the Court decided, 
its opinion on the recognition of the Saramaka people’s juridical personality will 
                                                        
1061 Ibid., paragraph 135, citing UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, supra note 97, p. 2.  
1062 Ibid., paragraph 135. 
1063 Ibid., paragraph 138. The difference between ‘compensation’ and ‘benefit-sharing’ requires 
further analysis. 
1064 Ibid., paragraph 147 – 158. 
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be briefly mentioned. For our purposes it is enough to say that the Court 
assessed that since the members of the Saramaka people form a distinct tribal 
community in a situation of vulnerability, the state must establish the judicial and 
administrative conditions necessary for the Saramaka people to collectively enjoy 
the right to property, in consultation with the Saramaka people and respectful of 
their traditions and customs. The state’s failure to do so resulted in a violation of 
their right to the recognition of their juridical personality pursuant to Article 3 
of the American Convention in relation to their right to property, protected 
under Article 21 of the Convention.1065 As mentioned above, the state argued 
that its domestic legal system offered enough opportunities for tribal groups to 
protect their lands, but the Court disagreed.1066  
The way in which legal personality could be exercised is: “A question that 
must be resolved by the Saramaka people in accordance with their own 
traditional customs and norms, not by the state or this Court in this particular 
case.”1067 Recognition of legal personality is indeed essential to enable 
indigenous and tribal peoples to exercise all their rights.1068 The Court 
emphasized that this is one of the special measures to which indigenous and 




The remedies that the Court offered reflect the developments in its system on 
participation, communal property, and FPIC. The Court directed the state to 
begin within three months and complete within three years: to delimit, 
demarcate, and grant collective title over the territory of the Saramaka in 
accordance with their customary laws through prior, effective, and informed 
consultations with the Saramakas.1069  
                                                        
1065 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 174 and 175. As was discussed earlier, Surinamese 
law does not recognize indigenous or tribal peoples, thereby creating large problems in 
relation to representation. 
1066 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 115: “The Court has previously held that, rather 
than a privilege to use the land, which can be taken away by the State or trumped by real 
property rights of third parties, members of indigenous and tribal peoples must obtain title to 
their territory in order to guarantee its permanent use and enjoyment. This title must be 
recognized and respected, not only in practice, but also in law, in order to ensure its legal 
certainty. In order to obtain such title, the territory traditionally used and occupied by the 
members of the Saramaka people must first be delimited and demarcated, in consultation with 
such people and other neighboring peoples. In this regard, the Court has previously declared 
that “a strictly juridical or abstract recognition of indigenous lands, territories or resources lacks 
true meaning where the property has not been physically established and delimited.” 
1067 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 164. 
1068 Mackay F, Saramaka, de Strijd om het Bos (KIT Publishers, 2010), p. 38. 
1069 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 193. Next to the requirements of delimitation, 
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The Court confirmed and brought into practice its system of granting territorial 
rights to indigenous (or in this case, tribal) peoples through recognizing a 
communal property right under Article 21 of the American Convention. Until 
this delimitation, demarcation and titling has been carried out, Suriname must 
abstain from activities that affect the existence, value, use, or enjoyment of the 
territory to which the members of the Saramaka people are entitled, unless the 
State obtains the free, prior and informed consent of the Saramaka people.1070 
Once again, an analogy with the Cobo conclusions is present. Cobo indicated 
that since it is the indigenous community concerned that will suffer most of the 
consequences, projects should be suspended until proper negotiations have taken 
place.1071  
  Furthermore, prior concessions have to be reviewed and evaluated to see if 
they need to be modified.1072 As was discussed in Part III of this study, the 
“prior” requirement may demand ex-post revision of existing arrangements. 
The Court also decided that legal recognition must be given to the Saramaka 
people, since their juridical capacity is necessary to ensure the full exercise and 
enjoyment of their communal right to property. Moreover, procedures have to 
be implemented in national legislation to ensure free, prior and informed 
consultation and consent, to guarantee equitable benefit sharing and to ensure 
that environmental and social impact assessments are conducted by independent 
and technically capable entities.1073  
The Court specified criteria for the scope and implementation of communal 
land rights for indigenous (and tribal) peoples and obliged the State to take far-
reaching measures in order to remedy the current situation. Furthermore, for the 
first time the Court awarded a monetary compensation on the basis of 
environmental damage resulting from the State’s violation of the relevant 
provisions of the American Convention.1074  
 
  
                                                                                                                              
demarcation and titling of indigenous territory, the Court ordered Suriname to: (a) amend its 
legislation impeding the exercise of the right to property, through fully informed, prior, and 
effective consultations with the Saramaka people, (b) grant the Saramakas legal recognition of 
their collective juridical capacity, (c) perform prior environmental and social impact 
assessments before awarding any concession for any development or investment project within 
Saramaka territory, (d) finance radio broadcasts and newspaper issues on the verdict and (e) 
compensate material and non-material damages, to be allocated in a development fund for the 
benefit of the community as a whole. 
1070 Ibid., paragraph 193. 
1071 José Martínez Cobo, Final Report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, third part: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, page 71, at 545. 
1072 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 193. 
1073 Ibid., paragraph 193. 
1074 Ibid., paragraph 198 – 213. 
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Conclusions from the Saramaka Case this far 
 
The Saramaka case offers the most comprehensive account of the scope of FPIC 
this far. Saramaka People v. Suriname expands the Court’s system of communal 
property rights that was explained above, and clarifies what a system of effective 
participation should include. While it was already discussed that restrictions on 
the right to property must be (a) previously established by law, (b) necessary, (c) 
proportionate, and (d) with the aim of achieving a legitimate objective in a 
democratic society, the Court added another “factor” to these requirements. 
When restricting the property rights of indigenous or tribal communities, it 
must be considered whether the proposed action amounts to a denial of the 
concerned communities’ traditions and customs in such a way that it endangers 
their - physical or cultural - survival. 
To make sure that this does not happen, the Court developed its three-part 
test. First, the effective participation of the members of the people concerned must 
be ensured, which implies - at a minimum - good faith consultations with the 
purpose of achieving free, prior and informed consent. Secondly, a reasonable 
benefit from the proposed plan must be guaranteed, and thirdly, prior 
environmental and social impact assessments must have been realized. Additionally, 
the Court explained that obtaining FPIC becomes mandatory when 
development projects have a major impact on indigenous communities.  
 the Court explicitly linked the principle of FPIC to the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The pieces of the puzzle seem to come 
together in this landmark decision. The doctrine of communal land rights, in 
combination with the principle of self-determination of peoples, create a form of 
territoriality for indigenous peoples in which the Court tries to delineate the 
scope for FPIC.  
 Later on in the conclusions to these paragraphs, the full system of the court 
will be reiterated, but first it is necessary to have a look at what happened in the 
aftermath of the 2007 Saramaka decision, since a number of questions about this 
system of effective participation and land/resource rights remained open. This 
discussion is divided in two different paragraphs, one specifically on the 
implementation of the Saramaka judgment, and one on further legal 
developments in the period after the judgment. However, some overlap 
between them is inevitable.  
 
V.1.2.4.4 Implementation of FPIC and International Judgments in Suriname 
 
As discussed earlier, implementation of the judgments of the Inter-American 
Court has not been without delays, to say the least. Saramaka is no exception. 
But while the Awas Tingni, Sawhoyamaxa, and Yakye Axa cases have largely 
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been concluded, the most important requirements of the Saramaka judgment 
still have to be satisfied.1075 
 The Court uses monitoring reports to measure and expose the way in which 
the state complies with its judgments. Furthermore, the state may request an 
interpretation of the judgment from the Court if certain parts are unclear. Both 
follow-up mechanisms were used after the Saramaka judgment. Furthermore, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, 
visited Suriname and offered his technical expertise to help the state with the 
implementation of the verdict. Moreover, representatives of the Saramaka 
people also requested the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) to consider their complaint (about the lack of 
implementation of the Saramaka judgment) under its Urgent Action and Early 
Warning Procedures. CERD also commented upon the judgment’s follow-up 
in its 2009 consideration of Suriname’s country report. The relevant reports, 
statements and documents will be discussed next.1076 
 
Interpretation of the Saramaka Judgment 
 
In 2008, Suriname requested the Court for an interpretation of its judgment. On 
August 12, the Court issued its interpretation judgment in which it clarified a 
number of elements. Pursuant to Article 67 of the Convention the Court can 
interpret its judgments if so requested by one of the parties. Nevertheless, a 
request for interpretation should not be used as a disguised form of appeal, but its 
exclusive objective should be to clarify the meaning of a judgment when parties 
are of the opinion that the text in the operative paragraphs lack clarity or 
precision.1077 
                                                        
1075 Furthermore, regarding the Moiwana village case, no independent investigation into the 
facts of the 1986 massacre has been conducted yet.  
1076 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs). Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, Suriname, CERD/C/SUR/CO/12, 13 March 2009, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention. Order of the 
President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of April 20, 2010, Case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment. Order of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights of November 23, 2011, Case of the Saramaka People v. 
Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment. A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, 
Addendum, Measures needed to secure indigenous and tribal peoples’ land and related rights 
in Suriname. Request for Consideration of the Situation of the Saramaka People of Suriname 
under the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s Urgent Action and Early 
Warning Procedures submitted by the Association of Saramaka Authorities and the Forest 
Peoples Programme, 22 January 2012. 
1077 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), p. 4.  
CHAPTER V 
271 
The Court explained a number of issues regarding compensation, 
environmental, and social impact assessments (ESIA’s) and future concessions in 
Saramaka territory. But most importantly - for this study’s purposes - it analyzed 
the issue of effective participation and the right to consultation. 
 The state asked the Court which particular members of the Saramaka people 
needed to be consulted, when this was mandatory, and how the system of 
benefit sharing ought to be structured. The Court explained that the State has 
the duty to consult with the Saramaka in relation to a number of elements in the 
judgment, and that it is up to the Saramaka people to determine, in accordance 
with their customs and traditions, which tribe members are to be involved in 
such consultations.1078  
 The Court explained that consultation is at least necessary with respect to the 
following issues: 
 
In this regard, the Judgment orders the State to consult with the 
Saramaka people regarding at least the following six issues: (1) the 
process of delimiting, demarcating and granting collective title over 
the territory of the Saramaka people; (2) the process of granting the 
members of the Saramaka people legal recognition of their collective 
juridical capacity, pertaining to the community to which they 
belong; (3) the process of adopting legislative, administrative, and 
other measures as may be required to recognize, protect, guarantee, 
and give legal effect to the right of the members of the Saramaka 
people to the territory they have traditionally used and occupied; (4) 
the process of adopting legislative, administrative and other measures 
necessary to recognize and ensure the right of the Saramaka people 
to be effectively consulted, in accordance with their traditions and 
customs; (5) regarding the results of prior environmental and social 
impact assessments, and (6) regarding any proposed restrictions of 
the Saramaka people’s property rights, particularly regarding 
proposed development or investment plans in or affecting Saramaka 
territory.1079 
  
The Court further reiterated its explanation regarding the last point, of when 
consultation is necessary – which is always - and that such consultation should 
always have the goal of reaching agreement (FPIC). It further restated that 
sometimes, when the impact of such development or investment plans is 
“significant” or “major,” the state also has the duty to obtain FPIC. This rather 
                                                        
1078 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), p. 5. 
1079 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), pp. 5-6. 
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unclear conceptualization of the structure of effective participation rights and 
FPIC, will be explained further in the following paragraphs. 
 The Court deliberately omitted any consideration as to who must be 
consulted, since it is up to the Saramaka people to decide and communicate to 
the state who their representatives are.1080 Furthermore, in the interpretation 
judgment, the Court again emphasized that consultation is always necessary and 
that this involves a number of elements - free, prior, informed - in order to 
adhere to the standard of effective participation. Free, prior and informed 
consent therefore is always the goal of such consultations and guides its form, 
while in some cases FPIC becomes mandatory for the State to obtain. 
 These requirements of consultation and consent are thus part of the 
safeguards the Court develops to protect the “survival” of tribal or indigenous 
communities. The Court reiterated in its interpretation judgment that “survival” 
entails more than just physical survival: 
 
The Court emphasized in the Judgment that the phrase “survival as 
a tribal people” must be understood as the ability of the Saramaka to 
“preserve, protect and guarantee the special relationship that [they] 
have with their territory,” so that “they may continue living their 
traditional way of life, and that their distinct cultural identity, social 
structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and traditions are 
respected, guaranteed and protected […].” That is, the term 
“survival” in this context signifies much more than physical 
survival.1081 
 
This forms the rationale behind the Court’s requirements of effective 
participation and ESIA’s. The Court refers to the “Akwé Kon guidelines” as one 
of the most used systems for implementing ESIA’s in relation to indigenous 
peoples.1082 The Akwé Kon guidelines will be discussed in the next paragraphs, 
on voluntary initiatives. 
 In the interpretation judgment, the Court reiterated that control over 
traditional territories is essential for indigenous peoples and that this entails: “The 
right to manage, distribute, and effectively control such territories, in accordance 
                                                        
1080 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), p. 7.  
1081 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), paragraph 37. 
1082 Akwé: Kon Voluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social 
impact assessments regarding developments proposed to take place on, or which are likely to 
impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by indigenous 




with their customary laws and traditional collective land tenure system.”1083 
Again it becomes very clear why self-determination and FPIC are such central 
claims indigenous peoples make: without these concepts, control over their 
traditional territories is virtually impossible. These concepts are not temporary 
measures or positive discrimination policies, but permanent rights.1084 
Nevertheless, restrictions are possible but only under strict conditions. The 
Court emphasized this in its interpretation judgment.  
 Finally, but most importantly, the Court explained that FPIC is always 
necessary in cases where the rights of indigenous communities to their lands 
have not been streamlined with the IACtHR’s system. It is therefore only when 
the full system of indigenous property rights has been implemented, that the 
“major impact” criterion is applicable. The Court reaffirms and stresses the 
importance of its earlier decision: 
 
Until said delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the Saramaka 
territory has been carried out, Suriname must abstain from acts 
which might lead the agents of the State itself, or third parties acting 
with its acquiescence or its tolerance, to affect the existence, value, 
use or enjoyment of the territory to which the members of the 
Saramaka people are entitled, unless the State obtains the free, 
informed and prior consent of the Saramaka people. With regards to the 
concessions already granted within traditional Saramaka territory, 
the State must review them, in light of the present Judgment and 
the Court’s jurisprudence, in order to evaluate whether a 
modification of the rights of the concessionaires is necessary in order 
to preserve the survival of the Saramaka people.1085 
 
Moreover, the Court explicitly stated that this criterion is not only applicable to 
the Saramaka but also to any other indigenous or tribal people that is affected by 
development or investment projects. Hereby the Court clearly indicated that 
Saramaka is to be an important precedent. 
 Notwithstanding the elaborate and arguably clear system the Court 
developed, the implementation process in Saramaka v. Suriname has run far 
from smoothly. It is to this issue that we will now divert our attention.  
 
  
                                                        
1083 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), paragraph 50. 
1084 Mackay F, Saramaka, de Strijd om het Bos (KIT Publishers, 2010), p. 48. 
1085 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), paragraph 55. Italics added. 
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Saramaka: Monitoring Compliance 
 
Monitoring compliance with its judgments is a power inherent to the judicial 
functions of the IACtHR, and in the period after the judgment in Saramaka, two 
compliance reports have been issued, in 2010 and 2011, respectively.1086 
Judgments of the Inter-American Court are binding for parties to the Convention 
and the obligation to comply with rulings of the Court are a basic principle of law 
regarding State responsibility. The principle of pacta sunt servanda implies that States 
must comply with international treaty obligations in good faith, and national 
legislation cannot be invoked to escape international responsibility.1087 The Court 
emphasized that States parties to the Convention must guarantee compliance with 
its provisions and their effects (effet utile) into their national legal orders.1088 It 
stressed that this principle applies not only to substantive provisions of human 
rights treaties but also with respect to procedural obligations such as the rules 
regarding compliance with the Court’s decisions.  
 Referring to earlier decisions, the Court explained that: “These obligations are 
to be interpreted and implemented in such a way that the protected guarantee is 
truly practical and effective, considering the special nature of human rights 
treaties.”1089 The Court therefore acknowledges that genuine implementation, that 
is effective implementation of its judgments, is vital and a matter of ongoing concern 
for safeguarding human rights. As was discussed above, implementation of the 
Court’s judgments in amongst others the Awas Tingni, Yakye Axa, and 
Sawhoyamaxa cases was a long and troubled process. Unfortunately, Saramaka is 
no exception in this respect. 
 In the compliance report, the Court assessed to what extent its judgment have 
been implemented. In the first report, dated April 10, 2010, the Court found that 
although some action had been undertaken, almost none of the orders of the 
Court had been carried out. It continued to monitor compliance and convened a 
closed hearing at the seat of the Court in San José in May 2010. A second report 
followed in November 2011, almost a year after the deadline for implementation 
had been met. 
 Although regular meetings between the representatives of the Saramakas and 
government were held, the State has not complied with the duty to delimit, 
demarcate and title Saramaka land. A project called “Support for the Sustainable 
Development of the Interior” was stopped because it lacked adequate stakeholder 
                                                        
1086 Order of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of April 20, 2010, 
Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment. Order of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 23, 2011, Case of the Saramaka 
People v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment. 
1087 See: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. 
Entered into force on 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, Article 26 - 
27. 
1088 Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 23, 2011, Case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, p. 5. 
1089 Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 23, 2011, Case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, p. 5. 
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support, but the State and Saramaka people signed an agreement in which it was 
declared that the state would assist the Saramakas in the delimitation process.1090 
But this was not enough to comply with the Court’s orders, and the IACtHR 
stated that in addition to complying with the requirements mentioned, the State 
also had to report on the specific action it was to take related to consultation of the 
Saramakas. Furthermore, since the State failed to meet the deadlines, it was 
ordered to submit a detailed schedule for compliance to the Court.1091  
 With regard to new and existing concessions, the Court warned Suriname that 
continuing with those activities, while Sarmaka territory had not been delimited 
yet: “without the consent of the Saramaka and without prior environmental and 
social impact assessments, would constitute a direct contravention of the Court’s 
decision and, accordingly, of the State’s international treaty obligations.”1092 For 
each of these concessions, the State has to show the Court that it had ensured the 
Saramaka’s effective participation, that there was a benefit-sharing agreement 
concluded and whether ESIA’s had been carried out in a proper way. 
 With respect to the creation of a legal framework that recognized the legal 
personality of the indigenous and Maroon peoples of Suriname, in casu the 
recognition of the collective juridical personality of the Saramakas, not much 
progress was made. The most important parts of the Saramaka judgment had not 
been implemented almost four years after the judgment, although some action in 
the right direction had been undertaken. 
 In this respect, it is interesting to discuss the reports of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the findings of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, who visited Suriname in 2011 
to assist in solving the implementation problems.  
 
Alternative Routes towards Compliance 
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
 
Besides the Inter-American Court, other mechanisms have been involved in the 
monitoring and promotion of compliance to the Saramaka judgment. Most 
prominently, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
have played an important role. Their actions and findings will be discussed here. 
 In the 2009 CERD report, in which the Committee explored the periodic 
reports of Suriname, it noted that it was deeply concerned about the 
                                                        
1090 Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 23, 2011, Case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, pp. 6-7. 
1091 Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 23, 2011, Case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, p. 8. 
1092 Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 23, 2011, Case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, p. 10. 
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implementation of the Saramaka judgment and legislation on land and resource 
rights in a wider perspective.1093  
 The Committee noted that major problems were caused by natural resource 
extraction - mainly logging and mining - on indigenous and tribal traditional 
lands. It expressed its concern about the lack of any effective natural resource 
management regime.1094 It urged Suriname to take steps towards: “A 
comprehensive national land rights regime and appropriate relevant legislation 
with the full participation of the freely chosen representatives of indigenous and 
tribal peoples.”1095 All this should happen in: “full compliance with the orders of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Saramaka people case.”1096 
 Central in the CERD report are the requirements of consultation and 
consent. The Committee urged the state to consult and involve the affected 
tribal or indigenous communities before granting mining concessions and 
recommended the that: “When taking legislative or administrative decisions 
which may affect the rights and interests of indigenous and tribal peoples, the 
State Party endeavor to consult and obtain their informed consent.”1097 The 
statement clearly reflects the wording of Article 19 of the UNDRIP.  
 More specifically, the Committee was concerned about the ongoing delays 
in compliance of the most crucial aspects of the Moiwana and Saramaka case, in 
particular concerning: “The recognition of communal and self-determination 
rights and the investigation and punishment of the perpetrators of the Moiwana 
Village massacre in 1986.”1098 
 Although some steps towards consultations had been made, the Committee 
argued that there are still situations in which indigenous peoples do not: 
“participate in decisions which affect them with a view to securing their 
                                                        
1093 CERD/C/SUR/CO/12, 12 March 2009, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Suriname. 
1094 CERD/C/SUR/CO/12, 12 March 2009, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Suriname, paragraph 12. 
1095 CERD/C/SUR/CO/12, 12 March 2009, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Suriname, paragraph 13. 
1096 CERD/C/SUR/CO/12, 12 March 2009, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Suriname, paragraph 13. 
1097 CERD/C/SUR/CO/12, 12 March 2009, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Suriname, paragraph 14. 
1098 CERD/C/SUR/CO/12, 12 March 2009, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Suriname, paragraph 18. 
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agreement.”1099 The terminology chosen is in line with what was discussed 
earlier: FPIC should always be the goal of consultation processes.  
 The CERD report affirms the criteria with regard to participation and FPIC 
enshrined in the Saramaka judgment and UNDRIP. This is indicative of the 
alignment of these specific criteria in international law, a trend that was 
described at length in Part III and IV of this study.1100 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ Study on Suriname 
 
In March 2011, James Anaya, the second Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, visited Suriname, after the Government of Suriname 
requested his technical and advisory assistance in developing a legal framework 
for securing indigenous and tribal rights. The report following Anaya’s visit 
contains some of the most interesting perspectives on how to implement the 
Inter-American system of land, resource, and participation rights, and therefore 
will be discussed at some length. Although in his report Anaya focused on the 
Surinamese context, it contains references to other countries and provides 
insights relevant to situations outside Suriname. Anaya’s report makes 
observations and recommendations to assist Suriname in the development of 
laws and administrative measures to secure indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights, 
in particular their rights over lands and natural resources.1101 In the report it was 
stressed that participation and FPIC play a vital role in this respect.1102 
 Anaya contended that although some advancements made have been made 
in the implementation of the orders of the IACtHR with respect to the 
Saramaka judgment, Suriname has not yet complied with the most important 
substantive elements of the decision. This includes first, the demarcation and 
titling of the Saramaka communities’ lands and second, the development of laws 
or procedures to carry out that process with the effective participation of the 
people involved.1103 In the report it was stressed that these two issues will have 
                                                        
1099 CERD/C/SUR/CO/12, 12 March 2009, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Suriname, paragraph 18. 
1100 Also remember the statement by the Human Rights Committee in the Poma case: “The 
Committee considers that participation in the decision-making process must be effective, 
which requires not mere consultation but the free, prior and informed consent of the 
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1101 A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Addendum, Measures needed to secure indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ land and related rights in Suriname. 
1102 A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Addendum, Measures needed to secure indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ land and related rights in Suriname, paragraph 4.  
1103 A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Addendum, Measures needed to secure indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ land and related rights in Suriname, paragraph 11. 
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to be resolved in order to: “Avoid a prolonged condition of international 
illegality.”1104 
 The primary tool to promote the “process forward,” according to Anaya, is 
the need for consultations with indigenous and tribal peoples. The Rapporteur 
noted that while there is not one formula (as is also argued throughout this 
study), there are a number of elements and principles that are vital for any 
effective participatory process. He provided a concise overview of these 
principles: 
 
These required elements of consultations include that they must: be 
distinct from consultations that may involve the general public or 
ordinary political processes; take place at the earliest possible stage; 
be a genuine dialogue and more than just the provision of 
information; be in good faith with the objective of obtaining 
agreement or consent; be carried out with due regard for indigenous 
peoples’ traditional decision-making institutions in the appropriate 
languages; provide the time necessary for the indigenous peoples to 
make decisions, taking into account their customary ways of 
decision-making; and provide information sufficient to allow 
indigenous peoples to make decisions that are informed.1105 
 
This brief statement indeed reflects the most important elements of 
consultation/consent processes, and is in line with what is argued throughout 
this study. It provides basic guidelines for any consultation process with 
indigenous or tribal peoples. 
  In order to facilitate such consultations, the Rapporteur argued that 
Suriname should firstly establish a platform for consultations, and he referred to the 
Coordinating Commission on Territorial Demarcation, that was formed 
following the Awas Tingni judgment and that has led to the demarcation of 
over 10.000 km² of indigenous territories on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua.1106 
The Nicaraguan case illustrates that judgments that concern a specific 
community have implications for a far wider number of indigenous groups. 
 Such a platform, or joint commission, should establish a clear timetable and 
measurable benchmarks related to the adoption of specific documents to be 
drafted. Anaya suggested a framework law and additional legislation regarding, in 
                                                        
1104A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Addendum, Measures needed to secure indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ land and related rights in Suriname, paragraph 11. 
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1106 A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Addendum, Measures needed to secure indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ land and related rights in Suriname, paragraph 27. 
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particular, a procedure for demarcating and titling indigenous and tribal lands 
and a procedure to follow for consultations with indigenous and tribal peoples 
on activities affecting their lands and resources.1107After the drafting of the 
instruments, consultation rounds should follow on community level, in line with 
international standards. When the final drafts are discussed in Parliament, special 
legislative arrangements should be made for indigenous and tribal representatives 
to participate in this last stage.1108  
 The Special Rapporteur also referred to the different international technical 
and financial resources that are available. Referring again to the Awas Tingni 
follow-up, he mentioned that assistance from the Inter-American Commission, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations Development 
Program, the International Labor Organization, and the World Bank, is 
available.1109 
 Anaya devoted special attention to a 2005 draft text, developed by 
indigenous representatives, in which amendments were proposed to the 
Constitution of Suriname and an “Organic Law on the Rights of Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples.”1110 Although the draft text includes provisions on self-
determination, legal recognition, land and resource rights, and participation, 
there has been virtually no progress towards adopting this instrument.1111 
Therefore, the Rapporteur proposed that – in addition to a framework law – a 
more practical instrument is developed, which again has as its two most 
important elements land and resource rights and consultation procedures: 
 
In light of the Moiwana and Saramaka judgments, the Special 
Rapporteur is of the opinion that priority should be placed on 
developing specific legal provisions for (1) a procedure to identify 
and title indigenous and tribal lands; and (2) a procedure to follow 
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for consulting with and seeking consent of indigenous and tribal 
peoples for resource extraction and other activities affecting their 
lands and resources.1112 
 
The remainder of the report is devoted to explaining how these two procedures 
could be implemented.  
 With respect to the land titling process, Anaya explained that although there is 
some flexibility allowed, there are a number of minimum components that such 
a process should entail: 
 
It could be expected, nonetheless, that the procedure for land 
demarcation and titling would contain, at a minimum, the following 
components: (a) identification of the area and rights that correspond 
to the indigenous or tribal community, or group of communities, 
under consideration; (b) resolution of conflicts over competing uses 
and claims; (c) delimitation and demarcation; and (d) issuance of title 
deed or other appropriate document that clearly describes the nature 
of the right or rights in lands and resources.1113 
 
The fundamental goal of these processes is to “provide security for land and 
resource rights in accordance with indigenous and tribal peoples’ own customary 
laws and resource tenure.”1114 These guidelines seem to be a helpful explanation 
of the Court’s order and are based on previous experiences elsewhere.  
 Anaya made clear that in addition to an adequate procedure for land titling, it 
is vital to have a clear and practical approach on the specific responsibilities for 
states and third parties (e.g. companies) for consultations with indigenous 
communities when development or other activities affect their territories.1115 
Although the rules in international law and the IACtHR’s judgments do not 
forbid development projects on indigenous lands, they do make clear that such 
projects will have to respect indigenous rights and that during implementation of 
these projects, the standards of consultation and FPIC are followed. Although 
these procedures should be flexible, the minimum requirements – mentioned 
above – ought to guide the participatory process. 
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CHAPTER V 
281 
The Special Rapporteur offers a detailed explanation on how to implement the 
Inter-American system on indigenous peoples land, resource, and participation 
rights. The Surinamese case is particularly illustrative, since no adequate legal 
framework on indigenous rights exists. Unfortunately, the Surinamese 
government has not given any follow up or reply to the gesture of the Special 
Rapporteur to offer further technical and advisory assistance.1116 
 Nevertheless, the report includes valuable insights into implementation of the 
Court’s system on land and resource rights. There is a central role for FPIC and 
effective participation procedures, as mechanisms to prevent or solve conflicts of 
interests. For Suriname, it is vital to harmonize the Constitutions and existing 
laws and policies in order to comply with the Court’s order in Saramaka. 
Anaya’s suggestions leave room for flexibility, but do establish minimum 
standards for land and participation rights. 
 
V.1.2.5 Legal Developments in the Aftermath of Saramaka People v. Suriname 
 
As was illustrated, in Saramaka people v Suriname the Court expanded and 
explained the Inter-American system on property and participation rights, but 
implementation of the Court’s orders has not been without delay. This 
paragraph will discuss the (mostly legal) developments in the aftermath of 
Saramaka. Firstly, an overview of the situation after Saramaka in Suriname will 
be provided and legal applications will be discussed. Secondly, two judgments of 
the Court, regarding other states and peoples within the Inter-American human 
rights system will be examined.  
 
V.1.2.5.1 Suriname: CERD and the Inter-American Commission 
 
The current situation in Suriname is not very encouraging, since there has been 
virtually no further progress on implementing a land rights regime and a legal 
framework for the recognition of indigenous rights. In this light, the Forest 
Peoples Programme, a UK based NGO that represents indigenous and Maroon 
peoples in Suriname, requested CERD to consider the situation of the Saramaka 
people under its Urgent Action and Early Warning Procedures in January 
2012.1117  
                                                        
1116 A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
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Suriname informed the Human Rights Council in September 2011 that it was 
unable to comply with recommendations made during the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR). These recommendations entailed that Suriname was to fully 
implement the Court’s decision in Saramaka People.1118 According to the state, 
it was difficult to reach agreement on the land rights issue, since: “It was not just 
a matter of copying what had happened in other countries in the region. 
Suriname needed to find a Surinamese solution, and that was why Suriname 
would ask for some time to deal with this matter.”1119 
 The Government claimed that these issues needed further studying and that 
it would organize a “national land rights conference” on the topic.1120 In 
October 2011, the Government held this conference (the “grondenrechten-
conferentie”) in Colakreek. While a lot of effort was put into the organization of 
this meeting, it was cancelled unilaterally by the President after one day, after a 
statement was read on behalf of indigenous and tribal peoples. The statement 
made references to land, resource, and self-determination rights, in line with 
what was ordered in Saramaka People v. Suriname, but according to a press 
conference by the President on 23 October 2011, self-determination and 
property rights over land and resources were “contrary to the Constitution.”1121 
The failed Land Rights Conference was a major setback for indigenous rights in 
Suriname and since then no progress on the implementation of the Saramaka 
case has been made. 
 Lee Swepston, former human rights coordinator of the ILO, has suggested 
that ratification of ILO 169 would be a giant leap forward for Suriname, since it 
would create a robust legal framework for the recognition of indigenous and 
tribal rights in Suriname, both in relation to land and resource rights and with 
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regard to consultation and consent. Unfortunately, Suriname stated in response 
to a question of the Norwegian delegation at the UPR that: 
 
As for the question from Norway regarding the timeframe in which 
Suriname intended to ratify and implement the International Labour 
Organization Convention No. 169 (1989) concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, the delegation stated 
that the essence of that Convention was the recognition of the 
rights of indigenous people, including their collective land rights. 
Given the current state of affairs in relation to the consultative 
process, Suriname was not yet able to ratify the Convention No. 
169.1122 
 
The litigation process within the OAS context, Saramaka People v. Suriname 
and its relative success for Maroons in Suriname, has motivated indigenous 
peoples in Suriname to pursue justice before the human rights entities of the 
Inter-American system as well.  
 Already in October 2007, the Inter-American Commission issued its 
admissibility report in the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples case.1123 The applicants 
complained that a number of private land titles have been given to non-
indigenous persons between 1976 and 2006 in indigenous villages in the area of 
the Lower Marowijne. Furthermore, they complained that mining concessions 
for bauxite have been granted and that three nature reserves were established 
without the knowledge or consent of the Kaliña and Lokono communities.1124 
The claim and context are very similar to those in Saramaka. The petitioners 
claimed a violation of Articles 3, 21, and 25 of the Convention, and like in 
Saramaka contend that the State of Suriname does not recognize their property 
rights, does not legally recognize the communities, and does not offer adequate 
judicial protection nationally. The Commission declared the petition admissible 
and continued its investigation of the merits of the case.1125 In March of 2012, 
the Commission arranged a hearing and an on-site visit of Commissioner 
Shelton is being organized. 
                                                        
1122 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Suriname. UN Doc. A/ 
HRC/18/12, 11 July 2011, paragraph 21. Special Rapporteur James Anaya already noted that 
the principles of ILO Convention No. 169 are valid in the Surinamese context, even though 
Suriname has not ratified the Convention. 
1123 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, 
REPORT Nº 76/07, Petition 198-07, Admissibility, The Kali a And Lokono Peoples, 
Suriname, October 15, 2007. 
1124 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, 
REPORT Nº 76/07, Petition 198-07, Admissibility, The Kali a And Lokono Peoples, 
Suriname, October 15, 2007, paragraph 4. 
1125 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, 
REPORT Nº 76/07, Petition 198-07, Admissibility, The Kali a And Lokono Peoples, 
Suriname, October 15, 2007, paragraph 69.  
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The second case, The Kaliña Indigenous Community of Maho Case (Maho) is still 
in an earlier stage, as the petition to the Commission was sent in December 
2009.1126 Maho is a Carib (Kaliña) indigenous community, which lives in the 
Saramacca district in close proximity to the Saramacca River and the Maho 
Creek. The Community does not have access to running water, sewage, or 
sanitation systems and there is no electricity in the village. The Maho 
Community’s lands are threatened by sand mining and third parties claiming 
private property titles. While most of the community’s members have already 
been forced to leave, the remaining members have been threatened by third 
parties and their situation was so troublesome that in 2007 the victims held a 
hunger strike.1127 
 In their claim before the commission the community asserts violations of 
Article 3, the right to juridical personality, Article 4(1), the right to life, Article 
5(1), the right to humane treatment, Article 13, the right to freedom of 
information, Article 21, the right to property, and Article 25, the right to 
judicial protection.1128 While the Commission has not decided on the merits yet, 
the situation of the Maho community was so worrisome that it did decide on 
adopting precautionary measures. The Commission explained: 
 
On October 27, 2010, the IACHR granted precautionary measures 
for the inhabitants of the Maho Indigenous Community, in 
Suriname. The request for precautionary measures alleges that since 
1990, the organization Stichting Mohsiro and other third parties 
have allegedly been encroaching upon the 65 hectares of land that 
was reserved for the Maho Community in 1971. It is also alleged 
that at times, the invaders have destroyed the community’s crops 
and threatened its members’ physical integrity. It is alleged that as a 
result of these actions, the extinction of this community may be 
imminent. The Inter-American Commission asked the State of 
Suriname to take the measures necessary to ensure that the Maho 
Community can survive on the 65 hectares that have been reserved 
for it free from incursions from persons alien to the community, 
until the Commission has decided on the merits of the petition.1129 
                                                        
1126 In January 2014, the Commission formally referred the case to the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights. 
1127 Petition Submitted to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Organization 
of American States, by The Kaliña Indigenous Community of Maho and The Association of 
Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname against the Republic of Suriname, 8 December 2009. 
1128 Petition Submitted to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Organization 
of American States, by The Kaliña Indigenous Community of Maho and The Association of 
Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname against the Republic of Suriname, 8 December 2009, 
paragraph 6. 
1129 See: Website of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:  
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp. Article 25 of the Rules of 
Procedure establish that, in serious and urgent situations, the Commission may, on its own 
initiative or at the request of a party, request that a State adopt precautionary measures to 
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In addition to the Commission, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination considered the Maho situation on a preliminary basis under its 
early warning and urgent action procedure. In its letter to the permanent 
representative of Suriname to the UN, CERD expressed its grave concerns 
about the serious violations of the rights of indigenous peoples in Suriname, and 
of the Maho Community in particular.1130 It requested Suriname to inform the 
Committee about which measures have been taken to comply with the Inter-
American Commission’s decision on precautionary measures. The Committee 
referred to its earlier reports on Suriname, related to: “The serious violations of 
the rights of indigenous peoples, the failure to recognize their rights to lands and 
resources, the refusal to consult them and to seek their free, prior and informed 
consent when granting mining concessions to foreign companies whose 
activities would have threatened their livelihood.”1131 No information about 
state compliance is available and representatives from indigenous organizations 
have stated that no follow-up action was undertaken by the State. 
 Both the Kaliña and Lokono case and the Maho case share a number of 
similarities with Saramaka, and they indicate that the problems for indigenous 
and Maroon communities in Suriname are widespread and shared. Without a 
proper legal framework and legal recognition, there is little hope that the issues 
will be resolved in the near future.  
 
V.1.2.5.2 The OAS Region and the Inter-American Court: Xákmok Kásek and Sarayaku 
 
After the Saramaka judgment, the Inter-American Court has decided on the 
merits in two cases that are related to property and participation rights for 
indigenous communities. The first is the case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay (Xákmok Kásek) and the second, and more important 
one for present purposes, is the case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of 
Sarayaku (Sarayaku).1132 Both cases will be explored briefly. 
 
  
                                                                                                                              
prevent irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of the proceedings in connection 
with a pending petition or case, as well as to persons under the jurisdiction of the State 
concerned, independently of any pending petition or case. The measures may be of a 
collective nature to prevent irreparable harm to persons due to their association with an 
organization, a group, or a community with identified or identifiable members. 
1130 See: Website of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/early_warning/Suriname02092011.pdf. 
1131Letter from the Chairperson of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination to the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Suriname to the UN. 
See: Website of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/early_warning/Suriname02092011.pdf. 
1132 IACtHR, Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214. &  IACtHR, Case of 
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and reparations. Judgment of June 
27, 2012. Series C No. 245. 
PRACTICES 
286 
Xákmok Kásek v. Paraguay 
 
In 2010 the Court issued its decision in the case of Xákmok Kásek v. Paraguay, 
and held, in accordance with its earlier jurisprudence on indigenous land right 
and rights to restitution, that a part of the traditional lands of the Community 
should be returned to them.  
 The Xákmok Kásek community is a multi-ethnic group of about 300 people 
who reclaimed lands which are currently occupied by a private owned farm. 
The Community, whose partly nomadic livelihood is based on hunting, fishing, 
and gathering is very vulnerable due to the dispossession of their lands to private 
third parties. The State also created a protected area, which further limited the 
nomadic and traditionally self-sufficient way of life of the community. Many 
members were forced to seek employment on other farms and abandon their 
traditional way of life.1133 Furthermore, a number of people, mostly children, 
died in recent years from preventable illnesses.  
 The Court argued that Article 21 covered not only the right to traditional 
lands for indigenous communities but also the right to reclaim specific ancestral 
lands because of their special cultural, spiritual and historical relation with 
them.1134 The Court held that: “The Community’s link to those lands is 
fundamental and unbreakable for its human and cultural survival.”1135 
 In Xákmok Kásek, the Court found violations of a large number of rights, all 
connected with the denial of property rights to the Community. The Court 
judged that Paraguay had violated the rights to property, fair trial, and judicial 
protection (Art. 21, 8 and 25 of the Convention). Furthermore, the rights to 
life, to personal integrity, and to the recognition of juridical personality were 
violated. Lastly, the Court also found a violation of the rights of the child, since 
their rights to healthcare and education were insufficiently guaranteed by the 
State.1136  
 In Xákmok Kásek the Court reaffirmed its earlier reasoning on land and 
restitution rights, and showed (again) that without effective control over their 
territories, indigenous peoples may become the victim of a number of other 
human rights violations. The Court also emphasized that there is a special duty 
for the State to provide assistance to marginalized communities with regard to 
healthcare and other basic services. In relation to effective participation the 
Court reaffirmed its ruling in Saramaka and stated that: 
 
                                                        
1133 The Human Rights Brief, Centre for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: 
http://hrbrief.org/2010/11/inter-american-court-rules-in-favor-of-paraguayan-indigenous-
group-in-land-rights-case/. 
1134 I IACtHR, Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214. 
1135 IACtHR, Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214, paragraph 282. 
1136 IACtHR, Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214., paragraph 258. 
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In this regard, the Court finds that, in order to guarantee the right to 
property of the indigenous peoples […] the State must ensure the 
effective participation of the members of the Community, in 
accordance with their customs and traditions, in any plan or decision 
that could affect their traditional lands and restrict the use and 
enjoyment of these lands, to ensure that such plans or decision do 
not negate their survival as indigenous people.1137 
 
The reparations reflected the large number of violated rights. Paraguay was 
ordered to return the traditional land to the community, to provide goods and 
basic services, to adjust its domestic laws, to publish and broadcast the judgment, 
and to pay compensation.1138 
 While Xákmok Kásek does not substantially expand the Inter-American 
system on property rights, it is an important reaffirmation of the Court’s 
reasoning, and serves to reinforce the Court’s argumentation.1139  
 
Sarayaku v. Equador 
 
More important for this study’s purposes is the recent ruling in Sarayaku v. 
Ecuador.1140 In this decision, the Court took the opportunity to reflect on the 
right to consultation and consent, and it is the first time, since Saramaka people 
v Suriname, that participation rights in relation to projects affecting indigenous 
territories were explained and upheld in a binding decision. The case is of 
tremendous importance, because the Court upheld the Saramaka criteria for 
effective participation and explained the different elements necessary for an 
adequate consultation process. Moreover, it reiterated the Saramaka argument 
that FPIC should always be the goal of consultation processes, but that in case of 
large scale projects that have a significant impact on the community, it is 
mandatory for the State to obtain full consent. The Court explained that respect 
for the right to consultation is essential for protection of both the right to 
property and the right to cultural identity.  
 The Kichwa community of Sarayaku has a population of about 1200 people, 
who live from subsistence agriculture, hunting, and gathering on their traditional 
territories. About 90% of their food needs are met by traditional subsistence 
means, while about 10% of the food needs are products brought in from places 
                                                        
1137 IACtHR, Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214, paragraph 158. 
1138 IACtHR, Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214, paragraphs 276 – 
331. 
1139 The Xákmok Kásek case is quite similar to the other two cases involving Paraguay that 
were discussed in this paragraph: Sawhoyamaxa and Yakye Axa. 
1140 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245.  
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outside their territory.1141 Decisions on important issues are made in the Tayja 
Saruta-Sarayaku, the traditional community assembly, which is composed of 
different traditional leaders, shamans, and advisors.1142 
 In the nineties, Petroecuador (the State owned oil company) signed a 
prospecting deal with Argentine and US companies for oil exploitation. Much 
of the lands in the deal are traditional lands of the Kichwa community. While 
protests and domestic legal action had already brought oil exploitation to a halt 
until 2010, there had already been an “exploration phase” during which a lot of 
damage had been done to the community’s territories. The oil company already 
felled a large number of trees, destroyed a sacred site, and polluted several water 
sources. Moreover, 467 holes had been drilled in the area in which 1433 kg of 
high-impact explosives were packed. After the temporary stop of the 
prospecting project, the vast majority of the explosives remained in Sarayaku 
territory.1143 Furthermore, the seismic prospecting activities went hand in hand 
with a militarization of the Sarayaku area.1144  
In 2003 the Sarayaku community took the case to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, who then presented the case to the Inter-
American Court in 2006 after the Commission’s 2004 precautionary measures 
requiring the operations to be suspended were ignored by the state.1145 
In its judgment of June 2012, the Court decided that Ecuador had violated the 
Kichwa community’s right to prior consultation, communal property and 
cultural identity when the seismic prospecting project was approved. Moreover, 
the activities threatened the community’s members rights to life and personal 
integrity and Ecuador had violated the community’s right to judicial 
protection.1146 
 
                                                        
1141 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Application to the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in the case of Kichwa People of Sarayaku and its members (case 12.465) 
against Equador, April 26, 2010, paragraphs 49 & 51. 
1142 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Application to the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in the case of Kichwa People of Sarayaku and its members (case 12.465) 
against Equador, April 26, 2010, paragraph 53. 
1143 Only approximately 10% of the explosives were actually removed from Sarayaku territory. 
See: Cultural Survival, Confirming Rights: Inter-American Ruling Marks Key Victory for 
Sarayaku People in Ecuador, http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-
quarterly/confirming-rights-inter-american-court-ruling-marks-key.  
1144 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Application to the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in the case of Kichwa People of Sarayaku and its members (case 12.465) 
against Equador, April 26, 2010. 
1145 Earthrights International, http://www.earthrights.org/blog/hard-earned-victory-
indigenous-rights-latin-america-sarayaku-v-ecuador. Also see: Order of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights of February 4, 2010, Provisional Measures, Regarding the Republic 
of Ecuador Matter of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku. & F Mackay, Forest Peoples 
Programme, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Amicus Curiae Brief in the Case of the 
Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, 22 July 2011. 
1146 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 341.  
CHAPTER V 
289 
The Right to Consultation 
 
The Court relied heavily on Saramaka People v. Suriname in explaining what 
the duty to consultation entailed. It confirmed the safeguard-criteria from 
Saramaka - effective participation, prior social and environmental impact 
assessments, and reasonable benefit sharing - and emphasized that consultation 
must be carried out in good faith in order to achieve agreement or consent 
between parties. Consultation of indigenous communities must be conducted in 
the first planning stages of development projects which will affect their lands and 
resources.1147 
 In the Sarayaku case, there was no doubt regarding the right of the Sarayaku 
people to their territory, since this right was fully acknowledged by Ecuador. 
The Court thus proceeded to examine the obligation to guarantee the right to 
prior consultation, in relation to the right to communal property and cultural 
identity.1148  
 The Court reiterated its earlier jurisprudence - discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs - concerning the right to property. It emphasized again that 
indigenous conceptions of property may diverge significantly from classic 
concepts of property. It cited the Sawhoyamaxa judgment: “Disregard for 
specific forms of use and enjoyment of property, based on the culture, uses, 
customs and beliefs of each community, would be tantamount to holding that 
there is only one way of using and disposing of property, which, in turn, would 
render protection under Article 21 of the Convention illusory for millions of 
people.”1149 
 The Court repeated the important reasoning from Yakye Axa (and later 
cases) that the right to use and enjoy territory would be meaningless for 
indigenous and tribal communities if it were not connected with the protection 
of natural resources. The Court held that the connection between territory and 
natural resources is necessary for indigenous peoples’ cultural and physical 
survival.1150 
 The Court proceeded to explain and reaffirm the limitation criteria that 
apply when the right to property is restricted. The additional Saramaka criteria 
of (a) effective participation, (b) prior ESIA’s, and (c) reasonable benefit sharing 
were recognized and tested.1151 Furthermore, the Court explained that the right 
to consultation is essential in order to respect indigenous peoples’ right to 
                                                        
1147 Earthrights International, http://www.earthrights.org/blog/hard-earned-victory-
indigenous-rights-latin-america-sarayaku-v-ecuador. 
1148 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 124. 
1149 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 145. 
1150 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 146. 
1151 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 157. 
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property and cultural identity: “One of the fundamental guarantees for ensuring 
the participation of indigenous peoples and communities in decisions regarding 
measures that affect their rights and, in particular, their right to communal 
property, is precisely the recognition of their right to consultation, which is 
recognized in ILO Convention No. 169, among other complementary 
international instruments.”1152 
 The Court explained that the right to free, prior and informed consultations 
should be applied in different situations, covered by ILO Convention No. 169. 
It also referred to a large number of domestic systems, within the OAS region, 
in which the right to consultation has been enshrined.1153It explained that States 
are obliged under Article 1(1) of the American Convention to structure their 
domestic standards and institutions in such a way that indigenous communities 
can be consulted effectively, in line with existing international standards. 
Moreover, States must incorporate those standards within the prior consultation 
processes: “So as to generate sustained, effective and reliable channels for 
dialogue with indigenous communities in processes of consultation and 
participation through their representative institutions.”1154 
 In an important passage, the Court summarized the requirements for 
effective participation by indigenous peoples in development or investment 
projects:  
 
The State has the duty to consult the community in an active and 
informed manner, and in accordance with its customs and traditions, 
in the context of a continuous communication between the parties. 
Moreover, these consultations should be undertaken in good faith, 
through culturally appropriate procedures and must be aimed at 
reaching an agreement. Similarly, the indigenous people or 
community must be consulted in accordance with its own 
traditions, during the early stages of the development or investment 
plan, and not only when it is necessary to obtain the community’s 
approval. Also, the State must ensure that members of the 
community are aware of the potential benefits and risks so they can 
decide whether or not to accept the proposed development or 
investment plan. Finally, the consultation must take into account the 
traditional decision-making practices of the people or community. 
Failure to comply with this obligation, or engaging in consultations 
without having regard to their essential characteristics, compromises 
                                                        
1152 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 160. 
1153 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 164. 
1154 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 166. 
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the State’s international responsibility.1155 
 
Paragraph 177 of the judgment comprises a number of important statements 
from the cases analyzed in these paragraphs regarding consultation and consent 
processes, and the Court expressly stated that failure to comply with the right to 
consultation compromises the state’s international responsibility. The Court 
evidently acknowledged that without a number of international guidelines on 
the content of the right to consultation, the right becomes easy to abuse. The 
Sarayaku case also allowed the Court to apply and test its criteria regarding 
effective participation and consultation. 
 
Application of Free, Prior and Informed Consultation Processes in Sarayaku 
 
The Court explained that to determine if the right to consultation has been 
respected, at least five elements are involved. It contended that the state’s 
attempts at reaching agreement had to satisfy the minimum standards and 
essential requirements of a valid consultation process with indigenous 
communities and peoples in relation to their rights to communal property and 
cultural identity.1156 It proceeded with analyzing the right to consultation in 
Sarayaku by means of these elements. Firstly, the Court examined if the 
consultation process was held sufficiently prior.1157 Secondly, it analyzed if the goal 
of the consultations had been to reach an agreement (FPIC).1158 Thirdly, the Court 
had to examine if the consultations had been adequate and accessible.1159 
 Fourth, it was examined if the environmental impact assessment had been 
conducted adequately and with the participation of the community.1160 Finally, 
it had to be assessed whether the informational requirements had been met in 
the consultation process.1161 
 Regarding the first element, the Court explained that the Sarayaku had to be 
consulted during the first stages of the development plan and not only when it 
was necessary to obtain the community’s approval.1162 The Court enforced its 
                                                        
1155 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 177. 
1156 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 178. 
1157 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 180-184. 
1158 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 185-200. 
1159 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 201-203. 
1160 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 204-207. 
1161 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245,paragraphs 208-211. 
1162 IIACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 180. 
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argument by referring to the ILO Expert Committee and different countries in 
the region that had domestic legislation or case law on the matter.1163 
Secondly, the Court stated that consultations must be in good faith and with 
the explicit objective to reach agreement or obtain consent regarding the 
proposed measure. Moreover, referring to the 2005 UNPFII Report on FPIC, 
the Court emphasizes that consultation does not constitute a mere formality but 
should be seen as a true instrument of participation, responding to the ultimate 
goal of establishing a dialogue between the parties based on principles of mutual 
trust and respect and with the aim of reaching consensus.1164 It emphasized that 
consultation in good faith is incompatible with practices such as attempts to 
undermine the social cohesion of the affected communities, for example 
corrupting community leaders through appointing parallel representatives or 
negotiating with individual members contrary to international standards.1165 
 With respect to the Sarayaku, the Court established that the oil company had 
limited itself to offering money and other benefits to the community, in order to 
obtain its consent, without establishing and implementing a systematic and 
flexible process of participation and dialogue with them.1166 The state had 
contributed to a climate of “conflict, division and confrontation” between the 
indigenous communities and discouraged a climate of respect among them. This 
way, and by inappropriately delegating its obligation to consultation to a private 
company, the state had failed to comply with the principle of good faith and its 
obligation to guarantee the Sarayaku’s right to participation. The Court 
concluded that no genuine dialogue as part of the participation process - aimed 
at reaching an agreement - was established.1167 
 Thirdly, the Court held that consultation needs to be both adequate and 
accessible. It agreed with the ILO Committee of Experts in that there is no single 
model for an appropriate procedure, and that therefore the consultation model 
has to be contextualized and developed in line with indigenous peoples’ own 
models of decision making and organization.1168 In Sarayaku, the Court 
concluded that the community’s form of political organization was not respected 
and that the actions carried out by the oil company in order to obtain the 
                                                        
1163 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 181-182. 
1164 Melo M, ‘The Importance of the Sarayaku Case Sentence for Indigenous Rights in the 
Americas’, The Pachamama Alliance, http://www.pachamama.org/news/sarayaku-lawyer-
mario-melo-offers-analysis-on-historic-case. IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of 
Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, 
paragraphs 177 & 186. 
1165 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 186. 
1166 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 194. 
1167 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 198-200. 
1168 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 201-202. 
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consent of the community could not be seen as appropriate or accessible 
consultation.1169 
The fourth element the Court had to test in order to ascertain whether the 
consultations were conducted in a “free, prior and informed” manner, 
concerned the use of the environmental impact assessment. The Court referred 
to Saramaka and held that:  
 
The purpose of these studies is not only to have some objective 
measure of the potential impact on the land and the people, but also 
to ensure that members of  the community are aware of the 
potential risks, including environmental and  health risks, so that 
they can decide whether or not to accept the proposed 
development or investment plan knowingly and voluntary.1170  
 
This statement clearly illustrates the value and purpose of impact assessments. 
These serve to facilitate informed consent processes, providing indigenous 
peoples with the relevant knowledge they need to make a truly informed 
decision about what happens to their lands and resources. In Sarayaku, the 
Court held that the environmental impact study was carried out without 
participation by the community, was carried out by a private company without 
State supervision, did not take into account the social, spiritual, and cultural 
impact of the proposed development plan, and was therefore not carried out in 
accordance with international standards and previous case law of the Court 
(Saramaka).1171  
Finally, and very much in relation to the impact assessments, the Court 
required that consultation processes must be informed. As was described earlier, 
this does require the State to accept and provide information and implies 
constant communication between the parties. As was explored in Part III, 
informed refers as much to the process of communication as to the type of 
information that is to be provided.1172 The Court concluded that the state did 
not carry out an effective and appropriate information process and that the 
                                                        
1169 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 203. 
1170 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 204-205. Refering to 
Saramaka People v. Suriname. 
1171 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 207. 
1172 In Sarayaku the Court established that the Kichwa were not adequately informed, did not 
participate in the process and did not inform the involved communities about advantages and 
disadvantages of the project. Moreover, the oil company did not aim to build a climate of 
respect and peaceful coexistence between the different parties, but divided and stimulated 
conflict among the different groups. I/A Court H.R., Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People 
of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and Reparations, Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 
245, paragraphs 209-210. 
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actions by the oil company also failed to meet the minimum requirements of 
prior consultation.1173 
Importantly, after testing the different requirements that a “free, prior and 
informed” consultation process should entail, the Court established a firm link 
between the right to consultation, the right to communal property and the right 
to cultural identity. While other cases also made clear that the special 
relationship between indigenous peoples and their lands bear on their cultural 
identity, the connection has never been made this explicit. In Saramaka, the 
Court already held that lands and fair participation are essential to guarantee 
indigenous peoples cultural survival, and in Sarayaku the Court further 
explained this connection. It referred to other jurisdiction and platforms, like the 
ILO, UNDRIP, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(which will be examined later on), and the European Court of Human Rights 
in arguing that the right to cultural identity has a collective dimension for 
indigenous, native, or minority groups.1174 
The connection between cultural identity and participation was stated 
unambiguously:  
 
The Court considers that the right to cultural identity is a 
fundamental right – and one of a collective nature – of the 
indigenous communities, which should be respected in a 
multicultural, pluralistic and democratic society. This means that 
States have an obligation to ensure that indigenous peoples are 
properly consulted on matters that affect or could affect their 
cultural and social life, in accordance with their values, traditions, 
customs and forms of organization.1175  
 
Very significant is also the argument by the Court that consultation and cultural 
identity are exponents of indigenous peoples right to self-determination. It referred 
to self-determination in UNDRIP and argued that it had even become 
enshrined in the Ecuadorian constitution of 2008.1176  
 The connection between failure to properly consult indigenous peoples and 
breaching rights to property and cultural identity is clearly stated by the Court in 
its concluding paragraph, cited here in full: 
 
                                                        
1173 The Court held that the Sarayaku people were not consulted by the State prior to the 
company carrying out oil exploration activities, planting explosives or affecting sites of special 
cultural value. IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits 
and reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 211. 
1174 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 216-217. 
1175 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 217. 
1176 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 217. 
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The State, by failing to consult the Sarayaku People on the 
execution of a project that would directly affect their territory, was 
in breach of its obligations, under the principles of international law 
and of its own domestic law, to adopt all necessary measures to 
guarantee the participation of the Sarayaku People, through their 
own institutions and mechanisms and in accordance with their 
values, traditions, customs and forms of organization, in the 
decisions made regarding matters and policies that affected or could 
affect their territory, their cultural and social life, their rights to 
communal property and to cultural identity. Consequently, the 
Court considers that the State is responsible for the violation of the 
right to communal property of the Sarayaku People, recognized in 
Article 21 of the Convention, in relation to the right to cultural 
identity, under the terms of Articles 1.(1) and (2) thereof.1177 
 
The Inter-American Court decided unanimously that Ecuador had violated the 
right to consultation, to communal property, and to cultural identity under 
Article 21 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 1(2).1178 
It ordered the State to consult the Sarayaku in a prior, adequate, and effective 
manner, and in full compliance with applicable international standards, when 
resource extraction might endanger their territories. Furthermore, the State had 
to implement legislation which gives effect to the right to prior consultation and 
to modify laws that prevented free and full exercise of this right. This process has 
to take place with full participation of the communities themselves.1179  
Such processes of participation and prior consultation must be carried out in 
good faith, throughout all stages of the preparation and planning of projects. 
With regard to exploration or extraction projects, the Court explicitly 
confirmed the Saramaka criteria, that prior comprehensive environmental and 
social impact assessments had to be conducted, with full participation of the 
indigenous communities involved.1180  
 
Conclusions: Saramaka Reaffirmed – “Free, Prior and Informed” further Explained 
 
The explicit recognition of the right to consultation and the subsequent analysis 
of the different elements of FPIC are a step forward in relation to Saramaka, 
where the Court did not explicitly test these. The Court reiterated that 
consultations should be conducted in good faith and that they must aim to reach 
                                                        
1177 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 232. 
1178 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 341. 
1179 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 341. 
1180 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraph 300. 
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an agreement and consent. Furthermore, the Court stated that there is a strong 
relation between the right to consultation and the rights to collective property 
and cultural identity, which are all vital parts of indigenous peoples right to self-
determination.1181 
These two essential statements reflect the main line of argument of this 
study: establishment of an intercultural dialogue in a situation of discursive 
control is seen as the ultimate goal of effective participation and it is vital to 
secure collective property rights through participatory structures in order to 
respect indigenous peoples cultural identity and self-determination. Achieving 
FPIC should always be guiding in consultation processes. And in Sarayaku the 
Court took the opportunity to apply the requirements of “free, prior and 
informed” to a specific case. 
As for reparations, the Court ordered Ecuador to pay damages to the 
community, remove the remaining explosives, make a public statement 
recognizing their international responsibility for the harms caused, and adapt the 
state’s consultation processes so that they are in line with international law.1182  
The Sarayaku case is the most important affirmation that the Inter-American 
system of property and participation rights, as it was constructed in Saramaka, is 
upheld and will play a larger role in the future when indigenous communities’ 
territories are at stake. Furthermore, Sarayaku offered the IACtHR the 
opportunity to be much more clear about the guidelines and rules that are to be 
followed in order to respect the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted. 
More importantly, the Court did not elaborate on the question in which cases 
consent is legally mandatory for the State to obtain. Since Ecuador did not satisfy 
the preliminary obligation to consult, the Court did not find it necessary to 
specifically examine when consent is required.1183 Although the Court reasoned 
that the duty to consult is now a general principle of international law, the scope 
and content of the requirement of consent are still underexposed. It seems 
inevitable that the Court will have to deal with this question in a later case. 
Nevertheless, it did explain further how the consultation process ought to be 
brought in line with the “FPIC requirements” free, prior and informed. In this 
respect it is an important and necessary next step after Saramaka. 
 
V.1.2.6 Influence of the Inter-American System Outside the OAS Area 
 
While this study is about FPIC and indigenous rights in international law, these 
paragraphs mainly discussed the jurisprudence on indigenous land and 
                                                        
1181 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, paragraphs 212-220. 
1182 Earthrights International, http://www.earthrights.org/blog/hard-earned-victory-
indigenous-rights-latin-america-sarayaku-v-ecuador. 
1183 American Society of International Law, The Duty to Consult in the Inter-American 
System: Legal Standards after Sarayaku, ASIL Insights, Vol. 16, Issue 35, November 28, 2012. 
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participation rights in the framework of the OAS.1184 Therefore, this paragraph 
will discuss the impact that legal decisions in the Inter-American human rights 
system could have on other regional human rights structures. After briefly 
discussing the influence of the Inter-American Human Rights System on 
International Law - issues to which we will return in the overall conclusions - 
the Endorois decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
will be debated, since this landmark decision for African indigenous peoples 
clearly shows how the judicial dialogue (or monologue) between different 
systems can take place. Endorois is the main example of how regional human 
rights norms may affect other regions. The African Commission cites frequently 
from Saramaka v. Suriname and other cases from the IACtHR, and refers to 
FPIC and communal property and resource rights. 
 The starting point for assessing the influence of the Court’s decisions remains 
Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, which in which it is stated that: “The decision of 
the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that 
particular case.”1185 Nevertheless, the reasoning in one or a series of cases may 
become very authoritative when the argumentation is compelling. Although 
judicial decisions are regarded as a subsidiary means for the determination of the 
rules of law, they can be of immense importance.1186 Over time judicial 
reasoning from international courts may become guiding for other decisions.1187 
 When judicial argumentation becomes so compelling – preferably in a 
number or sequence of similar cases – it is still allowed to deviate from the 
earlier decisions. In practice, however, substantial divergence in similar decisions 
does not happen too often. As was discussed, the Inter-American Court has 
upheld (and expanded) its reasoning about the system of collective property 
rights for indigenous peoples. An important sign that the Inter-American System 
becomes authoritative in other jurisdictions is of course when the judicial 
reasoning is quoted and followed elsewhere. 
 
V.1.2.6.1 Judicial Interpretation and Approach 
 
As explained, in interpreting the provisions of the American Convention in light 
of their object and purpose – the effective protection of human rights – the 
Court and Commission have stretched and developed their meaning to include 
a number of special measures for indigenous peoples. Protection of their lands 
and resources entails a number of positive obligations for the state, and 
                                                        
1184 As explained, this is because the Inter-American human rights of property rights includes 
norms of participation, consultation and FPIC. 
1185 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 59. Article 38, which qualifies legal 
decisions as a secondary source of international law. 
1186 Statute of the International Court of Justice Article 38, which qualifies legal decisions as a 
secondary source of international law. See: MN Shaw, International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, pp. 109-112.  
1187 A well known example is the ICJ’s doctrine on customary international law. 
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guaranteeing indigenous peoples’ effective participation is an important part of 
this.  
  Formally, a positivist approach dictates that the Court does not have any 
direct law-making authority.1188 In positive international law, states are not 
legally bound to decisions of international institutions to which they are not 
parties. In this view, the Court would only have the formal authority to 
interpret and apply the law in relation to its parties. But in practice, it is no 
longer only states that create international law. In Saramaka, for example, the 
Court appeared to interpret elements of the UN Declaration as having gained 
the status of international custom, thereby shaping and interpreting international 
legal norms.  
The Court chose an active approach, and instead of merely functioning as 
“la bouche de la loi,” it endeavored to interpret and shape contemporary legal 
norms.1189 This approach has been described by James Anaya as the post-modern 
realist method - a working method that uses interdisciplinary inquiries to 
determine how the law actually works or has worked in the past in relation to its 
effect on specific groups.1190 The “evolutionary method” of purposive 
interpretation, as practiced by the Court in the Awas Tingni case and repeated 
in the following decisions by the Commission and Court, goes further than 
applying positive international law and rather progressively aims at genuinely 
addressing and posing solutions for the pressing needs of indigenous peoples. 
The Court inquired into the core values of the American Convention’s 
property provisions seen in light of the underlying values of the OAS Human 
Rights System. Moreover, the Court took into account the broader body of 
international law and contemporary developments within this field.1191 The 
ICCPR (mainly articles 1 and 27) and ILO Convention No. 169 were 
considered as additional sources for interpreting the rights of the indigenous 
community.1192 
                                                        
1188 Anaya S J, ‘Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Land 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend’, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005, page 249. 
1189 International Courts in general tend to be more ‘common law like’, which implies a more 
active law-shaping role on behalf of the judge. 
1190 Anaya S J, ‘Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Land 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend’, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005, page 250. 
1191 Anaya S J, ‘Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Land 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend’, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005, page 253. 
1192 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976. & ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, Adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General Conference of the 




What is important, as will be shown, is that these judgments already serve as a 
point of reference for other international judicial and quasi-judicial decisions and 
documents.1193 The Court adopts this dynamic or evolutionary (and indeed 
purposive) method of interpretation to expand the scope of Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights to include a collective or communal 
property right for indigenous and tribal peoples over their traditionally occupied 
lands and resources. Moreover, the Court develops and explains participatory 
requirements for the implementation of mentioned rights. Article 29 of the 
Convention determines a number of restrictions on the interpretive freedom the 
Court’s judges have. Although in Article 29 ways in which the Convention 
should not be interpreted are provided, it can also be used to expand the Court’s 
jurisdiction, since it enables the Court to take into account other human rights 
sources and view them from the perspective of the Convention. This is in line 
with the view that human rights are interdependent, and it allows the Court to 
take international conventions as well as national laws into account.1194 
According to Aharon Barak’s method of interpretation, which is quite 
similar to the system the IACtHR adheres to, it is not possible to know how to 
interpret the law unless the goal of such interpretive exercise is explicit. The goal 
of interpretation in general is to achieve the purpose of the law or a particular 
legal text. Of course, law has a purpose - it is a social device. The goal of 
interpretation is to achieve the social goal a particular law (and the legal system 
as a whole) perceives.1195  
  In general, this conception of interpretation concerns “rational activity giving 
meaning to a legal text,” and this should be perceived as both the principal and 
the most important tool a court possesses.1196 As was explained, interpretation 
concerns a process whereby the legal meaning of a text is extracted from its 
semantic meaning. In interpreting a legal text, the interpreter thus transforms 
static law into dynamic law.1197 
 Barak argued that in purposively interpreting a legal text, judges must take 
into account the values underlying the legal system and interpret a text, 
depending on its content, objectively, in order to reveal its true meaning in 
contemporary society. Furthermore, he mentioned that such texts must not be 
interpreted on their own but in light of the broader legal instruments. 
 The pragmatic and realist approach purposively interpreting the Convention 
in a way in which culture plays a central role, as used by the Inter-American 
Court in Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua and later cases, offers a good example of the 
                                                        
1193 ACHPR, 276 / 2003 – Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, 4th February 2010. 
1194 See, e.g. Lixinski L, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-american court of Human rights: 
Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law’, EJIL, Vol. 21 no. 3, 2010, pp. 
603- 604. Lixinski argues that this exercise in expansionism that the Court employs eventually 
contributes to the unity of international law. 
1195 Barak A, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005), p. xv. 
1196 Barak, 2006, p. 122.  
1197 Barak, 2006, p. 123. 
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importance for human rights courts to engage in purposive judicial law making. 
It illustrates that in order to bridge the gap between law and society, human 
rights instruments must be regarded as dynamic texts, as living instruments that 
are able to adapt to changing societal circumstances. 
 The realist model is traditionally contrasted with a formalist approach. The 
latter interpreted the rights of indigenous peoples with fixed rules and positive 
application, while the former emphasizes a contextual interpretation of human 
rights norms as it applies to a specific set of problems.1198 Anaya has explained 
and summarized that this realist model establishes three interpretative principles 
that are widely accepted in international adjudication.1199 First, human rights 
provisions are to be interpreted in light of the overall context and object of the 
instrument of which they are a part. Secondly, the larger body of relevant 
human rights norms is to be taken into account and thirdly, they are to be 
interpreted in the manner that is most advantageous to the enjoyment of human 
rights. 1200 The last principle is also known as the “pro homine principle” as 
discussed earlier on in this part. The cases discussed in these paragraphs served as 
good examples of how these principles were applied in actual cases. 
 This realist or evolutionary method of the Court serves to develop 
international human rights law so as to give it meaning in the contemporary 
struggles of indigenous peoples. It focuses on real-life problems faced by 
different indigenous and tribal communities in the Americas. The Court’s 
interpretive exercise underlines its willingness to take into account a divergence 
of concepts that is necessary to protect the physical and cultural survival of 
vulnerable groups from violations of their rights to self-determination and 
inherently, their rights to freely enjoy their traditionally occupied territories. 
 
Universalistic Approach  
 
While the starting point for human rights protection is the national system, 
regional human rights tribunals have an important complementary role.1201 As was 
argued earlier, this is certainly the case for indigenous peoples, since the state is 
often the violator of their asserted rights and is not in the position to act as an 
independent mediator in conflicts between states and indigenous communities.1202  
                                                        
1198 Hopkins J, 'The Inter-American System and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Human 
Rights and the Realist Model', in: Richardson (ed.), Indigenous Peoples and the Law: 
Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Hart, 2009), pp. 140-141. 
1199 Anaya S J, ‘Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Land 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend’, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005. 
1200 Anaya S J, ‘Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Land 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend’, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005. 
1201 Killander M, ‘Interpreting Regional Human Rights Treaties’, SUR - International Journal 
on Human Rights, v. 7, n. 13, dec. 2010, p. 163. 
1202 Remember the criticism on Tully’s ‘Strange Multiplicity’ in which the State has the role 
of mediator in conflicts over cultural recognition. 
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The Inter-American Court ascribes autonomous meaning to the provisions in the 
Convention, independently from how a particular term is defined nationally.1203 
By means of the “living instrument doctrine” the Court recognizes that its 
provisions are not static and that their content and scope may change over time. 
But the Court is also aware that its judgments have a profound effect on broader 
international law and that they are involved in a judicial dialogue that affects other 
regional or international legal systems.  
 The human rights entities of the OAS generally follow a universalistic approach, 
relying heavily on other international sources like UN treaties and opinions or 
reports from UN human rights mechanisms and experts. The UN bodies, in turn, 
frequently cite the opinions and judgments of the Inter-American Court. As such, 
the Court and Commission also aim to develop international law outside the OAS 
region by making its reasoning consistent with broader international law. This 
way, the jurisprudence of the IACtHR may have beneficial effects for indigenous 
rights outside of its jurisdiction, in other regions.  
 The Inter-American mechanisms and their decisions have been cited by the 
ECtHR, albeit not in relation to decisions involving indigenous peoples.1204 The 
Inter-American Court and Commission more frequently cite the judgments of the 
European Court, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
often relies on reasoning by both the ECtHR and the IACtHR.1205 One of the 
decisions of the African Commission is of particular interest to this study: Endorois 
v. Kenya. This decision will be discussed in more detail below. 
This (quasi) judicial dialogue between different regional and international 
platforms is necessary for the creation of a coherent system of international law for 
indigenous peoples. Furthermore, sharing arguments and reasoning leads to 
stronger normative roots and increased legitimacy, while at the same time it 
exposes the difficulties that diverging contexts may bring. As mentioned, there is 
one recent and very relevant example of this judicial dialogue regarding FPIC and 
indigenous rights.  
 
V.1.2.6.2 Regional Diffusion of the Inter-American Approach: The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in Endorois v. Kenya 
 
In 2008, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights issued its 
decision in the case between the Endorois Community and the State of Kenya.1206 
It is the leading example of how the Inter-American system of property and 
                                                        
1203 Killander M, ‘Interpreting Regional Human Rights Treaties’, SUR - International Journal 
on Human Rights, v. 7, n. 13, dec. 2010, p. 163. 
1204 Killander M, ‘Interpreting Regional Human Rights Treaties’, SUR - International Journal 
on Human Rights, v. 7, n. 13, dec. 2010, p. 154. 
1205 Killander M, ‘Interpreting Regional Human Rights Treaties’, SUR - International Journal 
on Human Rights, v. 7, n. 13, dec. 2010, p. 154. 
1206 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010. 
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participation rights affects other jurisdictions within the context of regional human 
rights protection,. The case will be examined here to illustrate how the African 
Commission used this system. 
 The complainants, the Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority 
Rights Group International on behalf of the Endorois Welfare Council, submitted 
a claim before the African Commission on Human Rights on May 22, 2003. The 
Endorois people traditionally inhabited the Lake Bogoria area in the Rift Valley 
province in Kenya. Approximately 400 families belong to the community, which 
had practiced pastoralism in said area from time immemorial.  
In 1973, the gazetting of the area as a game reserve resulted in the eviction 
and relocation of the community. Furthermore, the complainants alleged that 
concessions for ruby mining on Endorois traditional lands were granted to a 
private company in 2002. The community was never consulted prior to declaring 
the region as protected area. They were displaced to semi-arid land, which proved 
to be inadequate for sustaining their livestock. Moreover, their access to Lake 
Bogoria, which is important to them for religious and cultural purposes, was 
denied and attempts to access the area were met with harassment and intimidation. 
In addition, the complainants claimed that there was no proper compensation 
given to the community for the loss of their traditional territory. 
The Complainants alleged that the displacement of the Endorois community 
from their ancestral lands entailed a violation of their rights, as enshrined in the 
African Charter. The allegations included the failure to adequately compensate 
them for the loss of their property, the disruption of the community’s pastoral way 
of life and violations of the right to practice their religion and culture, as well as 
the disruption of the overall process of development of the Endorois people. They 
claimed that the Government of Kenya has violated the Endorois community’s 
religious freedom (Article 8), its right to property (Article 14), cultural rights 
(Article 17 (2) & (3)), the right to natural resources (Article 21), and the right to 
development (Article 22).1207 The Community firstly claimed restitution of their 
land, with legal title and clear demarcation, and secondly compensation to the 
community for all the loss they have suffered through the loss of their property, 
development and natural resources, but also freedom to practice their religion and 
culture. 
 Although the Endorois decision includes a number of interesting statements 
relevant to indigenous rights, the focus in this paragraph will be on the rights to 
property, resources and development, since in the Inter-American Court has most 
                                                        
1207 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Adopted June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force, October 21, 1986. 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraphs 1-22. 
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profoundly influenced the decision of the African Commission these areas and it is 
with respect to these rights that participatory rights are involved.1208  
Regarding the land rights of indigenous communities in Africa, the 
Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations had already 
stated in its 2005 report that land rights are probably the most important of the 
indigenous issues since: “The protection of rights to land and natural resources is 
fundamental for the survival of indigenous communities in Africa.”1209 
 With regard to the right to property, protected by Article 14 of the Charter, the 
Commission stated that it would first look into its own jurisprudence, and then 
into international case law.1210 While the Endorois did not have a registered 
property title to their lands, the Commission made clear - referring to Awas Tingni 
- that possession should suffice for an indigenous community to obtain official 
recognition of that property.1211 The Commission emphasized that the state does 
not only have the duty to respect that right but also to protect it.1212 
 The Commission continued with its analysis using the Inter-American Court’s 
reasoning. It explained that in Saramaka the failure to recognize an indigenous or 
tribal group becomes a violation of the right to property and quoted the Court: 
“This controversy over who actually represents the Saramaka people is precisely a 
natural consequence of the lack of recognition of their juridical personality.”1213 
Quoting Saramaka again, the Commission stated that lack of clarity on this issue 
should not be an insurmountable obstacle, since the State has a duty to consult 
with the community.1214  
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The Kenyan State had argued earlier that special treatment in favor of the 
Endorois might be discriminatory but the Commission referred to Awas Tingni, 
Sawhoyamaxa, Moiwana, Yakye Axa, and Saramaka to confirm that: “Special 
measures of protection are owed to members of the tribal community to guarantee 
full exercise of their rights”.1215 The Commission furthermore referred to a 
number of other international instruments and cases that confirmed that such 
special measures may be necessary and stated that: “It is a well established principle 
of international law that unequal treatment towards persons in unequal situations 
does not necessarily amount to impermissible discrimination.”1216 
 The Commission continued to assert that the Saramaka reasoning was fully 
applicable to the Endorois case, and that only de jure ownership of the land could 
effectively protect indigenous peoples.1217 The Commission affirmed that the 
IACtHR’s criteria were now internationally recognized norms and stated that 
delimitation and demarcation of the territories in consultation with the Endorois 
was necessary before granting the community official title.1218 It then summarized 
the Inter-American jurisprudence and applied it to the situation of the Endorois:  
 
In the view of the African Commission, the following conclusions 
could be drawn: (1) traditional possession of land by indigenous 
people has the equivalent effect as that of a state-granted full 
property title; (2) traditional possession entitles indigenous people to 
demand official recognition and registration of property title; (3) the 
members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left their 
traditional lands, or lost possession thereof, maintain property rights 
thereto, even though they lack legal title, unless the lands have been 
lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith; and (4) the 
members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost 
possession of their lands, when those lands have been lawfully 
transferred to innocent third parties, are entitled to restitution 
thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality. 
Consequently, possession is not a requisite condition for the 
existence of indigenous land restitution rights. The instant case of 
the Endorois is categorized under this last conclusion. The African 
Commission thus agrees that the land of the Endorois has been 
                                                        
1215 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 197, quoting Saramaka. 
1216 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraphs196 and 198. 
1217 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 205. 
1218 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 206. 
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encroached upon.1219  
 
The Commission obviously respected the Inter-American system and 
acknowledged that it has a wider application than just the OAS region. But the 
Commission even went further and applies the entire Saramaka system of FPIC to 
the case of the Endorois. It argued, regarding the alienation of the Endorois lands 
by the Kenyan State, that: “In terms of consultation, the threshold is especially 
stringent in favor of indigenous peoples, as it also requires that consent be accorded. 
Failure to observe the obligations to consult and to seek consent – or to 
compensate - ultimately results in a violation of the right to property.”1220 The 
Commission proceeded by describing the Saramaka safeguards - effective 
participation, benefit sharing and ESIA’s - and confirmed that these are necessary 
to guarantee that restrictions on indigenous property rights do not lead to a denial 
of their survival. Based on these criteria, the Commission concluded, in maybe the 
most important paragraph of the decision, that: 
 
In the instant case, the African Commission is of the view that no 
effective participation was allowed for the Endorois, nor has there 
been any reasonable benefit enjoyed by the community. Moreover, 
a prior environment and social impact assessment was not carried 
out. The absence of these three elements of the “test” is tantamount 
to a violation of Article 14, the right to property, under the Charter. 
The failure to guarantee effective participation and to guarantee a 
reasonable share in the profits of the Game Reserve (or other 
adequate forms of compensation) also extends to a violation of the 
right to development.1221  
 
This paragraph comprises the full Saramaka test, applied to an indigenous group in 
Africa. The Commission was unambiguous is asserting that failure to uphold the 
requirements was “tantamount” to a violation of the right to property. 
Furthermore, failure to secure effective participation (and compensation) also led 
to a violation of the right to development. Although the right to development is a 
particular right in the African Charter, it is obviously connected with the right to 
                                                        
1219 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 209. The Commission 
almost literally cited the IACtHR in Sawhoyamaxa, discussed earlier in this paragraph. 
1220 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 226. 
1221 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 228. 
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self-determination for indigenous peoples, as discussed earlier in this study.1222 Self-
determination is about the right for peoples to choose their pace and path of 
development and a lack of effective participation amounts to a denial of self-
determination. Later on in this paragraph, the right to development and its relation 
to participation will be further discussed. 
 In the issue of property rights the Commission endorsed the Inter-American 
System from Awas Tingni to Saramaka, and acknowledged that under current 
international law this is the way to protect indigenous peoples’ lands. It concluded 
that the encroachment on the property of the Endorois people is disproportionate 
and not in accordance with international law, and that therefore the Endorois had 
suffered a violation of Article 14 of the African Charter.1223 
 With regard to the connected issue of resources (Article 21 of the Charter), the 
Commission again relied on the Saramaka reasoning. The Commission 
acknowledges the IACtHR’s view that the cultural and economic survival of 
indigenous and tribal peoples and their members depends on their access and free 
use of the natural resources in their territories.1224 It further agreed with the 
Court’s argument in Sawhoyamaxa and Yakye Axa that: “Members of tribal and 
indigenous communities have the right to own the natural resources they have 
traditionally used within their territory for the same reasons that they have the 
right to own the land they have traditionally used and occupied for centuries.” 1225 
While also acknowledging that the right to property and its connected right to 
resources is not absolute, the Commission did find that Kenya had violated Article 
21 of the Charter, as the Endorois never received adequate compensation or 
restitution of their lands.1226 
 While in the Inter-American System the scheme for the protection of 
indigenous land rights is primarily based on the right to property, in the African 
Charter it is also based on the right to development (Article 22 of the Charter). 
Participation and involvement in development projects are important and it is 
therefore that a lot of the reasoning in Endorois in relation to participation rights 
and FPIC is linked to Article 22. 
                                                        
1222 On the connection between the right to development and self-determination, see: Doyle 
C and Gilbert J, 'Indigenous peoples and globalization: from development aggression to self-
determined development’, European Yearbook on Minority Issues 219, 2011. 
1223 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 238. 
1224 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 260.  
1225 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 260. 
1226 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraphs 265-268. 
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In this respect, the African Commission quoted the UN Declaration on the Right 
to Development which states that the right to development includes active, free 
and meaningful participation in development.1227 The Commission asserted that 
the issue of participation is closely allied with the right to development and 
proceeded to analyze if the norms regarding effective participation and FPIC were 
upheld. 
 The Commission cited Saramaka and states that there is a duty to consult with 
respect to development or investment plans in indigenous territories. Furthermore, 
the Commission followed Saramaka in stating that the consultations must be in 
good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures and with the objective of 
reaching an agreement.1228 It then proceeded to apply the FPIC criteria on the 
case at hand: 
 
In the instant Communication, even though the Respondent State 
says that it has consulted with the Endorois community, the African 
Commission is of the view that this consultation was not sufficient. 
It is convinced that the Respondent State did not obtain the prior, 
informed consent of all the Endorois before designating their land as 
a Game Reserve and commencing their eviction. The Respondent 
State did not impress upon the Endorois any understanding that 
they would be denied all rights of return to their land, including 
unfettered access to grazing land and the medicinal salt licks for their 
cattle. The African Commission agrees that the Complainants had a 
legitimate expectation that even after their initial eviction, they 
would be allowed access to their land for religious ceremonies and 
medicinal purposes – the reason, in fact why they are in front of the 
African Commission.1229  
 
The Commission tested the different elements of FPIC and concludes that they 
have not been respected in the present case. Subsequently, it quite literally adopted 
the important viewpoint from Saramaka that: 
 
Additionally, the African Commission is of the view that any 
development or investment projects that would have a major impact 
within the Endorois territory, the State has a duty not only to 
consult with the community, but also to obtain their free, 
                                                        
1227 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 283. 
1228 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 289. 
1229 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 290. 
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prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and 
traditions.1230  
 
The Commission agreed with the Complainants that the State did not ensure that 
the Endorois were accurately informed of the nature and the consequences of the 
process, which is a minimum requirement from the Dann Sisters case, which was 
discussed earlier in this part.1231 The case for FPIC was also supported with 
arguments from the UN Special Rapporteur, who stated that free, prior, and 
informed consent is essential for the protection of human rights of indigenous 
peoples in relation to major development projects.1232 Furthermore, the 
Commission argued that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination had recommended that both the equitable sharing of benefits and 
the securing of prior informed consent were essential when such projects are 
planned on indigenous territories.1233 The Commission concluded with regard to 
the case of the Endorois that: 
 
The African Commission is convinced that the inadequacy of the 
consultations left the Endorois feeling disenfranchised from a process 
of utmost importance to their life as a people. Resentment of the 
unfairness with which they had been treated inspired some members 
of the community to try to reclaim the Mochongoi Forest in 1974 
and 1984, meet with the President to discuss the matter in 1994 and 
1995, and protest the actions in peaceful demonstrations. The 
African Commission agrees that if consultations had been conducted 
in a manner that effectively involved the Endorois, there would 
have been no ensuing confusion as to their rights or resentment that 
their consent had been wrongfully gained.1234  
 
The Commission’s analysis of the participatory requirements reveals the problems 
with FPIC that have been described throughout this study and emphasized why it 
is so important that consent or consultations are conducted in a manner that can 
                                                        
1230 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 291. Emphasis added. 
1231 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 292. 
1232 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 293. 
1233 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 296. 
1234 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm no. 276 / 2003, 2010, paragraph 297. 
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be qualified as “free, prior and informed.” The Endorois had highlighted in their 
complaint that illegitimate consultations had taken place and that the authorities 
had selected individuals to ‘lend their consent’ on behalf of the Endorois.1235  
 Eventually this led the Commission to conclude that the right to development 
was also violated and stated in its recommendations that Kenya had to recognize 
rights of ownership to the Endorois and restitute Endorois ancestral lands, ensure 
unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria, and pay adequate compensation to the 
community for the loss suffered. Furthermore, the State had to engage in a 
dialogue with the community to implement the Commission’s recommendations. 
 In conclusion, Endorois v. Kenya is an important decision for a number of 
reasons. It is the leading example of the aforementioned “judicial dialogue” 
because the Commission relied on the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. In doing so 
it recognized that the Court’s system is part of international human rights law. 
This way, the decision not only affirms that the Inter-American system is 
applicable to a wider context - which is in line with the mentioned universalistic 
approach of the OAS human rights entities - but also enforces the persuasive 
power of the Court’s reasoning. Additionally, the decision is also of importance to 
the OAS area, since it affirms that the system is applicable in different contexts.1236 
Furthermore, it is the first time that the FPIC criteria, as developed foremost 
in Saramaka, were applied in another international platform. The Commission’s 
analysis of the FPIC and effective participation requirements in Endorois 
highlighted the importance of “free, prior and informed” consultation and consent 
processes and is an important step in the legal development of FPIC.1237 The 
importance of effective participation and FPIC in relation to self-determined 
development and control over land and resources is firmly acknowledged in the 
Commission’s decision.  
V.1.3 Conclusions and Recapitulation: The OAS System, International law 
and FPIC 
The judgments and decisions discussed offer the most elaborate account of how 
indigenous lands rights are legally structured and justified, and how they are to 
be implemented. Effective participation and FPIC are seen as essential tools for 
indigenous peoples to regain or maintain control over their lands and natural 
resources. The focus has been on the Inter-American human rights system, since 
                                                        
1235 Gilbert J, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: The Pragmatic Revolution of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 60, 2011, p. 265. 
1236 And therefore may diminish reluctance on the part of OAS member States to implement 
the Court’s orders with regard to indigenous and tribal property rights and FPIC. 
1237 Agreeing with Jérémie Gilbert, who argues that: “The adoption of the right to FPIC by 
the Commission is important since it is an area of the law where there is little legal 
adjudication.” Gilbert J, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: The Pragmatic 
Revolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 60, 2011, p. 267. 
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it is within this framework that the most elaborate explanation of FPIC and its 




In the groundbreaking Awas Tingni case, the Court developed its justification of 
indigenous land rights, based on the right to property. The Court stressed the 
vulnerable and special position of indigenous peoples and the need for special 
protection. Delimitation, demarcation, and titling of traditional lands are 
required in order to respect communal land rights.1238 Importantly, possession of 
the territories involved is regarded as sufficient proof of ownership.1239 In 
creating a “hard” system of property rights for indigenous peoples the Court 
aimed to shield communities from outside interference, but it may have some 
negative consequences as well.1240 Nevertheless, it is clear that without legal title 
to their lands, indigenous communities are often left without a say and at the 
discretion of States. 
  Building on this doctrine, the Commission started to explain the concept of 
FPIC in the Dann case. As described earlier, consent, when given free, prior and 
informed, serves as a safeguard for protecting indigenous lands and resources. 
Consent has to be acquired on behalf of the community as a whole, and this 
entails at a minimum that all of the members of the community are fully and 
accurately informed of the nature and consequences of the process and provided 
with an effective opportunity to participate individually or as a collective. In this 
way, the Court and Commission also distinguish between an internal and an 
external dimension in which FPIC is applied, as was discussed in the paragraphs 
on self-determination. Consent of the community as a whole clearly indicates 
the relation between the collective entity – the indigenous people - and the 
larger political order (the state) that has to obtain consent. The requirement that 
there has to be optional participation for all individual members of this 
community refers to the internal dimension, entailing participatory standards as 
necessary in determining the consent or non-consent of the community as a 
collective. As discussed in Part III this is a difficult issue, where on the one hand 
it is up to the community itself to decide how it is represented, while on the 
                                                        
1238 Nevertheless, creating such a ‘hard’ property notion may also lead to conflicts and may not 
suit a variety of situations, for instance when lands have traditionally been shared or in the case 
of nomadic communities. Furthermore, it may be at odds with indigenous conceptions of 
‘property’. 
1239 This is a very practical and important consideration, where in other cases and situations, 
indigenous peoples have often been confronted with a very demanding burden of proof. This 
has led to unfair situations in which indigenous communities had to provide ‘western’ style 
legal proof of their relation to their lands, while custom and oral traditions were regarded as 
insufficient. 
1240 Requiring ‘hard’ boundaries and agreements about land use may lead to various conflicts 
as discussed earlier this study in the paragraphs on overlapping interests. Property rights could 
maybe best be seen a ‘bundle of rights’ entailing different competences and responsibilities. 
These could be negotiated in FPIC processes and agreements. 
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other hand participation of vulnerable groups within the community is a 
prerequisite. These demands might collide in some circumstances.1241 
  In the Belize report, the Commission reaffirmed the communal land tenure 
doctrine and the criteria for FPIC as developed in the Dann decision. In 
addition, the Commission explicitly recognized the importance of the principle 
of self-determination for indigenous peoples, thereby grounding and justifying 
FPIC on the basis of two notions of self-determination and the collective right 
to property over traditional lands.  
 In Moiwana, Yakye Axa, and Sawhoyamaxa the Court explained that 
restitution of ancestral lands should also be made possible, but that the right to 
property is not absolute and that it may be limited if those restrictions proposed 
are established by law, necessary, proportional and have the aim of attaining a 




In the Saramaka case the view developed in the preceding decisions was restated 
the system of property and participation rights was also significantly 
expanded.1242 The Court is guided by the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and referred to and explained FPIC. The Court expanded its 
safeguards for limiting the right to property in creating three criteria related to 
development plans and the implementation of FPIC processes.  
  In addition to the limitation clause mentioned above, the State must ensure 
effective participation of the affected people. As was explored in-depth, effective 
participation entails rights to consultation and consent and the elements of FPIC 
aim to secure that participation is indeed effective. The State must also guarantee 
a reasonable benefit for the affected people in relation to development plans on 
their territory. This implies that the State has to engage in benefit sharing 
consistent with the just compensation clause of Article 21. The Court explained 
that benefit sharing should be understood “as a form of reasonable equitable 
compensation resulting from the exploitation of traditionally owned lands and of 
those natural resources necessary for the survival of the Saramaka people.”1243 
Finally, he State must ensure a prior environmental and social impact assessment. 
The Court stated that these ESIA’s must conform to the relevant international 
standards and best practices and must take account of the cumulative impact of 
                                                        
1241 Fortunately, a lot of attention is given in UN context to the position of vulnerable groups 
within indigenous communities, like women and youth. 
1242 Also see: N Bankes, ‘The protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to territory 
through the property rights provisions of international regional human rights instruments’ 
(2011) draft. & Bankes N, 'International Human Rights Law and Natural Resources Projects 
within the Traditional Territories of Indigenous Peoples', 47, Alberta Law Review, 2010. 
1243 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), paragraph 140. 
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existing and future activities.1244 Highly significant is the Court’s unambiguous 
affirmation that obtaining consent is deemed mandatory when large-scale 
development projects have a significant impact on indigenous peoples and their 
lands and territories.1245  
As long as indigenous territories have not been demarcated and titled, the 
State also has to abstain from activities on these territories unless it obtains the 
community’s FPIC. The Court explained that a proper conception of 
indigenous peoples land rights comprises the notions of culture, self-
determination, consultation, and consent.1246 The Saramaka judgment led to an 
increase of studies on participatory rights which have led to a further clarification 
of rights to consultation and consent.  
The report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
is highly instructive in this respect. Anaya explained that the two core issues are 
land titling and consultation processes and that, although there is not one 
formula for implementation, both must adhere to certain minimum standards. 
 With respect to the land titling process, Anaya explained that such procedures 
have to entail at a minimum (a) identification of the area and rights that 
correspond to the indigenous or tribal community, or group of communities, 
under consideration, (b) resolution of conflicts over competing uses and claims, 
(c) delimitation and demarcation, and (d) issuance of title deed or other 
appropriate document that clearly describes the nature of the right or rights in 
lands and resources.1247 
 
Consultation and FPIC 
 
The Special Rapporteur explained that consultation processes must take place at the 
earliest possible stages, which means “prior” in the sense that indigenous 
communities have ample time to internally discuss the proposals. Furthermore, 
Anaya stated that these ought to be a genuine dialogue and more than just the 
provision of information. It was discussed at length in the paragraphs on 
information and communication why FPIC processes must be conceptualized as 
                                                        
1244 N Bankes, ‘The protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to territory through the 
property rights provisions of international regional human rights instruments’ (2011) draft, p. 
57 ff. 
1245 The Court and Commission, as described earlier, do not autonomously invent this regime 
of FPIC, but build on the elements of such a principle as explained in the former paragraphs of 
this study. The Court also required FPIC in situations where the land rights of indigenous or 
tribal communities have not been legally guaranteed. The Court and Commission are 
developing a methodology on FPIC that emphasizes the interrelationship between self-
determination and communal property rights. 
1246 Cf. Page A, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-
American Human Rights System’, Sustainable Development, Law and Policy 16, 2004, page 
19. 
1247 A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Addendum, Measures needed to secure indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ land and related rights in Suriname, paragraph 36. 
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communicative transactions and not merely as transfers of information between 
different agents.  
  Anaya explained that consultation and consent processes must be carried out 
with due regard for indigenous peoples’ traditional decision-making institutions 
and respect for their customs. These elements were also discussed earlier. In part 
III the importance and prerequisites of such an intercultural dialogue were 
explored. James Tully explained that mutual recognition, continuity and consent 
should be guiding if such a dialogue is to be successful. The legal reasoning 
examined in this paragraph is in line with this, without legal or juridical 
recognition there is no basis for dialogue, and only a stable dialogue in which 
consent is the guiding principle can lead to adequate and mutually beneficial 
arrangements between indigenous peoples and States or other actors regarding 
land and resource rights. 
Furthermore, the consultations must be in good faith; they must be “free.” 
As was stated in Part III of this study, this means that the dialogue takes place in 
a situation in which indigenous groups enjoy discursive control and have their 
say without being subjected to any form of hostile coercion. The fundamental 
goal of these processes is to “provide security for land and resource rights in 
accordance with indigenous and tribal peoples’ own customary laws and 
resource tenure.”1248 Control over land and resources in combination with fair 
participatory structures is a prerequisite for indigenous communities to exercise 
their right to self-determination. 
 The Court stated that consultation is always necessary, but that it is vital with 
respect to the following issues: 
 
In this regard, the Judgment orders the State to consult with the 
Saramaka people regarding at least the following six issues: (1) the 
process of delimiting, demarcating and granting collective title over 
the territory of the Saramaka people; (2) the process of granting the 
members of the Saramaka people legal recognition of their collective 
juridical capacity, pertaining to the community to which they 
belong; (3) the process of adopting legislative, administrative, and 
other measures as may be required to recognize, protect, guarantee, 
and give legal effect to the right of the members of the Saramaka 
people to the territory they have traditionally used and occupied; (4) 
the process of adopting legislative, administrative and other measures 
necessary to recognize and ensure the right of the Saramaka people 
to be effectively consulted, in accordance with their traditions and 
customs; (5) regarding the results of prior environmental and social 
impact assessments, and (6) regarding any proposed restrictions of 
the Saramaka people’s property rights, particularly regarding 
                                                        
1248 A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Addendum, Measures needed to secure indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ land and related rights in Suriname, paragraph 36. 
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proposed development or investment plans in or affecting Saramaka 
territory.1249 
 
The Court explicitly stated that these criteria are not only applicable to the 
Saramaka case but also to any other indigenous or tribal people that is affected 
by development or investment projects. As such, the Court clearly indicated that 
Saramaka is to be an important precedent. 
  The fundamental goal of consultation and FPIC processes is to “provide 
security for land and resource rights in accordance with indigenous and tribal 
peoples’ own customary laws and resource tenure.”1250 The Special Rapporteur’s 
report is a welcome addition to the Court’s reasoning because it offers a detailed 
explanation on how to implement the Inter-American system on indigenous 
peoples land, resource, and participation rights. The Surinamese case is 
particularly illustrative, since no adequate legal framework on indigenous rights 
exists.  
 Following the Saramaka case, the Court has decided two more cases on 
indigenous property and participation rights. The 2012 Sarayaku case is especially 
important for this study, since the system and importance of the right to 
consultation is analyzed and the Saramaka FPIC criteria are confirmed. The 
Court emphasized that consultation should not be seen as a mere formality but 
as a true instrument of participation, responding to the ultimate goal of 
establishing a dialogue between the parties based on principles of mutual trust 
and respect, and with the aim of reaching consensus.1251 Consultation rights are 
vital with respect to protecting both communal property and the cultural 
identity of indigenous peoples. 
 
Judicial Interpretation and Dialogue 
 
Since these paragraphs focused mainly on the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, an 
important question is what the effect of these cases is on general international 
law or on other regional human rights systems. When the judicial reasoning is 
quoted and followed elsewhere it is important sign that the Inter-American 
System becomes authoritative in other jurisdictions. 
The Inter-American Court applies a dynamic or evolutionary method of 
interpreting human rights provisions and adheres to a universalistic approach. 
This means that human rights provisions are to be interpreted in light of the 
                                                        
1249 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs), pp. 5-6. 
1250 A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Addendum, Measures needed to secure indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ land and related rights in Suriname, paragraph 36. 
1251 Again clearly reflecting the argumentation of part III of this study, most prominently (a) an 
agreed upon form of mutual recognition, (b) continuity of relationship and (c) consent as 
prerequistite for alteration of the relationship or present arrangements. 
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overall context and object of the instrument of which they are a part. Moreover, 
the larger body of relevant human rights norms is to be taken into account and 
they are to be interpreted in the manner that is most advantageous to the 
enjoyment of human rights.1252 The cases discussed in these paragraphs served as 
good examples of how these principles were applied in actual cases. The 
approach of the IACtHR illustrates that in order to bridge the gap between law 
and society, human rights instruments must be regarded as dynamic texts, as 
living instruments that are able to adapt to changing societal circumstances. 
Endorois v. Kenya is the leading example of the aforementioned “judicial 
dialogue” since the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights relies 
on the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. In doing so the Commission recognizes 
that the Court’s system is part of international human rights law. This way, the 
decision not only clarifies that the Inter-American system may be applicable to a 
wider context but also increases the persuasiveness of the Court’s reasoning.  
Furthermore, it is the first time that the FPIC criteria, as developed foremost 
in Saramaka, are applied and adjudicated by another human rights body. The 
Commission’s analysis of the FPIC and effective participation requirements in 
Endorois underline the importance of “free, prior and informed” consultation and 
consent processes and is an significant step in the legal development of FPIC.1253 
The importance of effective participation and FPIC in relation to self-
determined development and control over land and resources is firmly 
acknowledged in the Commission’s decision.  
 
Property Rights and FPIC: Legal Outline 
 
The Inter-American Human Rights entities offer the most elaborate explanation 
of what FPIC legally amounts to. Effective participation is essential when it 
comes to protecting indigenous peoples’ lands and resources.1254 Moreover, in 
the OAS jurisprudence it is clarified that this entails that consultation and 
consent are vital in order to secure indigenous peoples’ control over their lands 
and resources, as an important component of their right to self-determination.  
 Communal property rights are not absolute and can be restricted in the 
interest of society if the restriction is (a) previously established by law, (b) 
necessary, (c) proportionate, and (d) with the aim of achieving a legitimate 
objective in a democratic society. Additionally, when indigenous property rights 
                                                        
1252 Anaya S J, ‘Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Land 
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Towards a Realist Trend’, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 16, 2005. 
1253 Cf. Gilbert J, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: The Pragmatic Revolution of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 60, 2011, p. 267. 
1254 Also see: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 34, 28 
June 2007, Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road Towards Strengthening 
Democracy in Bolivia. & Follow-up report to OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 34, 28 June 2007, 
Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road Towards Strengthening Democracy in 
Bolivia. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2009. 
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are at stake, a proposed limitation may not amount to endangering their physical 
or cultural survival. Therefore, when considering a limitation, the state must (a) 
ensure the effective participation of the community concerned, (b) guarantee a 
reasonable benefit from the proposed project, and (c) perform prior ESIAs. 
  Consultation with indigenous peoples should always have the purpose of 
obtaining FPIC, and to ensure that such participation is “effective” it should be 
in accordance with the requirements of “free, prior and informed.”1255 At a bare 
minimum this means that consultations are in good faith, commenced at the 
earliest stages of a planned project, and accurately informed. In this last respect 
the obligation to conduct ESIAs is highly relevant. 
Consultation is not a single act, but concerns negotiations that require 
parties’ good faith and are held with the objective of achieving a mutual 
agreement. FPIC processes therefore also entail responsibilities on the part of the 
indigenous peoples involved. As was described in the paragraphs on freedom, 
FPIC and mainly the element “free” are best conceptualized as fitness to be held 
responsible, which is possible in a discursively controlled position. 
In such co-responsible decision making processes, States are always under the 
obligation to consult with indigenous peoples and guarantee their effective 
participation in decision-making regarding any measure that affects their 
territories.1256 In Sarayaku, the Court reasoned that this obligation to consult has 
become a general principle of international law.1257 Therefore, FPIC is always 
important when decisions affect indigenous communities. It is in these situations 
therefore not just a question of when FPIC is relevant but more how it should 
guide the consultation process. The right to - free, prior and informed - 
consultation is vital for securing rights to cultural identity and communal 
property, which are exponents of indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination.1258 Consequently, failure to respect the minimum requirements 
of consultation processes may lead to violation of indigenous peoples right to 
collective property and cultural identity. 
                                                        
1255 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30 
December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 273. 
1256 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30 
December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 273. 
1257 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, par. 164. Also see: American 
Society of International Law, The Duty to Consult in the Inter-American System: Legal Standards 
after Sarayaku, ASIL Insights, Vol. 16, Issue 35, November 28 2012. 
1258 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, primarily paragraph 217. 
CHAPTER V 
317 
FPIC and effective participation are not limited to property rights but it is 
within this area that they are most important for indigenous peoples.1259 Any 
administrative decision that may legally affect indigenous and tribal peoples’ 
rights or interests over their territories should therefore be based on a process of 
full participation.1260 This includes decisions concerning the natural resources 
within indigenous territories.1261 
In some cases, obtaining consent becomes a mandatory requirement. This is 
the case when indigenous peoples are to be relocated, when hazardous materials 
are stored on (or in) their territories, and when large-scale development or 
investment projects may have a significant impact on them. This is often the case 
when such projects concern the extraction of natural resources.1262 The 
obligation to consult or obtain consent is a responsibility of the state.1263  
Of vital importance is the insight that FPIC processes concern both consent 
and consultation requirements. Consultation processes that do not aim to reach 
                                                        
1259 As explained at the beginning of this study, that is the reason why the focus is on 
indigenous peoples’ rights to land and resources. In this area the problems concerning 
decision-making and consultation and consent provisions are most pressing. 
1260 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30 
December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 277. 
1261 Also see: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 
30 December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 290: “Consequently there is a State duty to consult and, in specific cases, obtain 
indigenous peoples’ consent in respect to plans or projects for investment, development or 
exploitation of natural resources in ancestral territories: States must “promote, consistent with 
their relevant international obligations, participation by indigenous peoples and communities 
affected by projects for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources by means of prior 
and informed consultation aimed at garnering their voluntary consent to the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of such projects, as well as to the determination of benefits 
and indemnization for damages according to their own development priorities.” Through 
such prior consultation processes, indigenous and tribal peoples’ participation must be 
guaranteed in all decisions on natural resource projects on their lands and territories, from 
design, through tendering and award, to execution and evaluation.” 
1262 Also see: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 
30 December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 283: “The duty of consultation, consent and participation has special force, regulated in 
detail by international law, in the realization of development or investment plans or projects or 
the implementation of extractive concessions in indigenous or tribal territories, whenever such 
plans, projects or concessions can affect the natural resources found therein.” 
1263 Also see: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 
30 December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 291: “Carrying out consultation procedures is a responsibility of the State and not of other 
parties, such as the company seeking the concession or investment contract. […] because 




agreement are no genuine consultation processes. And consent, more specifically 
“free, prior and informed” consent, cannot be achieved without a fair 
consultation process. Distinguishing between consultation and consent processes 
is therefore highly counterproductive.  
While the OAS jurisprudence offers the most comprehensive legal analysis 
of FPIC and offers a number of guidelines on how to implement FPIC 
processes, the Court, Commission, and UN Special Rapporteur also contended 
that the form of implementation is context dependent and that there is no 
“single formula” for consultations.1264 In order to get a better picture of how 
such FPIC processes are to be shaped and implemented, the next paragraphs will 
look at a number of specific areas concerning voluntary sustainability initiatives 
in which FPIC requirements are embedded. The most comprehensive 
implementation models for FPIC processes can be found in this area.  
V.2 Practices and Implementation of FPIC in Voluntary 
Environmental Protection Schemes 
In the previous paragraphs of this study FPIC and participatory processes were 
mainly explored in terms of their justifications, international legal character, and 
status. In part II it was explained that the normative pedigree of FPIC is formed 
by rights to self-determination and corollary rights to lands and resources. In 
short, it was concluded that rights to lands and resources are essential to realize 
indigenous aspirations to be “self-determining” and that in order to implement 
those rights, there is a need for effective participatory mechanisms.  
In Part III we explained these participatory structures and illustrated why 
they are so important in intercultural decision-making processes involving 
indigenous peoples. Here the justifications for FPIC were exposed. Furthermore, 
the different elements of FPIC – mainly free and informed – were examined and 
it was argued that respect for these procedural safeguards is key in concluding 
and maintaining constructive arrangements between indigenous peoples and 
other actors. The main goal: a genuine intercultural dialogue under conditions 
of mutual respect and trust is only to be achieved if FPIC leaves space for a 
flexible approach in which communicative processes take into account the 
cultural diversity that exists in multi-nation states. One of the most important 
ways to realize self-determination for indigenous peoples is a strong system of 
land and resource rights combined with participatory norms. 
 In Part IV of this study the international legal framework in which FPIC 
requirements are enshrined was traced, and it was concluded that although FPIC 
is becoming a key demand in a wide variety of instruments and platforms, not 
                                                        
1264 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30 
December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 301. & A/HRC/18/35/Add.7, 18 August 2011, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Addendum, Measures needed to secure 
indigenous and tribal peoples’ land and related rights in Suriname. 
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much guidance on its implementation is available. Here contemporary standard-
setting with respect to FPIC was explained, but not so much the way in which 
practical implementation is to be approached. Part V therefore contained an 
examination of primarily the OAS jurisprudence, since this is the framework in 
which the most advanced legal explanation of a system of property, self-
determination, participation and consultation rights is to be found.  
The present chapter will concern a deeper investigation into how this 
system of FPIC processes is to be implemented. Since there is not much further 
guidance on the level of general international law, a number of specific voluntary 
initiatives dealing with sustainable development are examined. However, this 
term does not imply that these systems have no legal value. On the contrary, the 
guidelines and protocols that will be scrutinized are very much influenced by 
international law and are by no means to be seen as detached from the 
international legal framework. Furthermore, the initiatives that are examined 
have an impact on how international law is explained. This was for instance the 
case in Saramaka, where the Court referred to the CBD’s Akwé Kon guidelines 
on ESIAs and indigenous peoples that will be examined in the next paragraph.  
In the following paragraphs the implementation of FPIC and FPIC 
protocols will be examined from a more specific angle. These voluntary 
initiatives, in which environmental law and the protection of indigenous or local 
communities is integrated, have a pioneer role. It will be illustrated that these 
voluntary initiatives are extremely important to reveal how FPIC processes are 
to be implemented. 
These voluntary standards are a result of the growing recognition of the role 
and responsibilities that the private sector has in relation to the sustainable 
production of a number of commodities.1265  
Noteworthy, at the UN level, the UN Guiding Principles for Business and 
Human Rights – the Ruggie Principles – illustrate that human rights protection 
is also a responsibility of private companies.1266 The UN Guiding Principles seek 
to provide an authoritative global standard for preventing and addressing the 
risks of negative human rights impacts caused by the conduct of companies.1267 
They outline how states and companies ought to implement the UN “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework in order to manage the current challenges 
with regard to business and human rights. The function of the Principles is 
clearly explained in their introduction:  
 
The Guiding Principles’ normative contribution lies not in the 
creation of new international law obligations but in elaborating the 
                                                        
1265 Colchester M, Chao S, Jiwan N, ‘Securing rights trough commodity roundtables? A 
comparative review’, Pre-Conference draft, Forest Peoples Programme, 2012, p. 5. 
1266 A/HRC/17/31, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John 
Ruggie. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 




implications of existing standards and practices for States and 
businesses; integrating them within a single, logically coherent and 
comprehensive template; and identifying where the current regime 
falls short and how it should be improved.1268  
 
In the Principles it is highlighted which steps states should take to promote 
respect for human rights. Furthermore a blueprint for companies is provided so 
that they may know how to respect those rights.1269 Indigenous peoples are 
mentioned with regard to the application of international human rights in the 
commentary on Foundational Principle 12 and in relation to Operational 
Principles 5 and 26 in the context of the duty of states to protect, and in respect 
of effective domestic legal mechanisms.1270 Certainly, adherence by states and 
companies to the Ruggie principles would be beneficial for indigenous 
communities that risk individual and collective human rights violations. 
The protection of the human rights of indigenous peoples is one of the 
important and recurring themes when companies are engaged in resource 
extraction. Within the voluntary standards that are explored, FPIC is one of the 
key requirements for successful sustainable development projects. 
 Throughout this study, it was argued that FPIC processes need to be flexible, 
that we should not look for any uniform procedure and that there is “no single 
formula for success.” Nevertheless, it was also argued that a number of guidelines 
and principles connected with such processes could be found. In this paragraph 
these different guidelines and FPIC protocols are studied and critically assessed. 
Firstly, the CBD Akwé Kon voluntary guidelines on impact assessments will be 
discussed.1271 These guidelines are still very general in application but offer the 
most comprehensive scheme of an integrated approach to FPIC processes, in which 
cultural, environmental, and social impact assessments are included. As argued, the 
scope of the decision-making powers that indigenous peoples may have is 
contingent on the impact that the proposed activity or decision may have. The 
Akwé Kon guidelines were developed in the framework of Article 8(j) of the 
                                                        
1268 A/HRC/17/31, Introduction to the Principles, paragraph 14. 
1269 Press Release concerning the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
available at: http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-
principles-press-release-24-mar-2011.pdf. Visited 3 February 2014. 
1270 A/HRC/17/31, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John 
Ruggie. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 21 March 2011, paragraphs 5, 12 and 26. 
1271 Akwé: Kon Guidelines: Voluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental 
and social impact assessment regarding development proposed to take place on, or which are 
likely to impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by 
indigenous and local communities. Adopted by the conference of the parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity at its seventh meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 9 - 20 
February 2004, UN Document UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21. (p. 261-263). The Guidelines 
derive their name from a Mohawk term meaing ‘everyting in creation’ to emphasize the 
holistic nature of the instrument. 
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CBD, and it will be shown that they discuss the different elements of the land 
rights and participation model that the IACt.HR developed in Saramaka People v. 
Suriname.  
 Secondly, and more specifically, the United Nations Collaborative Programme 
on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries (REDD) and its framework programme REDD+ will be discussed. 
REDD aims to create financial value for the carbon that is stored in forests. It 
offers incentives for developing states to reduce emissions from forested lands and 
invest in low-carbon alternatives for sustainable development. ‘REDD+’ takes this 
one step further, as the name suggests, and includes a wider framework of 
conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon 
stock.1272 In this setting one of the most elaborate models for implementing FPIC 
is being developed.  
 Thirdly, the role of FPIC within an even more specific area is examined: 
sustainable forest management. Very recently, the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) - which aims to secure and promote sustainable forest management along 
the entire “chain of custody,” has developed guidelines for the implementation of 
FPIC processes. This is a welcome development but also rather late, since 
informed consent requirements have been present within sustainable timber 
certification schemes for quite some time. Fourthly, a number of other voluntary 
initiatives, which include FPIC requirements to a minor extent, will be briefly 
explored.1273  
 Finally, a case study on the Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia and their 
experiences with FPIC and sustainable forest management will be used to illustrate 
that although FPIC criteria are enshrined in voluntary codes, their implementation 
may still be problematic. This case will illustrate how different overlapping legal 
and quasi-legal regimes may lead to undesirable and confusing situations to the 
detriment of the affected communities. Nevertheless the integration of 
environmental protection schemes and FPIC processes in voluntary initiatives 
offers the most comprehensive examination of how FPIC is to function in 
practice. The ‘Orang Asli’ case will illustrate how FPIC is (wrongly) applied in 
voluntary initiatives and what kind of issues arise at the intersection of national and 
international law. 
 In summary, it will be argued that the concrete implementation of FPIC 
procedures in an international setting is most elaborately dealt with in voluntary 
initiatives. Where legal reflections stop, specific guidelines and protocols of a more 
voluntary nature offer more concrete explanations of FPIC processes. The 
examination of these guidelines sheds light on a number of important issues that 
were discussed throughout this study. 
                                                        
1272 See UN REDD website:  
http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx.  
1273 The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, The Roundtable on Responsible Soy, The 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels and the International Committee on Mining and Metals 
will be explored. 
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The goal of this paragraph therefore is to examine practical guidelines that may 
help clarifying the apparently difficult issue of implementing FPIC processes. In 
line with what is argued throughout this book, Gerard Persoon and Tessa Minter 
confirmed that FPIC is the best available mechanism for guaranteeing indigenous 
peoples’ involvement, participation, decision-making and self-determination. 
However, the problem is that although FPIC is becoming a legal demand in more 
and more settings and documents, little research has been done on best practices 
and other forms of practical implementation.1274 
 The manner in which FPIC is to be implemented, as an international human 
rights concept, will vary from case to case.1275 Nevertheless, a number of general 
principles is to be taken into account in every FPIC process. It will therefore be 
argued that implementation guidelines should for a large part be concerned with 
creating the right circumstances for developing a proper community protocol for 
the specific situation at hand, based on good faith, trust and discursive control. The 
central question in this paragraph is: “How could FPIC be implemented?” 
V.2.1 Integrating Impact Assessments: The Akwé: Kon Guidelines  
Article 8(j) CBD and the Adoption of the Guidelines 
 
the CBD’s Akwé Kon Guidelines provide one of the possible routes for 
implementing FPIC processes, entailing effective participation and ESIAs. This 
was suggested by the Inter-American Court in its interpretation judgment 
following Saramaka People v. Suriname1276Within the framework of the CBD it is 
recognized that biodiversity and culture are closely linked and interdependent.1277 
It is increasingly accepted that in order to respect this connection, it is necessary 
for communities to develop protocols and rules that articulate customary norms in 
forms that are understandable to others. For FPIC processes, these “community 
protocols” are of particular importance, since FPIC entails the inclusion of 
indigenous decision making structures in broader decision making processes. The 
                                                        
1274 Persoon G A and Minter T, ‘Code of Conduct for working with indigenous and local 
communities’, Tropenbos International, 2011. Persoon and Minter further argue that 5 simple 
questions will have to be answered with respect to FPIC: what is it? Who gives it? What is the 
proof that you have obtained it? And, who accepts this evidence. While these are indeed some 
of the most important questions that FPIC processes should take into account, they are not 
always that simple to answer, as was argued throughout this book. 
1275 As was described throughout this study, FPIC arrangements concern a wide – maybe the 
widest – variety of relations between individuals, communities and other actors.  
1276 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of The Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of August 12, 2008, (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, paragraph 41. The Court refers to the guidelines and states that the 
Akwé Kon Guidelines are one of the most comprehensive and used standards for conducting 
ESIAs in the context of indigenous and tribal peoples. 
1277 Swiderska et. al., ‘Community protocols and free, prior and informed consent – overview 
and lessons learnt', International Institute for Environment and Development (iied), 
Participatory Learning and Action 65, 2012, p. 26. 
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essence of a successful FPIC process is that it is largely designed by the community. 
These ideas are reflected in the Akwé Kon Guidelines. 
 The Guidelines, drafted by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in 2004 and adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its seventh 
session that same year, are fully called: “Voluntary guidelines for the conduct of 
cultural, environmental and social impact assessment regarding development 
proposed to take place on, or which are likely to impact on, sacred sites and on 
lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by indigenous and local 
communities.”1278 They provide an integrated approach for those situations in 
which certain projects are likely to affect indigenous peoples and their 
environment. As was discussed when examining the Saramaka case, the Inter-
American Court agrees that environmental protection and participation rights of 
indigenous peoples ought to go hand in hand. Therefore, an examination of the 
suggested process in these voluntary guidelines is valuable in clarifying how FPIC 
is to be implemented. 
  The guidelines are developed in the framework of Article 8(j) of the CBD on 
“in situ conservation” which states that:  
 
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: 
[...] Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote 
their wider application with the approval and involvement of the 
holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage 
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of 
such knowledge, innovations and practices.  
 
In Article 8(j) the need for taking into account indigenous traditional knowledge is 
emphasized and important elements of the land and participation rights model of 
the Saramaka judgment are enshrined. In the Article the need for participation and 
consent of indigenous peoples and the need for equitable benefit-sharing are 
mentioned. While Article 8(j) at first sight mainly concerns traditional knowledge, 
in the Akwé Kon Guidelines the scope of this article is broadened to include 
projects that may affect indigenous lands, waters and sacred sites.1279 
                                                        
1278 Akwé: Kon Guidelines: Voluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental 
and social impact assessment regarding development proposed to take place on, or which are 
likely to impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by 
indigenous and local communities (henceforth: Akwé: Kon Guidelines). Adopted by the 
conference of the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its seventh meeting, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 9 - 20 February 2004, UN Document UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21.  
1279 Traditional knowledge is defined in the Akwé Kon Guidelines as: “The traditional 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.” 
Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 7. 
PRACTICES 
324 
The Guidelines, developed by the working group on Article 8(j), were adopted by 
the Conference of the Parties (COP) with the idea that conducting impact 
assessments applying an integrated approach will increase the effectiveness of the 
involvement of indigenous - and local - communities. The COP also recognized 
that: “The effective participation, involvement and approval of indigenous and 
local communities will require close cooperation among these communities, as 
well as between all relevant actors, and the design of appropriate mechanisms.”1280 
Furthermore it was acknowledged that the implementation of the guidelines 
should be in tune with international law.1281 An integrated and transparent process 
is needed in which the participation of indigenous peoples is promoted and in 
which sufficient time for assessment prior to the implementation of the 
development plans is allocated. The COP emphasized the different elements of 
FPIC in providing its arguments for adopting the Guidelines. It furthermore called 
for a universalistic approach in stating that it requested the Executive Secretary to: 
“Continue to liaise with relevant international organizations, multilateral 
environmental agreements and processes on impact assessments with a view to 
developing or enhancing synergies between, and ensuring coherence of, 
assessment methodologies and guidelines.”1282 
 The aim of the Guidelines is therefore to develop an integrated approach in 
which participation, transparency, and international cooperation are promoted. 
 
The Implementation Model of the Guidelines 
 
In the Guidelines states are called upon to consider this model whenever 
developments are proposed that are likely to impact sacred sites, lands, and waters 
traditionally occupied by indigenous communities.1283 Although the wording 
indeed reflects the voluntary nature of the guidelines, this statement is very similar 
to the text of Article 32 UNDRIP, which was also quoted in the Saramaka case. 
The introduction to the guidelines also suggests that its system should be flexible 
and adapted to suit the particularities of each development initiative.1284 
 The guidelines provide a collaborative framework in which governments, 
indigenous and local communities, decision-makers, managers, and other actors 
are able to support the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples and 
properly take into account the cultural, environmental and social concerns and 
interest of indigenous communities.1285 The interrelationship of cultural, 
environmental and social elements is a central theme in the Guidelines.  
 The main phases in the implementation model are firstly, a preparatory stage, 
and secondly, the main stage in which impact analysis and assessments are 
conducted. The third stage concerns the reporting and decision-making phase, and 
                                                        
1280 UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21, Seventh Conference of the Parties, 2004, p. 261. 
1281 UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21, Seventh Conference of the Parties, 2004, p. 262. 
1282 UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21, Seventh Conference of the Parties, 2004, p. 262. 
1283 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 3. 
1284 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 4. 
1285 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 5. 
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finally, monitoring and environmental auditing is required.1286 These phases are 
reflected in a ten-step plan which can be summarized as follows: 
 
a) Notification and public consultation of the proposed development by the 
proponent; 
b) Identification of indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders 
likely to be affected by the proposed development; 
c) Establishment of effective mechanisms for indigenous and local community 
participation, including for the participation of women, the youth, the 
elderly and other vulnerable groups, in the impact assessment processes; 
d) Establishment of an agreed process for recording the views and concerns of 
the members of the indigenous or local community whose interests are likely 
to be impacted by a proposed development; 
e) Establishment of a process whereby local and indigenous communities may 
have the option to accept or oppose a proposed development that may 
impact on their community; 
f) Identification and provision of sufficient human, financial, technical and legal 
resources for effective indigenous and local community participation in all 
phases of impact assessment procedures; 
g) Establishment of an environmental management or monitoring plan (EMP), 
including contingency plans regarding possible adverse cultural, 
environmental and social impacts resulting from a proposed development; 
h) Identification of actors responsible for liability, redress, insurance and 
compensation; 
i) Conclusion, as appropriate, of agreements, or action plans, on mutually 
agreed terms, between the proponent of the proposed development and the 
affected indigenous and local communities, for the implementation of 
measures to prevent or mitigate any negative impacts of the proposed 
development; 
j) Establishment of a review and appeals process.1287 
 
These steps are explained in detail throughout the guidelines. In the document 
also a number of concerns are highlighted that were raised in this study. 
Identifying the indigenous communities that are affected may be a difficult step. 
Furthermore, in the Guidelines it is indicated that capacity building and providing 
sufficient resources is key to successful implementation. In step (e) it is provided 
that a process may be needed in which indigenous peoples may have the option to 
accept or oppose a certain project. The cautious wording reflects that the scope of 
the decision-making authority that indigenous peoples have depends on the 
impact of the proposed project. Of course, this impact is to be assessed by going 
through the different steps in the Guidelines. In the steps the need for a review 
and appeals process is also mentioned, which is - as was discussed in Part III - also 
                                                        
1286 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 8. 
1287 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, pp. 8-9. 
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of vital importance. In the next paragraphs on the UN-REDD Programme and 
the Forest Stewardship Council the relevance of review and grievance mechanisms 
will also be noted. 
 FPIC processes do not end when parties have come to an agreement but 
should be open to revision in case unforeseen circumstances arise. In the guidelines 
it is confirmed that all the relevant information about the project and the impact 
assessments should be made available to organizations representing indigenous 
peoples and that their customary law should be taken into account.1288 
  
Integration of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments  
 
The special relationship between indigenous peoples and the environment is taken 
into account in the Akwé Kon Guidelines. It is proposed that cultural, 
environmental, and social impact assessments should be integrated into a single 
process.1289 Similar to the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence, consultation and 
consent processes should be perceived as holistic procedures through which 
indigenous peoples may come to a truly “free and informed” decision. In addition 
to Article 8(j), Article 14 of the CBD provides the general requirements for 
carrying out the assessments.1290 
 
                                                        
1288 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, pp. 10-13. 
1289 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 13. 
1290 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992. Article 14 states that: 1. Each Contracting 
Party, as far as possible and as appropriate, shall: (a) Introduce appropriate procedures requiring 
environmental impact assessment of its proposed projects that are likely to have significant 
adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects and, 
where appropriate, allow for public participation in such procedures; (b) Introduce appropriate 
arrangements to ensure that the environmental consequences of its programmes and policies 
that are likely to have significant adverse impacts on biological diversity are duly taken into 
account; 
(c) Promote, on the basis of reciprocity, notification, exchange of information and 
consultation on activities under their jurisdiction or control which are likely to significantly 
affect adversely the biological diversity of other States or areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, by encouraging the conclusion of bilateral, regional or multilateral arrangements, 
as appropriate; 
(d) In the case of imminent or grave danger or damage, originating under its jurisdiction or 
control, to biological diversity within the area under jurisdiction of other States or in areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, notify immediately the potentially affected States of 
such danger or damage, as well as initiate action to prevent or minimize such danger or 
damage; and 
(e) Promote national arrangements for emergency responses to activities or events, whether 
caused naturally or otherwise, which present a grave and imminent danger to biological 
diversity and encourage international cooperation to supplement such national efforts and, 
where appropriate and agreed by the States or regional economic integration organizations 
concerned, to establish joint contingency plans. 
2. The Conference of the Parties shall examine, on the basis of studies to be carried out, the 
issue of liability and redress, including restoration and compensation, for damage to biological 
diversity, except where such liability is a purely internal matter. 
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The Guidelines contain comprehensive definitions of the different 
necessary impact assessments. A cultural impact assessment is defined as:  
 
A process of evaluating the likely impacts of a proposed 
development on the way of life of a particular group or community 
of people, with full involvement of this group or community of 
people and possibly undertaken by this group or community of 
people: a cultural impact assessment will generally address the 
impacts, both beneficial and adverse, of a proposed development 
that may affect, for example, the values, belief systems, customary 
laws, language(s), customs, economy, relationships with the local 
environment and particular species, social organization, and 
traditions of the affected community.1291 
 
The cultural impact assessment (CIA) should identify all aspects of culture during 
the early phases of the process. Important elements highlighted in the Guidelines 
are: indigenous systems of resource use, places of cultural significance, customary 
law systems, patterns of land use, and political systems.1292 In conducting the CIA 
due consideration is to be given to the protection and preservation of traditional 
knowledge and specific protocols should be established for particular kinds of 
developments like mining, tourism or forestry.1293 As was discussed earlier, it is 
indeed vital to tailor the process to the kind of activity that is proposed or the 
nature of the right that may be violated.  
 Furthermore, it is emphasized in the Guidelines that there is a need for 
respecting cultural privacy and avoiding negative impact on sacred sites or 
ceremonial activities. An important issue is that the impact on the exercise of 
customary law should be carefully assessed.1294 When development projects affect 
indigenous territories, it may be that an outside workforce is introduced, or that 
land tenure systems are altered, formalized, or disrupted. This may lead to 
conflicts, and negotiations to minimize violating customary law are essential. 
 An environmental impact assessment (EIA) is: “A process of evaluating the likely 
environmental impacts of, and proposing appropriate mitigation measures for, a 
proposed development, taking into account interrelated socio-economic, cultural 
and human health impacts, both beneficial and adverse.”1295 
 In The Guidelines it is noted that both direct and indirect impacts should be 
carefully assessed, and a number of important elements of baseline-studies are 
summed up. It is also stated that traditional knowledge should be an important and 
                                                        
1291 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, pp. 6-7. 
1292 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 13. 
1293 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 14. 
1294 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 15. 
1295 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 7. It is beyond the scope of this study fully examine the scope 
of environmental impact assessments. Therefore only some key points from the Guidelines 




integral element of the baseline studies.1296 “Informing” here has a double 
meaning, it is not only the EIA that may help indigenous communities to make an 
informed decision, but conversely it is also the knowledge and expertise of the 
indigenous communities involved that contributes to measuring the 
environmental impact of a proposed project. Especially in relation to the 
mentioned baseline studies, indigenous knowledge may be essential.1297 
The social impact assessment (SIA) is described as:  
 
“A process of evaluating the likely impacts, both beneficial and 
adverse, of a proposed development that may affect the rights, 
which have an economic, social, cultural, civic and political 
dimension, as well as the well-being, vitality and viability, of an 
affected community - that is, the quality of life of a community as 
measured in terms of various socio-economic indicators, such as 
income distribution, physical and social integrity and protection of 
individuals and communities, employment levels and opportunities, 
health and welfare, education, and availability and standards of 
housing and accommodation, infrastructure, services.”1298 
  
Regarding development projects on indigenous territories, these assessments 
should be evaluated in relation to tangible benefits for the communities involved. 
These may be: job creation, access to markets, revenue-sharing, or diversification 
of income opportunities.1299 However, the transition to different economical 
systems may also lead to an increase in crime, alcohol abuse, or sexually 
transmitted diseases. It becomes very clear why the Guidelines entail an integrated 
and holistic approach; the different cultural, environmental, and social factors all 
influence each other. In this respect, it is mentioned in the guidelines that when 
                                                        
1296 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, pp. 16-17. 
1297 The Guidelines refer to necessary information with respect to: (a) Species inventories 
(including identification of particular species important to the affected indigenous or local 
community as food, medicine, fuel, fodder, construction, artefact production, clothing, and 
for religious and ceremonial purposes, etc); (b) Identification of endangered species, species at 
risk, etc. (possibly referenced to the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Red Data Book, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 
and national inventories); (c) Identification of particularly significant habitat (as 
breeding/spawning grounds, remnant native vegetation, wild-life refuge areas including buffer 
zones and corridors, habitats and routes for migratory species) and crucial breeding seasons for 
endangered and critical species; (d) Identification of areas of particular economic significance 
(as hunting areas and trapping sites, fishing grounds, gathering areas, grazing lands, timber 
harvesting sites and other harvesting areas); (e) Identification of particularly significant physical 
features and other natural factors which provide for biodiversity and ecosystems (e.g. 
watercourses, springs, lakes, mines/quarries that supply local needs); and (f) Identification of 
sites of religious, spiritual, ceremonial and sacred significance (such as sacred groves and 
totemic sites). 
1298 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 7. 
1299 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 17. 
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determining the scope of the SIA, at least the following points should be taken 
into account:  
 
(a) Baseline studies; 
(b) Economic considerations; 
(c) Possible impacts on traditional systems of land tenure and other uses of 
natural resources; 
(d) Gender considerations; 
(e) Generational considerations; 
(f) Health and safety aspects;  
(g) Effects on social cohesion; 
(h) Traditional lifestyles; and 
(i) The possible impact on access to biological resources for livelihoods.1300 
 
The Guidelines provide a detailed analysis of each of these points. The document 
refers to the particularly large impact that development projects may have on 
subsistence based communities. Furthermore, the impact on resource and land 
tenure and the effects on the social cohesion and health of communities affected 
are areas of ongoing concern.1301 
 As is correctly argued in the Akwé Kon Guidelines, it is only when an 
integrated approach is followed - comprising assessments of the impact of 
environmental, social-economic and cultural elements - that a clear view of the 
overall impact of development projects on indigenous territories can be acquired. 
This integrated approach can only be successful when community participation is 
respected and promoted throughout the process. 
 
General Principles: FPIC and Self-determined Development 
 
The Guidelines furthermore provide for a number of general considerations that 
should guide the impact assessments. Prior informed consent is mentioned. The 
Akwé Kon Guidelines elaborate on FPIC in paragraph 53, cited here in full: 
 
Where the national legal regime requires prior informed consent of 
indigenous and local communities, the assessment process should 
consider whether such prior informed consent has been obtained. 
Prior informed consent corresponding to various phases of the 
impact assessment process should consider the rights, knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities; the 
use of appropriate language and process; the allocation of sufficient 
time and the provision of accurate, factual and legally correct 
information. Modifications to the initial development proposal will 
require the additional prior informed consent of the affected 
                                                        
1300 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 18. 
1301 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 20. 
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indigenous and local communities.1302 
 
Several points in the above statement require some further attention. First of all, 
the first sentence is striking, since it requires FPIC only when the national legal 
regime calls for this. As will be discussed in the following paragraphs, there are also 
situations in which voluntary schemes may demand FPIC irrespective of whether 
this is a national legal demand. It will be shown that for instance the Forest 
Stewardship Council requires FPIC, even when this is not a national legal 
requirement.1303 Important to bear in mind, is that the Akwé Kon Guidelines 
were developed in 2004, so before the adoption of UNDRIP and before the 
important decisions of the Inter-American Court, primarily the 2007 Saramaka 
decision. In the meantime, FPIC processes have become more firmly embedded 
in international law and it is only in and after Saramaka that the integration of 
FPIC processes with environmental and social impact assessments has gained a 
stronger legal status. 
 Nevertheless, the explanation given in the Guidelines does entails the 
importance of the different elements of FPIC. It is emphasized that sufficient time 
should be allocated, that sufficient information is to be provided, and that the 
practices and customs of the indigenous communities involved should be taken 
into account. Furthermore, in the Guidelines it is correctly stated that FPIC 
should be obtained in different phases in the process - not as a “single moment” 
and that alterations in the project should also allow for revision on the basis of 
prior informed consent. 
Informed consent requirements are a general consideration when implementing 
the Guidelines. However, there are a number of other principles that should be 
taken into account. Most importantly, in the Guideline a form of self-determined 
development is advocated. Communities should be encouraged to formulate their 
own development plans which include mechanisms for impact assessments defined 
by the communities concerned.1304 
 Other important principles contained in the Guidelines concern the position of 
elderly, women and youths, the rights of indigenous peoples consistent with 
international law, the need for transparency, and the creation of review and 




The Akwé Kon Guidelines offer a detailed but flexible plan for the 
implementation of FPIC processes from the perspective of environmental, 
                                                        
1302 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 21. 
1303 See especially the case study on the Orang Asli of the Malaysian Peninsula, at the end of 
this paragraph, in which this was a particular important issue. New guidelines acknowledge 
that FPIC may have force of (international) law, thereby creating norms that may trump 
national legislation. 
1304 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, p. 22. 
1305 Akwé: Kon Guidelines, pp. 22-23. 
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cultural, and social impact assessments (ECSIAs). In this way they offer good 
guidance on how to implement an important part of the “Saramaka model” on 
land and participation rights when development projects affect indigenous lands 
and resources.  
One of the most important lessons from the Guidelines is that without proper 
ECSIAs, conducted in an integrated and holistic manner, it is unlikely that the 
impact of projects on indigenous lands and their environment is properly assessed. 
Such assessments are vital for allowing indigenous peoples to make a genuinely 
informed decision. Moreover, indigenous peoples’ knowledge may avail other 
parties in the process to detect unforeseen effects and impact. The Guidelines 
provide an alert and balanced program which is in line with international law, 
particularly with the model developed in the context of the OAS. 
 The Akwé Kon Guidelines in the framework of Article 8(j) CBD have impact 
assessments as their central theme, and integrate indigenous participation rights. 
The following system that will be discussed (REDD+) takes FPIC as the key 
concept for stakeholder engagement. One of the most advanced and recent 
models for implementation of FPIC can be found within this framework. 
V.2.2 FPIC in the UN-REDD Programme 
Introduction: Reducing Emissions 
 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries (REDD) is a model that uses market and financial incentives to reduce 
greenhouse gasses. It was developed in 2008 in collaboration with the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP).1306 REDD aims to ensure that deforestation and forest degradation can 
be reduced to a minimum. Deforestation and forest degradation as a result of - for 
instance - agricultural expansion, infrastructural development projects, timber 
harvesting, and fires for land clearing account for nearly 20% of global greenhouse 
gas emissions.1307 
 REDD strategies therefore have the purpose of making the forests more 
valuable standing up than they would be cut down, and in their final phases, the 
projects involve developed countries paying developing countries carbon offsets 
for their standing forests.1308 They aim to tip the balance in favor of sustainable 
                                                        
1306 UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) FAO, UNDP, UNEP, Framework 
Document, 20 June 2008. 
1307 UN-REDD programme website,  
http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx, consulted November 
2012.  
1308 UN-REDD programme website,  




forest management to realize that: “their formidable economic, environmental and 
social goods and services benefit countries, communities, biodiversity and forest 
users while also contributing to important reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions.”1309 
 “REDD+” is the broader framework programme or initiative, and covers - 
besides degradation and deforestation - the role of conservation, sustainable forest 
management, and the enhancement of carbon stock.1310 REDD+ activities can be 
conducted by local or national governments, NGOs or the private sector. It is a 
vast programme that aims to do far more than just avoiding deforestation and 
includes a number of initiatives like the UN-REDD programme and The World 
Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).1311 REDD+ is a complex 
programme with a large number of different approaches to the problems at hand. 
The 2008 Framework document explains this complexity: 
 
While the primary cause of deforestation in Latin America was a 
conversion of forests to large scale permanent agriculture, in Africa 
deforestation was mainly caused by conversion of forests to small 
scale permanent agriculture and in Asia there was a mix of direct 
causes. The underlying causes are often even more intractable, 
ranging from governance structures, land tenure systems and law 
enforcement, to market and cultural values of forests, to the rights of 
indigenous and local communities and benefit sharing mechanisms, 
to poverty and food production policies. As a result, solutions need 
to be tailor-made to the environmental and socio-economic 
conditions of each country and their institutional capacity.1312 
 
It would be beyond the scope of this study to go into all the different possible 
initiatives and actions that can be undertaken in the framework of REDD+. The 
                                                        
1309 UN-REDD programme website,  
http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx, consulted November 
2012.  
1310 UN-REDD programme website,  
http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx, consulted November 
2012, On the website it is explained that: In order to constrain the impacts of climate change 
within limits that society will reasonable be able to tolerate, the global average temperatures 
must be stabilized within two degrees Celsius. This will be practically impossible to achieve 
without reducing emissions from the forest sector.” REDD+ is thus a climate change 
mitigation solution (or strategy/mechanism) that a number of initiatives, including the UN-
REDD Programme, are supporting and developing. Other multilateral REDD+ initiatives 
include the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Forest Investment Programme 
(FIP), in the framework of the World Bank Group.  
1311 World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/12, consulted November 2012.  
1312 UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) FAO, UNDP, UNEP, Framework 
Document, 20 June 2008, p. 2. This paragraph will refer to REDD+ and REDD 
interchangeably, but the broader REDD+ framework is meant. 
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focus in the following paragraphs will be on the role of indigenous peoples and 
FPIC within REDD+ mechanisms and strategies.1313  
 
Indigenous Peoples and FPIC in REDD+  
 
Since the majority of the world’s forests in developing countries are located in 
places where indigenous peoples live, participation of these communities is seen as 
essential for successful REDD+ strategies.1314 Given that inadequate mechanisms 
of effective participation of indigenous peoples in REDD+ could seriously 
jeopardize the benefits of the system, FPIC is embraced as the means to guarantee 
adequate involvement. A number of different reports and documents on FPIC 
implementation in REDD+ strategies have been produced, of which two of the 
most recent and important ones will be discussed in this paragraph: firstly, the 
“Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+” and secondly, the “UN-
REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent,” which are 
in their final drafting phases.1315 The emphasis will be on the Joint and Draft 
Guidelines, since they entail the most recent and most comprehensive treatment of 
FPIC.1316  
 
Joint Guidelines on Stakeholder Consultation 
  
Within the framework of REDD+ the critical role that indigenous peoples (and 
forest dependent communities) have with respect to the long term sustainability 
and effectiveness of the strategies is stressed.1317 Following a series of consultation 
rounds with indigenous groups, the UN-REDD developed the Joint Guidelines 
in close cooperation with the FCPF.1318  
                                                        
1313 Importantly, REDD+ recognizes the importance of (strategic) environmental and social 
impact assessments who have to result in Environmental and Social Management Frameworks 
(ESMFs). See Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+ Readiness With a Focus on 
the Participation of Indigenous Peoples and Other Forest-Dependent Communities April 20, 
2012 (revision of March 25th version) (Joint Guidelines), p. 19. 
1314 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012. 
1315 Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+ Readiness With a Focus on the 
Participation of Indigenous Peoples and Other Forest-Dependent Communities April 20, 
2012 (revision of March 25th version) (Joint Guidelines). UN-REDD Programme Guidelines 
on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final Working Draft, October 2012 (Draft Guidelines).  
1316 Other, older documents will also be referred to, since they are also referred to in the 
mentioned guidelines. An important document in this respect is: Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent in REDD+, Principles and Approaches for Policy and Project Development, 
RECOFTC/GIZ, Bankok, February 2011. (Principles and Approaches). 
1317 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 4. 
1318 Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+ Readiness With a Focus on the 
Participation of Indigenous Peoples and Other Forest-Dependent Communities April 20, 
2012 (revision of March 25th version), see: UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent, Final Working Draft, October 2012, p. 4. 
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These Joint Guidelines broadly present the framework for engagement and 
participation of stakeholders in REDD+ strategies. They develop a number of 
principles for effective stakeholder engagement that include: recognition of the 
diversity of stakeholders, the need to hear voices of vulnerable groups, transparent 
and timely information, facilitation of dialogue and consensus building, special 
attention for indigenous decision making structures, land tenure and resource use, 
and fair grievance mechanisms.1319 
 Furthermore, the Joint Guidelines propose an eight step plan for carrying out 
effective consultations: 
 
1. Define the desired outcomes of consultations 
2. Identify stakeholders 
3. Define the issues to consult on 
4. Define the terms of the consultation 
5. Select the consultation and outreach methods 
6. Ensure that stakeholders have sufficient capacity to engage fully and 
effectively in consultations 
7. Conduct the consultations 
8. Analyse and disseminate results1320 
 
These steps are useful for an initial mapping of the interests of stakeholders but 
are evidently not enough to secure FPIC for indigenous communities. 
Therefore, the Draft Guidelines go further than the Joint Guidelines a step further 
and include a normative policy and operational framework for UN-REDD 
countries to seek FPIC.1321 The UN-REDD Programme is held to promote 
respect for, and to seek the full application of, UNDRIP. For that reason, FPIC 
is a mandatory requirement in the Programme regarding activities that affect 
indigenous peoples lands, territories, and resources.1322 
  
Draft UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
 
The Draft Guidelines are the most important documents related to FPIC in the 
context of REDD+ because they incorporate the most recent FPIC standards 
and lessons from so-called “FPIC pilots,” mainly in Vietnam and Indonesia. 
                                                        
1319 Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+ Readiness With a Focus on the 
Participation of Indigenous Peoples and Other Forest-Dependent Communities April 20, 
2012 (revision of March 25th version), p. 5. 
1320 Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+ Readiness With a Focus on the 
Participation of Indigenous Peoples and Other Forest-Dependent Communities April 20, 
2012 (revision of March 25th version), pp. 6-11. These eight steps were also followed in the 
FPIC Pilot in Vietnam, to be discussed below. 
1321 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 4. 
1322 See: UN-REDD Programme website: 
http://www.unredd.org/Stakeholder_Engagement/Guidelines_on_FPIC/tabid/55718/Defau
lt.aspx. Consulted February 2013. 
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They should be applied in conjunction with the Joint Guidelines discussed above. 
The Draft Guidelines are directed at partner States and contain an important 
affirmation that international law recognizes the right to FPIC for indigenous 
communities.1323 Furthermore, the Draft Guidelines recognize that other forest 
dependent communities may be similarly affected by REDD+ strategies, so that 
FPIC may also become a requirement in respect of these groups.1324 This 
pragmatic approach is not unique: FPIC is about giving vulnerable groups a say 
in decisions that affect them and especially in forest areas chances are that other 
non-indigenous communities may have quite similar interests. 
 In the Draft Guidelines the legal framework of FPIC is well described. In the 
Guidelines it is acknowledged that FPIC is a corollary of a myriad of universally 
accepted human rights, including the right to self-determination, and rights to 
participation, property, cultural integrity, and equality.1325 The Guidelines also 
contain a “Legal Companion,” in which the most relevant provisions and 
statements concerning FPIC in international law have been included. The firm 
basis for FPIC that is sought in international law increases the legitimacy of the 
REDD+ Draft Guidelines and REDD+ strategies can only be effectively 
implemented when a human rights based approach is followed. 
 A consequence of the detailed alignment between FPIC in the context of 
REDD+ and international law is that FPIC is described as a process instead of as 
a single moment of decision-making and one that acknowledges that the goal of 
such processes is to protect indigenous peoples’ lands and resources and thereby 
their cultural and physical survival. The reasoning from Saramaka People v. 
Suriname and the spirit of the UNDRIP therefore make up the foundation of 
FPIC requirements in REDD+ as well.1326 
 In defining FPIC, the Draft Guidelines also follow the Elements of a 
Common Understanding from the 2005 UNPFII workshop.1327 Importantly, 
the Draft Guidelines also state that:  
 
While the objective of consultation processes shall be to reach 
agreement (consent) between the relevant parties, this does not 
mean that all FPIC processes will lead to the consent and approval 
by the rights-holders in question. At the core of the right to choose 
to engage, negotiate and decide to grant or withhold consent, is the 
                                                        
1323 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 6. The Draft Guidelines build on and expand the 2011 
report: Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in REDD+, Principles and Approaches for Policy 
and Project Development, RECOFTC/GIZ, Bankok, February 2011. 
1324 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, pp. 6-7. 
1325 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 7. 
1326 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 11. 
1327 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, pp. 12-13. See: E/C.19/2005/3, paragraph 46. 
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acknowledgment that under certain circumstances, it must be 
accepted that the project will not proceed and/or that engagement 
must be ceased if the affected peoples decide that they do not want 
to commence or continue with negotiations or if they decide to 
withhold their consent to the project.1328 
 
In this passage “under certain circumstances” is of course the key phrase. It will 
depend on the impact and nature of the violated rights whether FPIC processes 
will gain a more mandatory character. It remains important to judge on a case-
by-case basis, what impact the proposed project will have. Moreover, it is vital 
to determine which rights may be violated, be they national, international, or 
customary. The Draft Guidelines do – in line with what is argued in this study – 
acknowledge that it is not possible to see consultation processes detached from 
“consent,” which always should be the goal of such processes. 
 In conclusion, in the Draft Guidelines the most recent developments with 
respect to FPIC in international law are enshrined these are integrated in its 
procedure. This is quite important because it is reflected in the offered 
implementation model, which increases the value of the document as a more 
general implementation guide to FPIC. 
 
The Implementation Model of the Draft Guidelines 
 
The Draft Guidelines clearly mention that it is up to the State (a Partner 
Country) to develop consultation and participation plans for engagement with 
indigenous peoples.1329 They provide a practical step-by-step implementation 
model for the development of community FPIC protocols. Initially, the State 
should develop a national FPIC guideline: 
 
  
                                                        
1328 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p 14. 
1329 This is clearly in line with the IACtHR interpretation and UNDRIP, discussed in 
previous paragraphs. What is also mentioned, is that peoples living in voluntary isolation 
should not be contacted. Their decision to remain isolated should be respected at all times. 
UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final Working 
Draft, October 2012, p 14, 15. Also see p. 21: “The duty and responsibility to secure FPIC 
ultimately belongs to the State. This obligation cannot be delegated to a third party/private 
party.” Furthermore, it is stated that: “[T]he Partner Country’s own recognition or 
identification of the community as ‘Indigenous Peoples’ shall not be the dispositive factor.” 
Important to note here is that although obtaining consent is a duty for the State, this does not 
imply that indigenous peoples have a duty to negotiate FPIC agreements at all costs. They 




Indicative Steps for Developing National FPIC Guideline 
 
1. Identify the relevant principles for the guidelines  
The country’s obligations under national and international law  
UN-REDD Programme FPIC Guidelines 
 
2. Identify any existing processes for consultation and consent concerning relevant stakeholders’ 
land and land use planning or natural resource development, and analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses of these processes  
For example, are they being properly followed? Where is the existing system 
breaking down?  
Are these systems effective in protecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples and 
other Forest Dependent Communities? 
 
3. Develop first draft of FPIC guidelines 
Ensure that there is a process of public consultation and validation by 
stakeholders on the guidelines. 
Include any actors which are likely to be involved in implementing the 
guidelines, such as local or national forestry authorities.  
 
4. Field test draft FPIC guidelines at a pilot site 
This should preferably be done where there is a concrete proposal which 
requires consent from the local rights-holders 
 
5. Independently evaluate the field test 
 
6. Amend the draft FPIC guidelines, as necessary 
Undertake a validation process with all stakeholders 
 
7.Consider how the FPIC guidelines could be formalized 
For example, by adopting the right to FPIC in legislation, and consider how 
the guidelines could be integrated into a broader regulatory scheme for 
REDD+.1330 
 
These basic, preliminary guidelines may help countries that do not have adequate 
consultation or consent processes available, although they are still quite general. In 
point 4 it is indicated that it is desirable to conduct a field test or “pilot” process. 
Later in this paragraph two of these pilots will be briefly examined, since these are 
some of the first real “FPIC in practice” studies available. 
In the document it is furthermore explained when FPIC is required, according 
to international law, and a more practical checklist for when FPIC is required is 
given. In the guidelines it is affirmed that the specifics of the consultation process will 
vary depending on the nature of the proposed activity and on the impact it may 
                                                        
1330 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 16. 
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have.1331 In the Draft Guidelines the different articles in UNDRIP with regard to 
FPIC are mentioned and an account of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court and the African Commission is provided. Furthermore, the new IFC 
Performance Standard 7 is examined in order to explain when FPIC is required. It is 
also mentioned that communal property rights or customary rights must be 
respected regardless of the national government’s recognition of those.1332 All this 
leads to the following ten-step model: 
 
CHECKLIST FOR APPRAISING WHETHER AN 
ACTIVITY WILL REQUIRE FPIC 
Yes/No 
1.  Will the activity involve the relocation/resettlement/removal of an 
indigenous population from their lands? 
 
2. Will the activity involve the taking, confiscation, removal or damage of 
cultural, intellectual, religious and/or spiritual property from 
Indigenous Peoples / Forest Dependent Community?  
 
3.  Will the activity adopt or implement any legislative or administrative 
measures that will affect the rights, lands, territories and/or resources 
of Indigenous Peoples / Forest Dependent Community (e.g. in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of 
mineral, water or other resources)? 
 
4. Will the activity involve mining and oil and/or gas operations 
(extraction of subsurface resources) on the lands/territories of 
Indigenous Peoples / Forest Dependent Community? 
 
5. Will the activity involve logging on the lands/territories of Indigenous 
Peoples / Forest Dependent Community? 
 
6. Will the activity involve the development of agro-industrial plantations 
on the lands/territories of Indigenous Peoples / Forest Dependent 
Community? 
 
7.  Will the activity involve any decisions that will affect the status of 
Indigenous Peoples’ / Forest Dependent Community’s rights to their 
lands/territories or resources? 
 
8. Will the activity involve the accessing of traditional knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities? 
 
                                                        
1331 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 17. 
1332 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 19. This goes a step further than the joint guidelines. Later 
in this paragraph, when examining the ‘Orang Asli’ case in Malaysia, it will be illustrated that 
this is a vital point for effectively protecting indigenous communities, even where 
sustainability initiatives are implemented. 
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9.  Will the activity involve making commercial use of natural and/or 
cultural resources on lands subject to traditional ownership and/or 
under customary use by Indigenous Peoples / Forest Dependent 
Community? 
 
10. Will the activity involve decisions regarding benefit-sharing 
arrangements, when benefits are derived from the lands/ 




Although they are very concise, it is possible to discern most of the situations 
and legal requirements that were examined in the previous paragraphs in these 
ten questions. Therefore they provide a good practical starting point for deciding 
whether FPIC is relevant. So when the answer to any of these questions is “yes” 
it is quite likely that FPIC is required for the proposed activity or decision.1334 
 The following step is to pave the way for the development of a more specific 
“community FPIC protocol,” designed to obtain FPIC for the proposed 
activity.1335 The operational framework for conducting the FPIC process in the 
UN-REDD Programme is roughly divided in three major steps: 
 
1. Partner Countries, in collaboration with relevant rights-holders, and taking into account 
the duties and obligations under international law, will undertake an FPIC scoping 
review.1336 
 
This first step will include - amongst others - a description of the proposed 
activity or policy, a description of the rights holders and their governance 
structures as well as clear guidelines on how they wish to be engaged in the 
process. Furthermore, the legal and geographical status of the lands, territories 
and resources of the involved rights holders will have to be charted. It is also 
during this first step that the social, environmental, and cultural impact 
assessments – derived from Saramaka People v. Suriname and the Akwé Kon 
Guidelines examined above – will have to be conducted. Last but not least, 
during this phase the resources for the process will have to be allocated.1337 
 Clearly, the first step in the operational framework takes into account the 
most recent findings and procedures, based on the international legal framework 
and the case law of the Inter-American Court. After this important first stage – 
                                                        
1333 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 19-20. 
1334 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 20. 
1335 Or, of course, to allow communities not to consent to the proposed project in a free and 
informed process. 
1336 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 23. 
1337 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 23. 
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and its outcome’s acceptance by all parties – it is time for the development of a 
proposal: 
 
2. The partner country, in consultation with the rights-holders, should develop an FPIC 
proposal that outlines the proposed process to seek FPIC.1338 
 
During the proposal phase, the information and communication requirements 
need to be addressed.1339 As was discussed before, this includes not just the 
provision of relevant information but also respect for the requirements of 
effective communication. In this phase it is also vital that the capacity needs of 
the indigenous communities involved are properly addressed.  
 Moreover, it is important to develop a timeline for the proposed 
consultations, as well as an understanding of how the decisions are to be taken, 
taking into account indigenous traditions and customs, while guaranteeing the 
participation of women and other vulnerable groups within communities.1340 
 Determining how FPIC is given, recognized, and recorded is also essential 
and the role of other actors in this process (e.g. government officials, donors, 
UN agencies etc.) has to be determined. Verification methods for the process, 
like participatory monitoring, are essential to guarantee the transparency of the 
process. Finally, it is important to develop complaint mechanisms for 
stakeholders to ensure adequate involvement of all affected stakeholders.1341 
 In this second phase, the drafting of actual FPIC proposal, the emphasis is on 
creating mechanisms for ongoing dialogue, participation, consultation, and 
consent. These should be transparent and respectful of the intercultural 
differences that may occur. It is in this phase that it is most essential to establish 
an “intercultural dialogue” and to ensure that FPIC processes take place in an 
atmosphere that can be described as “free.” As examined in Part III, this will 
have to involve a large degree of discursive control on the part of the affected 
communities. FPIC is a process of co-responsible decision making. 
  
3. Agreement upon the FPIC process and opportunities for evaluation and review. 
 
When these initial steps have been undertaken – that is, when rights holders 
agree to finalize the negotiations – it is time to combine the scoping review and 
the proposal into one document which should be agreed upon by all parties.1342 
                                                        
1338 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 24. 
1339 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 24. 
1340 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 24. 
1341 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 24. 
1342 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 25. 
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This document or procedure then forms the legitimate course to conduct the 
actual FPIC process. This combines insights explored earlier in this study, 
namely that FPIC processes should be flexible and tailor-made to suit specific 
intercultural situations, while they should still adheres to certain principles and 
norms that have been internationally agreed upon. The UN-REDD model 
seems to strike a proper balance in this respect, at least in theory. 
An important element of FPIC processes - an element that was already 
elaborated upon when discussing indigenous self-determination and Tully’s 
intercultural dialogue - is that arrangements should be open to review and 
grievance. Indigenous peoples are in an enduring relationship with the larger 
States in which they reside, and continuity has been described as one of the 
pillars of a successful intercultural constitution.1343 FPIC is not a single moment 
of decision making, or ends at that point, but has to involve a continuous 
process of mutual recognition. 
In the Draft Guidelines this is acknowledged and it is stressed that there 
should be independent evaluations and grievance mechanisms. The evaluations 
should be undertaken by an institution agreed upon by all stakeholders, in order 
to verify that the process has been in line with the requirements of international 
law and the Joint Guidelines.1344 
Moreover, a national grievance mechanism should be developed since the 
complexity of the issues and the diversity of stakeholders may lead to numerous 
questions and possible objections.1345 Such a mechanism is described as a 
“process for receiving and facilitating resolution of queries and grievances from 
affected communities or stakeholders related to REDD+ activities, policies or 
programs at the level of the community or country.”1346 The establishment of 
such a platform is in line with what the Inter-American Court has stated in 
Awas Tingni and later cases: that an effective mechanism for dispute resolution 
has to be created. According to the Draft Guidelines, these grievance 
mechanisms are to be considered effective when they: “address concerns 
promptly and fairly, using an understandable and transparent process that is 
culturally appropriate and readily accessible to all segments of the affected 
stakeholders.”1347 It is indicated in the Draft Guidelines that these mechanisms 
are critical to ensuring that grievances and disputes in FPIC processes are 
addressed in a proper manner.1348  
                                                        
1343 Where constitution is used in the sense that it was described in the paragraph on James 
Tully’s intercultural dialogue. 
1344 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 25. 
1345 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 26. 
1346 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 26. 
1347 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 26. 
1348 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, p. 26. 
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Figure: Indicative Steps for a REDD+ Process to Respect the Right of Communities to 
FPIC.1349 
                                                        
1349 Anderson P, ‘Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Principles and Approaches for Policy 
and Project Development’, RECOFTC – The Center for People and Forests, Deutsche 
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FPIC Pilots in Vietnam, Indonesia and elsewhere 
 
The final phase - the development of grievance mechanisms and independent 
evaluations is not only vital to ensure that the specific FPIC process is successfully 
implemented, but is also essential in creating a body of practice that is needed in 
order to effectively implement FPIC processes in other settings.1350 In this respect, 
the UN-REDD Programme has a pioneer role in providing best practice 
documentation. Nevertheless, there are only a few of these pilot-studies 
underway, and more are needed to effectively assess the chances and problems of 
FPIC processes.  
The UN REDD Programme has summarized the lessons learned from two 
pilot projects, one in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia and a second in Lam Dong 
Province, Vietnam. Since the most detailed assessment was conducted with regard 
to the Vietnam pilot, that case will be subject to a more in-depth examination.1351  
The FPIC trial in Indonesia revealed that it is important to segment the 
audiences to divide the ways and means in which people are informed according 
to their needs and capacity.1352 Furthermore, it was found that the more concrete a 
proposal is, the easier it was for communities to understand the nature and impact 
of a certain activity. In the Vietnam pilot, the question was if the people would 
agree to REDD+ activities, while in Indonesia, they were asked about specific 
replanting initiatives.1353  
Using trained facilitators from the community itself greatly improved the 
understanding of the project since building trust between the facilitator and 
community is far easier this way. 
 
FPIC in Lam Dong Province Vietnam 
 
The FPIC process in Vietnam is the first and most successful example in the 
framework of REDD+.1354 The process started in early 2010 when the need to 
                                                                                                                              
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Sector Network Natural 
Resources and Rural Development – Asia, Bangkok, February 2011, p. 24-25. 
1350 This is the main future challenge, comparative studies into different ‘best and worst’ 
practices of FPIC processes should lead to a better understanding on how to proceed with 
implementation. 
1351 Nevertheless, it is not the purpose of this work to develop a comparative best-practice 
study on the application of FPIC. One of the main recommendations however, is that such 
studies should be undertaken, since they offer one of the best ways to advance understanding 
of a proper and practical implementation of FPIC requirements. 
1352 For instance the use of visual information for illiterate people and written documents for 
others. 
1353 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, Annex VI, lessons learned from FPIC pilot experiences, UN-
REDD Programme Vietnam and UN-REDD Programme Indonesia, p. 37. 
1354 For the full report see the country website: http://vietnam-redd.org/: Applying the 




obtain FPIC was identified on the designated pilot sites. The Programme staff and 
consultants designed the process and developed the necessary awareness raising 
materials, which included consultations with the different communities. Some 
documents were also published in the local K’Ho language.1355  
 An FPIC team of facilitators or interlocutors was recruited to implement the 
process. This included training on climate change, the UN-REDD Programme, 
communication skills, and field practice.1356 The actual FPIC process, conducted 
between April and June 2010, concerned 78 villages in 12 communes in Lam 
Dong Province. Various awareness raising activities, workshops, and consultations 
were held and both the Vietnamese and K’Ho language were used to ensure that 
the people understood the contents of the discussions.1357 
 At different moments in the process, facilitators had to reflect, adjust, and 
improve their methods of organizing the village-level process and the ways in 
which awareness raising took place.1358 Eventually the FPIC decision had to be 
recorded, which itself included a number of difficulties. The signing of a consent 
sheet was replaced by a show-of-hands voting, due to the fear of some local 
people that signing their names might make them vulnerable to criticism in the 
future. However, a show of hands is difficult to record and does not avoid the 
effect of majority pressure for a certain decision. Eventually, anonymous ballot 
papers were chosen to allow the villagers to express their opinion freely and in 
secret. 1359 
The evaluation of the FPIC trial in Vietnam broadly led to the following eight 
lessons: 
 
- Adequate time needs to be allowed for awareness raising. 
- Adequate time must be given to absorb information and for internal 
discussion. 
- Local PFIC events can be very time-consuming and complex. 
- Engagement with local authorities needs to be managed carefully and 
flexibly. 
- Local facilitators are essential for effective awareness-raising and discussion. 
                                                        
1355 Assessing the Effectiveness of Training and Awareness Raising Activities of the 
UNREDD Programme in Viet Nam (2009-2011) UN-REDD PROGRAMME, June 2012, 
p. 27. 
1356 Assessing the Effectiveness of Training and Awareness Raising Activities of the 
UNREDD Programme in Viet Nam (2009-2011) UN-REDD PROGRAMME, June 2012, 
p. 27. 
1357 Assessing the Effectiveness of Training and Awareness Raising Activities of the 
UNREDD Programme in Viet Nam (2009-2011) UN-REDD PROGRAMME, June 2012, 
p. 27. 
1358 Assessing the Effectiveness of Training and Awareness Raising Activities of the 
UNREDD Programme in Viet Nam (2009-2011) UN-REDD PROGRAMME, June 2012, 
p. 27. 
1359 Applying the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the UN-REDD 




- Documenting FPIC decisions can be challenging. 
- Managing expectations of villagers is important. 
- A mechanism for addressing grievances and disputes should be identified 
and established at the outset.1360 
 
While these lessons do not by themselves lead to very new insights – most of them 
were already addressed earlier on in this study – it is of vital importance to 
document and compare the different practices on FPIC.  
 When a larger number of these studies is available, it is to be hoped that 
comparative research is developed. This will undoubtedly reveal a number of 
important perspectives relevant for successful FPIC processes. While the 
Indonesian and Vietnamese FPIC pilots are still the only ones within the 
framework of UN-REDD that are “finalized,” a detailed study of these and other 
FPIC pilots in the Asian region was published in November 2012.1361 
 The Vietnam pilot has been the most elaborate study of FPIC in practice and 
involved the organization of about 12 technical trainings with 400 participants for 
FPIC facilitators, about 90 village level workshops, the development of posters, 
television and radio broadcasts, and a programme website.1362 A thorough 
assessment of the different training and awareness raising activities led to a detailed 
report on the effectiveness of the FPIC process.1363 Such effectiveness assessments 
will undoubtedly be of great value to the successful implementation of FPIC 
processes, within and outside of the REDD framework. 
 
Conclusions: FPIC Implementation Models and Best Practice Studies in UN-REDD 
 
The UN-REDD Programme and the Draft Guidelines in particular provide one 
of the most recent and complete models for implementing FPIC processes. They 
incorporate state of the art international legal developments concerning FPIC and 
indigenous rights and acknowledge that although some guidance is evidently 
necessary, it is also important not to lose sight of the myriad of different 
intercultural situations in which FPIC is relevant. 
                                                        
1360 UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Final 
Working Draft, October 2012, Annex VI, lessons learned from FPIC pilot experiences, UN-
REDD Programme Vietnam and UN-REDD Programme Indonesia, p. 38. For a detailed 
overview of these lessons, see: Applying Free, Prior and Informed Consent in Viet Nam, UN-
REDD Programme, April 2010. And: UN-REDD Programme, Fact Sheet on Work on Free, 
Prior Informed Consent in Vietnam. 
1361 UN-REDD Programme, Free, Prior and Informed Consent for REDD+ in the Asia-
Pacific Region: Lessons Learned, November 2012. 
1362 Assessing the Effectiveness of Training and Awareness Raising Activities of the 
UNREDD Programme in Viet Nam (2009-2011) UN-REDD PROGRAMME, June 2012, 
pp. 15-27.  
1363 Assessing the Effectiveness of Training and Awareness Raising Activities of the 
UNREDD Programme in Viet Nam (2009-2011) UN-REDD PROGRAMME, June 2012. 
See pp. 29-34 for the main findings, lessons and recommendations.  
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The step by step approach offers a systematic plan for States who are struggling 
with implementing FPIC requirements. Due to its basis in international law and 
the large diversity of possible REDD+ related activities, the UN-REDD system 
may have application outside the scope of reducing emissions. Furthermore, 
comparative practice studies on FPIC pilots are being developed in the framework 
of UN-REDD. Although these are still in an early phase, a lot of practical 
knowledge will be revealed when these studies are conducted and structured in a 
more expanded manner in the future. All in all, the work of the UN-REDD 
Programme on FPIC is one of the most promising developments related to 
implementation of FPIC processes. 
V.2.3 The Forest Stewardship Council Guidelines on FPIC 
Introduction 
 
The next implementation system that will be explored is to be found in the FSC 
Guidelines on FPIC.1364 Although “free and informed consent” has been a 
requirement in the Forest Stewardship Council’s principles and criteria since 1994, 
the first official version of the guidelines was adopted very recently, in October 
2012. It is remarkable that virtually no detailed and documented best practices on 
the implementation of this requirement have been available.1365  
 In the following paragraphs some key characteristics of sustainable forest 
management will be briefly discussed before a more in-depth examination of the 
FSC’s system and recent implementation model will be provided for.  
 
Sustainable Forest Management 
 
Over the past decade large changes occurred in the timber sector. No real 
requirements on legality and sustainability existed previously but now, with the 
general recognition that the world’s forests are diminishing rapidly, criteria and 
certification schemes are developed that have the aim of securing that timber 
logging is conducted in a legal and sustainable manner. These are becoming an 
important tool for combating deforestation. Especially in the equatorial region, 
where a large part of the tropical rainforest has already disappeared, these measures 
                                                        
1364 FSC Guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Forest Stewardship Council Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, 30 October 
2012 (Henceforth: FSC Guidelines 2012). 
1365 FSC Guidelines 2012, p. 6. It is also noted that: “several conflicts arising from disregarding 
this right have been reported.” One exception is a 2008 study of FPIC and SFM in the 
Congo Basin: Lewis J, Freeman L and Borreill S, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent and 
Sustainable Forest Management in the Congo Basin, A Feasibility Study conducted in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo and Gabon regarding the 
operationalisation of FSC Principles 2 and 3 in the Congo Basin’, July 2008. 
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are vital.1366 The Amazon region, the Congo Basin, and South-East Asia are the 
core suppliers of tropical wood, and it is in these parts that large areas of tropical 
rainforest have visibly disappeared. Some tree species have become extremely rare, 
due to forms of “cherry-picking” logging in these most diverse forests. The timber 
industry is forced to innovate and to practice more sustainable methods of forest 
management.1367 
The basic idea behind sustainable development is that it meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs. In sustainable forest management the importance of linking the economic, 
environmental, and social value of forests in a single scheme is recognized.1368 The 
Great-Britain forestry commission illustrates these broad objectives of sustainability 
in the following model: 1369 
 
 
The principles underlying forestry management have shifted over time and the 
initial focus on achieving sustained production of a single commodity has been 
abandoned for a more realistic and holistic approach called Sustainable Forest 
Management (SFM).1370 Part of this approach is introducing certification schemes, 
                                                        
1366 The situation in the Arctic and other ‘pine-tree regions’ seems to be less desperate, the 
‘softer’ type of wood that come from these areas is easier to manage in a sustainable manner, 
since there is not so much diversity as in the tropical ‘hard wood’ areas. 
1367 An example of this is that the industry is experimenting with injecting glue like substances 
in ‘softer’ types of wood to give them the characteristics of tropical wood. The timber sector is 
anticipating the disappearance of tropical ‘hard’ wood for the market in the near future. 
1368 These criteria are often referred to as the three ‘P’s’: People, Planet and Profit. 
1369 Diagram taken from the Great Britain Forestry Commission website:  
http://www.forestry.gov.uk/website/forestry.nsf/byunique/edik-59fmzf.  
Consulted December 2011. 
1370 Nasi R and Frost P G H, 'Sustainable forest management in the tropics: Is everything in 
order but the patient still dying', 14 Ecology and Society 40, 2009. The PEFC international 
standard defines SFM as: A holistic approach defined as the stewardship and use of forests and 
forest land in a way and at a rate that maintains their biodiversity, productivity, regeneration 
capacity, vitality and potential to fulfill, now and in the future, relevant ecological, economic 
and social functions, at local, national and global levels and does not cause damage to other 
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devised to assure consumers that the products they purchase are produced in a 
sustainable manner, equitably and with adequate management.1371  
 The debate surrounding sustainability and forest management is vast and 
complex. The basic premises are contested and fundamental questions remain 
unanswered. Even the very aim and achievability of the available solutions is 
questioned: Is sustainable forest management - as the key standard - really 
achievable at all? Is it possible to define sustainability? Can the triple bottom line of 
“people, planet and profit” be upheld or should trade-offs be made in order to 
make real progress?1372 Going into these highly intricate questions is far beyond the 
scope of this paragraph, but awareness of their existence is important for a better 
understanding of the issues in this and the following paragraphs, especially when 
we discuss the mixed experiences the Orang Asli People of Peninsular Malaysia 
have with SFM. An important part of the regulatory framework devised to 
structure the requirements of sustainable forest management, are the certification 
schemes devised to control forestry along the entire “chain of custody” by 
upholding a principled approach and tracking the forest produce from source to 
user. 
 Two main certification organizations exist, The Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). 
FSC is a single certificate to which accession is possible, while PEFC is structured 
more like an umbrella organization that allows other certificates to use the 
certificate when they adhere to certain standards.1373 
The social criteria are an important element of these schemes, and they 
incorporate international standards related to indigenous peoples, like ILO 
Convention No. 169, UNDRIP, and the CBD.1374 They furthermore include 
procedures for stakeholder engagement and participation of local and indigenous 
communities in SFM. Protection and participation of indigenous peoples has a 
central role in SFM and, according to the website of PEFC, 60 million indigenous 
people are fully dependent upon the forests and an additional 350 million depend 
on them primarily for income and subsistence.1375 The loss of forests threatens the 
                                                                                                                              
ecosystems. See: PEFC International Standard, PEFC ST 1003: 2010, requirements for 
sustainable forest management.  
1371 Nasi R and Frost P G H, 'Sustainable forest management in the tropics: Is everything in 
order but the patient still dying', 14 Ecology and Society 40, 2009. 
1372 Nasi R and Frost P G H, 'Sustainable forest management in the tropics: Is everything in 
order but the patient still dying', 14 Ecology and Society 40, 2009. 
1373 Noteworthy, FSC was set up by societal and environmental organizations (NGOs), while 
PEFC was created by the timber industry as its counterpart. Rivalry and competition between 
the two is not uncommon. 
1374 See e.g. http://www.pefc.org/forest-issues/sustainability/indigenous-people: “We also 
require that forest management activities shall be conducted in recognition of the established 
framework of legal, customary and traditional rights, which shall not be infringed upon 
without the free and informed consent of the holders of the rights.” FSC International 
Standard, Fsc Principles And Criteria For Forest, Stewardship, Fsc-Std-01-001 (Version 4-0) 
En. 
1375 It is unclear to what extent these statistics are reliable. 
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way of life and the very livelihoods of many of the indigenous peoples that live 
and work directly in forests and forest landscapes.1376 
 Different types of standards aim to secure the protection of indigenous peoples 
within certification schemes. Within the framework of FSC, these standards are 
most developed. 
 
Comparing The FSC Principles and Criteria 
 
FSC operates along a list of ten key principles and corollary criteria (P&C) that 
guide the forest management operations. They were first published in 1994 and 
amended in 1996, 1999, and 2001.1377 The forest management unit – the 
organization that seeks FSC certification – must prove that it respects all ten 
principles before certification is awarded.1378 
 In 2009, FSC initiated a comprehensive review of its P&C, which resulted in a 
new version in January 2012. The new P&C (which are not yet in use for the 
auditing process, but which will gradually be implemented over the coming 
period) contain some important changes with regard to FPIC and therefore will be 
compared with the older version here.1379  
Principle 3, of the 1996 P&C clearly reflects the key role of indigenous 
peoples in SFM: 
 
Principle #3: Indigenous peoples’ rights (1996) 
 
The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own, use 
and manage their lands, territories, and resources shall be recognized 
and respected. 
 
3.1  Indigenous peoples shall control forest management on their 
lands and territories unless they delegate control with free and 
informed consent to other agencies. 
3.2  Forest management shall not threaten or diminish, either 
directly or indirectly, the resources or tenure rights of indigenous 
peoples. 
3.3  Sites of special cultural, ecological, economic or religious 
significance to indigenous peoples shall be clearly identified in 
cooperation with such peoples, and recognized and protected by 
forest managers. 
 
                                                        
1376 http://www.pefc.org/forest-issues/sustainability/indigenous-people. Consulted 11 
December 2012. 
1377 FSC international standard, FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, Fsc-Std-
01-001 (version 4-0) En, 1996. 
1378 FSC Website: https://ic.fsc.org/principles-and-criteria.34.htm. Consulted April 2013. 
1379 FSC international standard, FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, Fsc-Std-
01-001 (version 5-0) En, 2012. 
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3.4  Indigenous peoples shall be compensated for the application of 
their traditional knowledge regarding the use of forest species or 
management systems in forest operations. This compensation shall 
be formally agreed upon with their free and informed consent 
before forest operations commence.1380  
 
In the 1996 P&C it is stated that indigenous peoples control their lands and 
resources, unless they delegate control by a process of free and informed consent. 
Furthermore, In Principle 3 it is indicated that indigenous peoples are entitled to 
compensation and that sacred sites and resource tenure are to be respected by 
external forest managers.  
 In the new Principle 3 the requirements for dealing with indigenous peoples 
are expanded and a more detailed explanation of FSC’s policy on the matter is 
provided: 
 
Principle #3: Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (2012) 
 
The Organization shall identify and uphold indigenous peoples’ 
legal and customary rights of ownership, use and management of 
land, territories and resources affected by management activities. 
 
3.1  The Organization shall identify the indigenous peoples that 
exist within the Management Unit or are affected by management 
activities. The Organization shall then, through engagement with 
these indigenous peoples, identify their rights of tenure, their rights 
of access to and use of forest resources and ecosystem services, their 
customary rights and legal rights and obligations, that apply within 
the Management Unit. The Organization shall also identify areas 
where these rights are contested. 
3.2  The Organization shall recognize and uphold the legal and 
customary rights of indigenous peoples to maintain control over 
management activities within or related to the Management Unit to 
the extent necessary to protect their rights, resources and lands and 
territories. Delegation by indigenous peoples of control over 
management activities to third parties requires Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent. 
3.3  In the event of delegation of control over management 
activities, a binding agreement between The Organization and the 
indigenous peoples shall be concluded through Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent. The agreement shall define its duration, 
provisions for renegotiation, renewal, termination, economic 
conditions and other terms and conditions. The agreement shall 
                                                        
1380 FSC International Standard, FSC Principles And Criteria For Forest, Stewardship, Fsc-
Std-01-001 (Version 4-0) En. Emphasis added. 
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make provision for monitoring by indigenous peoples of The 
Organization’s compliance with its terms and conditions. 
3.4  The Organization shall recognize and uphold the rights, 
customs and culture of indigenous peoples as defined in the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) 
and ILO Convention 169 (1989). 
3.5  The Organization, through engagement with indigenous 
peoples, shall identify sites which are of special cultural, ecological, 
economic, religious or spiritual significance and for which these 
indigenous peoples hold legal or customary rights. These sites shall 
be recognized by The Organization and their management, and/or 
protection shall be agreed through engagement with these 
indigenous peoples. 
3.6  The Organization shall uphold the right of indigenous peoples 
to protect and utilize their traditional knowledge and shall 
compensate indigenous peoples for the utilization of such 
knowledge and their intellectual property. A binding agreement as 
per Criterion 3.3 shall be concluded between The Organization and 
the indigenous peoples for such utilization through Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent before utilization takes place and shall be 
consistent with the protection of intellectual property rights.1381 
 
These new P&C will be phased in over the coming years, when generic indicators 
that further specify the new P&C will be developed. They broaden the scope of 
the right to FPIC and are more specific about in which situations FPIC is 
required.1382 The new P&C also provide a definition of FPIC based on the 2005 
Workshop conclusions, discussed earlier: 
 
Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: A legal condition whereby 
a person or community can be said to have given consent to an 
action prior to its commencement, based upon a clear appreciation 
and understanding of the facts, implications and future consequences 
of that action, and the possession of all relevant facts at the time 
when consent is given. Free, prior and informed consent includes 
the right to grant, modify, withhold or withdraw approval.1383 
  
In the new P&C ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ is mentioned, thereby 
bringing the terminology in alignment with the UNDRIP. Furthermore, it is 
specifically acknowledged that the organization has to respect indigenous rights 
                                                        
1381 FSC international standard, FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, Fsc-Std-
01-001 (version 5-0) En, 2012. Emphasis added. 
1382 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 6. 
1383 FSC international standard, FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, Fsc-Std-
01-001 (version 5-0) En, 2012, p. 27. 
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derived from ILO Convention No. 169 and the UNDRIP, thereby making the 
standards applicable to countries that have not ratified or adopted the mentioned 
instruments.1384  
 Moreover, the new P&C unambiguously state that the organization has to 
identify indigenous peoples and their rights (legal or customary) to their lands and 
resources, as well as their right to control forest management. Control can only be 
delegated through an FPIC process that has to lead to a binding agreement 
(Principle 3.3.). This agreement has to include the project’s duration, provisions 
for renegotiation, renewal, termination, economic conditions, and other terms and 
conditions. This way the new P&C include strong duties for the organization to 
make sure that indigenous peoples’ rights are respected. It also provides a more 
detailed explanation of when FPIC is needed and what an FPIC agreement should 
include. 
 Additionally, the new P&C also confer the right to FPIC to local communities 
in its revised Principle 4. The scope of FPIC is therefore expanded to include 
other communities that may have similar characteristics and interests as indigenous 
communities.1385 Earlier on it was described that the Inter-American Court took a 
pragmatic approach towards the applicability of indigenous rights for other 
similarly affected communities, foremost in the Saramaka case. 
 In sum, the revised P&C significantly strengthen the rights of indigenous 
peoples with regard to control over forest management. FPIC must be sought in 
two situations: first, to determine if the indigenous community that has legal or 
customary rights to land or resources in or near the forest operation, and that may 
be affected by the activity, agrees to the proposed project. Second, FPIC processes 
must be started when a certified organization intends to use the traditional 
knowledge of indigenous peoples.1386 Besides being in line with the UNDRIP, 
this second situation is in line with the requirements of the CBD’s article 18(j). In 
order to effectively implement these strengthened FPIC requirements, FSC 
developed an extensive guidance document under the auspices of Leo van der 
                                                        
1384That is, applicable with regard to forestry operations with FSC certification. FSC 
certification thus requires respect for the latest international norms, this may differ substantially 
from what is positive law in a particular state. 
1385 In the Guidelines local communities are defined as: “Communities of any size that are in or 
adjacent to the Management Unit, and also those that are close to enough to have a significant 
impact on the economy or the environmental values of the Management Unit or to have their 
economies, rights or environments significantly affected by the management activities or the 
biophysical aspects of the Management Unit.” Indigenous peoples are defined in line with the 
ILO 169 definition. Furthermore, the Guidelines Glossary of Terms also mention ‘traditional 
peoples’ who are described as: “Social groups or peoples who do not self-identify as indigenous 
and who affirm rights to their lands, forests and other resources based on long established 
custom or traditional occupation and use. See: FSC guidelines for the implementation of the 
right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, 
October 2012, pp. 67-68. One could think of for instance certain communities of African 
descent in Latin America. 
1386 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 17. 
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Vlist and Wolfgang Richert.1387 This document establishes a six step 
implementation model. 
 
The 2012 Guidelines on FPIC 
 
FPIC is not an isolated requirement in FSC’s new P&C, but it is to be 
implemented taking into account a large number of other principles and criteria as 
well.1388 The guidelines incorporate these other standards in the six step process.  
 According to principle 3, the rights of indigenous peoples to control their lands 
and resources must be respected. Claims to these rights must be based on “long 
established use” and must be “fair and legitimate.” Both these terms may lead to 
conflicting interpretations. 1389 
 Moreover, FPIC processes should result in a binding agreement, while taking 
into account that an important goal of such agreements should be to establish an 
ongoing relationship based on mutual trust between indigenous peoples and other 
involved actors (mainly the organization).1390 The organization is also encouraged 
to use a precautionary approach and to respect – and utilize – indigenous peoples’ 
traditional knowledge.  
 The mentioned goals are to be met following these six steps: 
 
1. Identify rights holders and their representative institutions 
2. Prepare for further engagement with identified communities 
3. Map rights, resources, lands and territories and assess impacts 
4. Inform affected indigenous and local community rights holders 
5. Negotiate and let community decide on negotiated FPIC proposal 
6  Formalize, verify, implement and monitor the consent agreement 
 
These steps are illustrated in the following scheme:1391 
 
                                                        
1387 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012. 
1388 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 19 
1389 What is considered ‘fair and legitimate’ varies, since it is dependent on a large number of 
factors determined by the specific context of the situation at hand. ‘Long and established use’ 
similarly may be applied and interpreted differently in different contexts. See: FSC guidelines 
for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), Technical 
Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 22. 
1390 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 21. This is fully in line 
with the preamble and ‘spirit’ of the UNDRIP. 
1391 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 






The FSC guidelines entail a very practical approach and checklist for execution 
of an FPIC process. A summary of the most important elements of each of the 
six steps will be provided next. 
 
Step 1. Identify rights holders and their representative institutions 
 
Regarding step 1, the organization takes the initiative to identify which 
indigenous peoples or other communities reside in proximity of the forest 
management unit and whether their rights, resources, and lands or territories 
may be affected by the operation.1392 Next, it is up to the organization to 
examine if the potentially affected communities want to consider the proposed 
project. In order to do this, the organization needs to identify how the 
communities’ decision-making system is structured and they need to agree on a 
method that includes all members of the different communities.1393 
 The representatives of the communities then have to be informed – in a 
culturally appropriate form – about the proposed forestry operation and about its 
possible impact on rights, lands, and resources.1394 In the FSC implementation 
model, it is also important to inform the communities that they are free to say 
“no” to the proposal, this way a strong interpretation of FPIC is implemented in 
the guidelines.1395 This means that if a community does not want to consider a 
project, the organization must refrain from further action that may impact the 
communities involved.1396 If the communities do want to consider the project, it 
is time for step 2.1397 
 
Step 2. Prepare for further engagement with identified communities 
 
Preparations that have to be taken in order to facilitate further engagement with 
the communities require a number of activities. The organizations should 
establish a multi stakeholder working group in which all relevant actors are 
included. Furthermore, an internal structure for effective interaction with the 
communities must be developed.1398 It is made clear in the guidelines that – as 
                                                        
1392 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 28. The Guidelines state 
that it is to be advised to involve NGO’s and other experts in this phase. 
1393 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 28. 
1394 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 28. 
1395 In a specific context, it may of course be easier to require full consent. Generally, and as 
the Special Rapporteur has noted, the scope of consent may be broader.  
1396 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 28. 
1397 The (expansive) guidelines include a checklist for each step as well as a detailed 
commentary on how to implement each step. 
1398 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 29. 
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was discussed throughout this study – the amount of effort that has to go into an 
FPIC process will depend on the scale, intensity and risk of the proposed forestry 
operations. It is also advised to agree with the different parties on an 
independent third party to verify the process from the earliest stages.1399 
 The organization must also establish a well-developed communication and 
information strategy to make sure that the “informed” criterion is met.1400 FSC 
acknowledges that informing is far broader than merely explaining to the 
community what the plans are, since it also involves delicate and time-
consuming communicative transactions between culturally diverging actors and 
stakeholders.1401An important point in step 2 is that the organization also has to 
find out if, and to what extent, the government already has an FPIC strategy or 
legal framework. This way, the organization can find out to which additional 
steps are needed in order to fulfill the strong FSC criteria.1402 When the activities 
that may have an impact on the identified communities are sufficiently defined, a 
realistic and flexible timeline has to be developed in order to adequately inform 
the involved communities.1403  
 
Step 3. Map rights, resources, lands and territories and assess impacts 
 
The third step involves the complex process of mapping the rights, lands, and 
resources concerned, and assessing the possible impact that the proposed activity 
may have on these. The guidelines refer to procedures for participatory mapping 
and participatory impact assessment as the preferred methods.1404 Participatory 
mapping means that the organization and communities jointly identify all those 
elements relevant for the FPIC process and indicate those on a map.1405 
Technologies for mapping like GPS are becoming more and more accessible and 
together with traditional knowledge of the areas may lead to accurate and 
detailed charts of the territories involved. The process of participatory impact 
assessment refers to the model of the Akwé: Kon Guidelines, described above, in 
which environmental, social, and cultural impact assessments are to be integrated 
                                                        
1399 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 29. 
1400 See paragraph III.3.3. 
1401 According to the standards and criteria for successful communicative transactions explored 
in paragraph III.3.3. 
1402 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 29. 
1403 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 29. 
1404 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 30. 
1405 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 48. Important elements to 
map include: sacred sites, tenure patterns, land usage etc. but also the exact scope of the 
activity that the organization proposes. 
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and in which local and indigenous communities have an important part to 
play.1406 
 For this step, it is essential that the communities have sufficient time, 
knowledge, training, and skills and that all segments of the community are 
involved to prevent possible future conflicts.1407 Conflicting claims may arise 
nonetheless, and it is up to the organization to devise an appropriate dispute 
settlement mechanism.1408 When the mapping is completed, the organization is 
to engage and agree with the communities to adapt the earlier developed plan 
and approach according to the findings of the mapping and impact assessment 
processes.1409 
 
Step 4. Inform affected indigenous and local community rights holders 
 
When the management plan is adapted according to the outcome of the 
mapping process and the impact assessment is finalized, it is time to inform the 
affected communities more formally about the forest management activities that 
the organization is proposing.1410 Information and communication are again the 
keywords during this phase. The organization has to provide the affected 
communities with all relevant information concerning the proposed operation in 
a way that is understandable, both in language and in form.1411 Again, the 
community will need sufficient time to deliberate and come to a genuinely 
informed decision. It is important to secure that the community members fully 
understand the potential benefits and costs of the project. Then, the community 
will decide if they want to enter into negotiations with the organization about 
the forestry activities.1412 
 
Step 5. Negotiate and let community decide on negotiated FPIC proposal 
 
In preparation of the consent agreement, the organization will have to make 
sure that there is indeed an agreed and inclusive decision-making model and that 
the communities involved have the necessary capacity to enter into negotiations 
                                                        
1406 Also see: FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed 
consent (FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 79. 
1407 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 30. 
1408 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 30. 
14091409 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 30. 
1410 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 31. 
1411 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 31. 
1412 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 31. 
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about the activities.1413The negotiation process that follows involves mitigation 
of the negative impacts, compensation of unavoidable damages, benefit-sharing 
solutions, and further needed financial and legal arrangements. If the parties 
agree, grievance mechanisms and monitoring models should be developed.1414 
This is essential to secure that FPIC is not a “single moment decision” but rather 
a continuous process that may involve revision of the existing arrangements.1415 
 After this, a consent agreement is drafted in which all of these elements are 
included. Then the community decides whether they give or withhold their 
consent, or if they would like to modify the existing agreement. In this phase, it 
is important to verify that the decision is made freely, accurately informed, and 
with sufficient time and capacity.1416  
 
Step 6. Formalize, verify, implement and monitor the consent agreement 
 
The final step in the FSC process is to appropriately formalize the consent 
agreement. The outcome should be made publicly available - if the community 
desires this - and the process should be verified by an independent party.1417 
 Subsequently, the consent agreement is implemented and monitored 
according to the arrangements that were made. The guidelines - correctly - 
indicate that even during this phase, changing policies, circumstances, or new 
information may re-open negotiations or even lead to withdrawal of consent. It 
is conceded in the guidelines that: “FPIC remains an iterative process and 
requires a continuous dialogue between the organization and the affected rights 
holders, to manage conflicts and to find solutions.”1418 Monitoring and grievance 
mechanisms are therefore essential to secure that the FPIC agreement is 
implemented correctly. 
 
Conclusions on the FSC Model 
 
The FSC Guidelines for the implementation of free, prior and informed consent 
contain one of the most elaborate models for preparing, negotiating and 
monitoring FPIC arrangements in relation to sustainable forestry operations in 
areas where indigenous peoples reside. Although consent requirements have 
been present in the FSC’s principles and criteria since 1994, there is remarkably 
                                                        
1413 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 32. 
1414 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 32. 
1415 See amongst others paragraph III.3.2 on prior, where it was already argued that FPIC is 
not just important prior to decision-making. 
1416 In compliance with the criteria for free, prior and informed consent identified in this 
study. 
1417 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 33. 
1418 FSC guidelines for the implementation of the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), Technical Series No. 2012-2, Version 1, October 2012, p. 33. 
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little documentation available about its implementation. In the new 2012 P&C 
the scope of the FPIC requirements is adjusted and broadened in line with 
contemporary international law. In the P&C UNDRIP, ILO 169, and the CBD 
are explicitly referred to as those documents in which the relevant norms can be 
found. Furthermore, the FSC Guidelines on FPIC draw on international 
documents and reports and decisions from the ILO, CERD, HRC, CESCR, 
ACHPR, and the IACtHR. This way, the FSC’s guidelines show a 
commitment to uphold international law and aim to bring FSC’s policy in line 
with what is emerging as an international consensus on FPIC. 
 Nevertheless, since the FSC certificate is a voluntary standard it may also go 
beyond what is legally required. FPIC is explained in the guidelines as also 
including a straight forward right to “say no” to forestry operations, and its scope 
is broadened to include local communities as well as indigenous peoples. The 
guidelines are also in line with other implementation guides on FPIC, foremost 
with the guidelines in the framework of the UN REDD Programme discussed 
above. Moreover, in the guidelines the Akwé: Kon Guidelines on impact 
assessments are referred to for regulating the different impact assessments that are 
needed to come to a genuinely informed decision about the planned projects. 
 What is particularly attractive about the FSC’s guidelines on FPIC is that 
they strike a balance between regulating and standardizing FPIC requirements 
on the one hand, while leaving enough space to negotiate flexible, tailor-made 
FPIC agreements on the other.1419 The different steps in the process seem to 
provide enough guidance for participating organizations to include FPIC in their 
policy, but also continuously remind us of the flexible understanding that is 
necessary for implementing FPIC in a wide variety of cultural, social, economic, 
and environmental situations. 
 However, up till now, there are virtually no best practice studies on the 
implementation of FPIC in the framework of the Forest Stewardship Council. 
The new P&C will gradually be applied over the coming period and the FSC 
has planned six FPIC Pilot Projects in order to create know-how and best 
practices on the implementation of FPIC.1420 These pilot programmes may be 
invaluable in examining the effectiveness of the FPIC implementation model the 
FSC is proposing. 
 Obtaining FPIC from indigenous and local communities is a key 
requirement for certification of forestry operations in the framework of FSC. 
The new P&C and the Guidelines for implementation have the aim to bring the 
FPIC requirement in line with international law and other voluntary initiatives 
containing FPIC requirements.  While it is too early to say much about the 
effectiveness of the FSC model, it is a positive development that different best 
                                                        
1419 That is, in theory, since almost no case studies on the implementation of the guidelines are 
available. 
1420 The planning of these six FPIC Pilots is still in a very early stage and there is no 
documentation available yet. FSC is planning these Pilots in different regions of the world, 
amongst others in Canada, the Russian Federation, Latin-America, Asia and Africa. To little is 
known about these Pilots to elaborate on them further at this moment. 
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practice or case studies are being developed. Voluntary initiatives like FSC may 
go beyond what is strictly speaking legally required, but also adhere to the 
international legal standard-setting on FPIC.1421 The proposed implementation 
model focuses on continuous dialogue with indigenous communities and entails 
strong information and communication requirements before and after 
formalizing an FPIC agreement about sustainable forest management.  
V.2.4 Other Voluntary Standards  
In addition to the guidelines discussed above – in the framework of the CBD, 
UN-REDD Programme and FSC – there are a number of other voluntary 
standards that incorporate consent requirements. A limited overview will be 
given in this paragraph.1422 Most of these “commodity roundtables” have 
developed their own standards for certifying and auditing participating 
corporations.1423 This paragraph will briefly explore standard-setting in relation 
to FPIC in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO),1424 the 
Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS),1425 and the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB).1426 Another, different organization that will be 
treated is the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), which has 
developed guidelines for indigenous peoples and FPIC in the mining sector.1427 
 
The Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) 
 
The RSPO was founded in 2003 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, after an inaugural 
meeting in which the statement of intent was signed by the participating 
organizations. Its formal establishment took place in 2004 under Article 60 of 
the Swiss Civil Code, adopting a governance structure that has the aim of 
ensuring effective participation and representation of all stakeholders throughout 
                                                        
1421 Which is often more than can be said about national legislation in this respect. 
1422 Colchester, Chao, Jiwan, Securing rights trough commodity roundtables? A comparative review, 
Pre-Conference draft, Forest Peoples Programme, 2012. Another example of a guide to FPIC 
designed specifically for indigenous communities is: Oxfam Australia, Guide to Free Prior and 
Informed Consent, June 2010. 
1423 Colchester M, Chao S, Jiwan N, ‘Securing rights trough commodity roundtables? A 




1427 Other voluntary standards in which consent requirements are (marginally) elaborated upon 
are BonSucro and the Shrimp Aquaculture Dialogue. See: http://bonsucro.com/site/ and 
http://www.asc-aqua.org/index.cfm?act=tekst.item&iid=7&iids=239&lng=1.  
These initiatives do not have explicit references to FPIC. For an overview of the relevant 
standards in relation to indigenous peoples, see: Colchester, Chao, Jiwan, Securing rights trough 




the supply chain.1428 The RSPO’s organization structure includes a General 
Assembly, Executive Board, Secretary General, and a number of associated 
committees and working groups.1429 
 Its vision is to transform markets so that sustainable palm oil is the norm. To 
accomplish this, the RSPO advances the production, procurement, finance, and 
use of sustainable palm oil products. It aims to develop, implement, verify, 
assure, and review credible global standards along the chain of supply and 
monitors the economic, environmental and social impacts of the uptake of 
sustainable palm oil in the market.1430 Furthermore, its mission is to engage and 
commit all stakeholders in the process.1431  
 Palm oil is an edible vegetable oil that can be harvested from the fruit of the 
oil palm. In recent years palm oil has become more and more popular since the 
global demand for vegetable oil is growing fast. Palm oil is relatively cheap, very 
versatile in application, high yielding, and easy to produce and harvest.1432 
Unfortunately, palm oil plantations often take the place of primary rain forest 
and indigenous communities residing in the area.  
 Similar to for instance the FSC, the RSPO operates following a number of 
principles and criteria. In brief, the eight principles that palm oil growers have to 
adhere to in order to become certified are: 
 
1. Commitment to transparency 
2. Compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
3. Commitment to long term economic and financial viability 
4. Use of appropriate best practices by growers and millers 
5. Environmental responsibility and conservation of natural resources 
and biodiversity 
6. Responsible consideration of employees and of individuals and 
communities affected by growers and mills 
7. Responsible development of new plantings 
8. Commitment to continuous improvement in key areas of activity1433 
 
In relation to indigenous peoples and local peoples, the terminology used in the 
RSPO’s P&C, It is mentioned in Principle 2 that use of the land for palm oil 
does not diminish the legal, customary, or user rights of other users without 
their free prior and informed consent.1434 Indicators for this include the 
                                                        





1433 RSPO, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013, accepted by the 
RSPO Executive Board for the Extraordinary General Assembly on April 25th 2013. 
1434 RSPO, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013, accepted by the 
RSPO Executive Board for the Extraordinary General Assembly on April 25th 2013, p. 12. 
Cf. Colchester M, Chao S, Jiwan N, ‘Securing rights trough commodity roundtables? A 
comparative review’, Pre-Conference draft, Forest Peoples Programme, 2012. 
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requirement for adequate maps of the areas involved, again following a process 
of participatory mapping. Furthermore, all relevant customary or user rights 





No new plantings are established on local peoples’ land where it can 
be demonstrated that there are legal, customary or user rights, 
without their free, prior and informed consent. This is dealt with 
through a documented system that enables these and other 





Where it can be demonstrated that local peoples have legal, 
customary or user rights, they are compensated for any agreed land 
acquisition and relinquishment of rights, subject to their free, prior 
and informed consent and negotiated agreements .1436 
 
The accompanying indicators clarify that in the view of the RSPO, FPIC means 
that indigenous peoples have the right to say “no” to operations on their lands. 
This right applies before and during initial discussions, but also during the stage 
of information gathering and associated consultations, during negotiations, and 
up until an agreement with the growers or millers is signed and ratified by the 
local communities or indigenous peoples involved.1437 
 Moreover, social and environmental impact assessments a required. 
Furthermore, it is stated that: “Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is a 
guiding principle and should be applied to all RSPO members throughout the 
supply chain.”1438  
 With regard to compensation, in the indicators accompanying principle 7.6 it 
is stated that it is necessary to develop a system for the identification of people 
                                                        
1435 RSPO, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013, accepted by the 
RSPO Executive Board for the Extraordinary General Assembly on April 25th 2013, p. 12.  
1436 RSPO, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013, accepted by the 
RSPO Executive Board for the Extraordinary General Assembly on April 25th 2013, p. 53. 
1437 RSPO, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013, accepted by the 
RSPO Executive Board for the Extraordinary General Assembly on April 25th 2013, p. 53. 
1438 RSPO, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013, accepted by the 
RSPO Executive Board for the Extraordinary General Assembly on April 25th 2013, p. 53. 
Reference is made to the 2008 guidelines developed by the Forest Peoples Programme: Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, A Guide for Companies, 
FPP, 2008. This guide provides a short overview of FPIC in international law and developes 
some principles and steps that companies should consider when implementing FPIC processes 
in the framework of sustainable palm oil. 
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entitled to compensation, and that the affected communities have access to 
information and independent advice concerning the legal, economic, 
environmental, and social implications of the proposed projects.1439 In the 
specific guidance it is explicitly stated that: “Growers and millers will confirm 
that the communities gave consent to the initial planning phases of the 
operations prior to the new issuance of a concession or land title to the 
operator.”1440 
 The 2013 Principles and Criteria of the Round Table on Sustainable Palm 
Oil integrate a strong requirement of FPIC as the central demand when palm oil 
plantations are created near indigenous communities. Integration of participatory 
mapping, social and environmental impact assessments, and strong FPIC 
requirements as well as compensation provisions indicate that the RSPO is 
committed to respecting indigenous peoples’ rights to a high level. This is also 
needed, since the rapid expansion of palm oil plantations threatens the rainforest 
and the lands and territories of many indigenous communities. Unfortunately, 
sustainable palm oil is still the exception.1441 
 
The Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS) 
 
The Round Table on Responsible Soy is the second initiative discussed here 
that includes FPIC requirements. The RTRS, like the RSPO is a multi-
stakeholder initiative which facilitates an international dialogue to make the 
production of soy economically viable, socially equitable, and environmentally 
sound.1442 It provides stakeholders and interested parties with the opportunity to 
develop global solutions for the responsible production of soy. 
 Soybeans are a species of legume native to East Asia, widely grown for its 
edible beans and multiple uses. Soybeans are a cheap and easy to produce source 
of protein for animal feeds and human food products, like soy milk and tofu. 
Soy bean production is expanding rapidly and threatens parts of the rainforest, 
especially in the Amazon region.1443 This speedy expansion creates a strong need 
to produce soybeans in a sustainable manner. 
 The RTRS members commit themselves to a global standard for the 
production of responsible soy. Producers, industry, and civil society 
organizations may become participating members while other organizations such 
                                                        
1439 RSPO, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013, accepted by the 
RSPO Executive Board for the Extraordinary General Assembly on April 25th 2013, p. 54. 
1440 RSPO, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil, 2013, accepted by the 
RSPO Executive Board for the Extraordinary General Assembly on April 25th 2013, p. 54. 
1441 Recall the large forest fires in Indonesia, created to illegally burn down large parts of 
tropical rainforest in order to free op land for the creation of palm-oil plantations. 
1442 www.responsiblesoy.org. 
1443 Berkum, S van and Bindraban P S (eds.) ‘Towards sustainable soy; An assessment of 
opportunities and risks for soybean production based on a case study Brazil’, Report 
2008&080, Wageningen UR, 2008, p. 3. 
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as auditing firms, academia, and donors may acquire the status of observing 
members.1444 
 The main instrument of the RTRS is the dialogue between groups with 
different interests and backgrounds, in order to explore and determine common 
ground for action. Its mission is to: 
 
Encourage that current and future soybean is produced in a 
responsible manner to reduce social and environmental impacts 
while maintaining or improving the economic status for the 
producer.1445 
 
The RTRS aims to achieve this through the development, implementation, and 
verification of a global standard and the commitment of its members involved in 
the entire value chain of soybean.1446 The RTRS describes its vision as follows: 
 
That soy help to meet social needs, environmental and economic 
consequences of the present generation without compromising the 
resources and the welfare of future generations and allowing the 
construction of a better world through consensus and joint 
action.1447 
 
The key objectives of the RTRS, in addition to facilitating the dialogue, are to 
reach consensus among the stakeholders linked to the soy industry, develop a 
standard of sustainability for the production, trading, and use of soy, and to act as 
an internationally recognized forum for the monitoring of global soy production 
in terms of sustainability.1448 
 The RTRS principles and criteria demand documented communication and 
dialogue with local communities and the resolution of use rights disputes 
through a comprehensive, participatory, and documented community rights 
assessment.1449 Although there is no clear definition of FPIC in the RTRS 
principles and criteria, it is required in principle 3.2.2 that: “Where rights have 
been relinquished by traditional land users there is documented evidence that 
the affected communities are compensated subject to their free, prior, informed 
and documented consent.”1450 
 With the increasing demand for soy, the need for a strong standard on its 
sustainable use is pressing. Soy plantations threaten the livelihoods of many 






1449 RTRS Principles and Criteria for Responsible Soy Version 1.0, ITG1-OUT-01-ENG, 
Date 22 April 2010, Principle 3.1 and 3.2. 
1450 RTRS Principles and Criteria for Responsible Soy Version 1.0, ITG1-OUT-01-ENG, 
Date 22 April 2010, Principle 3.2.2. 
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indigenous groups, especially in the Amazon region, and large parts of primary 
rainforest are disappearing in order to make place for soybeans. The standards 
that the RTRS set in relation to FPIC are underdeveloped if compared to the 
FSC and UN-REDD implementation models. There are few references to 
international law and not much guidance on the implementation of FPIC 
processes is available. Nevertheless, the RTRS principles and criteria are 
relatively young - they were drafted in 2010 - so the coming years will 
hopefully lead to a more developed model. Creating a dialogue on the 
responsible and sustainable production of soy, including FPIC requirements, is 
to be encouraged. 
 
The Round Table on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) 
 
The RSB, like the other initiatives examined here, is a multi-stakeholder 
initiative that brings together farmers, companies, NGO’s, experts, governments 
and IGO’s who operate in the field of sustainable biomass 
production.1451Biofuels - like ethanol and biodiesel - are generally seen as a good 
alternative for oil based fuels, but there is also a lot of criticism.1452 Biofuels may 
lead to adverse impacts on the environment, food security, and land use. The 
challenge therefore is to create a biofuel production that is based on responsible 
policies to ensure that its commercialization is sustainable.1453 
 The RSB acknowledges that in order to achieve such a sustainable 
production chain, it is necessary to develop a global standard and platform for 
discussion. Its vision is to create a global sustainable production, conversion, and 
use of biomass. To achieve this the RSB endeavors to: (1) provide and promote 
the global standard for socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable 
production and conversion of biomass, (2) provide a global platform for multi-
stakeholder dialogue and consensus building, (3) ensure that users and producers 
have access to credible, practical, and affordable certification, and (4) support 
continuous improvement through application of the standard.1454 
 The RSB 2010 Principles and Criteria entail FPIC requirements in Principle 
2, 9, and 12. In Principle 2 it is stated that: “Sustainable biofuel operations shall 
be planned, implemented, and continuously improved through an open, 
transparent, and consultative impact assessment and management process and an 
economic viability analysis.”1455 In Criterion 2b it is explained that: “Free, Prior 
                                                        
1451 www.rsb.org.  
1452 The leading opinion is that biofuels will help to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and that 
it may address global warming, but only in specific cases and if it is produced and used in a 
sustainable manner. 
1453 Biofuels are fuels that use energy from carbon-fixation. Biomass, derived from (food)plants 
like sugar cane, wheat, maize and palm oil, is converted into energy. This may be in liquid, 
solid or gas form.  
1454 www.rsb.org. Vision and mission statement for the RSB (as of november 5, 2010). 
1455 RSB Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production, RSB reference code: 
[RSB-STD-01-001 (Version 2.0)], 2010, Principle 2. 
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& Informed Consent (FPIC) shall form the basis for the process to be followed 
during all stakeholder consultation, which shall be gender sensitive and result in 
consensus-driven negotiated agreements.”1456 In the Guidance on the P&C it is 
stated that this means that the stakeholder engagement process for an impact 
assessment must: “seek to build consensus and strive to ensure that the final 
recommendations of the impact assessment process are acceptable to and 
supported by the directly affected stakeholders.”1457 This definition of FPIC 
seems somewhat “lighter” than the definitions used by the FSC, RSPO, and in 
the framework of the UN-REDD Programme. Nevertheless, the RSB does not 
explicitly refer to indigenous peoples as the only ones benefitting from FPIC 
processes, thereby acknowledging that other affected communities should also 
be consulted in a similar way. Moreover, the RSB refers to ILO Convention 
No. 169, the UNDRIP, and the CBD as applicable international law in the 
Guidance on Principle 1: Legality.1458 
 Further reference to FPIC can be found in Principle 9 about water resources 
under legitimate dispute and in Principle 12 about legitimate disputes over land 
rights.1459 Importantly, in Criterion 12.b. it is stated that: “Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consent shall form the basis for all negotiated agreements for any 
compensation, acquisition, or voluntary relinquishment of rights by land users or 
owners for biofuel operations.”1460 In the P&C’s minimum requirements it is 
mentioned that no involuntary resettlement shall be allowed for biofuel 
operations. Furthermore, international and regional legal bodies are to be 
consulted if the rule of law is not adequately applied. Moreover, if there are 
disputes about the tenure agreements of the land among stakeholders, biofuel 
operations shall not be approved.1461 This suggests that indigenous communities 
- or other stakeholders - may block biofuel projects when land disputes have not 
been adequately resolved. 
 Although the RSB contains a number of references to FPIC and the 
guidance on its Principles and Criteria require respect for the available 
international standards, the definition of FPIC seems a bit unclear and may have 
to be developed further in the near future to become an effective tool for 
indigenous communities that are affected by biofuel projects.  
 
  
                                                        
1456 RSB Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production, RSB reference code: 
[RSB-STD-01-001 (Version 2.0)], 2010, Criterion 2b. 
1457 RSB Guidance on Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production, RSB 
reference code: [RSB-GUI-01-000 (Version 2.0)], p. 5. 
1458 RSB Guidance on Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production, RSB 
reference code: [RSB-GUI-01-000 (Version 2.0)], p. 4. 
1459 RSB Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production, RSB reference code: 
[RSB-STD-01-001 (Version 2.0)], 2010, Principle 9 and 12. 
1460 RSB Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production, RSB reference code: 
[RSB-STD-01-001 (Version 2.0)], 2010, Criterion 12.b. 
1461 RSB Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production, RSB reference code: 
[RSB-STD-01-001 (Version 2.0)], 2010, Criterion 12.b.1. Minimum requirements. 
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The International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) 
 
Founded in 2001, the ICMM brings together a number of mining and metals 
companies as well as a number of national and regional mining and global 
commodity associations. Its goal is to improve the sustainable development 
performance in the mining and metals industry.1462 
 The ICMM engages with a broad range of stakeholders – governments, 
international organizations, academia, civil society and indigenous peoples – to 
build strategic partnerships. ICMM members are required to make public 
commitments to improve their sustainability performance on an annual basis. Its 
five core principles are: (1) care for the safety, health, and well-being of workers, 
contractors, host communities, and the use of the materials produced, (2) respect 
for people, the environment, and the values of host societies; (3) integrity as the 
basis for engagement with employees, communities, governments, and others; 
(4) accountability for upholding commitments made, (5) collaboration as an 
important tool for addressing the challenges and seizing the opportunities.1463 
 Indigenous peoples are often affected by mining operations, since precious 
sub-surface resources are often found in areas where indigenous communities 
reside. The ICMM acknowledges this and has developed a “good practice guide 
on indigenous peoples and mining” in order to build constructive partnerships 
between mining companies and indigenous peoples in 2010.1464 Experiences of 
indigenous peoples with mining companies have been mixed and, more than 
occasionally, very negative. Nevertheless, FPIC requirements are gaining ground 
in the mining – and more broadly – in the extractive industries sector.1465 
 The good practice guide is intended for mining companies that want to 
engage in mining operations in areas where indigenous peoples reside. In the 
guide some guidelines on FPIC are enshrined but it does not go as far as the 
FSC and UN-REDD guidelines on the issue of consent. “Broad community 
support” is referred to and it is stated that the diverging positions on “a right to 
say no” precludes the ICMM to endorse this as a necessary element of FPIC.1466  
 However, the new 2013 position of ICMM on indigenous peoples and 
mining opens with emphasizing the central importance of FPIC in relation to 
mining operations that may affect indigenous peoples. Instead of “broad 
community support” and free, prior and informed consultation – familiar 
                                                        
1462 http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us 
1463 http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us 
1464 ICCM, Good practice guide on indigenous peoples and mining, London 2010. Also see: 
ICCM’s position on indigenous peoples and mining, 2013. Available on the website 
icmm.com. 
1465 Doyle C and Cariño J, ‘Making Free Prior and Informed Consent a Reality, Indigenous 
Peoples and the Extractive Sector’, Middlesex University, 2013, p. 3. Doyle and Cariño argue 
that multinational mining corporations rarely comply with the standards necessary to respect 
indigenous peoples’ rights, interests, and well-being. 
1466 ICCM, Good practice guide on indigenous peoples and mining, London 2010, p. 24. 
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terminology that is also included the World Bank’s policy discussed earlier on – 
the new position of the ICMM is that: 
 
FPIC comprises a process, and an outcome. Through this process 
Indigenous Peoples are: (i) able to freely make decisions without 
coercion, intimidation or manipulation; (ii) given sufficient time to 
be involved in project decision making before key decisions are 
made and impacts occur; and (iii) fully informed about the project 
and its potential impacts and benefits. The outcome is that 
Indigenous Peoples can give or withhold their consent to a 
project, through a process that strives to be consistent with 
their traditional decision-making processes while respecting 
internationally recognized human rights and is based on good 
faith negotiation. The commitments in this position statement 
relating to consent apply to new projects and changes to existing 
projects that are likely to have significant impacts on indigenous 
communities. The position statement will not apply retrospectively. 
Where both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples are likely to be 
significantly impacted, members may choose to extend the 
commitments embodied in this position statement to non-
indigenous people.1467 
 
The new position statement adjusts the old view and clearly indicates that 
indigenous peoples are indeed allowed to give and withhold their consent to 
mining operations. In the document the “Ruggie Principles” on Business and 
Human Rights, and ILO Convention 169 are referred to and it is far more in 
line with the FSC and UN-REDD guidelines discussed above.  
 Nevertheless, in the document it is also stated that: 
 
In most countries however, “neither Indigenous Peoples nor any 
other population group have the right to veto development projects 
that affect them,” so FPIC should be regarded as a “principle to be 
respected to the greatest degree possible in development planning 
and implementation.1468  
 
Hopefully, the new position, which will be mandatory to uphold for member 
companies from 2015, will promote effective FPIC processes between 
indigenous peoples and mining companies, since it is within the extractive 




                                                        
1467 Indigenous Peoples and Mining, Position Statement, ICCM, May 2013, p. 2. 
1468 Indigenous Peoples and Mining, Position Statement, ICCM, May 2013, p. 3. 
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Summary: Other Voluntary Standards 
 
While the voluntary initiatives examined above do not have such a well 
developed implementation scheme as the FSC and UN-REDD Programme 
have, they do include FPIC requirements. The RSPO includes FPIC as one of 
its most important principles in its 2013 Principles and Criteria. Moreover, 
participatory mapping and integrated impact assessments are another important 
demand in producing sustainable palm oil. In the framework of the RTRS, 
FPIC requirements can also be found, although there is not much guidance yet 
on its implementation and little references to international law can be found in 
the RTRS’ P&C. In the RSB Principles and Criteria it is stated that FPIC is the 
basis for stakeholder consultation procedures and they refer to ILO 169, the 
CBD and the UNDRIP as sources for legality. Nevertheless, the definition of 
FPIC seems somewhat unclear. The ICMM’s new position statement seems to 
include a concept of FPIC that is similar to the FSC and UN-REDD 
Programme definitions. However, it is explicitly mentioned in the position 
statement that FPIC does not necessarily amount to a veto power. Especially in 
relation to extractive industries, clear and effective FPIC procedures have to be 
developed, since it is often in this area that indigenous peoples suffer most.1469 
 These different and important initiatives for sustainable production of 
commodities, as well as the ICMM - which aims to build a dialogue in which 
mining corporations and indigenous peoples can solve their differences - all have 
FPIC requirements included in their criteria. Nevertheless, they do not include 
extensive guidance on the implementation of FPIC. The earlier explored 
models in the framework of the FSC and the UN-REDD Programme offer far 
more practical guidance, and may be informative to other sustainability 
initiatives, especially when case studies will be developed in the near future. 
More intensive cooperation between the different initiatives will undoubtedly 
improve practical knowledge on the application of FPIC. 
 The next paragraph will discuss the experiences of the Orang Asli People of 
Peninsular Malaysia with sustainable forest management, in order to illustrate 
that a number of problems may arise when implementing these voluntary 
initiatives. After this examination, a number of general conclusions will be 
developed in which the role of these voluntary initiatives in shaping and 
promoting FPIC will be discussed 
 
                                                        
1469 See for just one example the report on the Mindiro nickelmine in the Philippines. While 
the Philippines are one of the first and only countries that actually have FPIC requirements in 
their mining legislation, this does not mean that FPIC is indeed respected. See the OECD-
WATCH report for numerous examples of what can go wrong in FPIC processes in relation 
to mining: http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_164.  
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V.2.5 Case: The Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia: Sustainable Timber 
Certification and FPIC 
V.2.5.1 Introduction 
 
The paragraphs on the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
illustrated that conflicts and uncertainties about the interpretation of FPIC lead 
to problems regarding its implementation. As was explored in the previous 
paragraphs, FPIC is also a prominent requirement in voluntary certification 
schemes concerning sustainable forestry. These voluntary initiatives offer some 
of the most developed implementation models for FPIC processes. This 
paragraph will explore a practical example of the standard-setting and use of 
informed consent requirements in the context of such schemes by means of an 
analysis of the situation of the rights of the Orang Asli on the Malaysian 
Peninsula, in order to illustrate the complexity of implementing such schemes 
successfully.  
First, an introduction on the Orang Asli, their rights and problems, and the 
relevant - national and international - legal framework will be provided. 
Subsequently, a deeper analysis of the debate surrounding the Malaysian 
certification body MTCC and the Dutch standards and criteria for sustainable 
timber will provide further understanding of the complexities regarding the 
implementation of FPIC. The paragraphs will illustrate how different and 
conflicting interpretations of FPIC lead to vast problems in relation to its 
implementation in a current case concerning sustainable forestry. 
 
V.2.5.2 The Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia 
 
The indigenous peoples of Malaysia are commonly referred to as “Orang Asal.” 
The Orang Asli (Original Peoples) is the name for the indigenous minority of 
Peninsular Malaysia. They number around 170.000, representing about 0.5% of 
the population of Malaysia.1470 The Orang Asli are usually divided into three 
sub-groups, the Negrito (Semang), the Senoi, and the Aboriginal Malay. These 
groups are further categorized into six different sub-groups.1471 They speak 
different languages and dialects, and have varied occupations and ways of life. 
About 40% of the Orang Asli population lives close to or within forests in which 
they practice hill rice cultivation and some hunting and gathering. Furthermore, 
they engage in trading different forest products. A small number are still semi-
nomadic, but the majority of Orang Asli practice permanent agriculture or 
manage their own small rubber or oil palm plantations. A substantial number of 
Orang Asli also live in or close to urban areas.1472 
                                                        
1470 Nicholas C, Engi J and Teh Y P, The Orang Asli and the UNDRIP, from Rhetoric to 
Recognition (Centre for Orang Asli Concerns, 2010), p. 9. (Nicholas 2010/1) 
1471 Department of Orang Asli Development, JAKOA/JHEOA website:  
http://www.jakoa.gov.my/ Consulted 4 December 2011. 
1472 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 10. 
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The Orang Asli that live in the rainforest have a close physical, spiritual, and 
cultural relation to their lands. Their adat or customary land is considered a living 
object, which provides for everything they need for their survival. The lands 
provide food, clothing, medicine, and all other means necessary for their 
subsistence. According to Colin Nicholas, one of the leading experts on the Orang 
Asli: 
 
It is the land, more than anything else, which gives life and meaning 
to their whole being; for it is in the land that their history and 
identity are contained. It is also the land that ensures their viability as 
an independent people and provides for their social and cultural 
development. The Orang Asli therefore, not only have material 
dependence on the land but they also share a spiritual and emotional 
relationship with it.1473 
 
Nicholas explained that a philosophy has evolved among the Orang Asli that 
comprises a strong reverence for the land and protects the continuous enjoyment 
thereof. This “ethos” is based on balance and harmony between humans and the 
environment, and between humans amongst each other.1474 This implies that land 
cannot be bought or sold as if it were a commodity, and “ownership” is held 
collectively by the community.1475 The principle behind this is that the Orang Asli 
people must maintain the precious balance between themselves and the 
environment.1476 
Of course, not all Orang Asli nowadays uphold this belief, and some regard 
their territories as an economic source of income. Mainly external factors like the 
battle for resources, power inequalities and changing consumption patterns of the 
main population have profound effects on these communities, often disruptively 
altering their social structures. Nevertheless, the majority of the Orang Asli desire 
to use their customary territories in the traditional way.1477 
Historically, the Orang Asli were allowed to retain their own economic and 
governance structures until the time of British rule, when they first experienced 
intrusive paternalistic policies.1478 After the Second World War and the Japanese 
occupation, the Orang Asli played a major role in “the Emergency” that took 
place between 1948 and 1960.1479 In this period the first piece of legislation 
pertaining to Orang Asli protection was enacted: The Aboriginal Peoples 
                                                        
1473 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 21. 
1474 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 22.  
1475 This concept of collective of communal property was extensively debated in paragraph 
II.2.1 on land and in paragraph V.1.2.3.1 on the Awas Tingi v. Nicaragua Case. 
1476 Nicholas (2010/1), pp. 22-23. 
1477 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 24. 
1478 In 1824 British hegemony in Malaya (the later Peninsular Malaysia) was formalized by 
the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, which divided the Malay archipelago between Britain and the 
Netherlands. 
1479 For an excellent historical survey, see Nicholas (2010/1), pp. 27-41. 
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Ordinance of 1954.1480 The next paragraph will further explore Malaysia’s legal 
framework. 
Nowadays, the Orang Asli are amongst the most impoverished and 
marginalized of all Malaysians. About 50% of the Orang Asli live below the 
poverty line and about 19% are considered “hardcore poor.” The poverty rate in 
Malaysia as a whole is 3.8%, and merely 0.7% qualifies as “hardcore poor.”1481  
 The Orang Asli suffer from poor health conditions, absence of basic 
infrastructure, high school drop-out rates, and numerous other problems. The 
main government organization concerned with the Orang Asli, JHEOA, has been 
criticized heavily for not acting in the best interest of the Orang Asli.1482 The main 
objections to JHEOA are that it is a rather paternalistic organization, that it is 
misrepresenting the Orang Asli; usurping traditional institutions and issuing 
policies that aim at assimilation instead of self-determined integration.1483 
 The main problem that Orang Asli communities face is undoubtedly the non-
recognition of customary (adat) rights to their lands. Only 15% of the total area, 
that in the eyes of the authorities is Orang Asli land and is claimed by them, has 
been formally gazetted as Orang Asli reserves in accordance with the Aboriginal 
Peoples Act. The fact that these areas have not been given formal recognition is 
the source of most of the Orang Asli problems. Later on, when the Malaysian 
Timber Certification Council (MTCC) will be discussed, it will become clear that 
the non-recognition of indigenous land claims is also the key problem there. But 
first the Malaysian legal and political framework will be examined. 
 
V.2.5.3 Malaysian Legal Framework and Judicial Decisions 
 
Malaysia is a federation comprising 13 states and three federal territories with a 
strong central government and a division of executive and legislative powers 
between the federal and state governments.1484 Important powers belonging to the 
states relate to: Islamic law, Malay and native customs, land, forestry, and the 
constitution and procedures of native courts. Malaysia’s plural legal system can be 
seen as a combination of common law, syariah law and customary law traditions. 
A number of legal and political instruments and court decisions deal in one 
way or another with the rights of indigenous communities in Malaysia. The 
Orang Asli are referred to as “aborigine” in Article 160(2) of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia.1485 The natives from Sarawak and Sabah are explicitly 
                                                        
1480 It was revised in 1974, and renamed ‘The Aboriginal Peoples Act’.  
1481 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 45. Statistics from Governmental 10th Malaysia Plan (2011-2015) 
1482 Jabatan Hal Ehwal Orang Asli (JHEOA), Department of Orang Asli Affairs. 
http://www.jakoa.gov.my/. 
1483 Nicholas (2010/1), pp. 48-49. 
1484 Bulan R, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision Making in 
Malaysia’, Discussion paper prepared for International Expert Seminar on Indigenous Peoples 
and The Right to Participate in Decision Making, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 20-22 January 
2010. 
1485 Federal Constitution, Incorporating all amendments up to P.U.(A) 164/2009. First 
introduced as the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya on Merdeka Day: 31st August 
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given a special status and privileges in the constitution while the Orang Asli are 
not.1486 The Constitution does provide that the Orang Asli aborigines are within 
the responsibilities and powers of the federal government. Nevertheless, matters in 
relation to land are under the purview of the individual states.1487 This division of 
powers in practice leads to problems in effectively protecting Orang Asli lands and 
establishing land reserves.1488  
 The Aboriginal Peoples Act is the only legal instrument that is concerned 
specifically with the Orang Asli, and entails references to them as such.1489 The act 
provides for the establishment of Orang Asli areas and reserves, but the common 
interpretation has been that the State has the power to order any community to 
leave any designated area. This leads to the situation where Orang Asli 
communities are at best seen as “tenants-at-will” and they do not have formal 
property rights.1490 Furthermore, when displacement occurs, the State is not 
obliged to pay adequate compensation, it “may” only do so.1491 No proper 
guidelines or protection mechanisms exist against the revocation of a declaration of 
an aboriginal reserve.1492 In practice this meant that the Minister concerned, or his 
representative, the Director-General of JHEOA, had the final say in virtually all 
matters concerning the governance of the Orang Asli. Nicholas explained in his 
report to the Malaysian Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) that this 
included the appointment of a headman, entry or removal of people into Orang 
Asli settlements, and deciding on the name given to the different subgroups.1493  
 This narrow interpretation of the Aboriginal Peoples Act seems to be in favor 
of the interest of the authorities, although in its preamble it is stated that it is: “An 
Act to provide for the protection, well-being and advancement of the aboriginal 
peoples of West Malaysia.” Nevertheless, a number of national court decisions and 
policy statements have sought to bring the interpretation of the Aboriginal Peoples 
Act in accordance with the Federal Constitution.  
Another important document in relation to the Orang Asli, is the 1961 policy 
titled “Statement of Policy Regarding the Administration of the Orang Asli of 
Peninsular Malaysia.”1494 The policy statement concerns a number of broad 
principles that aim to secure Orang Asli rights. Some of the most important are: 
                                                                                                                              
1957, Subsequently introduced as the Constitution of Malaysia on Malaysia Day : 16th 
September 1963. 
1486 Federal Constitution, Article 153 and 161A. 
1487 Federal Constitution, Ninth Schedule, Federal list No. 16 & 2. 
1488 C Nicholas,’Orang Asli: Rights, Problems, Solutions’ (SUHAKAM, 2010), p. 6. 
(Nicholas, 2010/2). 
1489 Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954, Act 134, revised in 1974. 
1490 Nicholas, (2010/2), p. 6. 
1491 Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954, Act 134, revised in 1974, Section 12. 
1492 Bulan R, ‘Indigenous Land Rights in Malaysia’, in: Engel J R, Westra L and Bosselmann 
K (eds), Democracy, Ecological Integrity and International Law (Cambridge Scholars Publishers, 
2010), p. 186. (Bulan, 2010). 
1493 Nicholas, (2010/2), p. 6. 




[1(a)] The aborigines … must be allowed to benefit on an equal 
footing from the rights and opportunities which the law grants to 
the other sections of community…. special measures should be 
adopted for the protection of institutions, customs, mode 
of life, person, property and labour of the aborigine people. 
 
[1(b)] The social, economic, and cultural development of the 
aborigines should be promoted with the ultimate object of natural 
integration as opposed to artificial assimilation […] Due account 
must be taken of the cultural and religious values and of the forms of 
social control. 
 
[1(c)] The aborigines shall be allowed to retain their own 
customs, political system, laws and institutions when they are 
not incompatible with the national legal system. 
 
[1(d)] The special position of aborigines in respect of land usage and 
land rights shall be recognized …. Aborigines will not be moved 
from their traditional areas without their full consent. 
 
 [1(j)] In all matters concerning the welfare and development of the 
aboriginal peoples, the Government will seek the collaboration of 
the communities concerned or their representatives. 
 
[2(iii)(a)] In the implementation of forest conservation 
requirements, the special position of these communities is 
to be acknowledged provided any relaxation exercised in their 
favour will not be detrimental to the effective and proper 
implementation of accepted Forest policy and objectives.1495 
 
The Policy Statement has led to a number of programs and action plans by 
JHEOA in order to promote the goals mentioned. The statement is the only 
official policy still in force that governs the affairs of the Orang Asli, and it 
indicates in rather unambiguous terms how legislators should behave towards the 
Orang Asli.1496 Moreover, it entails forest policies in favor of the Orang Asli, but 
its main aim is said to be the achievement of settled agriculture. Although the 
principles in the Statement are meant to give the Orang Asli greater powers over 
their traditional lands, the reality today is that they often find themselves living as 
squatters on state lands.1497 The mechanisms for the gazettement of lands thus have 
                                                        
1495 JHEOAS, 1961, Statement of Policy Regarding the Administration of the Orang Asli of 
Peninsular Malaysia. Cited in: Nicholas, (2010/2), pp. 10-12. Emphasis added. 
1496 Nicholas, (2010/2), p. 14. Noteworthy, the policy statement entails a requirement of 
consent in relation to the relocation of aboriginal people. 
1497 Bulan, (2010), p. 181. 
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not been effective in protecting Orang Asli rights. In recent years, the Orang Asli 




The Malaysian courts have been proactive in the interpretation and recognition of 
Orang Asli rights, which has led to a collection of arguably precedent-setting 
judgments.1499  
 The High Court of Ipoh ruled in 1992 in the case of Koperasi Kijang Mas v. 
Kerajaan Negeri Perak that the Government of Perak had violated the Aboriginal 
Peoples Act, when it allowed a company to harvest timber on places that had been 
approved by the State Government as aboriginal reserves.1500 The Court held that 
the logging activities were prohibited and that only the Orang Asli have the right 
to the forest produce in these reserves. What is also important in this decision is 
that formal gazetting of the territories was not necessary to confer rights to the 
Orang Asli, where areas had already been approved. Approval alone was thus 
sufficient to create the reserves, and henceforth only the Orang Asli had exclusive 
rights to the forest products there. Only a small portion of the aboriginal lands that 
have been approved are formally gazetted.1501 
 The Johor High Court, in Adong bin Kuwau & Ors v. State Government of Johor, 
ruled that Orang Asli have a proprietary interest on the land and awarded 
compensation to the Jakun community for the loss of their ancestral lands.1502 The 
Court held that the Jakun people have proprietary rights over their lands, but no 
inalienable interest in the land itself. This meant that no formal title is held, but 
that nevertheless rights to use the land for subsistence and other needs exist.1503 
The Court stated that aboriginal peoples had the right to continue to live on their 
lands, as their forefathers had lived. The decision was based on Article 13 of the 
Federal Constitution and upheld in 1998 by the Court of Appeal.1504 
 
The Sagong Tasi Cases: Aboriginal Title in Malaysia 
 
The reasoning in “Adong” was enforced and expanded by the judgment in the 
                                                        
1498 Bulan, (2010), p.181. 
1499 Nicholas, (2010/2), p. 7. Nicholas explains that although some cases favor indigenous 
rights and are in line with the spirit of the UN Declaration, these are not always followed in 
other judgments. Nicholas (2010/1), p. 93. 
1500 Ipoh High Court, Koperasi Kijang Mas & 3 others v Kerajaan Negeri Perak & 2 others, 1992. 
In Nicholas, (2010/2). 
1501 Gazetting is the final step in the process of establishing Orang Asli Reserves, it entails the 
official and public recognition of the designated area.  
1502 Johor High Court, Adong bin Kuwau & Ors v State Government of Johor, 1997. In Nicholas, 
(2010/2). 
1503 Nicholas, (2010/2), p. 8. 
1504 Nicholas, (2010/2), p. 8. 
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groundbreaking Sagong Tasi v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor cases,1505 in which the 
Courts decided that Orang Asli also have a proprietary interest in the land.1506 In 
Sagong Tasi, a number of Orang Asli (Temuan) families from Selangor had a 
substantial amount of land taken away from them for the construction of a 
highway. They were informed that they had to vacate their lands within 14 days, 
and when they failed to do so, they were forcibly evicted during a police 
operation, which was observed by officials from JHEOA.1507  
 While there was some minor compensation for the crops and dwellings that 
were destroyed, there was none for the land itself. The Court held that the 
Temuans have native title under common law over their lands and that 
compensation had to be given in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act 1960. 
In the Sagong Tasi cases, the Courts relied on cases from other jurisdictions. 
Especially the Mabo No. 2 case from Australia and the Calder and Delgamuukw 
cases from Canada served as examples for the Court of how the native title 
argument was to be constructed in the case at hand.1508 But also the old 
“Nigerian” Privy Council case of Amodu Tijani was cited to explain the 
communal nature of the title and to explain that simply applying national law does 
not suffice: 
 
The title, such as it is, may not be that of the individual, as in this 
country it nearly always is in some form, but may be that of a 
community. Such a community may have the possessory title to the 
common enjoyment of a usufruct, with customs under which its 
individual members are admitted to enjoyment, and even to a right 
of transmitting the individual enjoyment as members by assignment 
inter vivos or by succession. To ascertain how far this latter 
development of right has progressed involves the study of the 
history of the particular community and its usages in each case. 
Abstract principles fashioned a priori are of but little assistance, and 
are as often as not misleading.1509 
 
Studying the history and customs of the community was thus deemed invaluable 
in establishing native title. The Court elaborated that the Temuans do not only 
have the right over the land but also an interest in the land and that therefore 
                                                        
1505 Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors 2002 (High Court) and Kerajaan 
Negeri Selangor & 3 Ors v Sagong Bin Tasi & 6 Ors 2005 (Court of Appeal). 
1506 High Court of Selangor, Sagong Tasi & 6 Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & 3 Ors, 2002. In 
Nicholas, (2010/2). 
1507 Bulan (2010), p.182. Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors 2002 (High 
Court), paragraph 3. 
1508 Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Mabo No. 2). Calder v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General) [1973] S.C.R. 313, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1. Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. 
1509 Privy Council case of Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399. 




compensation for those lands should be on the basis of full ownership.1510 The 
Court cited Judge Brennan’s opinion in Mabo No. 2: 
 
Whether nor not land is owned by individual members of a 
community, a community which asserts and asserts effectively that 
none but its members has any right occupy or use the land has an 
interest in the land that must be proprietary in nature: there is no 
other proprietor. It would be wrong, in my opinion, to point to the 
inalienability of land by that community and, by importing 
definitions of “property’ which require alienability under the 
municipal laws of our society, to deny that the indigenous people 
owned their land. The ownership of land within a territory in the 
exclusive occupation of a people must be vested in the people: land 
is susceptible of ownership, and there are no other owners.1511 
 
Furthermore, the Court relied on the Delgamuukw case, quoting Judge Lamer, in 
dismissing the government statements that Aboriginal title is only a bundle of 
rights pertaining to certain activities on the land: 
 
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the right 
to engage in specific activities which may be themselves aboriginal 
rights. [...] aboriginal title differs from other aboriginal rights in 
another way. To date, the Court has defined aboriginal rights in 
terms of activities.  
 
[…] in order to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an 
element of practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive 
culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right. 
 
[…] Aboriginal title, however, is a right to the land itself. Subject to 
the limits I have laid down above, that land may be used for a 
variety of activities, none of which need be individually protected as 
aboriginal rights under s. 35(1). Those activities are parasitic on the 
underlying title.1512 
 
Recognition of Aboriginal Title is therefore not just recognition of certain 
aboriginal use rights but concerns a more fundamental right to the land itself. In 
elaborating on the Mabo No. 2 case, the Court explained that it was the duty of 
                                                        
1510 Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors 2002 (High Court), paragraph 11. 
1511 High Court of Australia, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) ("Mabo case") [1992] HCA 23; 
(1992) 175 CLR 1 (3 June 1992). Cited in Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & 
Ors 2002 (High Court), paragraph 11. 




the Crown to make sure that traditional title was not destroyed or impaired 
without the consent of the title holders.1513  
 The Court mentioned the influence and significance of international law, and 
stated that it was necessary to keep in line with the worldwide recognition now 
given to Aboriginal rights.1514 Judge Brennan was cited again: 
 
The common law does not necessarily conform with international 
law, but international law is a legitimate and important influence on 
the development of the common law, especially when international 
law declares the existence of universal human rights. A common 
law doctrine founded on unjust discrimination in the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights demands reconsideration. It is contrary both 
to international standards and to the fundamental values of our 
common law to entrench a discriminatory rule which, because of 
the supposed position on the scale of social organisation of the 
indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony, denies them a right to 
occupy their traditional lands.1515 
 
In the Court of Appeal1516 the decision was upheld and the Court explained that 
the Temuans indeed have proprietary rights and title over their lands, and that 
therefore compensation had to be paid for the land itself.1517 The Federal and State 
governments had breached their fiduciary duty,1518 by failing to protect the Orang 
Asli, to gazette the Orang Asli land and to provide for adequate compensation.1519 
This fiduciary duty is best understood as a duty to protect the welfare of the 
aborigines including their land rights, not to act in a manner inconsistent with 
these rights, and to provide remedies where appropriate.1520 
Judge Gopal Sri Ram also held in Sagong Tasi that the purpose of the 
Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 was to protect the first peoples of Malaysia and that: 
“It was therefore fundamentally a human rights statute, acquiring a quasi-
constitutional status giving it preeminence over ordinary legislation. It must 
therefore receive a broad and liberal interpretation.”1521  
The Court of Appeal, once again relying on Aboriginal Title cases from other 
jurisdictions, mainly Amodu Tijani, made another important statement: 
                                                        
1513 Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors 2002 (High Court), paragraph 14. 
1514 Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors 2002 (High Court), paragraph 11. 
1515 High Court of Australia, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) ("Mabo case") [1992] HCA 23; 
(1992) 175 CLR 1 (3 June 1992). Cited in Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & 
Ors 2002 (High Court), paragraph 11. 
1516 Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & 3 Ors v Sagong Bin Tasi & 6 Ors 2005 [CA]. 
1517 Nicholas, (2010/2), p. 10. 
1518 The fiduciary duty arose from Article 8(5)(c) and Ninth Schedule, item 16 of the Federal 
Constitution. Section 11 and 12 Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954.  
1519 Bulan, 2010, p. 183. 
1520 Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors 2002 (High Court), paragraph 14. 
1521 Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & 3 Ors v Sagong Bin Tasi & 6 Ors 2005 [CA]. par. 20. Also 
see: Nicholas, (2010/2), p 13. 
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[…] The fact that the radical title to land is vested in the Sovereign 
or the State (as in the case here) is not an ipse dixit answer to a claim 
of customary title. There can be cases where the radical title is 
burdened by a native or customary title. The precise nature of such 
a customary title depends on the practices and usages of each 
individual community.1522 
 
Native Title can thus exist together with a formal ownership title held by the 
government. This statement is highly relevant for the subsequent paragraph, in 
which the arguments from the parties in the debate surrounding the timber 
certification scheme MTCS will be examined. 
The Sagong Tasi case is a landmark decision for the protection of Orang Asli 
rights to their traditional lands. The Court confirmed the existence of aboriginal 
title in Malaysia, which is not merely a right to use certain territories but concerns 
a more fundamental and proprietary interest in the land itself. As discussed, FPIC is 
an important tool in guaranteeing and protecting indigenous peoples’ rights to 
land, but there are serious indications that FPIC is often not respected in Malaysia, 
even while the Malaysian government voted - without any reservations - for the 
adoption of UNDRIP. Malaysian legislation, policy, and jurisprudence thus seem 
to a large extent susceptible to indigenous rights, but the reality unfortunately 
appears to be quite different.1523 Unawareness of the FPIC requirements in 
UNDRIP, and of the Declaration in general may be one reason for this, but there 
are other problems of a more serious nature, that will be discussed next. 
 
Malaysia: the UNDRIP and FPIC 
 
Although the Malaysian government voted for the adoption of UNDRIP,1524 its 
commitment to the Declaration is contested by Colin Nicholas in his latest study 
on the Orang Asli and UNDRIP.1525 He contended that there is in fact: “An 
increasing trend not only to go against the intent of the UNDRIP but, more 
disheartingly, to neutralize or negate the implementation of the UNDRIP 
principles in the treatment of the Orang Asli in Malaysia.”1526 
 While some of the Court cases are in line with the rights enshrined in the 
UNDRIP, their implementation is prevented by a lack of political will and 
leadership. In practice, this means that the whole native title argument, 
                                                        
1522 Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & 3 Ors v Sagong Bin Tasi & 6 Ors 2005 [CA]. par. 12. 
1523 This is the main point Colin Nicholas makes in his latest study on the Orang Asli: 
Nicholas (2010/1). 
1524 Noteworthy, Malaysia is also party to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Article 8 (j) 
of the Convention requires that the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local 
communities may only be used with their approval:  
“Access to traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities should be 
subject to prior informed consent or prior informed approval from the holders of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices.” (CBD 1992). 
1525 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 93 ff. 
1526 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 95. 
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reconstructed in Sagong Tasi, must be argued anew when Orang Asli file a case 
over a disputed territory.1527 
 Nicholas identified a number of key problems that prevent the Orang Asli 
from exercising their rights as indigenous people. The lack of official recognition 
of the customary laws of the Orang Asli is an important one. While the 
indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak have their own native court system, 
such a system is absent for the Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia. Moreover, 
Nicolas claimed that: “The official objective of assimilation and integration into 
the mainstream society – with the attendant programmes of conversion to Islam 
and subjection to the mainstream educational curriculum – all attest to the 
subjugation of Orang Asli identity.”1528 
 Issues related to the non-recognition of land, non-recognition as indigenous 
people, policies of assimilation, and disregard for the customary laws of the Orang 
Asli all lead Nicholas to conclude that there is a wide gap between the 
endorsement of UNDRIP by the Malaysian government and its implementation.  
 The lack of FPIC is another major problem. Nicholas explained that in 
developments affecting Orang Asli lands, livelihoods or identity, the practice has 
clearly not been one of obtaining FPIC. Orang Asli frequently find out about 
planned projects only when they find bulldozers and surveyors already on their 
territories. In general, Orang Asli representatives are not informed or called to 
attend meetings and negotiations about their lands. In such decision-making and 
negotiation processes, the Orang Asli are often misrepresented.1529 The following 
paragraph will explore a present-day example of this. 
 So while FPIC is recognized in UNDRIP and in the Malaysian 1961 Policy 
Statement (in relation to resettlement), it seems that in practice it is not respected 
or applied. Nicholas concluded:  
 
In fact, complying with FPIC requirements is usually regarded as 
something officials would want to do away with, if they could. And 
in most cases, they can. Five decades of domination of Orang Asli 
lives and livelihoods has resulted in JHEOA becoming the ‘ruler’ of 
the Orang Asli and with that status, the routinely unchallenged 
decision-maker for all matters concerning the Orang Asli.1530 
 
As was illustrated in part III, a system of fair representation is vital for making 
FPIC work. Misrepresentation and non-representation of the Orang Asli seem to 
prevent their effective participation in decision-making. Moreover, as the 
following paragraph will examine more closely, conflicts regarding the lands and 
resource rights and the interpretation of FPIC are a major threat to Orang Asli 
livelihoods and identity. 
                                                        
1527 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 96. 
1528 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 97. 
1529 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 98-99. 
1530 Nicholas (2010/1), p. 115. 
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It is clear from the preceding paragraphs that although important steps in 
legislation, policies ,and cases have been taken towards affirming indigenous rights 
in Malaysia, practice reveals that implementation is often lacking and that the 
problems of the Orang Asli in relation to lands, resources, and participation are 
widespread. 
 The following paragraph will examine the controversy over FPIC in relation 
to the Orang Asli and sustainable timber certification schemes in a current case that 
involves both the Netherlands and Malaysia. 
 
V.2.5.4 Sustainable Logging and the Orang Asli 
 
As was explored at length in the previous paragraphs on the Forest Stewardship 
Council, protection of the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities is 
integral part of certification schemes that regulate sustainable forestry and timber 
sales. In 2010 the Dutch Timber Procurement Assessment Committee (TPAC), 
which was set up to test and control admission of such schemes for the Dutch 
market, reversed its earlier judgment and stated that the Malaysian Timber 
Certification System (MTCS), did not meet the requirements for sustainability. 
One important objection was that the rights of the Orang Asli were not 
sufficiently guaranteed. More specifically, requirements in relation to customary 
rights and free and informed consent were not met by MTCS.  
 This paragraph will explore this case and the arguments of the parties in 
relation to FPIC. A short introduction into sustainable forest management was 
already provided when the Forest Stewardship Council’s guidelines on FPIC were 
discussed. In summary it can be stated that FPIC is the central principle used in the 
different certification schemes to guarantee firstly that indigenous peoples’ rights 
are not violated and secondly, that they are involved in the process of SFM. And it 
is precisely this principle that led to controversy and conflict over Orang Asli rights 
in relation to the Malaysian certification system MTCS. 
 
V.2.5.5 MTCC and TPAC: Concerns about Safeguarding Orang Asli Rights 
 
The Dutch Timber Procurement Assessment Committee (TPAC) assesses if 
certification systems are in accordance with the Dutch Procurement Policy for 
timber.1531 From 2010 onwards the Dutch government has committed itself to 
100% sustainable procurement and TPAC is burdened to “test” if these 
certification systems are in line with the Dutch criteria for sustainable timber. 
The Committee was set up in 2007 and is one of the five Committees of experts 
that fall under the independent foundation SMK (Stichting Milieukeur) that 
assesses environmental certification systems. 
                                                        
1531 http://www.tpac.smk.nl/nl/s518/c410-TPAC-home. Consulted 12 December 2011. 
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The most relevant standards of TPAC in relation to indigenous peoples are 
principles and criteria 1 and 2:1532 
 
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION  
Legislation and 
regulation 
P 1. Relevant international, national, and regional/local legislation and 




C 1.1. The forest manager 
holds legal use rights to the 
forest.  
 
C 1.2. The forest manager 
complies with all obligations to 
pay taxes and royalties.  
 
C 1.3. Legal and regulatory 
obligations that apply to the 
forest management unit, 
including international 
agreements, are fulfilled.  
Guidance: International Agreements 
pertain in particular to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 
Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES), ILO 
agreements and the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
Irrespective of the fact whether a given 
country has ratified these agreements, the 
standard of the Certification system 
should, where relevant, reflect the 
intention of these agreements. 
Illegal activities 
 
C 1.4. The forest management 
unit is sufficiently protected 
against all forms of illegal 
exploitation, illegal 
establishment of settlements, 
illegal land use, illegally 






P 2. The interests of directly and indirectly involved stakeholders shall be 
taken into account. To that end the system requires that:  
Tenure and use 
rights 
C 2.1. The legal status of the 
management of the forest 
management unit and claims 
of the local population, 
including indigenous peoples, 
 
                                                        
1532 Dutch Timber Procurement Policy, Annex I, User Manual, for the assessment of certification 




in the property/tenure or use 
rights regarding the forest 
management unit or a portion 
thereof have been inventoried 
and are respected.  
Consultation 
and permission 
C 2.2. Effective 
communication with and 
consultation and participation 
of stakeholders take place 
regarding the management of 
the forests.  
Guidance: A plan and reports on how 
and when communication with 
stakeholders takes place are considered to 
be indicators of effective 
communication. 
C 2.3. The local population 
and indigenous peoples have a 
say in forest management on 
the basis of free and informed 
consent, and hold the right to 
grant or withhold permission 
and, if relevant, receive 
compensation where their 
property/use rights are at stake  
Guidance: Free and informed consent is 
interpreted in the sense that the activity 
will not be undertaken before the 
relevant consent is given. 
 
Guidance: The local population and 
indigenous peoples can only prevent 
activities through withholding their 
consent where their property/use rights 
are at stake. 
Public 
availability 
C 2.4. The forest management 
plan and accompanying maps, 
relevant monitoring results and 
information about the forest 
management measures to be 
applied are publicly available, 
except for strictly confidential 
business information.  
 
Guidance: Public availability implies that 
if stakeholders should have limited access 
to certain media, the management plan is 
dispersed through other channels. 
Depending on the level of detail in the 
management plan, the full plan or a 
summary should be available. 
 
Guidance: Wherever practical and 
necessary, information on the forest 
management can also be communicated 
to the people in the forest through in situ 
markings or information displays. 
Dispute 
resolution 
C 2.5. Adequate mechanisms 
are in place for resolving 
disputes regarding forest 
management, property/usage 
rights, work conditions, or 
social services.  
Guidance: In case of a conflict of 






C 2.6. Objects of cultural and 
traditional economic value are 
identified and inventoried in 
consultation with the 





In the User Manual, free and informed consent is defined as: “The right of 
indigenous peoples and local communities to give or withhold consent to 
activities planned on their lands and territories or which will affect their cultures 
and traditional knowledge. Information on which they should base their 
decisions should be complete, presented in an understandable manner and be 
made available timely.”1533 In the Dutch criteria the aim is to integrate current 
international law in relation to indigenous peoples into its standards. UNDRIP, 
ILO Convention No. 169, and the CBD are mentioned, and FPIC is the key 
guiding principle. It is in relation to these criteria that a conflict arose in relation 
to the Malaysian Timber Certification Council (MTCC).1534 
On 22 October 2010 TPAC revised its judgment of 3 March 2010, which 
was initially a positive one, on the Malaysian certificate MTCS after a notice of 
objection was filed by a number of social and environmental NGOs.1535 In its 
revised judgment TPAC concluded that the Malaysian certification system 
MTCS – which is endorsed by PEFC international – is “not conforming to the 
Dutch Procurement Criteria.”1536 
 Different objections to MTCS were raised, related to its independence from 
the Malaysian government, the reliability of the certification results, poor public 
support for the system, and limited NGO and stakeholder participation. 
However, the most important objections concerned the alleged large scale 
conversion of forests into palm oil and rubber plantations that occurred and, for 
our purposes most relevant, the allegations that the rights of the Orang Asli were 
not sufficiently guaranteed by the Malaysian certification system.  
 Already in its previous judgment, TPAC had noted that the extent to which 
the rights of indigenous peoples were recognized and respected in MTCS forests 
was unclear, and had therefore concluded that its principle 2 “interests of 
stakeholders” was only partially addressed. The committee had received 
contradictory information concerning the Orang Asli and MTCS. While the 
MTCS standard contains a number of stringent criteria related to the rights of 
the Orang Asli, there was ample evidence that key organizations representing 
the indigenous peoples of Peninsular Malaysia had dissociated themselves from 
MTCS and had repeatedly reported rights abuses in MTCS certified forests.1537 
                                                        
1533 Dutch Timber Procurement Policy, Annex I, User Manual, for the assessment of certification 
systems by the Timber Procurement Assessment Committee (TPAC), Version 4.0 – November 2010, 
page 24. 
1534 http://www.mtcc.com.my/  
1535 ‘Response to Notice of Objection’ Response of the Timber Procurement Assessment 
Committee (TPAC) to the Notice of objection which was filed by Greenpeace et. al. against 
TPAC’s final judgement of the Malaysian Timber Certification System (MTCS), 22 October 
2010. 
1536 ‘Response to Notice of Objection’ Response of the Timber Procurement Assessment 
Committee (TPAC) to the Notice of objection which was filed by Greenpeace et. al. against 
TPAC’s final judgement of the Malaysian Timber Certification System (MTCS), 22 October 
2010, p 12. 
1537 ‘Response to Notice of Objection’ Response of the Timber Procurement Assessment 
Committee (TPAC) to the Notice of objection which was filed by Greenpeace et. al. against 
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The notice of objection filed by the NGOs emphasized the problems regarding 
the situation of the Orang Asli and their research, together with previously 
unavailable audit reports led TPAC to conclude that there was a fundamental 
difference in the interpretation of customary rights between TPAC and MTCS. 
These interpretations, which will be examined in the next paragraph, eventually 
led the Committee to conclude that principle 2 was inadequately addressed. 
A large number of reports, statements, letters, and hearings followed the 
revised judgment of the Committee,1538 leading up to an appeal against the 
judgment by MTCC.1539 The precise meaning of the difference in interpretation 
about the use rights and FPIC – and the profound consequences this may have 
on the Orang Asli situation – is best explained taking into account the decision 
in the appeal case. First some of the problems the Orang Asli experience with 
the MTCS certificate will be mentioned to get a clear picture of the substantive 
issues involved.  
 
V.2.5.6 FPIC in the MTCS case: Standards versus Reality 
 
A number of serious allegations have been made against MTCC by Orang Asli 
representatives and societal organizations. As was mentioned earlier, virtually all 
problems are a result of the non-recognition of Orang Asli territories. Recall 
that only 15% of the total area that is claimed has been formally gazetted as 
Orang Asli reserves in accordance with the Aboriginal Peoples Act.  
 A 2010 field study by Grassroots Consulting clearly exposed the problems 
the Orang Asli have with MTCS logging activities. While the study was 
conducted in two Orang Asli villages, its results reflect problems that persist for 
the larger part of Orang Asli forest communities.1540 The findings indicate that 
there has been virtually no stakeholder consultation and that no fair 
compensation was offered for the loss of land. Orang Asli were refused access to 
parts of their ancestral lands and extensive logging led to a serious loss of means 
of subsistence. Moreover, ancestral graves and sacred sites were destroyed by the 
logging operations and there were even casualties among the Orang Asli caused 
by landslides as a result of the logging operations.1541  
                                                                                                                              
TPAC’s final judgement of the Malaysian Timber Certification System (MTCS), 22 October 
2010, p. 8. 
1538 For the full dossier, see: http://www.indigenouspeoples.nl/our-issues/timber/228-more-
info. Consulted 14 December 2013. 
1539 Brought before the Board of Appeal of SMK (Stichting Milieukeur), the umbrella 
organisation in which TPAC is embedded. 
1540 Cf. The views and experience of indigenous communities with the Malaysian Timber Certification 
Scheme (MTCS), Grassroots Consulting, 2010.  
http://www.indigenouspeoples.nl/images/stories/pdf/Timber/2010-04-
09_bijlage_2_TPAC-MTCS_social_issue_report.pdf 
1541 An Unfair Burden, A rapid field assessment on logging impacts of MTCC-certified operations in and 





FPIC processes that are required by the Dutch TPAC criteria, and that also form 
the core of the social criteria in the FSC and PEFC standards, have clearly not 
been applied here. But also within the MTCS system, FPIC is a requirement. 
The Malaysian Criteria and Indicators for Forest Management Certification (or 
in short the MC&I(2002)) was the standard used for assessing forest management 
practices at the forest management unit (FMU) level for the purpose of 
certification.1542 Identical to the old FSC principles, it is stated in the 
MC&I(2002) that: “Indigenous peoples shall control forest management on their 
lands and territories unless they delegate control with free and informed consent 
to other agencies.”1543 
 The question arises as to why - if MTCS recognized FPIC as a requirement 
- the principle was not adequately applied. The arguments of the parties and the 
decision in the SMK Board of Appeal case will answer this question and clearly 
illustrate how FPIC criteria can easily be brushed aside. Two related issues are at 
stake here: firstly, the rights that the Orang Asli have to use their lands 
(customary rights) and secondly, and closely related, the right to have a say in 
forest management: FPIC. The crucial consideration, which led TPAC to revise 
its judgment on the Orang Asli situation was stated as follows in the response to 
the notice of objection: 
 
The Committee concludes that there is a fundamental difference in 
interpretation of customary rights between the Committee on the 
one hand and MTCS certified forest managers and certification 
bodies on the other. The Committee interprets customary rights as 
resulting from and/or based on traditional use. The forest managers 
and certification bodies limit the customary rights primarily to 
formal rights that have been granted to indigenous communities by 
the state. This difference in interpretation implies that rights 
resulting from and/or based on traditional use are not recognized in 
MTCS certified forests, and are therefore not at all times respected. 
This has led the Committee to conclude that Principle 2 (Interests 
of Stakeholders) of the Dutch Procurement Criteria is inadequately 
addressed by the MTCS.1544  
 
                                                        
1542 Malaysian Criteria and Indicators for Forest Management Certification, [MC&I(2002)]. 
Presently, the MC&I(2002) have been replaced on 13 January 2012 by the new MC&I 
(Natural Forest), which entered into force on 1 July 2012 and is mandatory to be used for the 
certification of natural forests with MTCS certification as of 1 January 2013. 
1543 Malaysian Criteria and Indicators for Forest Management Certification, [MC&I(2002)], p. 
12. 
1544 ‘Response to Notice of Objection’ Response of the Timber Procurement Assessment 
Committee (TPAC) to the Notice of objection which was filed by Greenpeace et. al. against 
TPAC’s final judgement of the Malaysian Timber Certification System (MTCS), 22 October 
2010, p. 11. 
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The main problem is not that MTCS does not recognize indigenous peoples’ 
rights but that the interpretation given to them is excessively restrictive. Only 
where formal ownership rights have been established, are the Orang Asli protected 
under the MTCS scheme. As was explained, only a small part of the land claims 
have been formally granted. This means that in practice, customary rights and 
rights to have a say in the forest management are not recognized in MTCS 
certified forests when no formal gazetting has been concluded in these areas.  
Nevertheless, as was decided in Koperasi Kijang Mas, formal gazettement is no 
necessary requirement for the existence of customary rights. Furthermore, the 
Adong case asserted the existence of rights to use the land for subsistence and other 
needs; the right to live on their land as their forefathers had lived.  
Moreover, the international framework set out by the UNDRIP clearly does 
not require formal ownership rights to be in place for indigenous communities to 
have rights to use their lands. On the contrary, in the UNDRIP states are required 
to give legal recognition to traditional lands over which they already have - traditional 




1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or 
otherwise used or acquired. 
 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and 
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by 
reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or 
use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, 
territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with 
due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the 
indigenous peoples concerned.1545 
 
The argument by MTCC that these rights do not exist where the 
state has not formally granted ownership rights clearly does not hold. 
In its statement before the Board of Appeal, TPAC further 
explained this problem in relation to FPIC: 
 
TPAC’s criterion 2.3 concerning the right of indigenous peoples to 
have a say in forest management on the basis of free and informed 
consent, is also touched upon by several MTCS criteria. On paper, 
                                                        
1545 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 




the MTCS standard seems to be quite robust on this topic. 
However, TPAC learned that MTCC makes this rights conditional 
on legal ownership of the relevant areas. Because the Orang Asli are 
not the legal owners of the forest they traditionally use, MTCC in 
fact invalidates the relevant MTCS criteria.1546 
 
MTCC claimed that the issue of free and informed consent did not arise because 
the areas used were already excluded from the certified forests through the 
gazettement process. This argument clearly does not hold, in light of what was 
stated above and since only a small part of the claims has been formally granted. 
Moreover, we learned from Sagong Tasi that aboriginal title - a proprietary interest 
in the land itself - can exist alongside formal property rights held - in this case - by 
the state. Instead, the argumentation of TPAC appears to be accurate. The 
Committee stressed that regardless of whether the Orang Asli exclusively and 
formally own the forest, they should still have a say in forest management on the 
basis of FPIC. Before the Board of Appeal, TPAC explained that the right to have 
a say in forest management is recognized in international law as a key right to free, 
prior and informed consent.1547 According to the Committee: “Although the 
interpretation of this right may differ in international documents,1548 none of these 
documents makes this rights conditional upon legal ownership of the area in 
question.”1549 
 In the decision of the Board of Appeal of SMK, the viewpoints of TPAC were 
upheld, and the appeal lodged by MTCC was dismissed.1550 Nevertheless, the 
standpoints taken by MTCC show how easy it is to brush aside FPIC 
requirements and indigenous rights. The reasoning by MTCC is not only legally 
incorrect, it also misses the point. There is always a duty to consult indigenous 
peoples when their lands and livelihoods are at stake,1551 and FPIC is the guiding 
principle for such negotiation processes. Even when dealing with an 
internationally recognized scheme for sustainable development, which entails state 
                                                        
1546 SMK Board of Appeal, Utrecht, Session of 5 August 2011, MTCC/TPAC. TPAC 
Statement for the Hearing of the SMK Board of Appeal, p. 3. 
1547 SMK Board of Appeal, Utrecht, Session of 5 August 2011, MTCC/TPAC. TPAC 
Statement for the Hearing of the SMK Board of Appeal, p. 4. 
1548 TPAC mentioned the international legal framework and indicated that FPIC is 
predominantly present within the 2007 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and the concept has been referred to by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Moreover, consent 
requirements are present in documentation of the International Labour Organisation, the 
Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and in the framework of the World 
Bank Group. 
1549 This is also the position taken in a legal opinion to TPAC from Tilburg University, 
available upon request. 
1550 Binding Opinion, Board of Appeal of Stichting Milieukeur (SMK) of the Hague, 19 
October 2011. 
1551 Cf. IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. 
Ct. H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 133. 
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of the art international law regarding indigenous peoples, practice seems far 
removed from the requirements and standards in place.1552 
 
V.2.5.7 Conclusions and Lessons from the “Orang Asli Case” 
 
This paragraph illustrated the difficulties that arise in implementing FPIC by means 
of exploring the situation of the Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia and sustainable 
forestry schemes. What is troublesome is that even within voluntary schemes for 
sustainable forest management, which include the highest internationally 
recognized standards for indigenous peoples protection, FPIC is misunderstood 
and disregarded.1553 A large number of the issues that are dealt with in this study 
are also present in this case. 
 Although national judicial decisions, policy instruments and legislation exist, 
and international commitments have been made, the Orang Asli still face 
enormous problems in having their rights recognized in practice. There is no clear 
agreement on and recognition of Orang Asli rights to their lands and resources. 
 More fundamentally, policies of cultural assimilation and non-recognition of 
the Orang Asli as a people undermine their right to self-determination. In line 
with what was argued in Part II of this study, FPIC remains a difficult requirement 
to implement as long as these underlying rights are contested and disputed. On the 
other hand, FPIC is also the principle by which agreement on these indigenous 
rights is to be established. The lack of political will to fully implement the 
Aboriginal Peoples Act and to formally gazette the Orang Asli reserves is 
troubling. Nevertheless, SUHAKAM (the Malaysian Human Rights Commission) 
                                                        
1552 The political process about whether the Dutch government will accept MTCS for the 
Dutch market is still underway at the time of writing (April 2014), but with the negative 
advice from both TPAC and the Board of Appeal of SMK, it seems likely that MTCS will - 
only - be accepted when MTCC undertakes a number of measures that will improve the 
current situation. In this respect, also see: Greenpeace, WWF, NCIV, “Did MTCC Implement 
the Netherlands Malaysia agreement dated 17 November 2010?”, 11 July 2013. The report 
indicates that up till now, MTCC has not complied with the requirements that TPAC had set. 
Furthermore, the report compares the old MTCS standard MC&I (2002) with the new 
standard MC&I (Natural Forest) and concludes that MTCS continues to uphold an outdated 
definition of FPIC. The new standard does refer to the UNDRIP and adds ‘prior’ to the 
requirements of FPIC. Nevertheless, the standard still only requires FPIC when customary 
rights have been ‘duly recognized’ (indicator 2.2.2). This remains controversial, since formal 
rights that have been granted to the Orang Asli (Gazetted Reserves) by definition do not 
coincide with MTCS certified forests. 
1553 Noteworthy, only 1 – 2 % of the Malaysian forests are under a sustainable certification 
scheme. The situation for the indigenous population in the rest of Malaysian forests is 
sometimes equally bad, but often even worse than in MTCS certified areas. A well known 
example of this is the situation of the (hunter gatherer) Penan People in Sarawak, Malaysian 
Borneo, the Penan are one of the few remaining nomadic peoples of the rainforest. Their 
survival is severely jeopardized by illegal logging. Nevertheless, the integration of international 
law pertaining to indigenous peoples in timber certification schemes is a positive development, 
one that may strengthen their legitimacy and lead to e.g. best-practices on how to implement 
UNDRIP’s rights and principles. 
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is in the process of conducting a National Enquiry on land rights which includes 
extensive consultation processes.1554 It is too early for conclusions, but its results 
may be beneficial for the Orang Asli in creating awareness about UNDRIP and 
the situation of the Orang Asli for the majority population, but also in informing 
the Orang Asli themselves about the rights they can claim. It is these sorts of 
dialogues that may lead to real results. 
 The key problem for the Orang Asli is that no effective participation or FPIC 
is possible as long as they are not fairly represented.1555 There are numerous reports 
of misrepresentation (by governmental institutions), manufactured consent (for 
instance having government officials appointing headman), coercion, and 
bribery.1556 This is clearly in conflict with the “free” requirement. 
 The requirement that the Orang Asli should have sufficient time before 
reaching an informed decision was clearly violated in the Sagong Tasi case, where a 
community was asked to vacate their traditional lands within two weeks time. 
This is a clear violation of the “prior” requirement. Similar issues arose in relation 
to MTCC and the Orang Asli. 
Looking more specifically to the “MTCS case” it is evident that the lack of 
consultation, information, and communication about MTCS activities on Orang 
Asli lands do not satisfy the “informed” criterion. Most Orang Asli communities do 
not know which parts of the forest is MTCS certified and are unaware of the 
place, scale, and duration of the logging activities.1557  
                                                        
1554 See: http://www.suhakam.org.my/web/682315/1. “This year, for the first time since its 
inception in 1999, SUHAKAM is holding a national inquiry on the issue of customary land 
ownership rights of the Orang Asli in Peninsula Malaysia and of the indigenous peoples in 
Sabah and Sarawak. It has decided to conduct the national inquiry following numerous 
complaints and memorandums received over the years on alleged infringement of the rights of 
the indigenous peoples on their customary lands. The National Inquiry was officially launched 
at SUHAKAM’s office in Kuala Lumpur on 10th May 2011. Experts on native customary 
land ownership rights including those with the legal background as well as the academicis have 
been invited to assist the inquiry to achieve its objectives. Also to be discussed during the 
inquiry are issues relating to occupational exploitation and education of the Orang Asli and 
other indigenous groups in the country. Another important function of the inquiry is to create 
greater public awareness and to raise issues that many may previously have not been aware of 
especially those in relation to violations which are not obvious to the public and which may 
not have been brought up before.” Consulted 14 December 2011. 
1555 The necessity of a fair system of representation, and the problems that may occur in 
relation to representation have been dealt with earlier in this study. 
1556 These issues of unfair representation are recognized as the key problem by Dr. Ramy 
Bulan, from the Centre for Indigenous Studies, University of Malaya, a leading expert on 
indigenous rights in Malaysia, and have been corroborated by Lim Teckwyn of the Malaysian 
Nature Society and former (and first) manager of MTCC, and Colin Nicholas, Coordinator 
van Centre for Orang Asli Concerns (COAC). 
1557 Dr. Colin Nicholas’ opinion is that FPIC is never relevant in Malaysia, since the 
Malaysian common law system does not perceive FPIC requirements as law. According to 
Nicholas, international law is not taken into account in Malaysia. Moreover, where Orang 
Asli are consulted, their opinions are often ignored or explained differently. Mister Lim Teck 
Wyn, a forestry expert and former employee of MTCC, explained that the Orang Asli are 
often misrepresented, and that their situation is getting worse. According to Teck Wyn, 
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The statement by MTCC that: “since no formal ownership rights are in place in 
MTCS certified forests, the issue of FPIC does not arise” painfully exposes the 
misconceptions about FPIC. It is not just when legal property rights are in place 
that FPIC is relevant. On the contrary, FPIC is always the relevant guiding 
principle in decision-making processes between indigenous peoples and the 
state.1558 If MTCC’s argumentation would be upheld, the Orang Asli would have 
no rights at all in MTCS certified areas. FPIC is not a veto-right but a principle 
that “spells out” under which conditions and with which objective fair negotiating 
processes are to take place. The requirement of “consent” as a process, by truly 
representative institutions and in accordance with indigenous decision-making 
processes. has clearly not been met here. 
The MTCS case again demonstrates clearly that the conflicts regarding the 
interpretation and application of FPIC arise from its underlying notions, but as has 
been shown, there is no reason to assume that land that formally belongs to the 
state cannot be burdened with a native title at the same time; overlapping rights do 
not invalidate FPIC requirements. 
The social isolation of the Orang Asli leads to unawareness about their rights 
and makes these rights vulnerable to misrepresentation. Instead of declaring FPIC 
requirements “not applicable” it is especially in these situations that the guidelines 
that FPIC proposes are to be upheld, if fair decision-making, conflict resolution, 
and sustainable partnerships are to be achieved.1559  
V.2.6 Conclusion: Progressive Implementation of FPIC in Voluntary Schemes  
This paragraph discussed some of the most progressive implementation models for 
FPIC processes included in voluntary initiatives concerning sustainable commodity 
use. At the beginning of this study, the legal foundations of FPIC - self-
determination and corollary rights to lands and resources - were exposed. FPIC is 
gaining ground in international documents and platforms as one of the most 
important principles for protecting indigenous peoples livelihoods and to integrate 
indigenous communities as fairly as possible into decision-making processes that 
concern them.  
 The OAS legal model provides the most comprehensive legal system for 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and resources. FPIC cannot be 
detached from a stable system of such rights: without these rights, FPIC becomes 
meaningless. And as was indicated, this also works the other way around: without 
                                                                                                                              
‘effective participation’ of indigenous peoples in Malaysia is a myth and national policies are 
still aimed at assimilating Orang Asli and other indigenous peoples in Malaysia. One of the 
main problems is that the Orang Asli are not aware of their rights and there are virtually no 
programmes that promote awareness about these in the communities. 
1558 MTCC’s independence from the Malaysian government is often questioned. 
1559 Unfortunately, up till now, not much progress has been made to strengthen and improve 
the FPIC processes in MTCS certified forests, see: Greenpeace, WWF, NCIV, “Did MTCC 
Implement the Netherlands Malaysia agreement dated 17 November 2010?”, 11 July 2013. 
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FPIC, rights to lands and resources, and truly self-determined development, is 
impossible. 
 The legal model exposed provides justifications for granting indigenous peoples 
rights to consultation and consent but it offers limited guidance on its 
implementation. As we have seen, not much detailed studies on the 
implementation of FPIC exist. The most elaborate models on how to implement 
FPIC processes can be found in systems that were defined as “voluntary 
initiatives.” This paragraph has reviewed and examined the most recent and 
relevant of these initiatives in order to come to terms with which elements are 
most important when FPIC is being operationalized. 
 The Akwé: Kon Guidelines are one of the most important directives for 
integrating social, cultural, and environmental impact assessments. As was 
discussed, the scope of FPIC necessarily depends on the impact the decision will 
have on the indigenous communities affected. These impact assessments are also 
required by international law, most prominently in the “Saramaka model” the 
Inter-American Court developed.1560 The CBD guidelines may be of assistance in 
fulfilling the “informed” requirement of FPIC. Without proper - and participatory 
- assessments of the impact a certain project or decision may have on the culture, 
social structure, and environment of indigenous peoples and other involved actors, 
it is impossible to make a genuinely informed decision. FPIC entails the inclusion 
of indigenous decision making structures in broader decision making processes. 
The essence of a successful FPIC process is that it is largely designed by the 
community. These ideas are reflected in the Akwé: Kon Guidelines. 
 The implementation models that were explored in the framework of the FSC 
and the UN-REDD Programme offer the most comprehensive and detailed 
systems for implementing FPIC currently available. Although both these schemes 
focus on the implementation of FPIC in relation to specific projects, they do offer 
general guidance that may be taken into account in a variety of FPIC processes.1561 
In both schemes this is acknowledged and the aim is to bring their guidelines in 
tune with international law. Warnings against overly determined models for FPIC 
were given throughout this study, but the examined schemes all focus on a 
participatory, community developed FPIC protocols. This way, a self-
determination based process is promoted. Some critical remarks will be given later 
on, but in trying to distill the most important elements from the FSC, REDD and 




                                                        
1560 Also see UNDRIP, Article 32(3) on development projects that affect indigenous peoples 
lands: “States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, 
and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, 
cultural or spiritual impact.” 
1561 It was already suggested that the FSC and UN-REDD Programme guidelines may serve 




- Identification of indigenous communities and other 
stakeholders that may be affected by a certain project. 
 
- Identification of the (customary) rights and representative 
institutions of the involved indigenous peoples. 
 
- Participatory mapping of the lands, territories, and resources 
of the indigenous peoples involved, including sacred sites. 
 
- Conducting impact assessments, using a participatory 
approach: social, cultural, and environmental impact 
assessments need to be integrated. 
 
- Agreement on community developed FPIC protocols, taking 
into account traditional decision-making structures. 
 
- Provision of sufficient time and resources to conduct the 
decision making process. Awareness raising about the 
planned activity and capacity building in communities to 
enter into negotiations, both internally and in relation to 
other actors. 
 
- Sufficient information and consultation rounds: it is essential 
that all communities and groups within communities are 
informed and consulted in a way that is culturally appropriate 
and understandable. 
 
- Producing consent agreements: these may have many forms 
and may entail compensation provisions, benefit sharing 
schemes, scope, duration and targets of the projects, relevant 
rights, and policies. 
 
- Creating effective review and grievance mechanisms: FPIC is 
an iterative process and a principle that has to work both 
prior and post the decision-making moment(s). 
 
- These elements all have to respect and promote 
contemporary international law, mainly the UNDRIP, ILO 
Convention 169, and the CBD. 
 
This list is by no means exhaustive but offers a general and flexible “baseline” for 
conducting FPIC processes in a variety of settings. Moreover, some of the 
elements may be left out if the process does not reach the stage in which they 
become relevant; for instance when a community decides in a very early stage that 
further cooperation is not desirable. 
PRACTICES 
394 
In the general conclusions to this study, the reflections on the different parts of this 
study will be combined in order to come to a coherent explanation of FPIC. The 
remainder of this paragraph is concerned with some final remarks on the voluntary 
schemes examined, taking into account the case study on the Orang Asli and some 
further complications that may arise when FPIC processes are being implemented.  
 The other initiatives that were examined - RSPO, RSB, RTRS, and ICMM 
- all enshrine FPIC as an important criterion for sustainable activities. Nevertheless, 
implementation of these requirements is underdeveloped and needs further 
research. It is recommended to take into account current international law as well 
as the FSC and UN-REDD programme work on implementing FPIC.  
 Unfortunately, not many actual case studies on the implementation of FPIC 
processes in the framework of the FSC and UN-REDD Programme currently 
exist. It is too early to make definite comments about the effectiveness of the FSC 
and UN-REDD Programme models. Different best practice or case studies are 
being developed, and will undoubtedly lead to useful insights. Voluntary initiatives 
may go beyond what is strictly speaking legally required but also adhere to the 
international legal standard-setting on FPIC.1562 The proposed implementation 
models focus on continuous dialogue with indigenous communities and entail 
strong information and communication requirements before and after formalizing 
an FPIC agreement about projects dealing with sustainable commodity use.  
 Practical implementation remains extremely difficult, as the Orang Asli case 
illustrates. It reveals complications when implementing the FPIC requirements in a 
scheme concerning sustainable forest management. Since Malaysian legislation 
does not recognize the largest part of Orang Asli claims to traditional lands, all 
these lands remain formally owned by the State. Customary rights to land have 
been recognized by the Malaysian Courts, although only to a minor extent. When 
formal ownership rights overlap with customary rights of indigenous peoples, their 
legal protection is minimal. In the Orang Asli case further complications arose. 
Although MTCS requires FPIC in their principles and criteria, in practice the 
requirement is meaningless, since MTCS only recognized a right to FPIC in forest 
reserves that were formally gazetted. Since no parts of the MTCS certified forests 
overlapped with formally gazetted reserves, the Orang Asli had no say over forest 
management whatsoever. So, besides non-recognition of Orang Asli rights over 
lands in national legislation, FPIC was rendered meaningless since the certification 
body itself employed a definition of FPIC that made it impossible for the Orang 
Asli to invoke their right. 
 More fundamentally, policies of cultural assimilation and non-recognition of 
the Orang Asli as a people undermine their right to self-determination. In line 
with what was argued in Part II of this study, FPIC remains a difficult requirement 
to implement as long as these underlying rights are contested and disputed. On the 
other hand, FPIC is also the principle by which agreement on these indigenous 
rights is to be established. 
                                                        
1562 Which is often more than can be said about national legislation in this respect. 
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The key problem for the Orang Asli is that no effective participation or FPIC is 
possible as long as they are not fairly represented. As long as national laws have no 
eye for international legal and voluntary explanations of FPIC, its effective 
implementation is impossible. 
These complications seriously jeopardize effective implementation of FPIC, even 
when voluntary sustainability initiatives are in place. Nevertheless, the case has led 
to increased attention for Orang Asli rights in relation to the international legal 
requirements that have emerged over the last few years.1563  
 The Orang Asli case illustrated how different and conflicting interpretations of 
FPIC lead to vast problems in relation to its implementation. Furthermore, the 
MTCS case proved another important point in this study: that without a 
clarification and recognition of the underlying norms of FPIC - self-





Integration of international law and sustainability initiatives leads to increased 
legitimacy of such “voluntary” schemes. Furthermore, these initiatives themselves 
may inform international organizations dealing with indigenous rights on the 
practical implementation of FPIC requirements. They lead to a growing awareness 
among companies, indigenous peoples, and government organizations of 
consultation and consent requirements based on rights to self-determination, lands, 
and resources. This may lead to a growing commitment to international legal 
standards concerning indigenous peoples, and to FPIC in particular. However, 
some of the initiatives examined differ substantially in how they interpret and aim 
to implement FPIC. A more streamlined model, in which the different initiatives 
cooperate and are compared, is needed in order to come to a common 
understanding of how to implement FPIC. The elements identified above may 
serve as a proper starting point. 
 As long as no policy and legal reforms accompany the implementation of these 
voluntary initiatives, implementation of FPIC remains highly problematic, as the 
Orang Asli case illustrated.1564 More cooperation and harmonization of FPIC 
requirements in the initiatives - in tune with international law - may promote 
such legal reform. 
 These models nonetheless remain difficult to implement. They will cost a lot 
of time and resources, and place a lot of responsibility in the hands of the 
indigenous communities, who may not yet have the capacity to engage in 
negotiations. It is important to secure that indigenous peoples have a sufficient 
                                                        
1563 Recall that the Malaysian human rights commission, SUHAKAM, is preparing a detailed 
study on land rights and indigenous communities. SUHAKAM is also involved in a awareness 
raising campaign which includes promotion of the UNDRIP. 
1564 Also see: Colchester M, Chao S, Jiwan N, ‘Securing rights trough commodity 




level of discursive control in these settings in order for a successful intercultural 
dialogue to take place. Moreover, companies may not be inclined to adhere to 
voluntary schemes if the cost is too high. 
 It is imperative to avoid a “check-list” approach to FPIC.1565 Instead we 
should advocate a participatory approach in which the development of the process 
itself becomes a tailor-made exercise of self-determination. Only when these 
implementation models themselves are the result of a participatory process, can 
they respect the FPIC principle. 
 To finish on a more positive note, implementation of FPIC is also made 
possible by means of employing these voluntary initiatives, even when no national 
legislation is in place. These voluntary schemes are backed-up by international law; 
the Akwé: Kon, FSC, and UN-REDD Programme Guidelines are all based on 
current international legal arrangements. In that sense, they may not be so 
voluntary after all. 
 Remarkably few best practice or case studies on the implementation of FPIC 
in these schemes are available as of yet. Fortunately, both the FSC and UN-
REDD Programme are developing pilot-studies. These will help to implement 
FPIC in the future if they are well documented and analyzed in a comparative 
way. 
 Sustainable development and environmental protection has to go hand in hand 
with protecting indigenous peoples. In these paragraphs it was argued that the 
voluntary track is extremely important for exposing how FPIC processes are to be 
implemented since these initiatives are on the rise and are often more easily 
accepted and more widely supported - in practice - than international rules dealing 
specifically with indigenous peoples. Furthermore, in some cases they already 
entail the mechanisms, procedures, and guidelines necessary for implementing 
FPIC. Moreover, these systems often already contain rules for the allocation of 
resources for capacity building in indigenous communities, and the bodies that will 
have to be involved in conducting the FPIC processes are often indicated. These 
schemes provide a testing ground for assessing the chances and pitfalls that FPIC 
processes entail - in specific settings - and will provide important data if 
comparative case studies are developed.  
 Protection of biodiversity and cultural diversity is integrated in these schemes 
and they follow current international (case) law by advocating a holistic approach 
to tackle environmental, social and cultural issues. Such an integrated approach 
may enforce and back-up indigenous rights. Moreover, indigenous peoples’ 
traditional knowledge may help to secure a more sustainable management of the 
environment. 
 
                                                        





VI. CONCLUSIONS  
VI.1 Explaining FPIC 
Indigenous peoples worldwide are often affected considerably by different types of 
development projects taking place on or near their traditional lands and territories. 
One of the effects of a globalizing economy is that the earth’s remaining natural 
resources are extracted at an increased pace by states and large transnational 
corporations. Areas in which these resources are found are often occupied by 
indigenous communities, but frequently their rights to these lands are not 
recognized and the communities are not having a say in the relevant decision-
making processes, even though these processes may have an enormous impact on 
them.  
 In international human rights law this problem is recognized and during the 
last decades a number of legal instruments have been developed to counter the 
existing power imbalances. Nevertheless, genuine implementation of the 
developed standards is urgently needed, otherwise the codification of indigenous 
rights remains merely a reminder of the injustices and human rights violations that 
indigenous people(s) have faced and continue to face present day. Fortunately but 
slowly, implementation models and procedures are being developed in the context 
of different international and regional organizations and on the national level. 
Free, prior and informed consent is seen as an important tool to realize 
recognition and application of indigenous rights. The purpose of FPIC is to give 
indigenous communities a stronger voice in the mentioned processes and it is 
rapidly becoming one of the most important concepts in contemporary 
international law concerning indigenous peoples. However, it is also one of the 
most contested and debated ideas in the context of the UNDRIP and beyond.  
 This study examined the following central questions: How is the concept of 
“free, prior and informed consent” presently understood in the context of 
indigenous peoples’ rights - under international law - to self-determination, land, 
resources, and participation and under which conditions could its implementation 
succeed in practice? The following paragraphs will explain in detail how these 
questions were answered throughout this study. At the end of this concluding part 
those findings will be summarized. 
For a proper examination of FPIC it has to be seen together with the 
substantive rights it is primarily concerned with. These are mainly: the right to 
self-determination, the right to effective participation, and rights to lands and 
resources. Like FPIC, these rights are amongst the most contested and debated 
current legal standards, since fully recognizing them may have profound 
redistributive consequences. It was argued that FPIC is not just a simple 
procedural requirement, but that it denotes a complex process that serves to 
promote respect for vital rights for indigenous peoples, mainly the right to self-
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determination and rights over lands and natural resources. This study has explored 
and analyzed this process from a number of legally relevant perspectives. 
As a starting point, the normative premises in international law on which 
FPIC is founded, were examined. Subsequently, the procedural framework 
surrounding FPIC and its different elements were inspected. The international 
diffusion of FPIC norms was charted and in the fifth part of this study the current 
legal standing of FPIC was discussed in light of recent case law, mainly in the 
context of the OAS Human Rights System. Finally, a number of recent voluntary 
implementation models for FPIC were considered in order to suggest practical 
guidelines for its application.  
Although FPIC is still developing and a number of questions about its 
application remain unanswered, it is becoming one of the most important and 
practical tools to operationalize indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination in 
concrete situations and will become an important site for resolving tensions 
between indigenous peoples and other actors in complex decision-making 
processes that may have profound economic, social, and cultural implications. 
VI.1.1 Principles: Self-Determination and Rights to Lands and Resources 
The Legal Infrastructure of FPIC  
 
In order to understand the scope and content of FPIC processes it is vital to 
consider their normative premises, namely rights to self-determination, lands, and 
resources. FPIC derives its legitimacy from these norms, and the manner in which 
it should be applied depends on the nature of the affected rights and the impact 
the relevant decisions may have on those rights.  
 The principles or foundations of FPIC are important to consider since consent 
is always “parasitic” upon another standard or value; you give your consent 
because otherwise a certain – higher or substantive - standard would be violated.  
 A right to self-determination is the core claim indigenous peoples make. 
However, for indigenous peoples self-determination usually does not involve 
independent statehood, but has to be achieved within the framework of the state 
in which the indigenous communities reside. Therefore, indigenous self-
determination is not just about autonomy, but it is also concerned with effective 
participation in the larger society. Indigenous peoples have no choice but to be 
affiliated with the state and it is essential to make sure that this relationship is 
organized in a fair way. Such participation is particularly important when 
indigenous lands and resources are at stake. This perspective on self-determination 
has both internal and external connotations. Internally, it is concerned with fair 
participation and representation of members of the indigenous community in 
decision-making, and externally it is related to the way in which an indigenous 
collective participates in decision-making processes in relation to other actors. 
Accordingly, self-determination for indigenous peoples is mainly a relational 
or participatory right that has important economic, cultural, and political 
characteristics. Most importantly, and central to this study, self-determination 
especially requires indigenous control over their lands and resources. Indigenous 
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peoples not only require protection of their lands and resources for their 
subsistence, but also have a special spiritual and cultural attachment to their lands. 
Their lands generally form a part of their cultural identity and may be in need of 
special protection. For indigenous communities, their territories are not simply a 
commodity they can sell and acquire at will, but a part of who they are. Not 
recognizing rights to lands therefore not only leads to economic problems, but to 
identity based issues as well.1566 
These substantive rights to lands and resources have to be accompanied by 
participatory norms in order for them to become effective. Participatory 
mechanisms serve as the conduit between the substantive international legal norms 
and their implementation in fact; they are the tools to close the existing 
implementation gap and it is therefore understandable that a lot of effort is directed 
towards making these participatory tools effective. It is only in a dialogue in which 
indigenous peoples are fairly represented that the scope of these rights can be 
determined. That is why the right to effective participation and FPIC are 
perceived as such important tools or mechanisms for operationalizing indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination. 




In order to give indigenous peoples more control over their lands and resources, 
to allow them to be “self-determinating” in that respect, different participatory 
provisions are enshrined in the UNDRIP, ILO Convention No. 169, and a 
number of other instruments, cases, and reports.  
 Within the framework of the UN, the right to effective participation is seen as 
a general framework for all dealings with indigenous peoples. Recently, different 
studies have concluded that without a right to effective participation both the 
individual and collective human rights of indigenous peoples cannot be fully 
enjoyed. This right includes a corollary duty of states to consult with indigenous 
peoples, and where necessary obtain their free, prior and informed consent. 
Effective participation, however, remains an ambiguous concept. FPIC takes a 
central place in discussions about the application of the right to effective 
participation and helps to clarify its content since it could denote a more practical, 
realistic, and targeted approach when it comes to including indigenous peoples in 
decision-making processes. 
 The lack of indigenous peoples’ participation, consultation, and consent in all 
sorts of matters that affect them remains one of the most pressing contemporary 
issues.  
 
                                                        
1566 Cf. Taylor C, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism, Examining 
the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995). 
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Intercultural Dialogues guided by Recognition, Continuity, and Consent  
 
James Tully’s influential study “Strange Multiplicity” was examined to come to 
terms with the justifications and content of effective participation for indigenous 
peoples. His viewpoints are important since indigenous peoples frame their claims 
in the language of international law and more specifically in the language of 
human rights and rights to democratic governance; the essence of self-
determination. Tully distilled three important principles from constitutional 
practice that serve as preconditions for a fair intercultural dialogue in multi-nation 
states.  
Indigenous peoples’ struggles are struggles for recognition of their collective 
identity and their collective rights to self-determination, lands, resources, and 
participation. The central question is: What kind of constitutional or legal 
viewpoints can accommodate such culture-differentiated rights on the national 
level? 
It was argued that these outcries for recognition are essentially struggles for 
liberty, involving claims to self-rule and non-domination. These demands for 
cultural recognition call for a variety of forms of self-rule and require an effective 
intercultural dialogue on different levels. Tully examined the foundations for such 
an intercultural dialogue, in which similarities and differences between indigenous 
groups and others can be mapped in order to get to a common understanding 
about appropriate forms of self-rule. He convincingly argued that when 
intercultural negotiations are held in accordance with the principles of mutual 
recognition, continuity, and consent, they will be respectful of cultural differences. 
Tully’s most important argument is that when indigenous peoples claim injustice 
has been done and demand redress, they appeal to these three conventions to 
justify their case, arguing that their status as nations or peoples has been 
misrecognised and their powers of self-rule discontinued and their consent bypassed.  
  This framework for intercultural dialogue is directly applicable to FPIC and 
self-determination processes. Moreover, it corresponds with the legal model for 
implementing land, resource, and participation rights that was examined in Part V 
of this study. Recognition as people and as legal subject is essential for an effective 
regime of collective rights to lands, resources, and participation. The dialogue has 
to be a continuous one, since indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is 
primarily exercised within the framework of the state and therefore parties are 
bound to live together in that setting. Moreover, the spirit of the UNDRIP is one 
of cooperation and respectful lasting relations between indigenous peoples and 
states. Self-determination and FPIC processes also have to include a continuous 
dialogue at the project level. A principle of consent should be at the basis of new 
arrangements or alteration of existing agreements. Moreover, consent always has 
to be an important goal of consultation processes. 
A vital insight from Tully’s study is that that the arguably outdated conception 
of cultures as separate, bounded, and internally uniform should be replaced by a 
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view of cultures as (a) overlapping, (b) interactive, and (c) internally negotiated.1567 
Cultures do not only overlap geographically and come in a variety of types; they 
are also densely interdependent in their formation and identity, and exist in 
complex historical processes of interaction with other cultures.1568 Moreover, they 
are not internally homogenous but continuously contested, imagined, and 
negotiated, both by their members and through interaction with others. For a 
good understanding of the nature of FPIC processes, this is an invaluable 
perspective, since FPIC processes take place in dynamic settings of overlapping and 
interdependent identities and allegiances; especially in cases in which large-scale 
development projects trigger rapid change in indigenous societies. 
The proposed model for effective participation is an open dialogue, in which 
there should be room for review and renegotiation if the solution is not as fitting 
as it appeared at the time. Tully advocated a practical dialogue in which similarities 
and differences are mapped, recognized, and respected. Moreover, he argued that 
this dialogue should be reiterative and decisions made open to revision and 
renegotiation. This framework for intercultural negotiations is flexible and 
pragmatic. Moreover, this concept of reaching agreement is open to mutual 
understanding, accommodation, and conciliation among the participants when the 
principles of recognition, continuity, and consent are upheld and the dynamics of 
culture are kept in sight. These perspectives assist in explaining FPIC processes and 
understanding why effective participation is vital to accommodate indigenous 
peoples’ claims.  
  
Elements of FPIC 
 
With this framework for self-determination through participation in place, the 
different elements of FPIC were explored. Since consenting provides a justification 
for some action that would otherwise infringe upon rights, consent is in need of 
strong requirements securing its validity. And misapplication or abuse of these 
elements hampers proper implementation of FPIC processes.1569 Consent or 
consultation processes involving indigenous communities are unfortunately 
vulnerable to manipulation, considering the imbalances in power, capacity, and 
knowledge that may exist when for instance large multinational companies 
negotiate arrangements with small, isolated indigenous communities. 
 FPIC agreements about projects on or near indigenous territories may have 
profound and lasting effects on indigenous communities, both in social and 
economic terms. For that reason, it is essential that FPIC processes are genuinely 
free and informed. The different elements of FPIC were examined from a number 
                                                        
1567 Tully, 1995, pp. 10-11. An important insight that helps explaining FPIC processes, and 
possible problems that may arise in such processes. 
1568 Tully, 1995, pp. 10-11. This old “billiard ball” conception of cultures in the past led to 
principles like the Wilsonean idea of “one nation, one state.” This has proved to be to a 
certain extent unattainable and undesirable.  
1569 Examples are: misinformation, manufactured consent, misrepresentation, hostile forms of 
coercion and manipulation in FPIC processes. 
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of perspectives in order to get to a more detailed understanding of what it means 
for consent to be provided “free and informed.” 
 Recent studies, workshops, and reports have elaborated on the meaning of the 
different elements of FPIC to some extent. Free should imply that consent is given 
without the presence of coercion, manipulation, or intimidation. Prior denotes 
that indigenous peoples have sufficient time to make a decision before the project 
commences or the final decision is taken. Informed should imply that indigenous 
peoples have access to information concerning the nature, scope, duration, and a 
number of other elements of a certain proposed project. FPIC processes may 
include the option to say “no” to a certain project but this depends on the nature 
of the affected rights and the impact of the decision at hand. 
 With this baseline in mind, the different elements of FPIC were analyzed in 
more detail, starting with what could be meant by “free” in the context of 
decisions that affect indigenous peoples’ lands and resources.  
 
Free: Discursive Control and Non-Domination 
 
A particularly attractive perspective on what is meant by freedom in FPIC can be 
found in the work of Philip Pettit because he explained freedom from an 
interpersonal perspective and explains that freedom can be guaranteed when an 
agent has sufficient discursive control in a dialogue or decision-making process. This 
idea of freedom as enjoyed between different groups or individuals is exactly what 
indigenous peoples need in FPIC processes. 
 It is essential that the agent is fit to be held responsible – what Pettit called 
“effectively reactionworthy” – for a certain action to be seen as free. Intuitively, it 
is proper to speak of freedom when we can say that a person - or people - is 
responsible for a certain action or decision.  
 Discourse-friendly relationships preserve a person’s freedom. It is essential for 
such relationships that the actor involved is recognized as a partner for discourse 
and also that the actor is authorized to take his place in the decision making 
process. Pettit called this capacity “discursive control” and if the group involved 
has sufficient discursive control in a decision making process its freedom is 
preserved. 
 Agents in Pettit’s view will be free persons to the extent that they have the 
ratiocinative capacity for discourse and the relational capacity that goes with 
enjoying discourse-friendly linkages with others.1570 That capacity, with its dual 
aspects is what constitutes discursive control. Agents will exercise such freedom as 
persons so far as they are engaged in discourse with others, being authorized as 
someone worthy of address, and they will be reinforced in that freedom so far as 
                                                        
1570 The first - the ratiocinative - concerns the abilities of the agent. In addition to the ability 
to deliberate free agents must have the ability to discourse. The second - the relational - 
concerns the social situation of the agent: free agents must be able to enter into actual 




they are publicly recognized as having the discursive control it involves.1571 This 
translates nicely to the context of indigenous peoples in FPIC and self-
determination processes. Both building capacity and a setting in which indigenous 
peoples are recognized as equal partners in the decision-making process are at the 
heart of what FPIC processes should be about. 
 Pettit also illustrated that this concept of discursive control translates to the 
political area in the form of the principle of non-domination, which is a central 
theme in documents, discussions, definitions, and measures that deal with the 
protection of indigenous peoples. If non-domination is upheld, it means that 
minority groups and indigenous groups are protected from state interference that 
amounts to arbitrary decision-making. By targeting and condemning only arbitrary 
interference, the ideal of non-domination could establish a polity that can possess 
coercive powers, but is constrained to such an extent that these powers tend not to 
be arbitrary.1572  
 Pettit acknowledged that this requires a new conception of democracy that is 
hospitable to minority and indigenous contestation rights. In his concept of 
democracy multicultural nations have to establish special ex-ante and ex-post 
contestatory powers for such groups in order to preserve their political freedom 
and to prevent them from becoming dominated by the majority.1573 This 
necessarily includes various self-government and participation rights, like FPIC. 
 Kymlicka described these rights as mechanisms that protect minorities against 
the possible injustices of state nation building.1574 These mechanisms determine 
and shape forms of self-rule by means of a “multilogue,” the inter-cultural 
dialogue Tully described. Pettit argued that in order to accommodate such 
minority rights, the concept of electoral democracy needs to be supplemented 
with what he called a contestatory dimension, in which special contestation rights, 
like FPIC are guaranteed for minority groups. 
“Free” in free prior and informed consent is best described as a large degree of 
discursive control in the relevant decision-making processes. When indigenous 
peoples enjoy discursive control, they can be seen as fit to be held responsible for 
the choices they make. The concept of discursive control does not leave room for 
hostile coercion, while more friendly forms of coercion, like offers, pleas, and bids, 
are not ruled out. Politically, the notion of discursive control relates to principle of 
non-domination, which is a central requirement for realizing indigenous peoples’ 
                                                        
1571 Pettit explained that this view of freedom leaves no room for hostile coercion, but it does 
allow for a number of other coercive actions, like an offer, bid, or plea. Furthermore he 
argued that his theory also applies to groups andcollective agents (the same way it applies to 
individuals) as long as they count as social integrates. 
1572 Since upholding a principle of non-domination implies that state interference is only 
allowed when it tracks the interests of the interferee. 
1573 These contestatory powers - like FPIC - establish a form of “editorial control” over state 
decisions and policies. 
1574 Instead of perceiving minority rights as a special status or privilege. Kymlicka W, Politics in 




right to self-determination. FPIC entails co-responsible, non-dominated, and 
discursively controlled decision-making. 
 
Prior: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Control 
 
The insights gained from Pettit’s and Tully’s studies also help in qualifying the 
requirement of “prior.” Obviously, this is an important requirements for any 
genuine FPIC process since there should be ample time allocated for internal 
debate and decision-making according to an indigenous community’s own 
cultural customs before a project might commence.  
 Nevertheless, FPIC is not only relevant prior to any agreement between 
indigenous peoples and others, but it is also concerned with sustaining respectful 
relations over time. FPIC may include revision of existing arrangement in light of 
new information or changed circumstances. When large, long-term projects are 
executed on indigenous territories, co-management and representation may be 
necessary. FPIC continues to guide the relationship after a project received a “go” 
from the community and prior denotes that sufficient time for deliberation should 
be available, also when revisions of existing projects are planned. Especially in cases 
where large-scale development projects are under way, circumstances may change 
and unforeseen issues may arise. In these situations indigenous communities may 
be pressed or forced to comply or agree. Prior consent does not give companies or 
states a “carte blanche” to do whatever they want after an initial consent 
agreement has been formalized. It merely waives specific requirements for limited 
purposes. This last point was also discussed in the paragraphs on information and 
communication, to which we will turn now. 
 
Informed: Communicative Transactions 
 
In order to be able to give their FPIC to certain projects or arrangements, it is vital 
that indigenous peoples are adequately informed about the planned activity. 
Manson and O’Neill’s study on informed consent in the field of Bioethics exposed 
two main helpful insights. They firstly described the role of informed consent as a 
legal standard. Secondly, they illustrated that the requirement “informed” is as 
much about communication as it is about what information is to be provided. 
Moreover, theur study exposed a number of standards that are essential to 
conclude successful communicative transactions. Seen together with Tully’s model 
for an intercultural dialogue and Pettit’s notion of discursive control, this outlined 
the dialogical model FPIC processes aim to uphold.  
  First of all, consenting concerns a waiver of other, more fundamental 
entitlements. Since consenting may - and very often will - have profound effects 
on indigenous communities, it should be accompanied with strong requirements - 
free, prior, and informed - that secure its validity. The focus in FPIC processes 
should be as much on the way in which communication is taking place between 
indigenous peoples and other actors, as it should be on informational disclosure. 
Information should be identified as action rather than only as content, since 
CHAPTER VI 
405 
informed consent processes involve much more than merely the transfer of 
information. 
 The role of FPIC is that it justifies acts that would otherwise be unacceptable or 
illegitimate. Any justification of informed consent therefore has to start from 
recognition of the underlying legal and ethical claims and legitimate expectations 
that are waived by consent transactions.1575 This is also the reason why the 
foundations of FPIC, namely self-determination and rights to lands and resources 
were treated in detail at the beginning of this study; without an effective land 
rights regime, FPIC cannot be meaningfully applied. In addition to consent as a 
defense against a breach of rights, it can also function to create new rights and 
duties.1576 Since it is an expression of indigenous self-determination, FPIC also has 
an important role in generating and sustaining contractual relationships between 
indigenous peoples, states, and other entities. 
 A blanket approach to consent requirements that seeks to standardize 
procedures for consent for all action is neither feasible nor desirable. Consent is a 
way of ensuring that those subjected to invasive action are not abused, 
manipulated or undermined, or wronged in comparably serious ways.1577 It seeks 
to ensure that such action is done only when specific norms are waived, and it is 
not undertaken if it would breach important ethical or legal requirements.1578 
Therefore, informed consent requirements have to be flexible and tailor-made. 
This is as much true for FPIC in the context of indigenous rights as it is in relation 
to the field of bioethics.  
 Informed consent processes - seen as communicative transactions - can provide 
protection against serious wrongs, evidence that violations of rights have not 
occurred, and assurance that systematic ways of preventing such violations are in 
place.1579Consequently, successful consent transactions can protect against serious 
wrongs, by placing control of invasive interventions that might otherwise cause 
harm in the hands of those who would be wronged or harmed. When consent is 
requested, indigenous communities can waive the norms or subjective rights at 
stake. When such norms are waived, those who consent provide evidence that can 
later be cited to show that no serious wrongs have occurred, and FPIC can be 
used by those who perform invasive interventions to justify their action. The 
systematic use of informed consent can furthermore provide assurance to third 
parties that action that would otherwise be seriously wrong is routinely prevented. 
Conversely, without free and informed consent requirements, individuals or groups 
may not be protected against force or fraud, deceit or duress, constraint, or hostile 
coercion.1580  
 FPIC is not only about “mere choice,” but it also entails a “dialogical” process 
that may also include a number of other considerations and principles that are 
                                                        
1575 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 73. 
1576 Brownsword R and Beyleveld D, Consent in the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2007), Ch. I, p. 7. 
1577 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 82. 
1578 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 82. 
1579 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 96. 
1580 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 96. 
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relevant for its effective application. It was illustrated that a narrow focus on 
“informing” - as merely transferring types of information - does not take full 
account what is actually needed for effective communication and sustainable 
commitments between the parties involved.1581 We have seen that so far, 
requirements in relation to “informing” in FPIC processes for indigenous peoples 
also focus mainly on informational disclosure. A more elaborate model of adequate 
communication is vital for successful communicative transactions in FPIC 
processes. Companies and states will have to take this into account when 
“informing” communities about their proposed projects or decisions. 
 In short, FPIC is primarily about the way in which the dialogue and the 
communicative process is structured. This insight is crucial for successful informing 
and for successful FPIC. The key argument is that when informed consent 
processes are undertaken, it is vital to not only focus on what type of information 
is to be provided but just as much on how such information is conveyed. In other 
words, for successful information and successful FPIC it is essential that a wide range 
of norms that guide communicative transactions are taken into account. This is 
particularly important in the context of indigenous peoples because 
communicative structures may differ greatly from those of other participants in 
FPIC processes. 
 FPIC cannot be achieved by communicative transactions that do not take into 
account norms of intelligibility and relevance since those norms are essential for 
effective communication. Moreover, norms of accuracy and honesty must also be 
respected. In this respect, the principle of good faith has to take a central place in 
FPIC processes. Other essential features of successful communication include that 
parties share a language, share at least some background knowledge, and are able 
to take each other’s inferences and commitments into account. This is to be 
guiding for successful application of the “informed” requirement. Especially in the 
case of participatory processes involving indigenous peoples, the focus should be as 
much on how you structure your communication process as on which types and 
kinds of information is to be provided. This is implicit in the “informed” criterion.  
 
Consent: Representation and Participation 
 
Participation, communication, and dialogue in FPIC processes presuppose forms 
of representation. International standard setting regarding self-determination is 
meaningless unless there are intermediate structures that facilitate its 
implementation, and this is possible only if indigenous peoples are fairly 
represented. 
 Both internal and external aspects of representation are vital to take into 
account for successful FPIC processes. Articles 18 and 19 of the UNDRIP, which 
set out the general framework for indigenous participation, highlight these aspects. 
Externally, it is important that it truly is a people “as a whole” that is represented, 
                                                        
1581 Manson and O’Neill, 2007, p. 184. 
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while internally the members should be able to participate in the collective will-
formation. 
 Different forms of isolation complicate representation and obtaining FPIC. The 
most isolated communities may be extra vulnerable, and in these communities 
FPIC processes are usually the most difficult to organize.1582 At the same time, the 
social isolation of indigenous groups forms the reason for developing effective 
participatory mechanisms, like FPIC, considering that they are often marginalized 
and excluded from decision-making that affects them. 
 Internally, FPIC processes have to make sure that the voices of vulnerable groups 
within the community - for example women, children, or minorities within 
minorities - are taken into account, while at the same time it is vital that these 
internal processes can be conducted in a manner compatible with the cultural 
governance structures of the group. Appropriate forms of self-government and 
participation rights may have the effect of promoting democratic values within 
communities. Indigenous rights are embedded in the international human rights 
structure and the two will have to go hand in hand. 
 Since cultures are internally negotiated, interacting, and overlapping and as it is 
important to take these multiple overlapping spheres of community, authority, and 
interdependency that exist in societies into account, obtaining consent is a 
complex issue. However, without taking into account these insights, FPIC 
becomes impossible to obtain. Perceiving FPIC as a single and centered moment 
of decision-making is undesirable as this perception may ignore that there are a 
myriad of intra- and inter-group relations and circumstances that play an important 
role. Cultural identity is dynamic, and this ought to be reflected in FPIC processes. 
These complexities related to overlap have the effect that FPIC processes and 
representation of cultural identities is highly complex, but this should not be seen 
as a definite obstacle. Acknowledging overlap and devising FPIC structures that 
take this into account can expose common ground between the parties involved 
and may lead to real cultural recognition. 
 
FPIC as a Democratic Process 
 
FPIC is embedded in the framework of self-determination and the right to 
effective participation. In contemporary international law and studies the 
importance of effective participation and FPIC is highlighted in relation to the 
implementation of the set standards. An intercultural dialogue is needed in which 
indigenous peoples enjoy a large degree of discursive control. When they are in a 
non-dominated position co-responsible decision-making will be possible. Fair 
representation and standards that guarantee successful communicative transactions 
are essential in any FPIC process. From the application of informed consent in the 
                                                        
1582 This is not to say that isolated communities are always more vulnerable, but when it 
comes to large-scale development projects that affect these communities, the power 
imbalances, cultural differences, and social impacts may often be larger than for instance 
regarding certain indigenous populations that live in urban areas and are already aquainted 
with the ways of the majority culture and their economic systems. 
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field of bioethics it became clear that it is vital to focus on the way in which 
communication takes place in order to apply the informed requirement. 
Moreover, check-list or standardized approaches to FPIC are to be avoided. FPIC 
functions as a waiver for actions that would otherwise infringe upon rights (to self-
determination, lands, and resources). 
 Part III, Procedures, exposed the central principles that need to be taken into 
account in order to successfully conduct FPIC processes. With this - fairly abstract 
and ideal - model in place, the platforms for FPIC were examined in Part IV and 
the relevant legal and voluntary practices surveyed in Part V. 
VI.1.3 Platforms: International Diffusion of FPIC Norms 
In part IV the different platforms that assert FPIC as an important norm for 
dealings with indigenous peoples were surveyed. A remarkable number of 
international and regional organizations have included FPIC requirements in their 
official policies, guidelines, recommendations, and other documents over the last 
few years. This recent expansion is indicative of a wider consensus that is emerging 
on the importance of respecting an FPIC principle for indigenous peoples. 
 FPIC norms can be found, amongst others, in the context of the International 
Labour Organisation, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Regionally, FPIC is enshrined in the policy of the 
European Union and in decisions and documents in the framework of the Inter-
American and African Human Rights systems. 
At the UN level, three specialized platforms exist. The UN Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues is a unique platform in which indigenous representatives can 
discuss their concerns on the international level on equal footing with state 
representatives. The Expert Mechanism, although still a rather new body, has 
already provided detailed studies on a number of important and pressing issues, like 
the right to effective participation. The UN Special Rapporteur, in exercising his 
broad mandate, has an important role to play in alleviating tensions in conflict 
situations between indigenous peoples, states, and companies worldwide. 
Although most organizations posit similar FPIC requirements, there are some 
deviations - the World Bank being the most notable - with its operational policy 
4.10 calling for “informed consultation” and “broad community support”. 
Moreover, while FPIC is emerging as the key standards for including indigenous 
peoples in decision-making processes of their concern, not too much guidance 
exists on how to implement it in specific situations. Within the Inter-American 
Human Rights system and in a number of voluntary initiatives, cases and 
guidelines have been decided and developed that aim to clarify how FPIC should 




VI.1.4 Practices: Legal Status, Case Law, and Guidance on Implementation 
Case Law and Current Legal Status 
 
The Inter-American Human Rights bodies offer the most elaborate explanation of 
what FPIC legally amounts to. Over the past decade the Commission and Court 
have issued a number of decisions and reports that deal with land rights, natural 
resource extraction, and participation and consent requirements. The Inter-
American Court has a pioneer role in explaining how to implement 
internationally recognized indigenous rights in practice.1583 
 The Court based its arguments for protecting indigenous communities in the 
Americas on their rights to self-determination, lands, and resources. More 
specifically it bases its reasoning on the American Convention’s rights to property, 
juridical personality, judicial protection, and affiliated rights to communal 
property, consultation, and cultural identity. Moreover, effective participation 
takes a central place in the Court’s system. Recognition of indigenous peoples as 
distinct collectives - as legal subjects - with a juridical capacity of their own is 
essential for any realistic land rights regime. The Court emphasizes that self-
determination goes hand in hand with a continuing, ongoing and respectful 
relation between indigenous peoples and the state, and when new arrangements 
are made or old ones altered, consent should be the principle that applies. 
 The OAS jurisprudence examined in Part V illustrated that effective 
participation means that consultation and consent are vital in order to secure 
indigenous peoples’ control over their lands and resources, as an important 
component of their right to self-determination. In this respect, consent functions 
as a defense against violations of human rights.1584 In a nutshell, the legal model of 
the Inter-American Human Rights entities entails the following elements.  
 Indigenous peoples have a collective property rights over their lands, which are 
based on the human right to property in light of the special spiritual relation they 
have with their lands (Awas Tingni case). In practice, this means that indigenous 
territories should be (a) delimited, (b) demarcated, and (c) titled, all in consultation 
with the communities involved and taking into account their customary systems. 
 Communal property rights are not absolute and can be restricted in the interest 
of society if the restriction is (a) previously established by law, (b) necessary, (c) 
proportionate, and (d) with the aim of achieving a legitimate objective in a 
democratic society. Additionally, when indigenous property rights are at stake, a 
proposed limitation may not amount to endangering their physical or cultural 
survival. Therefore, when considering a limitation, the state must follow three 
                                                        
1583 García-Sayán D, ‘The Inter-American Court and Constitutionalism in Latin America’, 
Texas Law Review, Vol. 89, 2011, note 127. Quoting: Rombouts S J and Contreras-
Garduño D, ‘Collective Reparations for Indigenous Communities before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights’, Merkourios, Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 
Volume 27/Issue 72, 2010. 
1584 This defensive role of a legal concept of informed consent was discussed at length in 
paragraph III.3.3 on informed consent requirements in the field of bioethics. 
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requirements developed in the Saramaka case: (a) ensure the effective participation 
of the community concerned, (b) guarantee a reasonable benefit from the 
proposed project, and (c) perform prior ESIAs. To accomplish these, the state 
should develop effective mechanisms for consultations. 
  Consultation with indigenous peoples should always have the purpose of 
obtaining FPIC and to ensure that such participation is “effective” it should be 
held in accordance with the requirements of “free, prior and informed.”1585 At a 
bare minimum this means that consultations are in good faith, commenced at the 
earliest stages of a planned project, and accurately informed. In this respect the 
obligation to conduct ESIAs is highly relevant. 
Consultation is not a single act but concerns negotiations that require parties’ 
good faith and are held with the objective of achieving mutual agreement. FPIC 
processes therefore also entail large responsibilities on the part of the indigenous 
peoples involved. As described in Part III, it is necessary that indigenous peoples 
enjoy a large degree of discursive control in order to make these communicative 
transactions effective. 
In such co-responsible decision making processes, states are always under the 
obligation to consult with indigenous peoples and to guarantee their effective 
participation in decision-making regarding any measure that affects their 
territories.1586 In the Sarayaku case, the Court reasoned that this obligation to 
consult has become a general principle of international law.1587 Therefore, FPIC is 
always important when decisions affect indigenous communities. It is therefore not 
a question of when FPIC is relevant, but how it should guide the consultation 
process. The right to - free, prior and informed - consultation is vital for securing 
rights to cultural identity and communal property, which are exponents of 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.1588 Consequently, failure to respect 
the minimum requirements of consultation processes may lead to violations of 
indigenous peoples’ rights to collective property and cultural identity. 
FPIC and effective participation are certainly not limited to property rights, 
but it is within this area that these contestation rights are most important for 
                                                        
1585 Cf. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30 
December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 273. 
1586 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30 
December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 273. 
1587 IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245., par. 164. Also see: American 
Society of International Law, The Duty to Consult in the Inter-American System: Legal Standards 
after Sarayaku, ASIL Insights, Vol. 16, Issue 35, November 28 2012. 
1588  IACtHR, Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and 
reparations. Judgment of June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, primarily paragraph 217. 
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indigenous peoples.1589 Any administrative decision that may legally affect 
indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights or interests over their territories should 
therefore be based on a process of full participation.1590  
In some cases, obtaining consent may become a mandatory requirement. This 
is the case when indigenous peoples are to be relocated, when hazardous materials 
are stored on (or in) their territories, and when large scale development or 
investment projects may have a significant impact on them. This last situation may 
often be present when such projects concern the extraction of natural 
resources.1591 The obligation to consult or obtain consent is a responsibility of the 
state.1592  
Of vital importance is the insight that FPIC processes concern both consent 
and consultation requirements. Consultation processes that do not aim to reach 
agreement are no genuine consultation processes. And consent, more specifically 
“free, prior and informed” consent, cannot be achieved without a fair consultation 
process. Distinguishing between consultation and consent processes is therefore 
highly counterproductive, since the scope of FPIC can only be assessed in and 
through consultation processes.  
 In all cases that were discussed the Court stressed that effective participation, 
communication, and community consent is urgently needed to protect indigenous 
communities in the Americas.1593 Contestation rights are seen as proper 
instruments to accommodate non-dominated decision-making between 
indigenous peoples and other actors and to neutralize existing power imbalances. 
They provide a democratic stimulus in multi-national societies. Moreover, this 
                                                        
1589 As explained at the beginning of this study, this is the reason why the focus is on 
indigenous peoples’ rights to land and resources. In this area the problems concerning 
decision-making and consultation and consent provisions are most pressing. 
1590 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30 
December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 277. 
1591 Also see: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 
30 December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and 
Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
par. 283: “The duty of consultation, consent and participation has special force, regulated in 
detail by international law, in the realization of development or investment plans or projects or 
the implementation of extractive concessions in indigenous or tribal territories, whenever such 
plans, projects or concessions can affect the natural resources found therein.” 
1592 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement of November 28, 2007, Int-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (Ser. C), No. 172 (2007), paragraph 134. Also see: Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, 30 December 2009, Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources, Norms and Jurisprudence 
of the Inter-American Human Rights System, par. 291: “Carrying out consultation 
procedures is a responsibility of the State and not of other parties, such as the company seeking 
the concession or investment contract. […] because corporate actors are, as a matter of 
definition, profit seeking entities that are therefore not impartial.” 
1593 Also outside the Americas, this system is noticed. The Endorois decision of the African 




integrated system of environmental protection and human rights law is aimed at 
achieving development models that are sustainable and respectful of cultural 
diversity. The Inter-American system comprises the most comprehensive, detailed, 
and legally most complete scheme of land, resource and participation rights for 
indigenous peoples, based on a large number of concrete situations and existing 
cases.  
 
Guidance on Implementation 
 
The most practical implementation models for FPIC on the project level that are 
in line with contemporary international law and the explanations given to it 
within the Inter-American Human Rights system can be found in a number of 
very recent guidelines and documents in the context of voluntary schemes that 
deal with sustainable use of natural resources. It is in the framework of these 
“voluntary initiatives” that the most progressive attempts at implementing FPIC 
are undertaken. They offer the most tangible guidelines for operationalizing FPIC 
processes and were therefore closely examined. These specific schemes may go 
further than what is legally required but they do take current international legal 
developments as their vantage point. 
 The Akwé: Kon Guidelines integrate social, cultural, and environmental impact 
assessments. As discussed, the scope of FPIC necessarily depends on the impact the 
decision will have on the indigenous communities affected. These impact 
assessments are also required by international law, most prominently in the 
“Saramaka model” the Inter-American Court developed.1594 The CBD guidelines 
certainly assist in fulfilling the “informed” requirement of FPIC. Without proper - 
and participatory - assessments of the impact a certain project or decision may have 
on the culture, social structure, and environment of indigenous peoples and other 
involved actors, making a genuinely informed decision is impossible. 
 The implementation models that were explored in the framework of the FSC 
and the UN-REDD Programme offer the most comprehensive and detailed systems 
for implementing FPIC currently available. Although both these schemes focus on 
the implementation of FPIC in relation to specific projects, they do offer general 
guidance that may be taken into account in a variety of FPIC processes.1595 Both 
schemes acknowledge this and the respective guidelines are based on international 
law and the Inter-American model.  
 These three examined schemes all focus on a participatory, community 
developed FPIC protocols, and focus as much on the way communication should 
                                                        
1594 Also see UNDRIP, Article 32(3) on development projects that affect indigenous peoples 
lands: “States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, 
and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, 
cultural or spiritual impact.” 
1595 It was already suggested that the FSC and UN-REDD Programme guidelines may serve 




take place as on which type of information is to be provided.1596 This way, a self-
determination based process is promoted. Although it was stressed that FPIC 
processes have to be flexible, tailor-made, and structured by and in line with 
indigenous customary laws, there are of course some guidelines that may be 
followed on the project level that actually promote flexible, culturally sensitive 
processes.  
 These are primarily: (a) identification of the indigenous communities and 
stakeholders that may be affected; (b) identification of the rights at stake and the 
representative institutions; (c) participatory mapping of the lands and resources 
involved; (d) participatory social, cultural and environmental impact assessments; 
(e) community developed FPIC protocols; (e) awareness raising, capacity building, 
and allowing for sufficient time and resources for internal and external deliberation 
on the proposed projects; (f) producing consent agreements; (g) creating effective 
review and grievance mechanisms. All these steps ought to conform to 
contemporary international law, mainly the provisions from ILO Convention No. 
169, UNDRIP and the CBD. 
 Certainly, these guiding steps are by no means meant to be exhaustive but they 
do provide general and flexible principles to be taken into account in a variety of 
situations where FPIC processes are to be conducted. Moreover, each step is 
conducive to creating a situation of discursive control for the communities 
involved.  
 Apart from these three most recent and relevant initiatives, other initiatives 
were examined (RSPO, RSB, RTRS, and ICMM). These all enshrine FPIC as 
an important criterion for sustainable commodity use. Nevertheless, guidance on 
the implementation of these requirements is underdeveloped and needs further 
study. 
 Although there are not a lot of case studies available as of yet, different best 
practice and case studies are being developed, which will undoubtedly lead to 
useful insights. Voluntary initiatives may go beyond what is strictly speaking legally 
required, but they also adhere to the international legal standard-setting on 
FPIC.1597 The proposed implementation models focus on continuous dialogue 
with indigenous communities and entail strong information and communication 
requirements before and after formalizing an FPIC agreement about projects 
dealing with sustainable commodity use.  
 Practical implementation remains very difficult, as the Orang Asli case illustrated. 
It showed a number of complications that may arise when implementing FPIC 
requirements. These mainly had to do with non-recognition of indigenous rights 
in national law, overlapping rights and claims to lands and resources, misuse of 
consultation processes and representation issues.  
 It is in the area of sustainable commodity use that the dynamics surrounding 
FPIC are most visible. More and more initiatives include consent protocols, and 
                                                        
1596 Cf. Paragraph III.3.3 where the informed requirement was clarified with reference to the 
field of bioethics. 
1597 Which is often more than can be said of national legislation in this respect. 
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further data and guidance on implementation of FPIC becomes available each day. 
This will undoubtedly lead to a better understanding on how to operationalize 
FPIC processes effectively and realistically. FPIC norms and processes are rapidly 
developing and spreading and these will become ever more pervasive and 




The themes discussed in this study reflect conditions under which successful 
implementation of FPIC processes could be possible. Recognition of self-
determination or self-government rights may require derivative rights to lands and 
resources, and participatory mechanisms to facilitate their implementation.  
 A political association - a multi-nation state - may accommodate such rights 
when it is guided by a principle of non-domination, and organizes a democratic 
intercultural dialogue between the different cultural groups based on recognition, 
continuity, and consent. Such effective participation is essential for indigenous 
peoples to have a fair say in decisions that affect them and requires tailor-made 
consultation processes in good faith. 
 FPIC qualifies how such consultation processes could be organized. If 
indigenous peoples enjoy a large degree of discursive control in these processes, 
they can be seen as fit to be held responsible and consequently as “free” in relation 
to others. FPIC processes require both ex-ante or prior powers of contestation and 
ex-post mechanisms for revision and review. Within these consultation processes, 
it is vital to uphold certain standards for successful communicative transactions 
next to providing the necessary information for making an informed decision. 
These safeguards - free, prior and informed - are needed since providing consent 
may have profound economic, social, and cultural consequences and because it 
involves a (partial and specific) waiver of the substantive rights involved. 
 A legal framework in which these FPIC requirements could be implemented 
may require recognition through demarcation, delimitation, and titling of 
indigenous peoples lands. Subsequent property rights are not absolute but may be 
limited. Such restrictions are allowed if they are established by law and if they are 
necessary, proportional, and serve a legitimate purpose. Additionally, when certain 
projects affect indigenous peoples’ lands and resources, they may only proceed 
when prior impact assessments have been conducted, if fair arrangement on 
benefit-sharing or compensation are in place, and if this all happens with the 
effective participation of the communities involved. 
 Where the goal of such obligatory consultation processes should always be to 
obtain the free, prior and informed consent of the communities involved, in some 
cases obtaining FPIC may gain a more mandatory character. This appears to be the 
case when indigenous peoples are (a) relocated, (b) when hazardous materials are 
disposed or stored on their lands or territories, and (c) when large-scale 
development or investment projects have a significant or major impact within 
indigenous territories. The scope of FPIC is necessarily dependent upon the 
impact of the proposed decision and the nature of the rights involved. 
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A number of voluntary initiatives contain guidance on how to implement FPIC 
processes on the project level. Important steps to take in this respect are: (a) 
identification and recognition of the indigenous communities involved and their 
rights, lands, and resources, (b) participatory mapping and social, cultural, and 
environmental impact assessments, (c) awareness raising and capacity building, (d) 
community developed FPIC protocols, and (e) arrangements for effective review 
and grievance mechanisms. The specific initiatives that were examined may go 
further than what is legally required, however, they are based on the 
contemporary international legal framework. 
 Given the interpretation of FPIC provided in this study, these are the 
conditions under which its implementation can become successful. 
VI.2 FPIC: Limitations and Future Development 
FPIC is a relatively new and very dynamic concept that is in rapid development. 
Therefore this study tracked the evolution of participation rights for indigenous 
peoples. In this respect, the relevant laws, norms, and practices are in a dynamic 
phase of definition.1598 Moreover, while most of the international standard setting 
has been done, we are still far removed from effective implementation of the rights 
and principles enshrined in the UNDRIP.1599 The aim was not to provide a 
comprehensive study on FPIC but to determine its current status, analyze its 
development, suggest justifications - why FPIC is so important - and routes 
towards implementation. Hopefully this work will serve as a catalyst for further 
discussion and debate. 
 FPIC is gaining ground as one of the most important tools to protect 
indigenous peoples and their livelihoods. A growing number of companies and 
states recognize the importance of gaining a social license to operate by obtaining 
indigenous peoples’ consent. But as is often the case with legal concepts in 
development - especially in international human rights law - it takes a while to 
bridge the gap between standard-setting and genuine implementation. Some 
tentative remarks on the questions that still need to be answered and the possible 
drawbacks of FPIC processes follow. Subsequently, some suggestions for the 




FPIC was examined mainly in the context of decision making processes that affect 
indigenous peoples’ lands and resources, since this is the area in which inclusion of 
                                                        
1598 Colchester M, 'Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Making FPIC work for forests and 
peoples', The Forest Dialogue, 2010. Also see: Colchester M and Cariño J, ‘From Dams to 
Development Justice, Progress with ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ since the World 
Commission on Dams’, Water Alternatives, Volume: 3, Issue: 2, 2010, Pages: 423-437. 
1599 Full effective implementation will probably remain an ideal situation. Cf. Douzinas C, The 
end of human rights: Critical legal thought at the turn of the century (Hart Publishing, 2000). 
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indigenous peoples is most needed, and where the economic, social, and cultural 
impact may be the highest.1600 
 Although the goal of FPIC is to bring about sustainable agreements between 
indigenous peoples, states, and companies, it is not unthinkable that in some 
situations misinterpretations of FPIC may have a polarizing effect on their 
relationship, may paralyze decision-making, and may escalate external conflicts 
over lands and resources. This is why the Special Rapporteur has mentioned time 
and again that perceiving FPIC as a veto power for indigenous communities is not 
the right way to proceed. A better perspective is to see FPIC as a duty to reach an 
agreement in good faith and in line with the cultural and traditional governance 
structures of the communities involved. Moreover, FPIC may also lead to internal 
division, since it may require communities to embrace a uniform position. This 
may escalate debates between different groups within the community - e.g. elders 
and young people - or different communities who may have conflicting land 
claims or other interests.  
 An obvious drawback of the FPIC system discussed is that it will undoubtedly 
require a lot of time and resources to conduct the necessary consultation processes, 
impact assessment, and mapping operations. States and companies will have to 
invest a lot in projects for land titling and delimitation, grievance procedures, 
consultation rounds and capacity building. Another, maybe less obvious 
drawback, is that FPIC may also place a lot of responsibility and put a lot of 
pressure on the communities involved. Although FPIC requires consultations in 
line with the cultural or traditional decision-making methods of the indigenous 
communities, it certainly also involves interference by large, dominant actors like 
companies and states. This may very well lead to social problems, stress, and 
uncertainty. This is why it is so important not to create a “single formula” 
implementation model for FPIC processes and to avoid a “check-list” 
approach.1601 Projects on the community level have to be approached on a case by 
case basis. 
 Furthermore, although FPIC is meant to help indigenous peoples to exercise 
their right to self-determination, it is essentially a reactionary concept. Indigenous 
peoples are asked to agree or disagree with an agenda that is set by someone else. 
This way it may be difficult to see FPIC as a tool to promote self-determined 
development. For instance, it does not seem to require that states aid indigenous 
peoples in development projects devised by themselves. This is of course an 
important aspect of the right to self-determination, especially its economic 
component, and application of FPIC as a pro-active principle is as of yet 
underexposed. 
 In reality, many of these processes strike a balance between effective decision-
making and development goals on the one hand and fair inclusion of culturally 
distinct groups in the decision-making on the other, and this balance may not be 
                                                        
1600 FPIC is also important in relation to intellectual property rights, for instance when 
indigenous art is being sold or exhibited and where traditional knowledge is used by others.  
1601 See especially paragraph III.2.4 and III.3.3.  
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in favor of the indigenous communities concerned. While all these reflections on 
the ideal model of FPIC may sound nice, we should not forget that in reality 
effective participation is often is absent and indigenous communities may be 
ignored, manipulated, or removed from their lands while other powerful other 
players benefit from the precious resources located on indigenous territories. FPIC 
may very well be the last line of defense - besides violent conflict - these 




Over the coming years, efforts will have to be directed towards examining FPIC 
projects in a variety of contexts and collecting information on the benefits and 
drawbacks of particular approaches. Essential in this respect is that the experiences 
of the indigenous communities involved are carefully mapped. Certainly, it is also 
important to learn from the experiences of the other actors involved, like 
companies, state institutions, NGO’s, other organizations, and affected 
communities or individuals. 
 Firstly, comparative research and case studies are needed. Both the Forest 
Stewardship Council and the UN REDD Programme are planning and 
conducting FPIC pilot projects to collect data on how to implement FPIC 
processes in their respective fields. This is certainly to be encouraged and it is to be 
hoped that more of these pilots will take place in other contexts, for instance in 
relation to World Bank projects and the IFC, regional development banks, and of 
course at the national level. If the different organizations exchange data and try to 
coordinate their approach, it will form a great opportunity for collecting valuable 
data on how to make FPIC work. “FPIC teams” of experts and community 
members could help and document the processes so that multidisciplinary teams of 
experts can analyze and produce further guidance on effective implementation. 
Both top-down and bottom-up models for implementation are needed since 
FPIC is both a global human rights norm and a duty to listen to the needs and 
ways of specific communities. To really test the principles that were subject of this 
study we need detailed and numerous case studies that can be brought in a 
comparative perspective; an intercultural and international dialogue between all 
parties involved. The UNPFII, Expert Mechanism, and Special Rapporteur could 
play an important role in this respect. 
 Secondly, the focus should be on awareness raising and capacity building in 
communities. Indigenous peoples are often not aware of their rights and this 
makes them vulnerable to abuse by companies or state representatives that have 
different interests from those of the community. Furthermore, since FPIC 
processes are complex, time-consuming, and necessarily include interaction with 
players - often very powerful ones like TNC’s or other organizations - training 
and other forms of capacity building are needed. There may be an important role 
for civil society organizations in this respect. However, it is not just indigenous 
communities that may require more capacity and knowledge about FPIC; 
companies and governmental organizations also need training, information, and 
capacity to be properly outfitted to conduct consultation processes. 
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Thirdly, more research is needed on how to combine environmental protection 
and respect for indigenous rights. While it is stressed in all examined documents, 
cases, and implementation schemes that environmental protection and indigenous 
peoples’ rights should go hand in hand, it is not inconceivable that in some cases 
environmental and indigenous peoples’ interests may collide. For example, what is 
to be done when environmental impact assessments clearly indicate substantial 
environmental damage while communities and companies still plan to proceed 
with a certain project? Well-balanced sustainability models are needed. 
  Fourthly, more clarity and guidance on the role of companies in FPIC 
processes is required. Human rights law is primarily concerned with obligations of 
states, but in situations where FPIC comes into play, companies play an important 
and often powerful role. In this framework it will be interesting to monitor 
implementation of for instance the IFC’s new performance standard on indigenous 
peoples and the application of the “Ruggie Principles.”1602 
 A number of positive initiatives are already under way. Some examples (apart 
from the mentioned FPIC pilots in the framework of the FSC and UN REDD 
Programme) are that Cultural Survival hosts a series of radio broadcasts - in 
different languages - to promote awareness about FPIC. Moreover, they 
developed an interactive map of the world on which you can mark FPIC projects 
and monitor them. Furthermore, communities use GPS and social media for 
mapping territories and indicating possible conflict areas. Such creative initiatives 
are to be encouraged and modern technologies may certainly be of assistance.  
 FPIC processes are here to stay and will continue to play a larger role in the 
future. Widespread diffusion and application of FPIC requirements and further 
integration in environmental protection initiatives may lead to self-determination 
models that promote sustainable development and are respectful of cultural 
differences. Successful FPIC processes could lead to a social and environmental 
license to operate by which all parties involved - certainly also companies and 
states - may benefit in the long term. 
 
                                                        
1602 A/HRC/17/31, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John 
Ruggie. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 21 March 2011. Also see: A/HRC/24/41, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Extractive industries 
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